ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with multi-media performance and installation art practices which foreground the live body in combination with mediatized images. The research is conducted through the making and examination of a number of the researcher's own art works. Practical multi-media performance and installation projects are analysed within the context of specific performance and visual cultural theories in order to advance their contribution to critical and cultural fields.

The research champions a symbiotic relationship between theory and practice. Practical works were undertaken and exhibited as solo or collaborative art projects. These works then formed the basis for individual 'case studies' and were subjected to a critical review informed by a variety of theoretical frameworks including feminist, psychoanalytic and post-structuralist philosophy. This practice-based methodology is contextualised by the mapping of historical and contemporary critical discourses for the field of multi-media performance. The 'reflection-on-action' results in an understanding of the mechanisms and effects of multi-media performance as a cultural practice.

Specifically this thesis aims to answer the question as to whether multi-media performance can form the basis for an 'interrogation' of our contemporary media dominated society? Through a practice-led enquiry it unpacks the dynamics between a meeting of live bodies and mediatized images, concentrating on the differences and similarities of their experiential sensory qualities. The research then extends these findings into social and political contexts through a comparison with other 'reality' and 'identity' re/producing cultural practices. The study concludes that cameras and recorded images used within live and/or time based art contexts can counteract the conventional constitution of mediatized images. To the extent that mediatized images can also be said to reflect and in turn constitute human subjectivity, multi-media performance, therefore, can provoke a re-evaluation of culture and its associated human activities and behaviours.
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This doctoral study has been conducted through my art practice, it therefore seems appropriate that my practical work should be represented within my doctoral submission. The integration of practical art works within a written text can present difficulties, particularly if that work is originally constructed, as mine is, for live and/or three dimensional spaces. The majority of my research projects have been documented on still and moving film and video, but this activity in itself is problematic and provokes a debate concerning documentation which forms a major part of my opening chapter. In order to present a thesis which also provides evidence of my art practice (as documentational video and stills), I have determined that the final written version of this thesis will be accompanied by a digital versatile disk (DVD). This disk can be played via a computer DVD Rom drive or dedicated DVD player and, unlike a video tape, will allow the reader immediate and precise access to individual video examples.

The DVD contains edited extracts of moments from my practical work; these extracts are used within the text to illustrate particular issues or arguments. In the text each excerpt is referenced by the abbreviation ‘Vid. no.’ followed by the title of the performance and/or installation and the name of the specific moment reproduced on the DVD. Also given in the text are small still screen-images which correspond to the number of views used to represent the particular moment on the accompanying DVD. For example:

Vid. 3. Constants II - Round the Walls.
Each image in the text has a corresponding moving image found on the DVD. Within the DVD these three small screens play in sync providing three different ‘versions’ or ‘angles’ of a particular moment from the performance. If the viewer/reader wishes to watch one of these ‘versions’ in more detail it is possible to click on the individual screens to see a full-screen version of that particular screen/angle. The DVD can be cross referenced with the text; preceding each video extract is a title screen giving the number of the sequence, its name and corresponding page number in the text;

3. Round the Walls
   page 54

This should enable the reader of the thesis to accurately locate the particular documenting video excerpt that accompanies the text. As my practical performance and installation work also forms a critique of the subjects under discussion in the thesis it is vital that the reader should engage with both the video and written text simultaneously; that is the text should be read in close proximity to a DVD playback device so that immediate cross referencing can occur insuring an interpenetration of the two texts.

There are also a number of still image illustrations within this thesis, these are referenced as ‘Fig. no.’. Within the body of the text these images are scaled to match the video stills, however, larger versions of these same pictures can be found in Appendix 4 beginning on page 274. Finally, due to the temporary nature of this paper-based document and heterogeneous nature of my illustrating references, I have determined that a ‘Table of Illustrations’ would serve little purpose and therefore each illustration encountered is thoroughly referenced within the body of the thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
HISTORY & DOCUMENTATION

1.1 General Introduction

Because live performance is the category of cultural production most directly affected by the dominance of media, it is particularly urgent to address the situation of live performance in our mediatized culture. (Philip Auslander 2).

This study examines the relationship between live performance and the mediatized image. My investigation looks specifically at the cultural practice of multi-media performance, and in particular, focuses on a number of art works that foreground a dialectic between the live body and the mediatized image. The art works in question were undertaken during the course of my study as practical research projects and have been publicly exhibited in art galleries, museums and performance spaces. These works include The Turin Machine, a performance/photography installation in a giant pinhole camera; Constants: A Future Perfect, a work created in collaboration with the performance company Bodies in Flight which integrates both live and recorded mediatized images with performance; Looking Glass, an interactive mirror piece designed to be ‘hung’ on a gallery wall and

1 All quotations from Philip Auslander in this text come from his book Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (apart from a quote in the conclusion which comes from “Liveness: Performance and the Anxiety of Simulation” a chapter in Diamond’s Performance and Cultural Politics).

2 The term ‘mediatized’ is used by Philip Auslander in Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture “to indicate that a particular cultural object is a product of the mass media or of media technology”(5). Auslander acknowledges that the term “is borrowed” from Jean Baudrillard’s For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign where it carries a much more “expansive” definition; “What is mediatized [...] is what is reinterpreted by the sign form, articulated into models, and administered by the code” (qtd in Auslander 5). Within the context of ‘multi-media performance’ as a specific art practice I will use the term mediatized to refer to images that have been created using media and its associated technologies, that is, from the simplest image forming apertures to the most complex electronic image manipulation systems. The word mediatized also avoids any confusion that may arise with terms such as ‘mediation’ or ‘mediated’.

3 Not all the practical work that I undertook during my period of research has been included in my analytical writing although every piece has resonances with the subjects under discussion in this thesis. For a chronology of all the works completed during my doctoral study please refer to Appendix 1.
Simulator, a small scale installation modelled on a war time building found at a Second World War airfield.

I will examine the ontological and phenomenological similarities and differences between ‘the live’ and ‘the mediatized’ within my work, in order to analyse an encounter with these two forms of expression. I wish to highlight various approaches and attitudes towards the live and the mediatized, and then speculate about what implications these attitudes might have within a wider cultural field and ultimately how these impact on our broader cultural, social and political interactions. This study proceeds through my own practical multi-media performance work, foregrounding the original working processes and exhibitions, documentational presentations and written critical analyses. Thus my enquiry looks to a practice-based methodology in order to create a productive synergy between the processes of theory and practice within my chosen subject area.

1.2 Methodology

The philosopher and educationalist Donald Schön has identified the idea of “knowing-in-action” as essential to effective practice and it is this idea which is integral to the concept of a practice-based methodology:

When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of the actions of everyday life, we show ourselves to be knowledgeable in a special way [...]. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that our knowledge is in our action (49).

In The Reflective Practitioner, Schön argues that intelligence and knowledge are embedded in our actions and that by thinking about and analysing action, information and understanding can be revealed. He calls this process “reflection-in-action”. Similarly, but without direct reference to

Unlike the other multi-media performance works cited above, both Looking Glass and Simulator do not use a specific performing subject. That is, these works do not include a body, or bodies, who can be identified as the ‘professional’ performer(s) within the work. Instead, these ‘installation’ or ‘time-based art’ pieces reflect the interdisciplinary nature of my practice and extend out of my interest in performance and media to construct a particular live dynamic for their viewers in which the viewer becomes the ‘live performing’ element within a work. Therefore, to the extent that these pieces continue to foreground live performance in conjunction with media, I am happy to include them under the general heading of ‘multi-media performance’.
Schön’s ideas, two Humanistic Studies scholars, Bruce Douglas and Clark Moustakas, outline a method for a ‘Heuristic’ inquiry in “Heuristic Inquiry: The Search to Know”. Their research proposes a number of stages which must be traversed in order to achieve an appreciation of the ‘tacit’ or the: “Subliminal, archetypal, and preconscious perceptions [which] undergrid all that is in our immediate awareness, giving energy, distinctiveness, form and direction to that which we know” (49). An understanding of the role of the tacit has particular relevance for practice-based research for art and design subjects, as Douglas and Moustakas point out, “The tacit dimension is the forerunner of inference and intuition [...]. In this sense, the tacit is visionary; it incorporates the aesthetic and artistic aspects of consciousness without neglecting the clues of cognition” (49). The American psychologist and inventor of ‘flow theory’, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, expands the terrain of a practice-based method and writes of the importance of contextualisation for studies centred round creativity: “We cannot study creativity by isolating individuals and their works from the social and historical milieu in which their actions are carried out” (325). Csikszentmihalyi identifies three main forces which he believes constitute this terrain, these are: a ‘field’ of social institutions, a cultural ‘domain’ and the individual.

Between them the aforementioned writers help to construct a theoretical basis for research conducted within and through practice. An exhaustive account of every influential aspect which has contributed to my practice would be an impossibility. But, I believe, that by scrutinising some of the working processes and end products of my artistic practice I will begin to reveal the tacit functions of my creative cognition. With this analysis, in combination with a contextualizing study of the history and theoretical concerns which relate to my field, I will be able to produce an interrogation of my individual motivations and the social, cultural and historical forces which impinge upon them. This interrogation will provide a number of


knowledges, some quite personal and related specifically to my practice and its future possibilities and others of more academic purpose which progress thinking and observations of consequence to the field of multimedia performance and related cultural and social practices.

Performance, as the subject of a practice-based investigation, has a pertinent relationship with the notion of “knowing in action”. The words performance and action are closely linked (as demonstrated by the above definition from Schön). Performance practitioners understand that through the repetition and ‘dramatisation’ of human actions a content and meaning is revealed. Behaviour is displayed and thus potentially subject to reflection. In performance, meaning comes from action and this is what makes it distinct from other forms of artistic expression. Performance, as an aesthetic cultural practice, manifests an understanding of the possibility and importance of “reflection-in-action”. There is, therefore, a direct link between performance and the notion of practice-based research which is located in the shared belief that through actions, knowledge maybe exposed for critical scrutiny.

Throughout my research I wish to avoid an illustrative relationship between theory and practice, or even an experimental relationship where the practice is used to ‘test’ theory. Instead, aware that both these fields infect one another in countless ways, I have ‘reverse engineered’ my theory as it develops from individual case studies written in response to my practice. During the course of my research I conducted practical projects and theoretical reading, initially independently of one another. After a public presentation of a particular performance and/or installation work, I then subjected the piece to detailed scrutiny in the form of a written case study which reviewed the development of the work and its final realisation. My theoretical reading was processed through comprehensive note taking and a variety of critical writings. The practical case study notes, in combination with my theoretical studies, form the basis for the individual chapters within

Appendix 2 contains written case study reports for each practical project undertaken.

Appendix 3 presents one such ‘artists paper’ “Spectral Bodies” presented in various forms during 1998 to the Performance Theory Seminar, Lancaster University, Nottingham Trent University’s Open Lecture programme and Napier University’s Department of Photography, Film and Television Senior Seminar.
this doctoral thesis and thus, I believe, provide a point of synthesis between my theoretical and practical work. In this way I hope to sustain a more ‘emergent method’ which continues to evolve in response to the differing demands of theory and practice as they manifested themselves through the course of my study. Such an approach ultimately preserves a symbiotic relationship between theory and practice which, I believe, operates at the heart of both my artistic and critical work.

This thesis represents the final phase of my evolving method. The document begins with an introduction to the subject area before moving on to examine the specific question of documentation in relation to mediums such as performance. Following on from this is an outline of some of the axial debates which impinge directly on my study. In three separate case study chapters I look at particular practical works in relation to a variety of pertinent theoretical discourses, in order to deconstruct my work and examine its specific effects and contributions, occasionally with the result of a reformulation of my work and these discourses. The document ends with a summary which revisits the axial debates and presents a series of conclusions formed in light of the research undertaken. Therefore this document does not primarily examine my working methods (details of which can be found in my initial case study notes provided in Appendix 2) but rather is concerned with the outcomes of this practical work, as it is here within public exhibition and/or performance, that the art work meets a wider critical context. My practical work will be present throughout the thesis in the form of still or moving image documentation; still images can be found within the body of the written text and in Appendix 4, moving images are provided on the digital versatile disk (DVD) which accompanies this Ph.D.
1.3 Terms and Definitions

The history of performance art in the twentieth century is the history of a permissive, open-ended medium with endless variables, executed by artists impatient with the limitations of more established art forms, and determined to take their art directly to the public (Goldberg 9).

Multi-media performance could be defined as a branch of the artistic discipline of ‘performance’ or ‘performance art’. The use of the word ‘performance’ to reference a specific form of art practice originated in the early nineteen seventies to describe a variety of work taking place across America and Europe. This work is identified by Marvin Carlson as having "an interest in developing the expressive qualities of the body, especially in opposition to logical and discursive thought and speech, and in seeking the celebration of form and process over content and product"(100). However, the word ‘performance’ can be used to describe a wide range of cultural and social practices and is studied across a number of different disciplines, most notably Performance/Theatre Studies, the Social Sciences and Linguistics. The American anthropologist, Edward L. Schieffelin, paraphrasing the linguistic anthropologist Richard Bauman, writes in more general terms about performance as...

a display of expressive competence or virtuosity by one or more performers addressed to an audience. Such performances aim to evoke an imaginative reality or an

---

Depending on the author and their time of writing a number of terms exist to describe performance which is integrated with visual media: Multimedia Theatre, Visual Theatre, Theatre of Mixed Media - (R. Kostelanetz), Intermedia Theatre - (Gene Youngblood), Filmstage - (Robert Whitman), Theater of Images - (B. Marranca) and Mixed Media Performance - (Auslander). I have chosen to use ‘multi-media performance’ as my preferred nomenclature for a number of reasons; ‘multi’ implies more than one and ‘media’ suggests, in a contemporary understanding of that term, visually orientated forms of communication technology including television, video, film, photography and personal computers, ‘performance’ identifies the work as having a lineage that pertains to, but is also different from, that of theatre. The hyphen in ‘multi-media’ identifies the term as distinct in meaning from the similar and predominate term ‘multimedia’ which is used to reference a particular form of computer based processing which can link video, audio and text information together. Lastly, and more personally, multi-media is the term that I first used to describe work that I began producing as an artist twelve years ago.

Performance is a generic term, other terms by which such works might be referred to include Theatre, Performance Art, Performance Theatre, Experimental Theatre, Avant-Garde Theatre and Live Art.
intensification of experience among the spectators, and bring about an altered awareness of their situation and/or a sense of emotional release (195).

Schieffelin’s broad definition allows a distinction to be made between performance as an “aesthetic” or “symbolic” activity, such as rituals and theatre, and the ‘performances’ of everyday life. Performances as specific cultural ‘events’ can be set apart from ‘performative’ actions, which Schieffelin characterises as expressive human behaviour in general.

The notion of the performative is of central importance to the study of performance and it originates from the work of the Oxford philosopher and linguist J.L Austin. The performative indicates a ‘speech act’ - “an utterance, such as ‘I promise’, which is itself the performance of an act [...] rather than a description of that act” (Flew 265). In this, performativity is centrally concerned with action and as such a performative utterance “does not refer to an extra-linguistic reality but rather enacts or produces that to which it refers” (Diamond 4). The notion of performativity, like performance itself, has been examined across a number of critical disciplines, and has, over time, moved from a specifically linguistic concept to be used in reference to many aspects of human interaction and behaviour. Although Schieffelin himself does not construct an overt difference between performance and performativity, some critics have drawn a distinction between the two. Judith Butler, writing about the performance of gender in Bodies that Matter, provides a different inflection on the idea of performativity which she derives from the Derridean idea of citation; “Performativity is thus not a singular ‘act’, for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms”(12).

Thus, alongside Schieffelin’s ‘expressive human behaviour’, Butler introduces the idea that in order for performativity to be effective it must make recourse to certain “culturally intelligible grids” (Gender 135). Butler thus is able to identify a difference between performance and performativity;

performance as bounded ‘act’ is distinguished from performativity insofar as the latter consists in a reiteration of norms which precede, constrain and exceed the performer

\footnote{Derrida’s ideas on citation or “iterability” are to be found in his essay “Signature Event Context” in Limited Inc. where he states “Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words if [...] [it] were not identifiable as \textit{conforming} with an iterable model”(18).}
and in that sense cannot be taken as the fabrication of the performer's 'will' or 'choice' (Bodies 234).

Yet both Schieffelin and the performance and theatre theorist Elin Diamond valorise inquiries that engage with performance and the performative on the grounds that these can produce wide ranging cultural and social insights. Schieffelin notes that it is through the study of performances and everyday performativity that it is possible to explore “the way that cultures actively construct their realities” (199-200) and Diamond further comments;

> When performativity materializes as performance in that risky and dangerous negotiation between a doing (a reiteration of norms) and a thing done (discursive conventions that frame our interpretations), between someone's body and the conventions of embodiment, we have access to cultural meanings and critique (5).

Therefore performance, as a specific artistic activity located around the self-conscious staging of expressive human behaviour (performativity), could be seen as a form of cultural practice by which a society can examine itself.

To return to the subject of performance as a particular art form. An awareness of the practice of ‘performance’ as a live, artistic event arose during the nineteen seventies due the work of art historians such as RoseLee Goldberg. In her pioneering history, *Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present*, she attempts to provide a definition for the form and notes that “By its very nature, performance defies precise or easy definition beyond the simple declaration that it is live art by artists”(9). The problem of creating an extensive definition of the form seems to be endemic. Diamond, in *Performance and Cultural Politics*, states “Performance describes certain embodied acts, in specific sites, witnessed by others (and/or the watching self)”(1). Therefore, in addition to Goldberg's liveness, Diamond pinpoints the importance of the body of the performer, performing in a particular place, watched by others. The isolation and identification of these three ingredients: performer(s), space, audience, combined in a live event, would
seem essential to any performance activity.\textsuperscript{12}

Another definition by the critic Richard Kostelanetz introduces the presence of technology into the performance equation. In what he coined ‘The Theatre of Mixed Means’ he states that this ‘new’ movement:\textsuperscript{13}

differs from conventional drama in deemphasing verbal language, if not avoiding words completely, in order to stress such presentational means as sound and light, objects and scenery, and/or the movement of people and props, often in addition to the newer technologies of films, recorded tape, amplification systems, radio and CCTV (\textit{Theatre 3}).

While this does not provide an exclusive definition of performance, particularly because there are many examples of more recent work in which the spoken word forms a key element, nevertheless such a description is notable as it identifies a role for media technology within live events which are predicated on the presence of a performer or performers, in a specific space with an identifiable audience. Carlson however, following on from Goldberg’s observation that “performance defies precise or easy definition”, provides us with a useful conclusion to this hunt for a meaningful teleology; “if we consider performance to be an essentially contested concept, this will help us to understand the futility of seeking some overarching semantic field to cover such seemingly disparate usages”\textsuperscript{(5)}.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{It seems to me that this difficulty in creating a definition for performance (or}
\textsuperscript{12} Other useful definitions of performance can be found in the article “Performance and Theatricality: The Subject Demystified” by Josette Feral in which she makes a comparison between the practices of performance and theatre identifying three characteristics of performance, similar to those cited by Diamond, as distinct from that of theatre. These concern “the manipulation of the body”, “the manipulation of space” and “the relation that performance institutes between the artist and the spectators, between the spectators and the work of art, and between the work of art and the artist”\textsuperscript{(171)}.

\textsuperscript{13} In his book of the same title, Kostelanetz provides a table of the four main areas of activity within this ‘new’ movement; Pure Happenings, Staged Happenings, Kinetic Environments, and Staged Performances.

\textsuperscript{14} Carlson takes the observation that performance is “an essentially contested concept” from the 1990 survey article “Research in Interpretation and Performance Studies: Trends, Issues, Priorities” by Mary Strine, Beverly Long & Mary Hopkins. It is in turn a phrase taken from W.B.Gallie’s \textit{Philosophy and the Historical Understanding} which indicates “Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies recognition of rival uses of it [...] as not only logically possible and humanly ‘likely,’ but as of permanent potential critical value to one’s own use or interpretation of the concept in question” (qtd in Carlson p.1).
at least one that goes beyond the ingredients of the performance event as: liveness, body, space, audience) is, in itself, an indication of a defining property. As an art form predicated on the live human body in an evolving interactive encounter, performance can be characterised by an instability equivalent to the flux of life itself and therefore will, almost by default, necessarily exceed its definitions. To borrow from Jacques Derrida’s comment on Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty; “the theater of cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which life is unrepresentable: Life is the nonrepresentable origin of representation” (Writing 234). It is performance’s immanence with life which makes its definition so problematic, as a cultural phenomenon it is virtually ‘unrepresentable’. Having considered a number of general definitions for the concept of performance I will turn my attention briefly to the notion of ‘multi-media’ and the separate distinction of ‘media’.

**Multi-media defined**

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* ‘multi-media’ is defined as “Designating or pertaining to a form of artistic, educational or commercial communication in which more than one medium is used”(82). Raymond Williams’ *Keywords* gives an interesting insight into the origins of the word ‘media’ or ‘medium’ as “the sense of an intervening or intermediate agency or substance”(203). According to Williams it was during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the term ‘medium’ began to signify a more contemporary understanding of this word in reference to newspaper journals. The plural form - media - is cited as a mid twentieth century development following on from the emergence of broadcasting which leads to the concept of a mass media or ‘the media’ as we would now collectively name newspapers, magazines, television, radio, video, film and other
elements of the ‘communications’ industry. However the word ‘media’ in my use of the term multi-media does not directly reference the institution of ‘the media’ but rather the image orientated technological machinery by which ‘the media’ originates its mass communication specifically video, film and photography.

‘Multi-media’ implies a combination of different media in one event or object. It is similar to the fine art term ‘mixed-media’, meaning a work that has been made using a number of different materials. The more common hyphen-less construction ‘multimedia’ refers to a specific form of computer based processing where video, audio and written material are linked by a ‘hypertext’ to create a multimedia document such as a CD-ROM or web page. I have used the hyphenated form of the word in this document to distinguish between the more general sense of multi-media as pertaining to different, or many media and the more specific ‘multimedia’ which refers particularly to a digital, computer originated language. The computer orientated multimedia industries or ‘new media’ of virtual reality, the internet, interactive film, computer games etc. do impinge on this study to the extent that our attitudes towards media in general are in part shaped by both old and new technology. As Kevin Robins states in Into the Image “Virtual culture should be seen as continuing the modern struggle against the limitations of the actual world”(14). However, for the reasons given above, as well as the fact that the technical origins of my own practice utilise the ‘old media’ of video, film and photography, it is these forms which will constitute the basis of my arguments and observations.

Williams goes on to refine his definition of media into three parts:
(i) the old general sense of an intervening or intermediate agency or substance; (ii) the conscious technical sense, as in the distinction between print and sound and vision as media; (iii) the specialist capitalist sense, in which a newspaper or broadcasting service - something that already exists or can be planned- is seen as a medium for something else such as advertising (203).

In his subsequent exploration of the concept of ‘mediation’ Williams provides an interesting reflection back onto the idea of media or mass media “where certain social agencies are seen as deliberately interposed between reality and social consciousness, to prevent an understanding of reality”(206). The use and effects of media in relation to the concepts of reality and consciousness is one of the key ideas behind this study and will be explored at greater length later on in this document.

The Dictionary of Twentieth Century Art makes a distinction between multi-media and mixed media: “The terms ‘composite media’, ‘intermedia’, and ‘multimedia’ have sometimes been used more of less synonymously with ‘mixed media’, but they are more usually applied to works in which different forms of art (rather than different materials) are combined, for example installations with Performance art or Video art” (398).
1.4 A History - Its Problems

Before embarking on a history of multi-media performance the processes of historicising should be subject to a brief examination. As has been demonstrated by Csikszentmihalyi the importance of establishing a context for studies of creative practice cannot be over emphasised. Similarly Jochen Schulte-Sasse, in the foreword to Peter Bürger’s *Theory of the Avant Garde*, states:

A literary or philosophical analysis that does not reflect its ties to history and society remains arbitrary. Even if such an analysis were ‘correct’ (in some sense) or ‘true’ to its object, it would still be important to recognise that the objects under the microscope of analysis and this analysis itself develop historically (xxxv).

Therefore, as directed by Schulte-Sasse, the researcher has also to be aware of his or her own position and articulation within the discourse of history and the means by which such discourses are constructed and maintained. The particular difficulty for a history of performance as an artistic practice is its lack of an object; that is an ‘art-object’ as it has been conceived of in more ‘traditional’ fine art practices and discourses - a single, whole, material ‘thing’, which exists autonomously, in Michael Fried's terms in a, “timeless condition[s]”(124). Much performance work arises as a direct challenge to this conception of the art object and, as Nick Kaye notes, various practitioners have worked to disrupt or “reconceive the ‘object ‘ in art” (*Postmodernism* 23). This reframing of the art object by early performance artists introduced a ‘theatrical’ (Fried’s term) sensibility into an understanding of the object of art and acknowledged the object as ‘in process’, and constituted by a series of ‘relations’ between object, viewer and context, all of which govern its ‘event’. The object of performance is “one that, by definition necessarily includes the beholder” (Fried 125) and thus cannot be determined as a stable, closed or autonomous entity. The pioneer performance practitioner and founder of Ontological-Hysterical Theatre Richard Foreman writes “I do think that some sort of dissolving of the object - which is invariably dishonest in its need to convince, is desirable” (qtd in Kaye *Postmodernism* 54). A discussion of this ‘object in process’ or ‘dissolving object’ forms the basis of the latter part of this
chapter. Yet, a key issue at stake in relation to historicisation is the lack of a primary text in the sense of a single, complete, persistent object which is _the_ performance art work, and in which historical observations can be grounded. This then places, as it does with ‘historical’ events themselves, an emphasis on secondary documentational texts and these become the objects from which a history is constructed. In this equation history and documentation are seen as interdependent.

Because the idea of the inherently unstable ‘dissolving object’ of performance necessarily conflicts with any notion of a single ‘definitive’ or ‘accurate’ account of performance(s), I believe it is necessary for me to describe the means by which I have derived an ‘authority’ for my narrative. My history of multi-media performance is constructed from attending certain performance events, first and second-hand accounts of performances, ‘official histories’, photographs, set plans and the occasional video. This reliance on forms of documentation (in the forms of written accounts, visual records etc.) raises practical technological problems. For example, prior to the advent of the Second World War only a limited number of multi-media performance events appear to have taken place in Europe. The lack of pre-Second World War multi-media performance may not reflect an absence of work during the period 1920 to 1939, rather, it might be due to a lack of adequate documentation. That is, during the intervening years accounts have been either lost or, due to certain technical limitations, such as the speed and availability of film stock, documents of this early work just do not exist. It is hard to prove this absence, nevertheless, it does have implications for any history of performance work. Though there maybe no evidence for a particular work this does not mean to say that the work did not exist or, indeed, form part of the overall development of multi-media performance. Therefore, taking into account both the practical and theoretical limitations of the notion of a ‘history’ of multi-media performance, shadowing my whole historical account is the potential for an alternative history, consisting of undocumented and irretrievable performances - an invisible history full of infinite possibilities.
A history of multi-media performance

Although the term ‘performance’, with reference to a specific art form, only emerged into current usage during the 1970s, it is possible to trace a history of this work which begins with the early modernist avant-gardes at the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, most performance histories, taking their lead from Goldberg, trace approximately the same trajectory beginning with the Italian and Russian Futurists, moving through Dada, Bauhaus and Surrealism, disappearing with the Second World War and reappearing across the Atlantic in the American Happenings movement and later in the Conceptual Art experiments of the sixties and seventies. Carlson, however, broadens this conventional genealogy by looking further back in time. He cites mimes, jugglers, rope walkers, troubadours, minstrels, mountebanks, gleemen, dancers, posturers, tumblers, circuses, jesters, storytellers and monologuists as all precursors of modern day performance work. Quoting Goldberg, he justifies their inclusion as historical examples of “‘a presence for the artist in society,’ a presence that can be variously ‘esoteric, shamanistic, instructive, provocative or entertaining’”(81).

Specifically, in relation to the development of multi-media performance, certain nineteenth century preoccupations can be identified. The first would be the notion of ‘gesamtkunstwerk’ attributed to Richard Wagner, and the second, appearing later on in this same period, is the Symbolists’ interest in synaesthesia - a confusion of the senses. Gesamtkunstwerk, translated as a “unified art work” (Warrack & West 276), proposes “that poetry, music and painting achieve their complete fulfilment and true significance only through being united in musical drama” (Sadie 122-123). According to E.T. Kirby in Total Theater this idea of the dramatic arts as the meeting place of separate art forms developed into the later twentieth century concept of ‘total theatre’, a notion expounded by many leading avant garde figures; Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, László Moholy-Nagy, Erwin Piscator, Walter Gropius and Antonin Artaud.18

17 Wagner wrote about his theory of Gesamtkunstwerk in Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft (The Artwork of the Future) and, according to Sadie, it is a concept “that claims to restore the idea of Greek tragedy”(123).

18 Kirby expresses this meeting as “a place of convergence of the arts as sensory modalities” (xxi).
The Symbolists, directly influenced by Wagner, believed in a reciprocity between the senses and hence a 'correspondence' between the arts.\textsuperscript{19} This led to a desire to create the ‘total artwork’, which manifested itself, with regard to theatre, in the theories of Stèphane Mallarmé and Adolphe Appia.\textsuperscript{20} Kirby draws parallels between the Symbolists and the later Surrealist movement, united in the figure of Antonin Artaud and his ‘cruel theatre’ which purported to use “all the means of expression open to theatre”\textsuperscript{(34)}. However, prior to Artaud and the publication in 1938 of \textit{The Theatre and its Double} it is possible to find other examples of a developing multi-media sensibility in the performing arts.

\textbf{Pre war Europe}

The Italian Futurists were enthusiastic about the cinema, finding in it an ideal form for the expression of movement and speed which preoccupied their aesthetic; “one runs, navigates, flies, takes voyage, lives intensely while resting comfortably in an armchair [...] it is necessary to add to theatre everything that is suggested by cinematography” stated Fortunato Depero in his 1916 \textit{Notes on the Theatre} (Taylor 654-5). Prior to this, in their 1913 \textit{Variety Theatre Manifesto}, the Futurists proclaimed “The Variety Theatre is unique today in its use of the cinema, which enriches it with an incalculable number of visions and otherwise unrealisable spectacles” (M.Kirby \textit{Futurist} 179). Yet even though the new medium of cinema was enthusiastically espoused by the Italian Futurists, there is little evidence of any ‘cinematic’ performances. The only example of a multi-media Futurist performance I have traced is a presentation made by Valentine de Saint Point at the

\textsuperscript{19} Symbolist poetry exploits this synaesthetic belief, for example the second verse of Baudelaire’s poem “\textit{Correspondences}” in \textit{Les Fleurs du Mal}.

\begin{quote}
as the long echoes, shadowy, profound,  
Heard from afar, blend in a unity,  
Vast as the night, as sunlight’s clarity,  
So perfumes, colours, sounds may correspond. 
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{20} Appia proposed solid stage sets that had a mathematical correspondence to musical forms, a means of lighting actors which revealed their object-like sculptural qualities and a style of performers movement which “would provide an integrated, plastic and visual equivalent to music”. Mallarme proposed a total artwork that used ‘emblematic’ rather than representational dance as a sort of “nonrepresentational form of drama” (Kirby xxii). However, as Kirby points out, in reality Symbolist theatre “was far from being a theatre of effect” and was predictably very much dominated by the spoken word as a literary form (xxiii).
Comedie des Champs-Elysee in December 1913. Saint-Point performed a number of dances (*Poems of Love, Poems of War, Poems of Atmosphere*) in front of cloth screens onto which coloured lights were projected while mathematical equations where projected onto the walls. Descriptions of other pieces of performance which used film or photography to depict “battles, riots, horse races, automobile and airplane meets, trips, voyages, depths of the city, the countryside, oceans, and skies” (M. Kirby *Futurist* 179), as suggested in the *Variety Theatre Manifesto*, are not, however, to be found.

In 1933, Marinetti, the leading figure of the Italian Futurist movement, published his vision for a ‘Total Theatre’ which consisted of eleven small stages interspersed around the audience, a larger central stage and a circular perimeter stage. The audience would sit on revolving chairs and watch a combination of film, television, poems and paintings projected on to the curved walls of the theatre, while action took place on the stages around them. Unfortunately, like the other Futurist allusions to a multi-media theatre, the project was never apparently realised.

The Russian Futurists and Constructivists were conducting similar aesthetic experiments in the period of intense artistic activity that followed the Russian Revolution. The theatre was a key player in this invigorated cultural scene and particularly the type of theatre that wished to mix and integrate other forms. “In the early 1920s theatre showed a vigorous tendency to take over other aesthetic territories. The theatre was ‘music-hallized’, ‘circusized’ and ‘cinematographized’” (91) states Konstantin Rudnitsky in *Russian and Soviet Theatre 1905-1932: Tradition and the Avant Garde*. Cabaret became the defining form for much post-revolution cultural activity, particularly in the Agit-Prop performances of Vladimir Mayakovsky and the Blue Blouse Group, a political theatre movement set up in 1923 which organised performances involving up to 100,000 people in city clubs through out the Soviet Union. Photography and film media played a role in these events. Mayakovsky, following on from his slogans near poster work with ROSTA, the Russian Telegraph Agency, used projected title slides which were then illustrated by other static slide images at the

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21 This description is based on a report by Christiana J. Taylor in her book *Futurism: Politics, Paintings and Performance* p. 72.
beginning of his agit-theatre performances. The cabaret evenings of the Blue Blouse Group featured short films as well as acrobatics, dancers, gymnastics, skits and sketches. The influence of this revolutionary cabaret form is most noticeable in the early theatre work of Sergei Eisenstein who, perhaps because of his later work in the cinema, is sometimes associated with the use of film in theatre. Goldberg quotes Alexander Ostrovsky’s *Diary of a Scoundrel* staged by Eisenstein as utilising twenty five different ‘attractions’ including film, clowns and sketches.\(^2^2\) However, it seems that this one show, which used a short film sequence of stunts titled *Glumov’s Diary*, is the only example of Eisenstein combining film with theatre and then only as a separate projected sequence at the end of the play.

In his 1930 lecture “Reconstructions of Theatre” the revolutionary theatre artist Vsevolod Meyerhold stated that “using every technical means at its disposal (theatre) will work with films, so that scenes played by the actor on the stage can alternate with scenes he has played on screen” (qtd in Kostelanetz *Theatre* 24). Although I can find no evidence that Meyerhold realised this particular idea, he was clearly aware of the potential of projected film via his earlier use of slides in his theatre productions. In 1923 he produced *The Earth in Turmoil*, designed by Liubov Popova, with a set that included a large central screen called a ‘machine - photo - placard’ showing slide photographs and slogans. This was followed in 1924 by *D.E. (Give Us Europe)* which used one central screen and two others on either side walls. The walls moved and slogans and intertitles were projected onto the screens in an attempt to compete with the dynamism of cinema.

In the same year as Meyerhold’s lecture, film was used in the play *The First Cavalry Army* by Alexander Diky. This play formed part of the contemporary Soviet documentary theatre movement. The director, Vsevolod Vishnevsky, used newsreel footage from the First World War, the February Revolution, the October Revolution and the Civil War to illustrate a soldier’s life in this “drama without a hero”.\(^2^3\) The inclusion of slide photographs became increasingly sophisticated and in Nikolai Pogodin’s *My Friend*, directed by Alexei Popov, giant ‘photo-placards’ designed by Ilya Shlepyanov were

\(^2^2\) It seems that this work is rather confusingly referred to as *Enough Stupidity in Every Wise Man* in Konstantin Rudnitsky’s book.

\(^2^3\) This phrase is taken from Rudnitsky page 281.
used. In this 1932 production large projection screens formed a spectacular backdrop illustrated by various aerial photographs of building construction sites superimposed by a faint picture of Lenin.

According to RoseLee Goldberg, it was Germany that saw the first true integration of performance with film as early as 1922. In Berlin, Fredrick Kiesler, an artist not directly associated with any of the early avant gardes, produced a version of Karel Capek’s *R.U.R (Ronsoms Universal Robots)* at the Theater am Kurfurstendamm.\(^\text{24}\) Kiesler explained, “The *R.U.R.* play was my occasion to use for the first time in a theatre a motion picture instead of a painted backdrop” (Goldberg 115). The stage set included two screens, one of which received images of performers backstage reflected by mirrors, and the other, a circular screen revealed by a diaphragm, showed a film of the interior of an enormous factory full of workers. The film did not merely ‘illustrate’ an environment but went further than that; the camera ‘walked’ into the factory and this ‘subjective’ view was intended to create the impression that the actors on stage were, like the camera, entering the factory.

Returning to the Surrealists, however, it is possible to find another example of early multi-media performance in Francis Picabia’s *Relâche* (1924), a ballet with music composed by Erik Satie. The piece included performances by Man Ray and Marcel Duchamp as well as films by René Clair. The work began with a prologue on film, and in the interval the audience were shown the film *Entr’acte* written by Picabia and shot by René Clair. The film ends with a coffin falling from a hearse and bursting open after which the cast on stage broke through the projection screen’s ‘End’ title to begin the second act. This action of stepping through the screen and onto the stage marks a significant moment as it is evidence of a momentary link between the screen and stage ‘worlds’. Until now the majority of the evidence seems to suggest that moving film images, with the exception of *R.U.R.*, were most often used as a separate element within a live performance. The

\(^{24}\) In a picture caption which accompanies a set illustration of Kiesler’s production Goldberg states that *R.U.R* was “the first time film and live performance were combined” (117). However, in order for Goldberg to make such a proclamation she must be making a distinction between work which specifically used film coterminously with performance and the earlier work of people, such as Eisenstein, who had used film and/or slides as a discrete element within a live event.
simultaneity of this ‘break through’ moment represents a different approach to the medium where the two elements of film and theatre are seen momentarily to coexist. This heterogeneity of performing elements was acknowledged by Ferdinand Léger who declared of the work, “The author, the dancer, the acrobat, the screen, the stage, all these means of ‘presenting a performance’ are integrated and organised to achieve a total effect” (qtd in Goldberg 95).

It is interesting to note that the Bauhaus movement, another prewar modernist avant-garde that worked extensively with performance, seems to provide no known examples of film combined with live performance, and that this is despite its well known preoccupation with art and technology. Moholy-Nagy declared in his 1924 essay “Theatre, Circus, Variety” that, “Nothing stands in the way of making use of complex APPARATUS such as film, automobile, lift, aeroplane, and other machinery, as well as optical instruments, reflecting equipment, and so on” (qtd in Goldberg 116-7). In 1927 Walter Gropius the ‘architect’ of the Bauhaus movement designed a ‘Total Theatre’ for the director Erwin Piscator which again, like Marinetti’s, was never built. Piscator was an artist associated with another German avant-garde movement - Dada. Following on from his earlier contribution to Dada cabarets in Berlin, Piscator continued Kiessler’s example and combined film with theatre in a 1926 production of *Sturmflut* by Alfons Paquet. In this production the set was backed by a large screen with a black frame which opened and closed to form apertures of various sizes. Film from four projectors was back projected onto this screen. In 1928 Piscator directed *The Good Soldier Schwejk* by Jaroslav Hasek and it could be said that this work forms the apotheosis of prewar multi-media experimentation. The show is famous for its use of two conveyor belts which allowed the actors to be perpetually in motion, walking throughout the play, this effect was enhanced by the use of a filmed landscape back projection which filled the end wall of the theatre and moved behind the performers. The film used location shots of landscapes taken from life but also included animated
It is perhaps interesting to reflect for a moment on this catalogue of pre-Second World War multi-media performances. What strikes me is the relative paucity of examples; with the exception of a handful of productions (R.U.R, Relâche, Sturmflut, Schwejk, The First Calvary Army) I have been unable to trace any other examples of work which simultaneously combine moving images with live stage action. This is particularly telling if one considers that by the early decades of the twentieth century photography was a well established medium and moving image film processes were becoming cheaper and more accessible. These facts, combined with art movements who professed to champion new forms over old, celebrated the liberating power of technology, and wrote a great deal about the use of filmic media in theatre make this poverty of examples all the more inexplicable. It could, of course, be accounted for, as previously observed, by an absence of documentation and it is worth noting that all the above examples I have traced were major productions which took place in established theatres and therefore remain relatively ‘visible’ in terms of documented events which go to make up a history of the avant-garde. This is in comparison with the less formalised performances of the cabaret scene held in the bars and clubs of prewar Europe.

This lack of prewar multi-media performance experimentation could, however, also be accounted for in a number of different ways. One could speculate that it is perhaps a reflection of the fact that film and photography were still not genuinely considered to be ‘artistic’ media and that therefore an inclusion of these more ‘popular’ forms, associated with news and entertainment, did not necessarily follow on from the avant-garde’s vehement antipathy towards past artistic traditions. The predominant deployment of media in prewar theatre/performance took place in the creation of a ‘context’, as misc-en-scene, and was mainly confined to

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This description is given in Huxley & Witts:
The grouping of the action could follow Hasek’s original closely, and the only problem left was how we could adequately stage Schwejk’s environment, which had a decisive effect on him. And as usual Piscator solved this question with film, but here with the difference that he had an animated cartoon made. At the beginning of every chapter where Hasek made direct general comments on his theme, Piscator projected cartoons, drawn by George Grosz (Gasbarra, Welt am Abend, January, 1928) (286).
producing backdrops and stage settings, albeit moving ones. This use of film as ‘moving scenery’ indicates an uncomplicated understanding of the relationship between ‘reality’ and the photographic image, as the lens is used to facilitate the unproblematic transfer of images from the ‘outside world’ into the theatre. Therefore one could conclude that a sense of photography and film as a ‘reality creating’ rather than merely ‘reality reproducing’ artistic media was not perhaps established in the sensibilities of most prewar European artists (and by extension the population as a whole?). If this is indeed the case then the explosion in multi-media experimentation which followed the Second World War is not just an indication of an increasing technological sophistication, but also a more complex understanding of the operations of media products within culture at large. Post war artistic experimentation, particularly in America, is informed by and in turn forms part of, the increasing penetration of mediatized forms into everyday life, social and cultural. In much of this work media, in combination with other elements, becomes the ‘text’ of a performance and not just a scenic back projection. In this way postwar multi-media performance can be seen to play with an understanding of mediatized forms as a constituent force of ‘reality’, in a way unprecedented by earlier prewar work.

**Post war America**

America is often seen as the locus for performance work particularly by critics who are perhaps unaware of earlier European traditions. To some degree, however, this emphasis is justified as America has been the site of much innovative post war performance. The *Untitled Event* at Black Mountain College in 1952 is frequently cited as the reemergence of performance practice after the war and the origins of performance in the United States. The event featured the artists John Cage, Merce Cunningham and Robert Rauschenberg, all of whom went on to produce other American performance works, as well as their better known contributions in the fields of music, dance and painting respectively. *Untitled Event* used abstract coloured slides and film clips which were projected by Rauschenberg onto the ceiling and then moved down the walls while a variety of other actions took place at the same time, including the playing of
‘exotic’ instruments and a dog which chased Cunningham through the aisles between audience blocks. In this performance media does not play a ‘supporting role’ to other, more dominant elements, but works in parallel with them. The casual and simultaneous use of media in this piece demonstrates an ease of integration which was to set the tone for the future works of the Happenings movement.

A leading member of the Bauhaus movement, Josef Abers, had moved to teach at Black Mountain College after the Bauhaus school in Dessau had been closed down by the Nazis in 1933. Abers was one of many artist exiles who had sought refuge in America from Europe’s oppressive war time regimes. Because of this migration some critics, such as the American, Douglas Davies, trace a direct line from the European prewar avant-gardes to the increase in artistic experimentation in post war America. Davies credits another Bauhaus exile, László Moholy-Nagy, as responsible for “the beginning of a long, fitful and inexorable rise in American artistic energy, much of it expressed through media generated by the new technology” (31). Despite this rather ‘Euro-centric’ and individualist interpretation of the history of recent American culture it would appear that, to some extent, the visions and manifestos of the prewar Europeans, including the dream of a ‘total theatre’, were to be realised and elaborated on in post war America.

The work of the Happenings movement and its exponents, most notably Allan Kaprow, could be characterised by the frequent use of photographic and filmic media, often projected simultaneously with other actions and/or onto the bodies of performers. In Al Hansen’s Requiem for W.C. Fields Who Died of Acute Alcoholism (1960), Hansen recited a poem whilst film clips from W.C. Fields’ films were projected onto his shirt. Along with a proliferation in the possibilities of performance came a freeing of the boundaries of performance spaces, so works came to be staged in car parks, on ranches, in swimming pools, in people’s gardens and, in a strange inversion of the idea of multi-media performance, works were performed in cinemas on the narrow platforms in front of the cinema screen. Most notable of these is Robert Whitman’s 1965 production Prune Flat performed at the Filmmakers Cinematheque in New York. Prune Flat was originally subtitled a ‘film-stage event’ and Gene Youngblood refers to
Whitman’s work as ‘filmstage’. This performance used the film figures of two women projected directly onto the same two performers who were live on stage, the gestures and actions of the stage performers paralleled those on the film while other, larger images, formed a projected backdrop on the cinema screen which transposed the stage action. The high point of this synthesis between stage and film action came when one of the performers appeared to remove her clothes in sync with the projected film image but in actuality only the woman on celluloid had disrobed, however this created the illusion of nakedness on a fully clothed body. Kostelanetz observed of *Prune Flat*, “these strategies contribute to the pieces’ major theme, which is the difference between filmed images and live ones, or between kinetic activity and static information” (7). In its play between stage and film action this work signals a shift in the use of media to a more nuanced relationship with ‘reality’ which provokes questions, as Kostelanetz notes, as to the differences “between filmed images and live ones”. In so doing *Prune Flat* begins to foreground issues which are at the root of much contemporary multi-media experimentation.

Another notable work from this period took place not in New York but in Ann Arbor, Michigan. *Unmarked Interchange* was produced by the ONCE group on top of a car park and used a 26’ x 36’ projection screen to show the film *Top Hat* starring Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers. The spectacle was deliberately reminiscent of a drive in movie but with the vital addition of live performers. Built into the screen were a series of drawers, louvres and horizontal platform surfaces; using this stage set performers superimposed themselves on the film. The soundtrack for the piece included both the original sound from the film, mixed with the live sound from the performance.26 *Unmarked Interchange* signals another development in American performance in that media images and techniques are used not only as a formal device within a performance but become in themselves, as products of ‘the media’, a content for this work. Reminiscent of Al Hansen’s

26 Gene Youngblood gives the following description of this piece in Expanded Cinema: while a couple dined by candlelight at a table in one corner of the screen, a man read into a microphone from the pornographic novel *Story of O*, at the opposite end of the projection space, periodically a girl walked across the catwalk in the centre of the screen and hurled custard pies in his face. In another opening a man played a piano. And over all of this Fred and Ginger danced their way through 1930’s Hollywood escapism (374).
Requiem, media itself - in this instance Hollywood and its stars - become the new subjects for performance work.

Artists in America had only just begun to explore the possibilities of film within a live setting when a new, more immediate and flexible imaging technology became available. Nam June Paik is the person most widely credited with introducing video into performance and art in general. However, prior to the possibility of recording electromagnetic signals on video tape and Paik’s infamous 1969 TV Bra for Living Sculpture with Charlotte Moorman, television had already entered the performance canon. The Nine Evenings series of performances which took place at the 69th Regiment Armoury in 1966 could be seen to be a pivotal moment in a history of multi-media performance. Most key practitioners of the day took part including Cage, Whitman, Rauschenberg, and Carolee Schneemann. Notably another participating artist, Oyvind Fahlstrom, declared “I think of it as initiation rites for a new medium, Total Theatre” (Davies 72). Nine Evenings was to be a celebration of ‘theatre and engineering’ and artists worked with specialised engineers in order to realise technologically complex performances. Two notable works emerged from these Evenings. Grass Field was a piece by Alex Hay in which Hay sat in front of a television camera which reproduced his face, live, on a giant screen behind him, across his body were electric pick up microphones which amplified his body sounds creating an involuntary sound track to accompany the piece. Robert Rauschenberg produced an even more technically demanding piece: Open Score involved 700 performers and much of the action took place in a darkened auditorium and was relayed to the audience via infra red cameras and television screens which surrounded the stage.

As the sixties progressed into the seventies, television and video began to feature heavily in the work of American artists, particularly figures such as Vito Acconci, Les Levine and Adrian Piper. These works were often formally complex playing with the technologies’ ability to create loops and

Open Score began with a tennis game by which each of the 48 lights illuminating the stage were turned off in turn as the ball hit the tennis rackets. Then, in darkness, the 700 performers advanced across the stage speaking in muffled tones and once they had exited Rauschenberg appeared carrying Simone Whitman in a sack. He stopped in the light of a tiny spot centre stage and Whitman sang a song from within the sack which was, unsurprisingly, barely audible, they then both exited.
displacements in time and space particularly using live camera relays. An example of such work would be Dan Graham’s *Present Continuous Past* (1974) which used a mirror and a video relay with an eight second delay. The performers of the piece were the spectators themselves who watched their immediate actions reflected in the mirror but also transformed into past and future actions via delayed video imagery shown on surrounding monitors. Anne Wagner has written in her analysis of 1970’s performance and video work “Performance, Video and the Rhetoric of Presence” that; “What was performed in performance, what was observed in video, are the uncertainties that by 1970 or thereabouts had begun to accumulate around ‘artist’ and ‘viewer’ as art’s two essential correlative terms”(60). The specular ‘feedback’ of the live video camera allowed an audience to become the ‘content’ of the performance art work, a position already encouraged by the reconfiguration and ‘theatricalisation’ of the art object by performance. This necessarily then reflects back on the position of the artist/maker in terms of the origins and site of meaning in a such a work. Wagner cites examples work of by Graham, Acconci, Joan Jonas, Lynda Benglis and Richard Serra in which the immediate presence of the performer and/or audience are displaced by their mediatized image. This leads Wagner to conclude that “Video and performance artists [...] do their utmost to invoke settings and artifacts and experiences that connate the problematic real of technologically mediated experience”(75-76). Therefore, in the light of Wagner, one could propose that by the 1970s American multi-media experimentation had extended its inquiry from the difference between live performer and film image to include an interrogation of the audience itself as a live mediatized entity. Such multi-media work demonstrates a preoccupation with the possibilities of its self-reflecting form and the implications of this in terms of the ‘site’ of meaning for such work.

**Post war Europe**

European performance practice had not completely ceased with the Second World War; alongside the American Happenings movement similar experiments were occurring in Europe as demonstrated by the actions of the Situationists and other Conceptual Art movements. Examples of European multi-media performance work, although harder to trace, have
been characterised by Günter Berghaus as distinct from the Americans in that “the affirmative attitude towards the artifacts of modern mass media that can be found among so many of the America artists was rarely shared by their European counterparts”(372). This view concurs with Douglas Davies’ observations on the subject; “The situation in Europe between the end of the war and 1965 was vastly different from that in the United States. The rate of progress toward a symbiotic mixture of art with technology was faster, as well as more self conscious”(52). If, by more self conscious, Douglas means to say that this work took an ideological position with regard to its materials and the culture they represented that, again, concurs with Berghaus, who notes that “Happenings and Pop Art in Europe contained a conscious sociopolitical critique of affluent consumer society as it had developed after the war”(372). On examination it does seem that much of the American work was aimed at presenting a multisensory spectacle to the point of sensory overload (something which Paik felt characterised American culture). In this way, the work could be said to have created something almost celebratory in its effect and self-reflective in its purpose, ultimately bound up with its own form. Oldenburg talked of his affection “for all these radiant commercial objects in my immediate surroundings” (Davies 39) and Jim Dine stated “Well if it’s art, who cares if it’s a comment [...] I’m involved with formal elements” (qtd in Berghaus 311). The European approach seems to have been more detached and at times took a distinctly critical position with regard to its media elements.

As early as 1959 Wulf Vostell had been working with the medium of television. He proposed a series of artistic events for television called TV-Dé-coll/age Events and Actions For Millions. These consisted of a number of images that encouraged the viewer to interact with their television “e.g., kiss the person on the TV screen; sit in front of the TV and brush your teeth; press your belly up against the monitor; drink a can of Coca Cola, but think of the adverts of Pepsi Cola” (Berghaus 325). Unfortunately the proposal was never broadcast but it was turned into a later Happening. Vostell wrote of this work; ”The viewer who submits to the events or acts against them experiences the absurdity and the dubious quality of mass manipulation through the means of communication.[...] The absurd and critical game ought to produce consciousness of these facts” (qtd in Berghaus 325/6). In
1963 Vostell made *No-Nine dé-coll/ages* which took place over 9 sites in the city of Wuppertal, West Germany. The Happening began in a cinema where Vostell showed *Sun in Your Head*, a film made from ‘décollaged’ (a fragmented collage) of television programmes, in front of which Vostell performed mundane tasks such as brushing his teeth, vacuuming, leafing through a book. The audience were then moved, on buses, to a number of different sites including a quarry where a television played a popular quiz show which Vostell electronically ‘jammed’ altering the picture quality before blowing up the television. In America in 1964 he presented *You* a décollage/Happening. Apart from a large amount of animal bones and innards, this Happening also included three television sets placed on hospital beds all showing distorted pictures of the same baseball game with the instructions “Allow yourself to be tied to the beds where the T.V.s are playing....Free yourself....Put on a gas mask when the T.V. burns and try to be as friendly as possible to everyone” (qtd in Goldberg 133). Vostell, through this process of décollage, was attempting to demystify communications media in order to demonstrate that it could be a phenomenon which could be controlled and acted upon by the individual. To this end he built the *Technological Happening Room* in 1966; this room was full of items from the communications industry: T.V.s, film projectors, video recorders, telephones, Xerox machines, record players, epidiascopes and computers, all of which were operated from a central control box. As viewers entered the room, one at a time, their images and actions were recorded and immediately played back, “Sender and receiver of the information merged; (passive) watching of images turned into (active) producing of images” (Berghaus 326). In this way it is possible to see parallels between this work and the 1970s video relay work of American artists mentioned above.

**The Theatre of Images**

The performance experiments which took place in Europe and America in the sixties and seventies began to have an effect on more theatre-based practices. ‘The Theatre of Images’, as pioneered by directors such as Robert Wilson, Richard Foreman and Lee Breuer, is often also referred to as multimedia theatre, visual theatre or intermedia. Although these directors
staged large-scale visually spectacular work, it is difficult to find many examples of projects that actually featured mediatized images to create this effect. The same, however, cannot be said of Laurie Anderson who is the artist who is perhaps most famously associated with multi-media work due to her eight hour performance ‘portrait’ of a country - *United States* (1980). This work produced the popular music best seller *O Superman* and used film and slide projection, including images taken from television screens, alongside music, songs, performance and autobiographical stories from Anderson’s life and observations.

Another American company, the Wooster Group, can be noted for their sophisticated incorporation of media into performance. Beginning in 1978, according to Kaye, “the Wooster Group have combined excerpts from plays with images, actions, film and sound drawn from a variety of sources to produce often disruptive and alarming performance collages” (*Postmodernism* 11). *Route 1 & 9 (The Last Act)* (1981) used a reconstruction of an Encyclopaedia Britannica ‘teaching film’ to introduce the Thornton Wilder play *Our Town* which formed the basis of an examination of the racism implicit within the text and broader society. I saw the Wooster Group’s 1991 production of *Brace Up*, at The Riverside Studios in London. This reinterpretation of Anton Chekhov’s *Three Sisters*, used live and prerecorded video in a subtle and sophisticated mix. Parts of the text were delivered via cameras and monitors, and at times it was difficult to distinguish between a live or a recorded section as the stage action so carefully matched the television picture. The monitors could also track up and downstage performing a physical zoom in to close up, and bring the picture closer to the audience for particularly significant moments. The whole piece was fast-paced with live, mediatized and recorded performance intricately woven together.

Outside of America visually orientated theatre was named Nuova Spettacolarita (in Italy) or Media Theatre. In Italy the company *Falso Movimento* formed in 1977 and were intent on “turning the stage itself into a screen” (Goldberg 198). Their work was full of media references, using filmic references for stage imagery as well as using actual film clips from films such as *Casablanca* in their production of *Otello* (1982) and Gene
Kelly’s On the Town in Tango Glaciale (1982). Another leading exponent of this type of theatre, whose work I have also seen, is the Canadian Robert Lepage, but rather than working with existing film material Lepage directs his own. Lepage has toured extensively with his technically complex, media rich, brand of theatre. Needles and Opium (1991), one of his earliest works, blended film, slides, video and even an overhead projector with a solo monologue. So infused was this piece of theatre with media that there was barely a moment in which the performance occurred without some form of visual accompaniment. His later two part The Seven Streams of the River Ota (1994/96) blurred multiple time frames with distinct media sequences including a live/prerecorded video sequence in an onstage photo booth, film and video material and a low key acting style imported directly from film and television. There is something spectacular in Lepage’s manipulation of media and theatrical elements which verges on the magical, particularly when moments of the live blur indistinctly with the recorded. When watching Lepage’s work, part of its effect is derived from the technical ‘trickery’ of his performances and in this way I find the experience similar to my enjoyment of the Wooster Group. Together these artists’ productions combine media with performance to create a unity of effect to the extent that no separation between its constituent elements can be perceived.

Multi-media Britain

Yet Britain’s representation in my history of multi-media performance is minimal. Davies notes that Britain “had not participated fully in the esthetic revolution launched during the prewar” (59) and “British art lagged behind the continent in terms of its interest in new media and processes” (62). Davies, following Nikolaus Pevsner, attributes this lack of aesthetic and technological experimentation to the legacy of William Morris in British culture. Davies quotes Morris at the beginning of his book Art and the Future; “As a condition of life production by machinery is evil” (17). Indeed the ‘populist’ circus and carnival based performance/theatre work by companies such as The People Show and Welfare State in the sixties and seventies seems to be infused with Morris’ sentiments; “what is the use of

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28 This production was shown in Britain in two stages: Part One was shown at the Edinburgh Festival in 1994 and the complete two part version was played at The Royal National Theatre, London, in 1996.
making art unless everyone can share it" (qtd in Davies 59). And, despite
the strength of the Pop Art movement in Britain, this interest did not really
extend to the use of media in performance and “confined itself largely to
pigment and canvas” (Davies 62). However the artist Mark Boyle “developed
a special brand of experiential art, recorded and transformed through
contemporary media” (Davies 65) by producing images of micro-organisms
on video tape, slides and film. These images were then projected with
dance and music events, and in 1969, accompanied *Soft Machine* at the ICA
in London in a show titled *Journey to the Surface of the Earth*. It seems
something of an anomaly that a performance movement engaged with the
’popular’ aesthetics of carnival and pop music did not interact more with the
equally ‘popular’ mediums of television, film or video. Perhaps uniquely in
Britain, as well as the shadow of Morris, media, and television in particular,
was seen as an institution of the state and therefore not a potential tool for
radical and experimental art work. However this distrust of media
technology is certainly no longer a feature of British performance work which
has experienced a burgeoning of multi-media experimentation in the past
two decades, accompanied by and developing alongside a dynamic Video
Art scene.

I am able to make these observations based on my own experiences of
seeing and working with multi-media performance events which began with
watching the work of Hidden Grin theatre company and their 1987
production *Suburbs of Hell* at the Arnolfini in Bristol. Forkbeard Fantasy, a
company lead by ‘The Brittonioni Brothers’ manages to combine the surreal
aesthetics of Britain’s ‘alternative theatre’ such as puppetry and mechanical
sets, with projected film blurring stage and film ‘worlds’ to great comic
effect, in work which they describe as “crossing the Celluloid Divide”.
29 Forced Entertainment Theatre Cooperative have incorporated televisual
elements into some of their productions such as their use of ‘tv angels’ in
200% and *Bloody Thirsty* (1987). The director Pete Brooks who originally
made work with Impact Theatre has also produced a number of works with
his company Insomniac, including *Clair de Luz*, (1994) a play set in a
cinema featuring film and sound work by Towering Inferno. More recently

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29 This quote is taken from documentation provided by the British Council web
site: http://www.britishcouncil.org/arts/theatredance/companies/theatre4_009.html
11/8/00
Blast Theory have extended multi-media performance experimentation into three dimensional VR space in their production *Desert Storm*.

At the present time the distinction between performance (theatre, live art, performance art) and multi-media performance appears to have become almost redundant. In the Arnolfini’s 1998 autumn/winter season, for example, three out of five companies describe themselves as multi-media. I also produced work for this season in collaboration with the company Bodies in Flight, and we were the third company in sequence to use video in our performance. The use of media is now so prevalent in performance that its integration need no longer be a point of remark or discussion, in much the same way that media in general has become immanent within everyday life. However, it is precisely because of this incorporation of media into all aspects of western society and culture that a deconstruction of multi-media performance as an art form is urgently required. To echo Schieffelin’s sentiments, it is through an examination of performance that it is possible to determine “the way that cultures actively construct their realities” (199-200) therefore a study of the specific form of multi-media performance may be able to deduce the role media plays in this construction.

**Reviewing my history**

Upon reviewing this history of multi-media performance I am able to establish a number of preoccupations which are resonant within my own practice and the interests of this study. Beginning with Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk and developing throughout the twentieth century there seems to be an interest in the mixing or merging of art forms. Accompanying this flourishing interest in interdisciplinarity is the synaesthetic understanding of the ‘reciprocity of the senses’. Therefore, just as it was it no longer possible, or indeed desirable, to maintain a separation between art mediums, this notion of integration extended into a cognition of the very receptors of art work - the senses themselves.

In terms of the specific medium of film, it was the Italian Futurists who first seem to have been alive to the possibilities that this form presented for theatre, identifying in film something that could ‘describe’ the ‘modern
experience'; “we are convinced that mechanically, by force of brevity, we can achieve an entirely new theatre perfectly in tune with our swift laconic Futurist sensibilities” (qtd in Taylor 47). Perhaps these “swift laconic sensibilities” were formed by (and in turn informed) changes to a western experience of time and space determined, in part, by technological changes that had begun at the latter part of the nineteenth century. This is certainly Stephen Kern’s thesis in The Culture of Time and Space. For Kern simultaneity is a defining condition of modernity and one created by the ‘new’ electronic communications industries. Though interdisciplinary, some early multi-media work seems not to have embraced this additional sense of simultaneity, Eisenstein’s ‘attractions’ or Relâche, for example, maintain a separation of their performing elements, however, other works projected film and/or slides concurrently with live stage action.

The combined effect of simultaneity and interdisciplinarity was an inevitable fracturing and collapsing of sensory experiences, particularly that of vision, across the space of the performance. The presentation of an excess of visual and performative practices can be seen at work in the anarchic seratas and cabaret evenings of the Futurists and Dadaists. In addition, various prewar accounts of ‘total theatres’ describe numerous screens and stage platforms simultaneously active within a larger performance space. This proliferation of visual and performative information within one performance event provokes a reconfiguration of ideas and assumptions concerning spectatorial positioning. In these events not only was there ‘too much to see’, but no one version or viewing position could claim superiority or authority over another. In this way multi-media performance had abandoned a single authorial or spectatorial perspective and it is this idea that can be identified most readily in post war American and European work. In these performances not only was a multiplicity of expressive information projected and performed across multifarious spaces and surfaces, these spaces and surfaces themselves were in flux, either transferred out from conventional ‘theatre’ spaces or, more literally, moving within the performance event itself.

As ‘the media’ expanded in terms of discourses, sites, power and influence across western society, the texts and conventions of these industries
inevitably become the subjects of an art form concerned with the examination of society; hence the use of televisual or filmic rhetoric or actually material extracts in multi-media performance events. In contrast to film processes, the technological apparatus of television and video provided the ability to produce an instantaneous image from a lens and this live camera relay was used, often in direct combination with the human body. The body seems to become a major site of exploration and interrogation in much art work of the latter half of the twentieth century and the body as a sign of instability and process becomes the prime ‘material’ in performance work. In combination with the electronic lens much 60s and 70s multi-media performance implicitly or explicitly questioned the ontology and constitution of the body, its relationships and behaviours. To this end later work exhibits a blurring of the difference(s) between the live body and the mediatized or recorded body. The live camera relay also provided a visual metaphor for a changing understanding of the role of an audience with regard to an art work - able to transform an audience into the subjects or performers of a piece, the viewer becomes literally central within the construction of the work. Meanwhile other, more theatre-based multi-media performance practices, create a sense of the visually spectacular and/or ‘magical’ and humorous through their work.

Many of the above observations made in relation to multi-media performance; interdisciplinarity, simultaneity, multiple perspective, body orientated, viewer foregrounding, visual spectacle have also been the concerns of other twentieth century artistic experimentation. I have chosen to emphasise these particular elements because they are also aspects of my own practice and history. Much of my early multi-media performance, although it was constructed in ignorance of the ‘history’ of multi-media work, resembles elements found in the descriptions of that history. In collaboration with other artists I used multiple screens, some of which moved, and a combination of film, video and slide material in live events often on a ‘spectacular’ scale. The media consisted of a collage of many different types of material; abstract images, found footage, specially constructed films and videos, classic film material, parodies of film and television forms, actual television programmes. This material was performed with and/or shown as discreet elements within a performance.
More recently, and coinciding with the focus of this study, I have developed an interest in the body as a subject and started to use self-built live cameras in my performance work. I have also expanded a practice as a solo video and installation artist and this work, which often pivots around the activity and ‘performance’ of an audience, is informed and influenced by my understanding and practice of live performance. Having established a context and ground for my own work I would now like to return to the particular question of documentation and the issues it raises for a study of performance.

1.5 The Trouble with Documents

in contrast to traditional art performances do not contain a reproduction element [...]. Whatever survives of a performance in the form of a photograph or videotape is no more than a fragmentary, petrified vestige of a lively process that took place at a different time in a different place (Herbert Molderings). 30

The preceding history exposes a difficulty in relation to the act of historicising performance, and echoing Foreman, I have named this difficulty the problem of the ‘dissolving object’. Performance does not produce a definitive object. As a consequence of this apparent lack there is no primary source, or original object, in which to ground an historical account of performance work. The discourses of painting, sculpture and even traditional theatre (as literary art) all maintain a form of integrity with their histories via their original objects which persist and continue to be a presence in the present day. Yet a history of performance has no such contingent, it has no one decisive object which remains to inform such a history, only disparate material traces and individual memories. 31 Therefore, within this equation, documentation takes on new and important dimensions, replacing the absent primary text. In this cultural constellation documentation equals a visibility within the discourse of history.

30 Quoted in Auslander, Liveness p 41.

31 I use the word contingent in the sense of a touch or a close connection in the same way that Roland Barthes uses it in Camera Lucida to describe the photograph’s relationship to the object it depicts: “the sovereign Contingency...in short what Lacan calls the Tuché” (4).
If performance is to have any presence within a history of culture it is necessary for it to be subject to forms of documentation. However this raises a spectre which haunts much performance debate; the impossibility of effectively translating a live form, constructed in contradiction to ‘the object’, into a document. Herbert Molderings’ above comment neatly sums up this problematic position. Elsewhere other commentators have noted the impossibility of capturing the live. Carlson refers to the performance text as a “text without trace” (qtd in Melzer 2:259) and Annabelle Melzer herself states; “The performance text leaves no replicable artifact for analysis” (1:148). However, it is Peggy Phelan’s assertion in *Unmarked* which is perhaps most poignant in relation to this impasse;

> Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations; once it does so it becomes something other than performance” (146).  

32 It seems that the quality of ‘liveness’, which is deemed to be the defining nature of any performance event, is exactly what cannot be reproduced in any form of documentation.

It is possible to construct a schema which contrasts various characteristics of ‘liveness’ as opposed to those displayed by recorded forms. Patrice Pavis has drawn up just such a comprehensive table in *Theatre at the Crossroads of Culture* in which he makes comparisons between the forms of Theatre, Radio, Cinema, Television and Video.  

33 My own table outlined below represents a more general comparison between the live and recorded as a series of dialectical oppositions.

32 All quotations from Peggy Phelan in this thesis come from her work *Unmarked*.

33 The table can be found on pp.104-5 of Pavis’ book.
This table is constructed from observations made while working with and documenting performance and a number of these binary oppositions will become the focus of my later case study chapters. When confronted with the practicalities of representing a performance work on, for example, video, a number of these oppositions become very real. While documenting the work *Constants II* I was struck by the impossibility of representing simultaneity within a linear form such as video. Principally, the difficulty occurred in showing actions that took place simultaneously in two different places within the same performance space. There seemed to be no satisfactory equivalent for such coexistence within the language of the screen. Film and video information is presented sequentially via montage; a hard cut indicates consecutive actions while a dissolve or wipe transition implies a larger separation in time between the events depicted. One way I could overcome this segmentation of time was by superimposing one picture over another to show two events as having coexisted.

Vid. 1. *Constants II* - Camera Dance
This proved to be visually effective but created a new image which presented a confusion of two spaces that had not originally taken place in the performance. It was also a strategy with limitations. Had I wanted to include other actions that took place concurrently (as had indeed occurred in the performance) the picture plane became cluttered and all the images became unreadable. Whilst this layering provided a form of equivalence it was at best a partial solution to what proves to be an intractable difference between performance and recording forms.  

Time and space

The dichotomy between recorded mediatized forms and performance originates in the different relationships these two phenomena have with time and space, as illustrated by the contrasting temporal and spatial elements presented in Table 1. Performance practice, indeed its ‘ontology’ as Phelan suggests, is predicated on a singular, momentary and therefore unique existence in time and space. This contrasts fundamentally with the function and purpose of a record, designed to persist, ideally unchanged, through temporal and spatial dimensions.

Concerning time, as a live event, performance can only exist in the present moment. This is unlike the event depicted in a document which has always already occurred, it is of the past and can only reoccur in the present. Subsequently, time in a record can be subject to the ‘external’ manipulations and adjustments of editing and omission, controls which are not possible in time as experienced in the living present. In parallel with the realm of its production, similar relations with time exist in the realm of reception. A performance can only be watched once in a specific time and space and, furthermore, the time, in terms of the occasion of this performance is determined by its producers, the performers. (The same performance might be repeated over a number of nights, however, it will never be exactly the same in the way that a film would be, for instance).

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It is interesting to note that a convention for presenting concurrent action occurring in two different places does exist within film rhetoric, this is the device of the split screen, commonly seen used to present two characters who are in conversation with one another over the telephone.
Conversely, a record has been constructed for ease of consumption, and it maybe experienced any number of times often in a variety of different places. It has a general, reproductive relationship with time and the time of its reception (occasion) is usually determined by the viewer.

The differences in relation to time between performance and records are inevitably intertwined with differences in space. These could be examined as a series of contrasts between ‘stage’ space (not necessarily a literal stage but any space in which a performance takes place) and in the terms of visual records, ‘screen’ space. The space presented on a screen is a fragmentary one, it has been delineated by a camera and positioned in time and in relation to its other spaces by an editor. The space of a performance is continuous; although a spectator’s view might be restricted by limitations in vision and position, this is not the same as the a priori selection and restriction that a camera delivers - the space is still experienced as a whole. The camera, as the instrument of recorded media and the messenger for the screen, also obliges an audience to remain remote. This effect might seem paradoxical in certain film and television genres which presume to transport a viewer into the presence of the event represented, but this metaphysical transport is very different from the actual bodily immediacy of a performance event which normally occurs in a space shared by both performers and audience. Moreover, like time, the space of the visual record has already been determined by the camera lens and editorial juxtapositions. Although a performance may have been rehearsed, planned and practised it still remains fundamentally undetermined in that at any moment during a performance change or difference could occur. These sentiments are exemplified by Allan Kaprow:

> The dividing line between art and life should remain as fluid and indistinct as possible and time and space should remain variable and discontinuous so that, by continuing to be open phenomena capable of giving way to change and the unexpected, performances take place only once (qtd in Feral 175-176).

A performance bears the potential for difference and this is not possible in a recorded document.
One could conclude, therefore, that the record, or document, operates in contradiction to a perception of time and space as framed by performance; that is time and space as singular and unrecoverable. The document undermines this privileging of the present and therefore the potency of performance and its potential efficacy. This then begs the question: what can a performance document hope to represent? The performance now seen on the documenting video has become reproducible, accessible, multiple, severed from a particular time and space and these are all elements which are at odds with the performance in its original manifestation. They are also elements which confer on the performance a type of objecthood, the performance as represented is no longer confined to a particular time and space and appears to reoccur in the time of the present. As Josette Feral observes in “Performance and Theatricality”: “Indeed, it is interesting to note that every performance ultimately meets the video screen [...]. There, performance once again encounters representation, from which it wanted to escape at all costs and which marks both its fulfilment and its end” (173). This is the trouble with documents, as Kaye writes in “Live Art: Definition and Documentation” performance “arises as a challenge to the ‘object’ in art and documentation can reestablish these stabilities and terms” (90). To present a ‘true’ record of a performance one would have to produce a document that did not have a stable, reproductive relationship with time and space and this is clearly in contradiction to the nature and purpose of a record. In the face of this temporal and spatial paradox the logical option would be to admit that performance operates beyond the realms of a record and visa versa. However Feral notes:

the theatrical experience is bound always to escape any attempt to give an accurate account of it. Faced with this problem [...] performance has given itself its own memory. With the help of the video camera with which every performance ends, it has provided itself with a past (175) and it is this, above all, that the performance document represents - the performance as past.
Interestingly it was exactly this documentational dilemma that was staged (perhaps unintentionally) by the 1998 Ulay/Abramovic exhibition at the Tramway in Glasgow. This exhibition consisted entirely of film and video documentation of performance work made between 1976-1988 by the artists Ulay and Marina Abramovic. Much of this work was extremely physical; for example in *Expansion in Space* the artists repeatedly walked into giant pillars moving the structures further apart with the force of the blows from their naked bodies; in *Light/Dark* they knelt opposite one another and slapped each others faces repeatedly; for *Rest Energy* Ulay and Abramovic held a bow under tension between them - the arrow inches from Abramovic’s heart. Most of the work represented in the exhibition created its intensity via the repeated, often painful subjections of the performers’ bodies. Because, however, the exhibition was staged from moving image records it constructed particular relations between the work and the spectator. One could move away, watch another recording of a different event, then return to watch the same moment or a different one. In this way a spectator did not experience a single piece of performance accumulating in one time and space. When watching the documented version of the work time and space could be fractured, interrupted and returned to in ways that would have been impossible in the original live performances. Subsequently the audience was never obliged to experience a concentration of this stark, often brutal physicality other than by a partial viewing of it. In the recorded document, we only see the blows against the body, we do not experience them in the way we would if they accrued, repeatedly, in front of us or rather, with us. Therefore the performances represented in this exhibition could be seen as equivalent to a series of specimens in a jars, available and on display but isolated and made remote by their protective glass screens. Furthermore, an exhibition constructed around documentation of this type of ‘body performance’ seems to be fundamentally at odds with the meaning of the original work. Ulay and Abramovic’s performances foreground the body, a body which is inseparable from its manifestation within living, present time and space. It is this encounter of flesh persisting through time and space which defines what it is to be a body and the sharing of this manifestation by an audience
creates the ‘content’ for this type of performance. The record severs this connection with immediate time and space and represents bodies locked in a cycle of inhuman repetition which occurs irrespective of its witnesses. The meaning of the work - the living body - can still be perceived but it is depicted at a distance and thus the implications for the bodies of the audience dissipate. The recorded performances retain echoes of what had once made them powerful but are also rendered impotent by their representation. This re-presentation shifts the emphasis of the original spectacle from all bodies to the two bodies displayed in the record; in this sense the exhibition transfigures the meaning of the work from what it is to be embodied, to the act of watching another’s embodiment.

1.6 The Live/Mediatized Dilemma

the notion of the live is premised on the absence of recording and the defining fact of the recorded is the absence of the live (Steve Wurtzler).35

Any discussion of the issues concerning documentation and performance clearly foregrounds differences between the two forms of expression. These differences extend into wider debates respecting comparisons between live and mediatized forms. These debates are premised around the singular existence of performance in relation to the reproductive nature of a mediatized document or recording.36 The live/mediatized discussion has become principally polarised between two theorists, Peggy Phelan and Philip Auslander, where Auslander has developed an argument in response to Phelan’s analysis in Unmarked.

Phelan’s position identifies performance as constructed in opposition to the logics of reproduction, “Performance in a strict ontological sense is

35 Quoted in Auslander Liveness p. 3.

36 It should be emphasised that throughout this section the mediatized is assume to be a recorded product. Later, in chapter two an important argument will be made for the contribution of live camera images as used in performance. These live mediatized images are ‘screen performances’ and could be seen to form an interstitial moment between the poles of the live and the recorded.
nonreproduction”(148). These logics, as exemplified by mediatized culture, are symptomatic of capitalism itself; “The production and reproduction of visibility are part of the labor of the reproduction of capitalism”(11) and performance’s rejection of reproduction “clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital”(148). Thereby Phelan creates an opposition between performance and capital, however, her argument takes performance beyond economic theory;

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being [...] becomes itself through disappearance (146).

Disappearance is seen as the fundamental quality of performance which in turn allows the form to possess a certain powerful radicalism. “Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility - in a maniacally charged present - and disappears into memory, into a realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it evades regulation and control” and it is this ontology of performance which allows performance “its distinctive oppositional edge” (148).

Phelan’s argument utilises linguistic and psychoanalytical theories, particularly those of Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, to explain how, in patriarchal culture, the feminine is always inscribed through the masculine, and thus female subjects remain ‘unmarked’ or invisible. Performance’s potential lies in its ability to expose this process of erasure by privileging the invisible or disappeared. Therefore “Performance is the attempt to value that which is nonreproductive,[...] The promise evoked by this performance then is to learn to value what is lost, to learn not the meaning but the value

[37] Phelan’s specific chapter heading is “The Ontology of Performance: Representation without Reproduction”, Unmarked pp 146-166.
of what cannot be reproduced or seen (again)”(152). This idea has significance not only in terms of seeing ‘the female’ within culture but also with regard to ‘seeing’ and notions of ‘the self’, as it emphasises the “political dimension of the encounter between the self and the other”(11). “Performance uses the performer’s body to pose a question about the inability to secure the relation between subjectivity and the body per se” (150-151). Like the invisible female, the self is seen as ultimately lost and “in that disappearance we are made to feel again the grief of our own essential absence from our deepest selves”(35). The ‘disappearance’ of performance is constructed as an equivalent to the nature of subjectivity. This self-absence becomes important in our relations with others as it is an acknowledgement of this lack which can construct a different (intersubjective) relationship between self (looker) and other (image). As Phelan observes;

This new relation between the looker and the image of the other requires more attention to communicating nonvisible, rhetorically unmarked aspects of identity, and a greater willingness to accept the impotency of the inward gaze. If we could accept that impotency and loss, we would not have to press quite so hard on the visible configurations of the other.

We might be able to give up […] the particular configurations of power and desire which inform and infect our external gaze (26-27).

In *Unmarked* Phelan provides a variety of aesthetic, economic, social and cultural critiques via an analysis of live and mediatized forms, including that of multi-media performance. Extending from this analysis, as Auslander suggests, Phelan could be seen to invest in live performance “as a social and politically oppositional discourse [based on] ontological differences between live and mediatized representations” (159).

Auslander takes up an antithetical stance and claims that Phelan’s attempt to isolate performance from mediatized culture is based on a tautology, “To the extent, however, that mediatization, the technology of reproduction, is embedded within the language of live performance itself, performance
cannot claim linguistic independence from mass reproduction”(40). In *Liveness* he identifies a number of writers who appear to valorise the liveness of performance as separate from media orientated forms: “performance theory continues to characterise the relationship between the live and the mediatized as one of opposition, despite the erosion of differences between them”(11). Auslander goes on to provide a number of examples which, he feels, demonstrate the elisions and similarities between performance and mediatized works. He cites the use of media in live events such as pop concerts and big sporting occasions, Broadway theatre and, in a less commercial context, experimental multi-media performance.

Auslander’s argument examines the confusion of rhetorics between live and mediatized forms. He reports, as have others before him, most notably Raymond Williams, how television maintains the illusion of liveness despite the majority of its output being prerecorded. He also quotes the practice of replicating the effects and scenarios of pop videos in the live stage shows of pop acts. He references Michael Kirby’s notion of ‘non matrixed performance’ and deems this to be a performance style originating from the technical demands of film acting which has been adopted by performance practitioners. He also identifies the obscure practice of interactive or franchised plays in which spectators follow a particular character through a narrative. This same play or performance text is franchised out to theatres and can be experienced in a number of different venues across the globe, a phenomena that Auslander sees as equivalent to mass production. These examples all demonstrate a contraction between the live and the mediatized where performance mimics the qualities of media or visa versa; “Whatever distinction we may have supposed there to be between live and mediatized events is collapsing

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39 Michael Kirby wrote about his theories of matrixed and non-matrixed performance in relation to the work of the Happenings movement. He proposed that the performance style utilised in Happenings could be termed non-matrixed as opposed to the ‘matrixed’ style employed in conventional theatre works where the meaning of the work is created through a matrix consisting of notions of character and text in order to create the fictional ‘other’ world of the play. Performance uses no such construction and often relies on staging the actual body and/or self of the performer for its ‘dramatic’ effect. These observations are very much a product of their time as nowadays these more theatrical constructions of text and character are frequently utilised or alluded to in performance work albeit often in a deconstructed fashion. Furthermore it is interesting to note, as Auslander himself acknowledges, that Kirby considers film acting to be a matrixed form of performing, a position which contradicts Auslander’s.
because live events are becoming more and more identical with mediatized ones”(32). This supposition leads him to conclude; “thinking about the relationship between live and mediatized forms in terms of ontological oppositions is not especially productive because there are few grounds on which to make significant ontological distinctions”(51).

By dismissing Phelan’s ontological premise which identifies performance as distinct from mediatized forms Auslander can then go on to claim that “Disappearance, existence only in the present moment is not then an ontological quality of live performance that distinguishes it from modes of technical reproduction. Both live performance and the performance of mediatization are predicated on disappearance”(45). In order to establish this disappearance of the mediatized, Auslander recalls the electron scan of the tv screen and the minute erosion of magnetic particles that take place each time a video tape is passed across a playback head. Once Auslander has abolished disappearance as an exclusively performance phenomenon he is then able to question Phelan’s ideological stand point; “I doubt very strongly that any cultural discourse can actually stand outside the ideologies of capital and reproduction that define mediatized culture or should be expected to do so, even to assume an oppositional stance”(40).

This undermines, therefore, Phelan’s assertion which positions performance as a socially and politically oppositional force, oppositional in that through its disappearance it resists certain reproductive laws of patriarchal capitalism.

Whilst I acknowledge that in modern day culture it is indeed difficult to distinguish between the live and the mediatized I am not convinced that Auslander’s primarily technological arguments justifies his dismissal of an ontological difference between live performance and the mediatized record; the notion that imperceptible fragments of metal particles are erased each time a video tape is watched is clearly very different from the moment by moment ‘disappearance’ experienced while watching a live event which can never be reproduced identically in the future. However I would also like to believe that the reductive stabilities invoked by recorded forms can, to some extent, be diffused or put to productive use within cultural contexts in similar terms to Phelan’s championing of performance. Moreover I suspect that
multi-media performance, because it combines the different treatments of
time and space afforded by the two mediums of expression, the live and the
mediatized, can provide insights into and a critique of a contemporary
culture and society which lives in and through media.

The Auslander versus Phelan debate clearly impacts upon the specific
subject of multi-media performance where the two potentially divergent
forms of the live and the mediatized are worked in close association with
one another. If we are to accept Auslander's interpretation, multi-media
performance is a manifestation of the absorption of all aspects of life into a
mediatized culture and, therefore, an example of the impossibility of
existence or expression outside of this culture and the wider ideologies that
this culture represents of capital and reproduction. Similarly, if we are to
follow Phelan, due to its incorporation of reproductive media, multi-media
performance might “betray[s] and lessen[s] the promise of its own ontology”
partly depriving performance of its defining quality of disappearance and
therefore its ability to expose and critique the all-encompassing rules which
determine visibility in a patriarchal capitalist society. This then, I believe, is
the particular challenge for multi-media performance, what interrogation, if
any, can it supply of contemporary, media driven, society? As a form which
plays with the meeting of two potential opposites can it provide an
intervention into the languages and consequences of this mediatized
culture or is it merely doomed to repeat its logics?

1.7 The Undocumentable Event

When attempting to answer this question a dilemma is encountered which
feeds back into the argument concerning performance documentation. As
Phelan observes “To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of
performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter
the event itself”(148). A piece of writing can operate in much the same way
as any visual record; it is not context specific, it can be returned to time and
again at the will of the reader, it does not and will not change, like visual
records, “Writing is an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same”
(Phelan 149). The written word persists through time and space and, when
employed as a form of performance documentation, potentially neutralises
the ingredients which give performance its efficacy: presence, risk, interaction, context. More challenging still, in relation to performance and its documentation, is the particular form of multi-media performance. This work often pivots around precisely the difference between the live phenomenon and the recorded or mediatized one. Once this work is documented on video tape, or other recording media, this dialectic has been reduced to a monologue, all actions are represented as records and therefore the difference, as experienced in the live multi-media performance, is no longer present, is no longer perceivable and therefore cannot be effective. However, if some form of analysis is to be made of multi-media performance a strategy must be devised to work within this documentational stalemate, as Phelan says;

It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself (148).

In this sentiment Phelan is echoing that of Roland Barthes who calls for a performative ‘Text’ in response to the changes made to an understanding of writing by the work of authors such as Mallarmé, Valéry, Proust, the Surrealists and linguistic theory:

The fact is that writing can no longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, ‘depiction’; rather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative, a rare verbal form in which the enunciation has no other context than, the act by which it is uttered (Image 144-145).

These observations concerning the impasse of performance documentation and the need for performative records/writing clearly have consequences for this study. Just as the discourse of my ‘history of multi-media performance’ was problematised by performance’s destabilisation of the art object, likewise any descriptive and analytical writing of my own

40 These are four experiential qualities of performance which are often described as ‘lost’ in subsequent documentation. This was the subject of Nick Kaye’s keynote address “Resisting the Document” delivered to the “Documentation and Devising” conference organised by the Centre for Performance Research in Cardiff, February 1993. A response to some of the issues raised at this meeting were published in The Drama Review in “Theatre/Archaeology” written by Mike Pearson and Julian Thomas, 38.4. 1994.
practice is conditioned by its performative origins, as Schieffelin writes “It is precisely the performativity of performance for which there is no analogue in text”(198). Phelan has declared “the interaction between the art object and the spectator is, essentially, performative”(147). This interactive exchange is privileged and foregrounded by the practice of performance itself and it is also the reason why the ‘theatrical’ was so despised by critics such as Fried, as it demonstrated the myth of the autonomous art object they valorised. By emphasising the art encounter as performative and thus ‘in process’, determined in part by the subjectivity and context of individual spectators, performance disrupts notions of a ‘true’, ‘real’ or ‘accurate’ meaning of a work as these terms now become varied and unstatic, subject to different individuals and contexts. Therefore, for my document to engage productively with the medium of multi-media performance as a form of academic research some form of documentational position must be devised to overcome these performative problems.

As has already been stated by Feral, the video document provides performance with a past and thus makes performance available for scrutiny. What must be achieved, however, is a sense of both the expense and the benefit of the document, what has been lost and what gained, in the words of Barthes, a text “which goes to the limit of the rules of enunciation” (Image 157). A performative document may reveal the limitations of and differences between the form of performance and the form of the record by placing the performative ‘now’ in the ‘recovered now’ of the document. In this sense this document becomes akin to the original project of my art work which, through a synthesis of performance with media, aims to introduce the performative into the mediatized. Therefore in order to progress my project I have devised a form of presentation for this research which, I hope, goes some way towards maintaining a vital synergy between my multi-media performance and its analytical document.

In her article on documentation, “Best Betrayal” Melzer quotes Danielle Sallenare, “One must accept that that which is lost, is lost in order to produce something completely different, a new artistic object, a creation” (2:266). Both my practice and my theory are my study or my art - which term is used in what context is merely a question of semantic emphasis.
Foremost, as a Ph.D. by Practice document I wish my multi-media performance work to be present within this text, partly to illustrate particular arguments but partly because the work itself contains a critique of the issues under examination. Restaging every work would not be practical, nor could it genuinely be included into the body of this text and remain a multi-media performance. Therefore I have relied on video documentation to provide at least some visual and aural continuity with the live performances. And this video documentation is integrated into my writing via the technologies of multimedia presentation in the form of a digital versatile disk. A DVD is a multimedia solution to a multi-media problem. By using a DVD, unlike a linear medium such as video tape, a reader/viewer is able to locate precisely individual video examples and is therefore allowed to move more easily between the text and the video and more quickly amongst the video examples themselves. Furthermore, on a DVD I am able to present, simultaneously, different ‘versions’ of the original performance as documented which prevents the view of the performance being reduced to a unitary representation and thus problematises the omnipotent gaze of the documenting camera in sympathy with the fractured spectatorial position of much performance work. Through the use of such technology I am attempting to suture my performance documentation with my writing in such a way that the reader cannot avoid the combination and dissonances of the discourses.

I will not pretend that this document provides a complete vehicle back to the meaning and intentions of the work as originally performed, as Phelan observes performative writing “can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive”(149). Nor is this DVD and its synchronous screens the perfect solution to the documentation of multi-media performance, or the integration of text with moving images for the purposes of reflective practice presentations. In Melzer’s article on the documentation of performance Mario de Marinis says “I will be subjective, partial, elusive and incomplete” (2:263) and I aspire to do likewise in the belief that it is in this realm of the unresolved that certain relations can be revealed. In this thesis presentation I am interested in establishing a way of interacting with information: linguistically, rhetorically and visually, which throws into relief some of the issues that underpin this research; namely
the consequences of the live and/or mediatized experience, its differences and its effects. Indeed it is this issue that I believe is figured in the meeting of performance and mediatized moments. Admittedly, studies and/or art works which confess to being “subjective, partial, elusive and incomplete” may engender frustrations in their audiences. However, in an age of ‘liquid information’, determined in the most part by the ubiquity of media operations, the acceptance that some information will just not transfer, that it is as context-dependent as a fish is to water, may be enlightening, particularly if it is just this fantasy of omnipresence that is potentially deconstructed by one’s chosen research subject.
CHAPTER TWO

ON TIME AND SPACE
CONSTANTS: A FUTURE PERFECT

2.1 Constants: A Future Perfect

The multi-media performance Constants: A Future Perfect was produced in collaboration with the performance company Bodies in Flight. The collaborating team consisted of a writer, Simon Jones; a choreographer, Sara Giddens, and a sound designer, Darren Bourne.¹ I was responsible for initiating, developing and realising the multi-media element of the performance. The work was funded by The Arts Council of England and was presented at the Arnolfini, Bristol and The Bonington Gallery, Nottingham. Constants II was concerned with the subject of time and specifically old age; an experience embodied by one of the performers of the piece, the seventy four year old Sheila Gilbert. Text, movement and media elements were used to establish a dialogical relationship between Sheila and a young, twenty two year old, performer Patricia Breatnach. The interaction between the bodies of the performers, spoken dialogue and mediatized imagery provoked a consideration of the encounter with old age while engaging the audience in a consideration of these events in relation to their own lives.

Constants II is a performance work in the sense outlined by Feral in that it foregrounds the body of the performer and makes it the subject of the performance.² The two speaking protagonists represent first and foremost themselves, that is the fact of their bodily existence and it is this that is performed in a specific, non-fictive time and space. Feral observes that:

Performance rejects all illusion, in particular theatrical illusion [...] and attempts instead to call attention to certain aspects of

¹ The full title of this multi-media performance is Constants: A Future Perfect. Throughout this chapter I shall refer to the work as Constants II in order to distinguish it from an earlier single screen video work of the same title which I completed in 1994 and from which the title of this performance piece was taken. Constants II also indicates that this work took place in two stages, the first stage, Constants I resulted a work-in-progress production performed at the Bonington Gallery in July 1998.

² Feral’s words are “performance subjects the performers body” (171 my emphasis).
the body - the face, gestural mimicry, and the voice - that would normally escape notice. To this end, it turns to the various media - telephoto lenses, still cameras, movie cameras, video screens, television - which are there like so many microscopes to magnify the infinitely small and focus the audience’s attention (171).

One of the functions of the mediatized elements in *Constants II* was to facilitate a form of visual scrutiny, creating images which dwelt upon the texture of elderly flesh and which permitted detailed close ups. Yet, the media in the performance did not merely provide a visual means to “focus the audience’s attention”. The media apparatus constructed a sense of the human as a mediatized entity and furthermore pointed towards the consequences of this in terms of our perceptions in and of mediatized culture in general. The performance was worked in three ‘parts’ or sections and the media in *Constants II* traced a trajectory through the performance working from live images to recorded ones via four stages, or ‘orders’, of mediatization.

The performance space was divided into three areas: four walls and an empty perimeter ‘track’ enclosing a circular cluster of audience, monitors and operators in the mid part of the space, all of which were grouped round an empty circular hub.

Vid. 2. *Constants II* - Audience enters.

Eight small television monitors were dispersed amongst the audience who sat isolated on separate chairs facing the televisions. The performers moved around the perimeter walls of the performance space, in and amongst the audience and finally into the empty central area. During the performance identical images were shown across the eight television
screens, each image corresponding with one of the four preordained ‘orders’ of mediatization. The first order was of live images produced by miniature, portable black and white cameras; the second order were recordings of these images made during the show; recordings made with the same cameras prior to the start of the performance constitute the third order; and the fourth order was prerecorded material originated on DV (Digital Video) which had been treated in post production prior to the performance. There were therefore varying degrees of separation in time between the production of a particular image and its reproduction on the screen, ranging from the instantaneous live-relayed camera images through to pictures played back minutes after their origination, hours, days, or even months. The use of these four ‘orders’ did not follow a uniformly linear trajectory from live through to recorded within the show, but circled back and repeated elements while progressing from one order to the next.

The simultaneous production and reproduction of live camera images immediately complicates the live/recorded paradox outlined in the opening chapter by providing a version of a mediatized image, via the live camera, that is not directly bound up with reproduction. A camera image does not automatically designate a recorded image and not all camera images are records (for example the images seen in a camera obscura or on live broadcast television). In Constants II, as with all multi-media performance, the media creates part of its effect by the different treatment it affords of time and space. However, in its use of live cameras Constants II introduces an alternative to the diametric differences in time and space effected by live and recorded modes (see table 1.). The products of cameras in Constants II display a certain ‘liveness’ and therefore emphasise attributes normally associated with performance.

The show begins with Sheila walking slowly around the perimeter of the performance space, supporting herself on the walls. At first she moves clockwise and then changes direction, as she does so images appear on all of the television screens. These images are produced by four black and white miniature cameras placed in each corner of the room.
These cameras render the figure constantly visible and form an electronic panopticon. At the moment when Sheila passes beyond one camera’s point of view, the image is modified by a cut to the next camera in the circuit, and Sheila begins her journey from long shot to close up all over again. These pictures, with their sequential switching and grainy black and white tone deliberately allude to the all pervasive images of closed circuit television surveillance (CCTV). Using cameras in such a way conforms to the powerful cultural conception of the camera as omnipotent and more specifically the gaze of the camera as an all-seeing entity, as John Berger observes in About Looking “Has the camera replaced the eye of God?” (53). This sense of technological scopic dominance provides any image produced by a camera lens with a certain powerful status. As Constants II continues, this notion of the camera as omnipotent is problematised when the performers begin to handle the cameras and manipulate the images they produce. This action draws the omnipotent gaze of the camera toward a more partial and subjective version of vision.

As Sheila makes her way around the performance space she does not acknowledge the presence of the cameras which track her every move. Towards the end of the opening sequence, however, she addresses her speech to one of the corner cameras.
This direct address demonstrates a marked shift in attitude towards the mediatized elements within the performance; firstly it acknowledges the cameras as operating within the space and contributing to the overall performance through their display of images; secondly, and more importantly, it collapses the performer into their screen representation as the performer now seems to address the audience directly from the television thus suggesting some form of effective equivalence between the screen image and the performer. Sheila has become mediatized, and instead of turning to face the audience or her fellow performer Patricia, she addresses them via the intermediary device of the television screen. In turn Patricia chooses to answer via the same ‘medium’. Each audience member is figuratively ‘faced’ by Sheila and Patricia as they stare into the camera and deliver their lines. This is in stark contrast to the two performers actual physical positioning within the performance space as they stand in opposite corners with their backs to the audience. The contraction of the physical space into the mediatized space indicates yet another collapse, in this case, of the camera into the screen. Although the image displayed is separated in space from its bodily source, this spatial distance is obliterated by the live camera’s instantaneous relay which electronically repositions its subject/object into the television screen.

Interestingly the performers’ appeal to - or rather through - the cameras establishes a definite viewing hierarchy for the first time in the multi-media performance. The ‘CCTV’ cameras provide an uninterrupted view of Sheila as she moves around the walls; the audience is able to watch this action as her unmediatized figure passes near or in front of them. Therefore, despite the omnipotent gaze of the cameras, the audience can also experience this
performance by looking directly at the live body. This arrangement encourages a comparative equivalence between the two different views of the same live action, one direct, the other mediatized. However, once the performers have their backs to the audience, the images produced by the cameras supersede the bodies of the live performers. The screen is therefore privileged as it appears to provide ‘more information’ - a facial/vocal encounter - in the absence of any direct performance. In so doing, a hierarchy of viewing is established where the screen performer takes precedence over the embodied one. Consecutively, as soon as the screen begins to be utilised as a surrogate performer, another sequence follows which complicates this notion. Patricia picks up the camera from its corner fixing and begins to move with it.

Vid. 5. **Constants II** - Camera Dance

The ‘Camera Dance’ immediately marks the space of the camera lens and the space of the performer as once more distinct, opening out the differences between camera, screen and body which had previously been conflated. While we watch Patricia dance we see her whole body move, and at the same time, she points a camera back at herself. Between Patricia’s dancing figure and the seated spectator, a screen, or number of screens, provide a view of the mediatized version of the dance. In this scenario the previously ‘invisible’ omnipotent camera becomes another object in the performance; it also allows the screen image to become a variation of this performance. The difference between the mediatized version and the activity of the live body within the performance space also establishes the performing body extended in three dimensional space as a distinct and separate entity from that pictured on the screen. These separations encourage a different perspective on mediatized images from those
previously figured in the work. The coexistence of the two different versions of the dance, the body and its mediatized image, provoke a comparison and through this comparison expose the action of the lens upon the body. The moving body that is watched directly is seen as a whole. This sense is derived from an understanding of space as described by Henri Bergson in *Matter and Memory*; “space, by definition, is outside us […] a part of space appears to us to subsist even when we cease to be concerned with it”(206). Even though the eye may shift and concentrate its gaze upon particular features of the body, this does not exclude the body in its entirety. The camera performs a similar selection and prioritising of vision as the eye, but what it ‘sees’ is determined by its operator and the angle of its lens which can at times exclude the whole body from the frame. The body delivered to the screen has been severed from its space; when the body is converted to a mediatized image it becomes partial and fragmented and that which is excluded by the lens becomes extraneous, no longer present to any sense.

The camera in the Camera Dance becomes a butcher that visually dismembers the performer. This has, of course, always been characteristic of the lens; however it is the immediate juxtaposition of the live mediatized image with the performing body, contained within the performance space which makes this characteristic so distinctive. In this context these camera images are seen as partial and specific and furthermore they can be identified as the products of a human operator. The establishment of a more ‘subjective’ identity for the camera once more allows a parity of views to be constructed between the mediatized and the unmediatized and neither version can be said to have ascendancy over the other. This lack of a viewing hierarchy does not automatically denote similarity between the screen image and the performer, indeed, these two views are radically different from one another and therefore do not facilitate a conflation of performer with screen image. This more subjective camera functions in contrast to the apparently robust totalising camera figured in the opening sequence.
The preceding extract (see Vid. 6.) demonstrates a departure from the strictly ‘live’ quality of the mediatized images in *Constants II* and marks a liminal moment between the live mediatized image and its recorded reproduction. During the show a number of different video effects are generated by a vision mixer and are occasionally added to the live mediatized images. These effects mediate between the signal from the cameras and the signal that is sent to the television screens, and in so doing, problematise the notion of the camera as a neutral conduit of visual information. When the light reflected by an object is interrupted by a camera an ‘interpretation’ occurs. In the case of an electronic camera, the object is translated into a flat grid of pixels with various electronic charges and these charges relate to the light and dark areas reflected by the object, with the brightest portions provoking the highest electric charge. In this sense light is transformed into electricity and thus becomes a malleable medium which can be altered and changed at will. A vision mixer acts as a nexus for camera signals, it facilitates smooth transitions between disparate sources and also allows changes to be made to these signals on an electrical level.

In the previous sequence a strobe effect was applied to the images produced by Patricia’s camera at the end of her ‘Camera Dance’. A strobe effect alters the output of the mixer; instead of outputting one new frame every 1/25th of a second as determined by the standard PAL video signal, the effects board in the mixer momentarily captures a single frame and outputs the same image repeatedly until the next frame is captured and held. This freezing and updating can continue indefinitely and the length of time each still image is displayed may be altered on a sliding scale which is determined by the internal strobe rate of the particular mixer. The strobe
gives a jerky, interrupted appearance to movement and thereby creates a separation between the screen’s representation of movement, in this instance Patricia’s dance, and the smooth flow of her actual body. This electronic intervention, like the ‘Camera Dance’ itself, prevents the simple collapse of performer into the screen because the mediatized image is so clearly divergent in its movements from the image the audience experiences of the unmediatized body. Furthermore the strobe effect disrupts the performance on more than just an imagistic level, it also alters a sense of performance time. As Phelan has noted performance privileges the present yet in this mediatized performance micro moments of the present are caught by the strobe and stopped, like temporary records which immediately implicate the present into the past.\(^3\) Another mixer effect emphasises this dynamic even more vividly - the freeze frame.

Vid. 7. Constants II - “full of it”

Once more this hiatus in the mediatized image disrupts the unity between the performer and her screen representation. After delivering her line Patricia moves away from the camera, however her image remains fixed on the screen. Unlike the time of performance, which will always run on, ‘mediatized time’ gets stuck. This difference in mediatized time and performance time is encapsulated in the body of the performer herself. A performer can create a frozen moment by holding a static pose, but this stasis can only ever reference a pause in time - it can never be one. However proficient the performer's freeze, even in stillness, the body pulsates with life and every body knows/feels this to be true via their own visceral, corporal experience. Electronics, like photography, can create pauses and freezes which are altogether more convincing because these forms of image making are preceded upon a certain control of time and

\(^3\) “Performance’s only life is in the present” (Phelan p. 146)
space and convert light into electrical or chemical data for just this purpose. When a freeze frame is activated on a vision mixer it holds 1/25th of a second’s worth of time and repeatedly sends out the same frame through its circuitry in a configuration of frequency which has originated in a past moment. Although this image is ‘created’ by a scanning electron beam on the back of a television screen once every 1/25th of a second, this image has its origin in a past moment and allows no signs of life such as movement or change.

The vision mixer was also used for another purpose in the composition of the multi-media contribution to the show Constants II. As well as providing a variety of visual effects, the primary function of a vision mixer is to switch (or mix) between source input signals. The shifting between different camera views in the opening ‘Round the Walls’ sequence was achieved by live cutting, selecting different camera signals for output, the sequence and timing of these cuts were dependent upon Sheila’s progress around the room. However, a vision mixer can also facilitate a change between different inputs over time, these are called transition effects and most commonly take the form of a dissolve or a wipe. Instead of creating an abrupt change from one source image to another (a cut) a transition effect allows two source pictures to coexist together on the screen over a period of time, thereby softening the shift from one view to another. A wipe moves a new picture to cover and ‘wipe over’ a preexisting one, but a dissolve blends two signals together across the whole picture surface and allows an operator to determine how much of each signal is ‘output’ at any one moment in time. Because transition effects occur through time this allows, at the level of the screen, a merging between two spaces which would be impossible in the undifferentiated three dimensional performing space. Thus space as mediatized is able to contradict Bergson’s observation on space; “there cannot be in the same place several things at the same time”(139).
In both the above examples the vision mixer allows a merging of bodies to occur on an imagistic level. The layering of space afforded by the media apparatus now causes a core metaphor of the piece to be illustrated. A central axis of the work is the young and old in relation to one another. This association suggests a mother/daughter relationship, but there is also the implication that the performers represent the same person at different stages in a single life span. The images of the two women are merged by a partial dissolve, and their bodies momentarily inhabit the same space at the same time. In this way the mediatizing elements of the work are able to make graphic a suggestion that is already present via the bodily coexistence of young and old in the same performance. By layering space and time mediatization is performing a physical impossibility and breaking the performance away from a notion of a singular time and space.

A vision mixer is also able to develop this idea beyond just layering one body with another; it also has the ability to select particular luma (light) or chroma (colour) frequencies within individual source inputs and substitute this part of the picture information with images from another source input. This is called keying. Towards the end of the show, for example, Sheila tracks a camera across her face, body and hands while Patricia speaks into another lens. These two pictures are combined causing part of Sheila’s image to show through the dark areas of Patricia’s mouth and face. At the
level of the screen, parts of Sheila have merged with Patricia. Both bodies are seen as one entity and are incorporated.

Vid. 9. Constants II - End Key

The live recorded

As has already be seen, Constants II opened with the performer, Sheila Gilbert, walking around the walls of the performance space watched by four video cameras. Whilst these images were being outputed to the television screens they were also sent simultaneously to a digital video recording deck and recorded onto tape. At a mid point in this opening sequence the live surveillance camera images were substituted for the recorded video information which had been stored only seconds previously.

Vid. 10. Constants II - Round the Walls II

Because the space and image quality of the recorded version was identical to the mediatized live version and because the action was repetitive, it was difficult for an audience to deduce that a split had been made between the live action previously seen on the screen and the screen image as a recorded playback. The spectator had to alternate his or her attention between the screen and the performer to ascertain a difference. This action
was made all the more problematic because the operations of the technology had, prior to the moment of playback, encouraged an audience to see what occurred on the screen as live and equivalent to the performance. The audience’s attention is diffused by the ‘stage’ configuration and the movement of the performers; crossing in and out of sight-lines the performers move around the perimeter walls and disappear behind the audience. Within this dispersal the screens provide, via the surveillance cameras, a fixed and continuous view of the performance which is visible to the whole audience. An exchange of focus from the live to the mediatized is encouraged by the understanding that the images on the screen are congruent with the action, they are live images and present the same space and time. This allows an audience to substitute their immediate, unmediatized and incomplete view of the action for the apparently superior, complete version offered by the camera/screen. Thus, when the image as a video playback is finally, if ever, perceived, this acts as a warning about particular assumptions and investments of equivalence made in the screen. Just as a mixer effect can freeze a moment in time, a recorded moving image can cause time to loop in a way that is not possible in day to day existence, as Sheila says “You were in some groove and you got stuck” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye) and her image endlessly repeats her walk around the walls.

Media apparatus permits the reproduction of time. A loop is caused by committing a portion of time, in the form of moving action or sound, to a recording carrier base and then repeatedly playing this back. A form of doubling then occurs in our experience of time within the performance. Whilst we perceive the loop from moment to moment in the present, the object of our attention is not progressing through the same temporal dimension, thus time is seen (or heard) as repetitive. In Constants II this characteristic is utilised to provoke a realisation about the consequences of mediatization upon experiences of time and space. The ‘Round the Walls’ playback appears to maintain a continuity of space and action between the screen image and the performance and therefore a continuity of present time is also assumed. It is only when the stage action radically departs from

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4 Carrier Base is a term used by Roy Armes in On Video and refers to any medium which fixes and records information such as images or sounds. Armes also cites examples of clay tablets, engraved stones, papyrus, parchment, paper prior to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries invention of gramophone records, celluloid film and electromagnetic tape (16).
that represented on the screen that a difference between the two can be identified. This separation then allows the performance to claim a privileged relationship with live, present time and exposes the duplicitous nature of the recorded image which has disguised its detachment from time by presenting a spatial and rhythmic continuity with the live event. The recorded camera image, in this instance, is shown to approximate space. This is possible because a lens simplifies space and reduces it to a flat visual representation devoid of colour and without detail. Because the recorded representation bears some of the same marks as the live manifestation of the space, its image becomes an acceptable substitute for the original three dimensional room and no significant difference is perceived between the two. It is only when the live diverges from the screen image that the mediatized is understood as reproduction and a difference is perceived. Therefore, recorded moving images could be said to masquerade as a form of life or liveness and this masquerade is exposed when records (as reproductions) are placed in close proximity to the progressive flow of their original live objects.

The only other time that a show recording was played back in Constants II was towards the end of the piece, thus forming a transition into the final sequence. After the ‘Round the Walls’ playback, recording of the vision mixer output recommenced, in effect committing all the mediatized images seen on the screens to digital video tape. As the work moved from part two into part three, this recorded show tape was rewound at high speed and the resulting images were relayed to the television screens.

Vid. 11. Constants II - Rewind

All of the past moments of the performance (or at least those which had
been mediatized) are now shown to the spectators. Again this replaying of a recording made during the show produces a double layering of time. Like the strobe effect before it, present moments are thrown into the past. The speed of this replay contains an element of quasi violence; the moments of the performance which had, until now, only occurred in present time now reoccur and become concretised, identified as past. The multi-media performance is pulled inexorably back to its beginning moments and, as it returns, its images break up and fragment. The violence of this action lies in its destabilisation of the present, it shows the present now to be the past, and instantly asserts the authority of the record which can capture the present and re-present it. Therefore present time is figured as insubstantial, and the record claims a securing power which offers a stable, fixed past/present colonising the ephemeral lived present. The present of this performance is effaced as it is re-membered by the record. However, as has been emphasised in earlier sequences, the mediatized version of the present is not an equivalent of the live, unmediatized, present, it has been reduced to a two dimensional black and white movie by the action of the camera lens and, within the record itself, the speed of the tape transport system which carries the time/tape back over the playback head omits and erodes details of the recorded spaces and actions.

The recorded live

The third order of mediatization consists of a recording that was made in the performance space prior to the audience's arrival. Called ‘Ghost Sequence’, a camera was used to provide a subjective point of view shot which represented a person who was absent from the space but whose presence was recalled by dialogue between Sheila and Patricia. This televisual spectre was sutured into the live mediatized performance image by means of a moment of video feedback which provided a section of indistinct visual imagery at which the live camera images could be substituted for the prerecorded material. The audience only became aware of this alteration when the images shown on the screen become ‘impossible’ in relation to the live performance.
The movement of the camera in the ‘Ghost Sequence’ is erratic and manic; the sequence thus uses the rhetoric of mainstream horror films to reference a ‘haunting spirit’. However, the consequences of these images in relation to the live performance take the sequence beyond pure trickery and spectacle. Significantly the camera presents a novel point of view. Previously the camera images have either been controlled by the performers and/or have been inhabited by the faces and bodies of the performers. Hovering many metres above the ground the new camera images are severed from the bodies - disembodied - and therefore, without a material body, now indicate an immaterial presence. Not only is the camera transformed into an absent performer in this sequence, the audience is also made absent, disembodied by the mediatized images which show a performance space complete with performers, furniture and operating hardware but no audience. Because these images have been deceitfully inserted into a mediatized space in which a sense of the live has prevailed, the first reaction to the new order is not to sense it as a record but to feel one’s self as absent from the scene.

The ‘camera spirit’ appears to share approximately the same space as the audience and it is therefore possible to construct ‘the spirit’ as the present manifestation of a past body. This interpretation is supported by Sheila’s dialogue, “You know, he is here now, with me” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye). There is, however, in the televisual absence of the audience, a palpable difference between the stage space and the screen space which threatens to disrupt our understanding of this image as a live presence in the present time of the performance. Nevertheless, I believe that this contradiction is resolved by a variety of logics which are constructed through
the multi-media performance. In the ‘Ghost Sequence’ the mediatized images make a claim to represent a reality as they present similar spaces and actions to those performed live and perceived by the audience. The only inconsistency between the screen and stage space lies in the absent figures of the audience. This absence can be accommodated by an understanding of the psychological functioning of the individual as spectator, a description of which is provided by John-Paul Sartre in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre describes ‘the voyeur’ peering through a keyhole, immersed and preoccupied by what he sees, he is utterly unaware of himself. As the feminist film theorist Kaja Silverman notes in her analysis of the psychology and politics of vision, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, “This ‘nothingness’ is paradoxically synonymous with a certain transcendence - a transcendence of spectacle, of the body, and, ultimately, of self”(164). I do not believe that the audience of a multi-media performance work is able to easily occupy this position of ‘the voyeur’ (as the act of watching is foregrounded in this multi-media performance as I shall argue later on in this chapter). However, I do think that an audience may well have an understanding of this form of spectatorship which stems from other modes of viewing initiated within more dominant forms of visual culture, such as television and film. Using these dominant spectatorial positions which function in relation to a screen, a spectator is able to construct a rationale for his or her disappearance within the multi-media performance event. The familiar position of the voyeur accounts for a lack of presence for an audience who are immersed in a visual spectacle. In this sense the image on the screen during the ‘Ghost Sequence’ illustrates the effect of the screen. The event, however, is not reduced to a purely visual encounter and the performance also maintains an awareness of a multisensory liveness through the bodily presence of the performers. This rationale allows two spaces, one prerecorded, the other live, to coexist as equally plausible with the present of the performance.

Another more historical and technically oriented argument could also be mobilised to explain the audience’s absence from the screen without disrupting the present presence of the ghost in *Constants II*. Since the earliest days of photography the camera has been utilised to see what the eye alone cannot perceive, Edvard Muyerbridge’s photographs of a
cantering horse provide the most famous example of this application. For over one hundred and fifty years the camera has been proved to ‘see’ differently from the human eye. Camera images can be automated and provide sight and pictures beyond the limitations of our physical bodies, and for this reason these images are sometimes seen as superior and can position the camera as a device that supersedes so-called ‘natural’ vision. The idea that the camera can operate beyond the eye infuses present day formations of visual culture and is one reason for the characterisation of the camera as ‘omnipotent’. These cultural assumptions are reinforced by the rhetoric surrounding, for example, virtual reality devices. As Kevin Robins observes “New technologies are not only amplifying the powers of vision, they are also changing its nature (to include what was previously classified as invisible or unseeable)”(156). With an understanding of the vision of cameras as different from humans it is possible to construct a rationale in which the ‘technological’ view of the ghost camera can show a different version of reality from that perceived by the eyes of the audience. This similarly allows a sense of two versions of the same space, or realities, to coexist in present time.

The transformation of recorded time and space into the present time and space of live performance inverts the action of the mediatized record as figured in the rapid rewind section. Here the present was subsumed into the past with a violence that made it difficult to conceive of present time as significant or robust in any way. In the ‘Ghost Sequence’ recorded mediatized images are used to create the opposite effect. What was recorded in the past is now reinvoked in the present. This is reminiscent of the reproductive power of records, particularly of the still photograph as a means of summoning objects out of the past. This desire to relive the past is most poignantly demonstrated by Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida. In this book he searches for a photograph of his dead mother, a photograph which will cause him to ‘announce’ her in the present with the cry - “there-she-is!”, an exclamation that simultaneously maintains the photograph’s evidential position “that-has-been” (113). This contradictory co-existence of past and present tense makes recorded media analogous with ‘pure memory’ as described by Bergson; “pure memory [...] interests no part of my body. No doubt it will beget sensations as it materializes, but at that very
moment it will cease to be a memory and pass into the state of a present thing, something actually lived" (139).

The prerecorded

The fourth order of mediatized material in Constants II was originally created for the first work-in-progress stage of the piece and was recorded months prior to those performances. The material was shot on a colour digital video camera which produced a superior image quality from the cameras used in the show. It was then treated and edited in post production. Two prerecorded sequences were used; the first was a ‘Hand Sequence’ which was shown in the middle part of the work. Sheila and Patricia sat opposite one another across the empty central circle each facing a television, and as the screens showed a prerecorded choreography of Sheila’s hands, Sheila echoed these moves, and Patricia performed a larger sequence of movements, whilst remaining seated.

Vid. 13. Constants II - Hands Sequence

The prerecorded hands introduce a new element within the multi-media performance by foregrounding Sheila’s elderly flesh. Although Sheila moves in close proximity through and around the audience, the clinical nature of the camera allows a study of the surface of the recorded performer not possible in a live encounter. A detailed look at the image is encouraged; the hands move in slow motion, disembodied by the tight framing of the shot and are isolated against a black background. The flesh is marked by age, and the images themselves fragment, blur and disintegrate, emerging and disappearing into the dark. Prior to this sequence of images Sheila has announced “Where does time go. It vanishes and stretches. In my bones.”
And very soon that's all there'll be left of me. Which will be not me” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye). The disintegrating, disappearing images of Sheila’s hands suggests the fragility and mortality of the body. In this way the recorded past performs a different function in relation to time than those figured at other points in the show. Now the recorded image, instead of referencing the past into the present, represents the future, when the body of Sheila, as an old woman, will be made absent through death.

Constants II concludes with a long prerecorded sequence which plays across the television screens while Sheila sits in the empty circular ‘hub’ of the performance space. The end sequence begins with the layering of Sheila’s face with Patricia’s face to form a conglomerate identity using a live partial dissolve (see Vid. 8.). This visual material then blends into similar prerecorded images, blurring the transitional edge between the live and the recorded material. These images resolve into a picture of Sheila’s face which then begins to merge and disappear in a manner reminiscent of the earlier hand sequence. As if she can guess what these pictures presage, Sheila holds her hand up to me, the video operator, and with this gesture pauses the tape.

Vid. 14. Constants II -End Pause

By pausing the video tape Sheila has exerted one final moment of control over the mediatized images which have concluded their trajectory from the performers’ live cameras to a prerecorded source. But even as she delivers her penultimate speech, the relentless progression of time, or, as Bergson expresses it “The essence of time is that it goes by”(137) is manifest in the form of colour which slowly bleeds into the black and white image of Sheila’s frozen face. The addition of colour to the still image repeats the
dual experience of time. Although time as action/movement has been temporally arrested in the mediatized image, present, lived time is insistent and continues. The paused image is, in this configuration, more akin to the paused body of a performer where, despite a freeze, signs of the progression of time (in this instance, the addition of colour) work across the surface of the image, moving Sheila, and all of us, closer to the moment of disappearance. The forward motion of time is pictured as unstoppable and brings with it the suggestion of the inevitability of death. The mediatized elements in this end sequence affect this inevitability but also represent a consideration of the recorded image in relation to this equation with death.

Vid. 15. *Constants II* -End Fade

The persistent properties of light have been contrasted with human frailty in a previous speech by Patricia; “But us. We are the inconstant, fragmentary things. We bleed. We spin and burn. And give everything to light, unstinting. Its lustre. Its hues. Its dusks and its dawns. Its loveliness to behold” ([Bodies in Flight](Bourne and Rye)). Sheila now sits alone in the slowly fading light as her image repeatedly fades from the screens. The recorded material metaphorises her disappearance through death (mirrored by her disappearance at the performance’s end) but also demonstrates her continuation in light. The end of *Constants II* signals the moment at which the image can supersede its referent. Sheila seated, with her eyes closed, is virtually no longer present in the performance space, instead she is represented by her image. Trapped in light, this is the relationship that the bodies of the nearly dead have with the photographs, films and videos that will outlive them. However the body represented is not the body, hence Patricia’s observation “The light is cruel. Not as life is cruel. That harbours malice. Whereas the light is without heart. Even a negative one. Cos light is
constant” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye). It is ironic that, as the work comes to an end, the mediatized images acquire a ‘life-like’ colour. In contrast to the previous monochrome these recorded images heighten the visual rhetoric at the moment in the performance when life becomes life-like (as representation) and the image supersedes its object. In this way recorded images are constructed as equivalent to the ‘future perfect’ tense when human temporality is transformed into an idea of immortality by becoming a recorded image. The record possesses a certain mobility and persistence in relation to time that is impossible for live performance yet within live performance is able to stage the consequences of this trapped light. Most recorded images, like the ‘Ghost Sequence’, act to summon a past into the present; in this configuration, however, like the ‘Hands Sequence’, the recorded image is used to predict a future where Sheila will be replaced by her recorded image. The record, so often associated with the past, is now used to invoke a future state where we are all preserved, outside time, in the perfected form of our recorded image - a future perfect.

2.2 On Time and Space

The preceding pages form a detailed description of the mediatized elements used in Constants II, as well as offering an analysis of the media’s contribution in terms of some of its meanings and effects. As I have proposed, the mediatized aspects of the work derive their effect from the different experiences of time and space which they promote and which run counter to those framed by non mediatized performance work. These mediatized effects can also appear, at times, to shift and contradict one another. What I believe this collaboration with performance affords is a perspective on the separate dynamics of the live and the mediatized which would otherwise remain hidden in the individuated practices of the two mediums. The shifting configurations of time and space in multi-media performance shapes not only performance, but also cameras and their mediatized images, in counter-conventional ways.

Stephen Kern explains how an analysis of time and space exposes “the essential foundations of experience”(5) for a particular epoch. Time and space as experienced in multi-media performance is complicated, thus
destabilising some of the conceptions that we may have of these
dimensions and perhaps enabling us to draw conclusions concerning our
broader experiences within modern mediatized culture. Time is shown to be
malleable: repeated through the loops, strobes, freezes, pauses and
replays of the mediatized. Space is also reconfigured as overlapping and
transferable by keys, dissolves and screen/camera collapses. In a purely
mediatized form, for example a music video, these effects may only be
perceived as a witty technological play - entertainment for the eyes.
However, when these ‘tricks’ are presented in a space which privileges the
live experience, the experiential present time of the viewer, his or her
embodied time, is also foregrounded. This produces a dual experience of
time and space; recorded mediated - time and space as it is re-presented
via the screen - versus living time and space - the moment by moment
experience of the object, performer or mediatized image, as it emerges in
the present. This dual experience of multi-media performance time equates
with Bergson’s description of time as experienced by a person on the edge
of sleep; “Do we not sometimes perceive in ourselves, in sleep, two
contemporaneous and distinct persons one of whom sleeps a few minutes
while the other’s dream fills days and weeks”(207). The same duality of
experience could be said to occur in perceptions of space which, despite a
physically limited visual field, are sensed as whole but simultaneously re-
presented by the screen as once more partial, yet different again from the
individual’s immediate view.

In our day to day existence we may not consider time and space to be
transferable or reproducible. Qualities of time can be either ‘fixed’ by a
notion of what Bergson calls “physicists time” - the homogeneous time of
clocks or, in contrast to the imposition of an external rationale, derived from
the internal biorhythms of the human body. Paul Virilio, taking into account
Einstein’s contribution to the philosophy of time, details this second
proposition in The Vision Machine;

   In short, if the Theory of Relativity maintains that the intervals of
time properly supplied by clock or calendar are not absolute
quantities imposed throughout the universe, the study of
biorhythms reveals them to be the exact opposite: a variable
quantity of sensa (primary sensory data) for which an hour is
more or less an hour, a season more or less than a season (26).²

Bergson, however, also suggests a less absolute, more subjective experience of time

This imaginary homogeneous time is [...] an idol of language [...]. In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many different rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds of consciousness and thereby fix their respective places in the scale of being (207).

What Bergson proposes, therefore, is that there can be no collective overarching totality of time, neither an internal or external one, but that time is determined by the specific condition of consciousness of each individual (no doubt informed, but not completely determined by, clocks and biorhythms).

Nevertheless, in a culture saturated by media we frequently experience time and space as an ever enfolding phenomenon; Kern observes that “electronic communication made it possible for the first time to be in a sense in two places at once”(88). Kern’s book concerns the period 1880 - 1918 and in it he claims to be able “to identify a single thesis that properly encompasses all changes in the experience of time and space that occurred during this period” and he names this thesis “the affirmation of a plurality of times and spaces”(8). Kern ascribes this change partly to the influence of Bergson’s philosophy whose “affirmation of private time radically interiorized the locus of experience”(314).⁶ And he also writes much about the effect of simultaneity induced by communication forms such as wireless telegraphy and the telephone and later the influence of cinema and the ‘contrast’ editing effects of film directors such as D.W.Griffith who were “able to slice open a moment and insert a number of simultaneous activities”(71). These ideas of the plurality of modern time contrast with a notion of time as a one dimensional linear progression, but interestingly Bergson’s analysis also seems to privilege elements of this latter type. In

² All quotations from Paul Virilio in this text are taken from The Vision Machine.

⁶ Bergson’s book Matière et Mêmoire was originally published in France by Presses Universitaris de France in 1896.
Bergson makes a sense of the present dependent upon, the consciousness I have of my body. Having extension in space, my body experiences sensations and at the same time executes movements. Sensations and movements being localized at determined points of this extended body, there can only be, at a given moment, a single system of movements and sensations [...] this system is determined, unique for each moment of duration (138/9).

Therefore there seem to be two conflicting descriptions of time arising from Kern and Bergson; the simultaneous mediatized time of ‘electronic communication’ and the singular, unique moment of time rooted in the body in space. It would seem that multi-media performance places these two experiences in direct proximity and thus contrasts the experience of time dictated by our individual bodies with mediatized time which exerts a control over time and space which supersedes the human and transcends the body.

Past, present, future

Multi-media performance is also able to stage the conventional (assumed) relations that visual records and performance have with notions of past, present and future, and to reconfigure some of these assumptions. Outside of a multi-media form, records (and I am thinking particularly of photographs, but the same could be true of any ‘documenting’ image) project a piece of the past into the present, as Dia Vaughan states in On Documentary they function “as witness borne to the having-been”(184). Inversely, performance, because it has no life other than in the present, could be said, perhaps slightly paradoxically, to be concerned with the future; “could I fix this indivisible present, this infinitesimal element of the curve of time, it is the direction of the future that it would indicate” (Bergson 138). These two experiences, brought together in multi-media performance, exactly constitute Bergson’s description of present time; “What I call ‘my present’ has one foot in my past and another in my future. In my past, first, because ‘the moment in which I am speaking is already far from me’; in my future, next, because this moment is impending over the future”(138). Kern
has observed that Bergson’s ideas, accompanied by late nineteenth century
electronic technological invention, had the effect of ‘thickening’ the present;
“the present was no longer limited to one event in one place, sandwiched
tightly between past and future and limited to local surroundings. In an age
of intrusive electronic communication ‘now’ became an extended interval of
time”(314). It is this modern sense of a ‘now’ of extended duration
constituted by both past and future that multi-media performance produces.
The recorded and the performative in Constants II provide these elements
of past and future in the ‘extended present’ of the multi-media performance
event.7

These dialectics of the past as immanent within the record and the future as
implicit in performance, can, however, at times be surprisingly reversed.
The rewind sequence in Constants II shows the present/future time of
performance to be an illusion as it vigorously spools back through the
performance, now shown as nothing but the past. Conversely the
technicolour finale of the present/past now alludes to a future moment of a
recorded Sheila, while the present performer Sheila disappears into the
past. In these moments of the performance the sense of a stable present is
eroded by the mediatized which threatens to crush or envelop it between
pasts and futures. Interestingly Bergson describes the present as “a thing
absolutely determined”(138) a sense which is created by his body extended
in space, however, when the body is overwritten by media this provokes, at
times, a more unstable, less determined present. This undetermined state
Bergson equates with the past but equally it could also be described as the
condition of the future.

The erosion of present time which is threatened in multi-media
performance also creates an effect in terms of present space. This is
illustrated most graphically by the ‘Ghost Sequence’ where the recorded
mediatizing camera recreates an absent presence whilst simultaneously
making those who are present - the audience - absent. Such an equation
could be used to describe the viewing relations that occur whilst watching

7 The ‘extended present’ is a phrase which is also used by Helga Nowotny in “From the
45-74. She uses the term to describe the ways that various social institutions and
technologies are engaged in predicting future trends thereby producing the effect of an
‘extended present’ where the future is absorbed and colonised into the present.
some more conventional mediatized forms such as certain types of film or television where the spectator becomes a voyeur lost in the spectacle of the mediatized performances. However, this sense of the absent body is not hidden in this cultural practice, but emphasised as another mediatized effect.

**The live mediatized**

*Constants II* does not concern itself exclusively with the recorded image. A good part of this chapter outlines the effects of a live camera within the performance setting. The live camera acts as a liminal mode between the live performance and the mediatized image as resolved in the form of a record. The live camera also serves to expose a live/recorded dialectic within the mediatized part of the work itself by setting up a live form of the mediatized image which exhibits different properties from the mediatized image as a record. There is therefore a doubling within the multi-media performance whereby the live performers are not just contrasted with their recorded equivalents, but the mediatized itself is treated as a ground on which to contrast the difference between live mediatized bodies and recorded ones. This double deliberation exposes the differences in not just two but three forms of address within the multi-media performance: - the live unmediatized - the live mediatized - and the recorded. These three modes of address point to moments at which the body beneath the live lens shares more qualities with the live performing body than a prerecorded one.

The live camera is a performative medium, it places the body in close proximity to the lens through which it enacts a reality. It is performative in that it is the mediatized equivalent of the first person present tense of spoken language and, as such, it privileges the originary moment of the image placing it firmly within the domain of the acting body; either as a body pictured or as constructed by the body, or both. As has been demonstrated, the recorded camera is capable of evacuating the body or the human from the equation of image making. As Virilio states “the series of visual

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\*In his early work on performative utterances J.L Austin believed that the first person present tense of the verb form was what characterised a performative utterance, but in his later work Austin dismantled this condition. However Emile Benveniste has reasserted this distinction and states the performative “must conform to a specific model, that of the verb in the present and in the first person” (qtd in Carlson p 62).
impressions become meaningless. They no longer seem to belong to us, they just exist, as though the speed of light had won out”(9). The ‘autonomous’ recording camera transcends the body by exerting a control over time and space which in turn determines the experiences of a body. This leads to a fantasy of power most clearly figured in the camera as omnipotent which denies the instrument of the camera and its products a human dimension. The autonomous camera begets the autonomous image and thus displaces any notion of a direct, effective relationship between the human and mediatized images, negating agency, control and ultimately responsibility for such images. Multi-media performance operates in opposition to dominant mediatized culture by functioning against the fantasy of technological anonymity, by staging the original moment of the mediatized image as coexistent with and determined by the human.

The sovereign contingency

Frank Lentricchia’s statement: “Art is, one of the powers that creates us as sociopolitical beings”(192) demonstrates the importance of art and culture for a society. The mediatized image in a multi-media performance setting exposes mediatized culture as subject to human operations. Such constructions are significant as they indicate that the origins of mediatized discourses extend from the interests and beliefs of particular (dominant) articulate groups. Likewise, Lentricchia’s statement also indicates that art has the power to help constitute a sense of ourselves, what it is to be human and thus also extends to determine, in part, our intersubjective behaviour as social beings. Not only does multi-media performance create a direct link between the mediatized and the body, it also demonstrates, via the screen, the action of the camera/media upon the body. The two phenomena; mediatized body/performance body are placed in close proximity thus facilitating a constant comparison between the two versions of the same body. What is demonstrated, almost immediately within Constants II through the use of the live cameras, is the way that the body can be substituted by its image. This succession of image over object has been taken up by numerous theorists, amongst them; Paul Virilio, Jean Baudrillard, Susan Sontag and Roland Barthes who observes “the
Photograph always leads the corpus I need back to the body I see; it is the absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency" (Camera Lucida 4). What is interesting about the mediatized body/performance body of multi-media performance is that despite the obvious differences between the two ‘versions’ of the body this substitution (image for object) is still acceptable and it is made acceptable because the live camera images maintain a direct relationship with the body. A body reflects light so that it can be apprehended; the body can be made to equal light, (the complexity of that light in terms of its differing colour spectrums are an extraneous detail which is why a black and white image can still represent a body), it is light that maintains the “sovereign Contingency” of any mediatized image, recorded or not.

The body’s dependency on light for its apprehension is not just operative in mediatized images but in all our visual perceptions. Thus the mediatized image plays through its technology an operation which is already functioning at the heart of our sensory existence - that of sight. Lacan uses the camera as a metaphor for the signifier of the gaze;

What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied and through which [...] I am photo-graphed (Four 106).

Therefore, as bodies are already perceived through light, why should a distinction necessarily be made between the different mediums that that light passes through, atmospheric, chemical, electrical, and which facilitate that encounter? Much has been written about the objectifying power of the lens, for example, Moholy-Nagy’s statement; “Thus in the photographic camera we have the most reliable aid to a beginning of objective vision” (qtd in Sontag 203). Lacan’s camera/gaze reminds us, however, that the action of the lens plays out what is also a psychological function at one remove. By its very nature the visual encounter objectifies, and the body becomes an

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9 Almost all film theory deals in part with this aspect of the camera, and it forms a central theme of feminist film criticism and the theories of realism. It has been written about by, amongst others; Laura Mulvey, Andre Bazin, Walter Benjamin, Colin MacCabe, Berthold Brecht, Györg Lukács, Terry Lovell, John Ellis, Roland Barthes and David Bordwell.
object of scrutiny. The lens merely doubles this process by allowing a further, alienated scrutiny.

Vid. 16. *Constants II* -“Here I am - the object”

What is, perhaps, unusual about multi-media performance as a cultural practice is that, through its combination of cameras and bodies, it restages this psychical process of vision and emphasises the ‘objectness’ of being. When Sheila presents herself through the live screen, she is also highlighting the presentation she already makes of herself as an unmediated performer in a performing space - “Here I am. The object”. Via the use of the prosthetic camera, multi-media performance stages this act of looking, and it is also able to draw attention to the consequences of perceptual processes. Paradoxically, as well as working with the mediatized image as an acceptable body substitute, by performing the body in close proximity to the lens, the difference between the two is also constantly foregrounded. The mediatized image is displaced in time and space from its body origin and can be frozen, fragmented and misplaced. In effect the camera is simultaneously embodied but also disembodies, severing the performer’s ties with a specific temporal and spatial dimension and transferring parts of bodies to screens and showing bodies to be where they are not. The foregrounding of this displacement reminds us that the mediatized (light) version of the body may not always be the same as the body possessed by the performer, and that the “sovereign Contingency” of light is not, in itself, a guarantee of equivalence. In this sense some aspects of multi-media performance refuse the substitution of the signifier for its referent, and because it purports to play out the psychological conditions of the perceptual process, suggests that the act of looking is itself some form of mediatization, or at least negotiation between the subject and object. This
work therefore suggests that even the apparently ‘unmediated’ operates through a signifier which screens the referent. In the light of this realisation concerning bodies, a similar scepticism could be extended toward the idea that vision ‘delivers’ an empirical, a priori, ‘real’ world, and instead, like the object body, this is actively subjectively constituted.

Embodied/disembodied

The intervention of the mediatizing camera on the body clearly changes the nature of the body as well as aspects of time and space. However, this is not a one way process, and the presence of the live body can also be seen to alter some aspects of mediatized images. In contrast to the majority of mediatized forms the omnipotence of the camera in multi-media performance is problematised. The mediatized image is given a body by using a direct address to the camera which then allows the media to act as a conduit to present the performer to the audience. In this way the live camera/screen represents ‘subject’ and likewise functions as partly subjective. The mediatized image in multi-media performance can also be disembodied, but this view is not constructed as omnipotent. The camera in the ‘Ghost Sequence’ is not an automaton, even through it presents a physically impossible point of view, its movements and the way it is addressed create a sense of a presence without a body, a spirit or an absent presence. In this way the camera/media still remains a subject, albeit one without a body, as opposed to the conventionally objective, omnipotent lens which operates beyond the subjective.

In terms of the table of oppositions proposed in chapter one which separated the temporal and spatial characteristics of live and recorded forms, some of these proposed binaries have become particularly problematic, not least due to the use of the third, liminal mode, of the live camera.
Table 1: Temporal and Spatial Oppositions as Figured by Live and Recorded Forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIVE</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Continuous Space</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td>Changing</td>
<td>Unique</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distanced</td>
<td>Space Fragmented</td>
<td>Realistic Objective</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Repeatable</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
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Multi-media performance complicates these separations and forces a distinction to be made between recorded forms per se and the mediatized in general, some forms of which display qualities of liveness. For example, although space can become distanced and fragmented by a lens, when cameras are used in live performance, spaces, which are normally remote from the viewer, can actually be made visually more immediate. Live close up cameras can also provide a form of visual continuity which cannot physically be experienced by the audience, (in the opening ‘Round the Walls’ sequence, for instance, where all aspects of Sheila’s action can be seen and relayed by the ‘CCTV’ cameras). In terms of positioning the body and the camera in a relationship of mutual dependency, multi-media performance also allows the lens a much greater degree of subjectivity; whilst its doubling of the spectatorial act through the use of a lens emphasises the objectifying effect operating in all visual encounters. The mediatized becomes associated with those qualities of partiality and subjectivity normally reserved for intersubjective human encounters, and certainly a live unrecorded camera shares the unique, temporary and changing qualities of a live human body. By placing such an emphasis on the originary camera/body axis, multi-media performance constructs the image and its referent as co-dependent and therefore prevents the succession of one by the other. This then qualifies the notion of a future perfect (a record) and delays it until a moment of death or absence of the living occurs.
Spectatorial positions

Throughout this analysis I have occasionally described or assumed a particular audience response to Constants II. I would now like to direct my attention to this aspect of spectatorial positioning so that I can discuss how the above statements and observations directly impact on audience perceptions. The physical arrangement of an audience in relation to the performance clearly plays a vital role in shaping an engagement with the performance. The staging configuration shown in Vid. 2. establishes an unusual set of viewing circumstances, isolating each member of the audience and creating individual viewers rather than a massed community of spectators. The performance is still apprehended visually and aurally, but the space and action has been arranged to problematise aspects of these activities. Performers walk and sit down next to audience members; they disappear behind sections of spectators and reappear to others; individuals interrupt one another's view of the action and no intrinsic separation is made between a stage space and an audience space. The emphasis is one of inclusion. Likewise, due to the live cameras, the audience can also see themselves pictured alongside the performers on the television screens.

As has already been discussed, the multi-media form of the performance causes a disjunction in conventional ideas of time and space to the extent that these phenomena become manifold. Disruptions, both literally in terms of interruptions in the field of vision and psychologically in terms of a disjunctive or overlapping sense of time and space, cause an audience to become aware of these conditions of time and space which govern their perceptions. Such a spatial configuration in combination with mediatization caused one such spectator, Guy Undrill, to observe “the piece realises Lacan’s comment that ‘I see from one point but in my existence am looked at from all sides’. When Patricia says ‘we are the inconstant fragmentary things’, for once in the theatre, this ‘we’ feels genuinely inclusive” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye). This awareness is driven by a bodily repositioning of the audience in relation to the performance which in turn marks a repositioning or reemphasis on the role of the body in relation to the
mediatized. The audience literally embodies this argument as their own viewing positions become complicated and highlighted as dependent upon their individual bodies (this construction is similar to the emphasis placed on the interdependent relationship of cameras to bodies). From within this new position questions are asked, questions which can no longer be confined to the bodies of the performers; namely what is the relationship of the body to the live, the mediated live and the recorded, and which version takes precedence and in what circumstances? Multi-media performance problematises any simple equation which might identify either the body as the source of an 'objective reality' or, similarly, the pictures created by a camera lens. In *Constants II* each version of the body, live, live mediatized, recorded, is seen as effective within certain specific constellations, and any totalizing epistemic claims made by one particular version are undermined by the alternative versions on offer. Just as the bodies of the performers become more complicated by the intervention of mediatizing elements, an audience understands, in a corporeal sense, that the same could also be said of their own bodies.

Within multi-media performance this complication of the body occurs first and foremost on a visual level, but because of the powerful role that the visual plays in the construction of a sense of self, the consequences of this complication extend beyond the immediate environs of the performance space. A conventional proscenium arch theatrical setting privileges an audience's view of the stage action and, like similar film, television and video screen arrangements the action is unproblematically 'given to be seen'. A multi-media performance such as *Constants II* inverts this status quo and as Undrill has previously remarked, an audience becomes aware of being both looker and looked at. In this sense the audience in such an event does not resemble Sartre's initial voyeur but instead conforms to a further stage of voyeurism - that of the self conscious viewer. Silverman, paraphrasing Sartre, describes a voyeur who, while peering through the keyhole hears footsteps or the rustle of leaves and the extraneous sound makes the voyeur aware of himself; “The voyeur now vibrates with an awareness of himself-as-spectacle, and through that awareness a consciousness of self is produced” (Silverman 164). In the specific context of this performance a self consciousness is brought about by the
problematic viewing positions detailed above, and most particularly by confronting the audience with their own watching images shown to them on the television screen.

Vid. 17. Constants II - Audience

The experience of self-consciousness is brought about by the sense of being perceived by others who are exterior to the self and in so doing being placed within the spectacle. Just as the audience see the performers made into representations, they themselves experience the same transference into the representational image. In this way they understand that even if they do not present themselves as performers they cannot escape the constituting vision of others who surround them in the performance space. Each individual spectator becomes, like the performers, the object of another’s gaze. Until this moment of self-consciousness the self has been, in Sartre’s terms, a nothing, a blank, a void. Self awareness obliges an individual to construct a sense of his or her self out of this void, and vision is seen as one of the prime constitutive forces in the construction of that identity.

2.3 Summary

Constants II is concerned with the nature of what it is to be human and particularly the effect of time upon that experience; it stages two female bodies which present two polar opposites of a ‘life-span’ and introduces a mediatizing influence into the performing event. As has been demonstrated, both live and recorded mediatized material construct experiences of time and space which are, in some ways, contrasting to those delivered by the live human body. Because the mediatized products of cameras are rarely seen juxtaposed with their original live moments these differences are
rarely perceived. This allows camera images to become acceptable substitutes for live experience and furthermore, at times, asserts the camera’s view as ‘superior’ to that of the live body. This superiority, omnipotence and objectivity is sometimes used within the multi-media performance, but it is also countered by another more ‘subjective’ figuring of the camera and its image. Such imagery plays directly with the difference between the two forms of experience - mediatized and unmediatized - and foregrounds ruptures and discontinuities in their temporal and spatial frames. Neither framework is ‘resolved’ in the performance both coexist and sustain one another's contrasts; and thus multi-media performance is able to describe an experience equivalent, or similar, to that of living in a mediatized culture. Because this work takes place within a performance aesthetic which foregrounds the body, the consequence of the similarities and differences between the live and the mediatized are relayed directly to the bodies of the performers. These bodies are altered by the intervention of the lens, but are also figured as active and partly determining these manifold temporal and spatial frameworks. And because of the ‘inclusive’ staging of the piece with its indiscriminate live cameras, these consequences are not merely isolated to the bodies of the two female performers but extend outwards toward the audience and beyond.

Thus, through this detailed case study of one of my multi-media performance pieces, I have been able to identify areas of equivalence and disparity between live and mediatized moments. Therefore, I have begun to intervene in the Phelan/Auslander debate. Auslander declares that “there are few grounds on which to make significant ontological distinctions” between the live and the mediatized. However, in analysing my material I have found numerous phenomenological differences (as well as some similarities), and these in turn would seem to hint at underlying ontological characteristics of the two forms. Lens-based media can affect and present an alternative relationship with time and space, and this is explicable when one considers that these media have developed (mostly) for the purposes of recording, they are predicated upon a control of time and space and this is their ontology. Performance (and the performative) can only occur amidst the flux of time and space as an expression within the unregulated passing moment. The ability to regulate and reproduce aspects of time and space in
turn inflects our understanding and experience of concepts such as the past, the present and the future, elements which determine the notion of a life-span and inevitably what it is to be a human body/being existing within these formulations. Ultimately I am convinced of the separateness of the two moments of the live and the mediatized because, although the two maybe elided as they are in multi-media performance, I realise that much of the effect and meaning of my work relies on and is sustained by a play on their differences.
3.1 Reality and Death

Simulator is an installation work made in response to a disused Second World War building in an airfield in Crail, Fife. The installation was constructed and presented as part of a group exhibition titled ‘The Shed’ at the Collins Gallery, Glasgow in June/July 1999. This work represents part of an ongoing research project and marks therefore an intermediate stage within a process, rather than a definitive response to the building.

One mile north east of the village of Crail lie the remains of H.M.S. Jackdaw, an airfield used to train navy personnel for the Fleet Air Arm. The airfield is now largely abandoned but retains a number of its original buildings including (set slightly apart from the rest of the camp) a bombing simulator or Torpedo Attack Trainer (TAT). The ‘bombing simulator’ is housed in a large brick barn and its exterior appears utterly nondescript, however, inside the building is a vast 340’ concrete cyclorama. The cyclorama and a few pieces of twisted metal are now all that remain of an ambitious training device which aimed to replicate the experience of torpedoing enemy ships.

Fig. 1. Exterior and Interior Stills of TAT, Crail Airfield, 1999

The TAT at Crail was the first prototype trainer to be built in Britain and its purpose was to familiarise airmen with the conditions they would
experience while tracking, diving and torpedoing shipping traffic. The original device consisted of a cyclorama painted with a sea horizon line, the cockpit of an aeroplane in which the trainee sat and an epidiascope which projected the image of a moving ship onto the cyc in front of the airman. A number of different times of day and night, as well as a variety of different weather conditions, could be simulated using various lighting techniques. After the trainee had sighted and identified the class of enemy ship, he was required to dive toward his target before levelling up and releasing a torpedo. The TAT was able to replicate this sequence of movements, altering the perspective and position of the ship in relation to the pilot’s operation of his aeroplane controls. When the pilot released his torpedo, the simulation was stopped and a calculation for speed and distance was made. The TAT was then restarted and the ship continued to sail on to determine whether the torpedo (represented by a line of light on the cyclorama) would meet its target.

Fig. 2. Diagram of Second World War Torpedo Attack Trainer

At first sight a torpedo attack trainer may seem to have little relevance in a study of multi-media performance, yet, I believe that the device and its architecture illustrates a meeting between performance and media imaging technology, which, in turn, illuminates a number of preoccupations within my field of multi-media performance.

The TAT exhibits a connection with the interests of performance somewhat tangentially through its use of theatrical scenic ‘effects’. The bombing simulator was designed, at military request, by two theatre specialists, Percy (Peter) Corry and Humphrey Watts, who owned a theatrical
contracting firm, Fitups, later called Watts and Corry, based in Manchester. Corry provides this description of the prototype trainer sited in Crail:

The complete installation consisted of a solid circular cyclorama 44 feet in diameter and 23 feet high, curved inwards at top and bottom. Substantial timber formers created the basic shape. To this structure extruded metal sections were attached, concrete being applied to create the cyclorama, which was plastered to a smooth surface and painted at the lower portion to represent the sea. The upper portion was off-white to allow projection of sky effects. [...] In planning the visual effects we had resorted to theatrical lighting techniques: by mixing primary colours (red, green and blue) flooding the cyclorama, with still clouds (fleecy and stormy) projected, we were able to suggest a variety of sky effects (sunny day, stormy day, moonlight, dark night, sunset etc). [...] Special lanterns, for projection of horizon effects at night, and other projections to suggest movement over the sea were designed. A complicated epidiascope projector, suspended above the Link Trainer created an image of the target ship on the cyclorama, which varied in size and inclination according to range and bearing (39).

In the preceding passage it can be seen that many of the techniques incorporated in the Crail trainer: the use of a cyclorama, scenic paint effects, projected and coloured lighting, were adopted straight from technical theatre practices of the day. Indeed Corry describes his work on the trainer as the “adaptation of theatre techniques to the less congenial process of ensuring destructive efficiency”(36).

Of prime importance to Watts and Corry in their work on war time simulators was an accurate depiction of reality;

We found that many of these [Synthetic Trainers] were more concerned with mechanical operation than with realistic effects [...]. Our own theatrical experience made it obvious that [...] it was essential to suggest reality as effectively as possible to enable the pupil to suspend disbelief (37).

The ‘realism’ of the Crail installation is affirmed by Dunstan Hadley who
trained in it during 1943 and records his experiences in *Barracuda Pilot*:

They installed a Link Trainer in a round building which had the walls painted in a seascape. Some of it was with a calm sea, a blue sky and a horizon and some rough and foggy. It was illuminated to simulate various times of day [...]. The movements of the silhouette [of the ship] gave a very realistic illusion as the pilot flying his Link, without its hood of course, made his attack [...]. We cheerfully sank the *Bismark* the *Tirpitz* and a number of Japanese aircraft carriers several times a week (86).

Therefore, despite the prevalence of other mediums more directly associated with the creation of a ‘reality effect’, such as film and photography, in the specific instance of the TAT, theatrical techniques were considered to be effective in producing a “realistic illusion”.

**Daguerre’s dioramas**

In its use of a cyclorama, stage lighting and painted scenery, the TAT displays all the conventional techniques for creating a theatrical ‘scene’. Many of these same scenic techniques were developed during the nineteenth century by theatre designers and one notable exponent was Louis Jacques Daguerre, the inventor of the diorama, and, more famously, the Daguerreotype. Daguerre studied as a stage designer and specialised in scenic and lighting effects; he was renowned for creating magnificent ‘realistic’ spectacles for Parisian theatre audiences. In *The History of the Diorama and the Daguerreotype*, Helmut and Alison Gernsheim provide a record of Daguerre’s 1819 production of *La Foret de Sénart* in which, critics claimed, he had used real streams, trees and grass, however, these were all the product of scenery, skilful painting and variable lighting from oil lamps. Daguerre went on to use his theatrical skills to produce dioramas, large back-lit scenic paintings which altered through changes made to their illumination.

Dioramas were a popular Victorian diversion which developed from the late
eighteenth century tradition of ‘panoramic’ paintings’. Large, semi-transparent linen cloths were painted front and back to depict a chosen scene and exhibited in purpose-built buildings. These cloths were then lit from behind and above by natural light which entered via large windows and skylights, some of which could be covered by coloured screens. By using a variety of shutters, the diorama artists were able to change the illumination of the painted cloths, thus creating the effect of different weather conditions and times of day. In *The Vision Machine* Virilio provides this description written by Daguerre;

> Only two effects were actually painted on - day on the front of the canvas, night on the back, and one could shift from one to the other by means of a series of complicated combination of media the light had to pass through. But these produced an infinite number of additional effects similar to those Nature offers in its course from morning to night and vice versa (41).

The coloured screens, what Daguerre calls ‘media’, acted like coloured gels and filtered out either the colour red or green from the painting, in this way the painters were able ingeniously to ‘animate’ their scenes causing, for example, the sun to rise or the candles to appear to light in a church scene. Dioramas also used another form of animation in their presentation; the Regents Park diorama consisted of two screens with an auditorium which pivoted an audience approximately 80’ to see two contrasting scenes (see Fig. 3.). In Paris Daguerre built a diorama in 1822 which Virilio describes as “a veritable sight travelling machine [...] *The viewers’ room was mobile* and spun round like a one-man-operated merry-

\[1\] Helmut and Alison Gernsheim provide this description of a panoramic painting in *The History of the Diorama and the Daguerreotype*, its similarity to elements of the TAT (painted scene, controlled lighting and a curved surface extending beyond peripheral vision) is notable:

The general enthusiasm for panoramas in England, France and other countries was caused by the astonishing illusion of reality of the depicted scene. Placed in semi-darkness, and at the centre of a circular painting illuminated from above and embracing a continuous view of an entire region, the spectator lost all judgment of distance and space, for the different parts of the picture were painted so realistically and in such perfect perspective and scale that, in the absence of any means of comparison with real objects, a perfect illusion was given (5).

\[2\] Contemporary descriptions of these weather and lighting effects in dioramas are given in Gernsheim, (pp. 14-17, 23-24, 28-29) including a remarkable description of *A Midnight Mass at Saint-Etienne-du-Mont* were the light wanes, candles are lit, a congregation arrives, a mass is sung, dawn breaks, the candles are extinguished and the congregation leaves p 32.
go-round. Everyone found themselves carried past all the paintings on show without apparently having to move a muscle”(40). By setting the cloth screens at a distance from the spectators and maintaining a low level of light within the auditoria the dioramas created spectacularly ‘realistic’ visual scenes. Most dioramas were accompanied by music and/or sound effects and some were supplemented by the presence of actors and even animals representing the ‘inhabitants’ of the scene.

Key to the diorama experience was the way that these painted scenes aimed to achieve a life-like depiction of their subjects using changes of lighting and the illusion of movement to heighten their reality. One unnamed critic quoted in Gernsheim wrote of The View of Mount St. Gotthard in 1824;

This beautiful representation of one of the grandest scenes in nature has the effect of bringing the reality before the eye so vividly as to excite those emotions and raise up those associations which a contemplation of the actual scene would produce in the mind; such truth, force and feeling is there in the picture (24).

Another critic from a contemporary magazine of the day wrote; “The View of Brest Harbour is not a vain representation - it is reality itself” (Gernsheim 23). Although the dioramas created their effect primarily through an appeal to the visual sense it is worth remembering that the events also used sound effects, music, choirs, actors, animals and even occasionally smells. Thus the dioramas appealed to a variety of senses beyond the purely visual, and in this way are more akin to a type of visual theatre and come close to producing the nineteenth century equivalent of an ‘immersive’ environment.

All quotations from Gernsheim are taken from The History of the Diorama and the Daguerreotype.
Interestingly Virilio makes the point that both panoramas and dioramas “brought a pictorial work and an architectural construct together” (39). He says of Daguerre:

We are not interested here in Daguerre the scenery-painter, doing sets for the Paris Opera or the Ambigu Comique, but Daguerre the lighting engineer, the master technician, whose application of the image to an architectural construct used absolutely realistic and totally illusory time and movement (41).

This description could apply equally well to the work of Watts and Corry a century later who used similar techniques of paint, coloured light and movement in their bombing simulator. Indeed the TAT could be seen as a direct descendant of Daguerre’s dioramas and although both devices make use of current theatre technologies both also function in ways which are distinct from that of theatre. The diorama and TAT wish to create an immersive realistic spectacle, and to this end both forms use an enlarged visual field which accommodates even the peripheral vision of any potential spectator. Much more than just large realistic paintings, however, both devices are housed in purpose-built auditoria constructed in order to facilitate their illusion without distraction from extraneous detail or decoration. These buildings allow an unprecedented control over the light which falls on the all-encompassing painted scene and it is through the careful manipulation of this light that both the diorama and the TAT are able to perpetrate their unique forms of realism. These paintings are animated by light, brought to life by the movement of light and this provides a realism of a new order - the realism of passing time. Gernsheim identifies the diorama as the precursor of cinema and these expansive visual spectacles unfolding in time are more akin to the moving recreations of ‘life’ afforded by film, than the concerns of graphical accuracy which have been the preoccupation of much pictorial representation. An emphasis on movement is further accented in some dioramas by the bodily repositioning of the spectators in order that they can see two scenic canvases in one visit or the continual motion of a canvas passing before spectators moved on giant upright rollers. This motion is drastically extended in the TAT into a complex and sophisticated alteration of the visual spectacle in relation to the various
bodily actions of the spectator/pilot. Therefore both the TAT and dioramas combine elements of painting and theatre to move toward a type of realist spectacle which, seen from a contemporary perspective, seems somewhat more aligned with the interests of forms such as cinema and virtual reality.

The concerns of theatre, pictorial representation and realism are linked in the figure of Daguerre not least as he went on to market successfully the Daguerreotype, an early type of photographic process which used mercury vapour and an iodine-sensitized silvered plate to present a fixed image. His interest in creating realistic images persisted and in 1838 he wrote; “The Daguerreotype is not merely an instrument which serves to draw nature [...] [it] gives her the power to reproduce herself” (qtd in Sontag 188). However, resonances between the two practices of theatre and realistic pictorial representation, including photography, reverberate beyond the individual figure of Daguerre and many are manifest in the work of Watts and Corry and the fabric of the TAT. The TAT uses lighting, paint and architectural construction to create an environment which simulates an ‘external reality’ in which people may act out in present time the concerns and preoccupations of the day. In its creation of a simulated world Watts and Corry’s TAT meets theatre once more but this time not through a direct technical connection but in a shared intent. The trainer, like the theatre, recreates a ‘life-like’ live arena in which specific socio-political preoccupations are revisited and interrogated. Both the theatre and the TAT operate by creating a ‘model world’, a limited but nevertheless recognisably ‘exterior’ environment in which their performers may rehearse and act out their desires and fears. The advantage that theatre has over film and photography for these purposes, despite the superior ‘realism’ of these later forms, is that, as a live medium, it can adapt and evolve to a degree in a spontaneous relationship with its performer. Film or photography, as fixed media, cannot respond to a performance such as that provided in the TAT by the moment to moment decision-making executed by the spectating/performing pilot.

War and photography

The influence of film and photography and other lens-based media can also
be observed in the TAT. Most obviously the device uses a projecting lens, in the form of an epidiascope, to reproduce the presence of an enemy ship moving across the sea’s horizon. An epidiascope, like a film or slide projector, projects an image across a space and onto a screen, unlike these other projectors, however, it does not require its image/object to be based on transparent film. An epidiascope projects an image from a solid object, which, in the case of the TAT, was a scale model of a war ship. The bombing simulator exhibits other similarities with imaging technologies primarily through a shared taxonomy with photography and the operations of the camera. In an unpublished memoir of H.M.S Jackdaw, an unnamed individual who was responsible for Civilian Transport Maintenance during the war refers to a ‘camera gun’ used by the pilots training in the simulator. The details of the recollection are somewhat inaccurate as the speaker never actually saw the TAT in action and no such ‘camera gun’ existed, however, the name given to this fictitious object indicates a confusion of activities which are indeed played out in the operation of the simulator.

Both Sontag in On Photography and Barthes in Camera Lucida write about the similarities between the language of war making and image taking: Sontag notes “we talk about ‘loading’ and ‘aiming’ a camera, about ‘shooting’ a film. [...] the camera is a sublimation of the gun, to photograph someone is a sublimated murder”(14/5). Barthes names the subject of the photograph “the target”(9) he writes about the camera shutter as “the trigger of the lens”(15) and, more abstractly, he writes of “an intense immobility: linked to a detail (to a detonator), an explosion [which] makes a little star on the pane of the text or of the photograph”(49). The actions that the pilot rehearses bear a likeness to those of the photographer; they must first ‘sight’ their ‘target’ by ‘aiming’ the ‘cross hair’ of the ‘camera/gun’ (bomb sight); they must then ‘shoot’ the ‘target’ by releasing a ‘trigger’ and the final moment of capture is signalled by an ‘explosive/explosive detonation’ or ‘flash’ of light which reveals as it obliterates. It is in this explosive/explosive moment that Berger in his book About Looking, like Sontag, identifies the ‘violence’ of photography;

The camera which isolates a moment of agony isolates no more violently than the experience of that moment isolates

4 All quotations from Barthes in this chapter are taken from Camera Lucida.
itself. The word \textit{trigger}, applied to a rifle and camera, reflects the correspondence which does not stop at the purely mechanical. The image seized by the camera is doubly violent and both violences reinforce the same contrast: the contrast between the photographed moment and all others (39).

Berger's idea, which corresponds with Sontag's, compares the violence of war with that of photography. He believes photography performs a kind of violence upon its object and its viewer by removing an image from the temporal flow of life - Barthes' “intense immobility”. The discontinuity of the photograph's relation with lived time in turn affects, in the viewer of the photograph, an alienated apathy, so, just as “the person who is recording cannot intervene” (Sontag 12), the person who views is paralysed like the petrified image itself; “Images transfix. Images anaesthetize” (Sontag 20). This leads to an ethical and moral dilemma. Sontag declares “The ethical content of photographs is fragile. [...] The particular qualities and intentions of photographs tend to be swallowed up in the generalised pathos of time past”(21) and Berger writes of the particular ‘contradiction’ of war photography;

its purpose is to awaken concern. The most extreme examples [...] show moments of agony in order to extort the maximum concern. Such moments, whether photographed or not, are discontinuous with all other moments. They exist by themselves. But the reader who has been arrested by the photograph may tend to feel this discontinuity as his own personal moral inadequacy. \textit{And as soon as this happens even his sense of shock is dispersed:} his own moral inadequacy may shock him as much as the crimes being committed in the war. [...] the issue of the war which has caused that moment is effectively depoliticised (39/40).

Berger, Sontag and Virilio have all written specifically about photography's relationship with war. Sontag notes “War and photography now seem inseparable”(167) and cites Félix Tournachon Nadar’s realisation in 1855 of the benefits of aerial photography for war makers. Virilio writes of the importance of British and American photographic propaganda to the success of the Second World War and the inversion of this during the
Vietnam conflict. He also describes the effect of the First World War on the physical and psychological environment of the western world and makes a direct comparison between guns and cameras

it [is] the environment which is constantly targeted, intercepted by an optical arsenal going from the ‘line of sight’ of the firearm - cannons, rifles, machine guns, used on an unprecedented scale - to cameras, the high-speed equipment of aerial intelligence, projecting an image of a de-materialising world (13).

And Virilio claims that from this time on “the visual field was reduced to the line of a sighting device” (13). Virilio puts forward a thesis that sees the depersonalised distanced vision of photography, exemplified in military imaging technology, as the key to an understanding of our contemporary relationship with the image/world.

War and photography provide numerous examples of practical connections as well as analogies to describe one another and elements of modern day existence, dominated as it is by the mediatized image. The TAT forms a small part of this constellation in that although its use of actual photographic technology is minimal (it can only really be associated with imaging optics in general via its epidiascope) the function of the TAT does parallel uses of the camera in war time, particularly that of aerial surveillance as predicted by Nadar. Here images are removed from the front line, the actual arena of war, by reconnaissance photographers and these pictures are then used, in the secure environment of a command centre to prepare and plan future attacks. The TAT is also a visually orientated representation which has been removed from the unpredictable context of the battlefield in order to facilitate and prepare for a future encounter within this unstable actuality. Both the TAT and photographs act to separate experience from an immediate, volatile context and resituate it in a safer, more predictable environment as a form of reflection and preparation. Thus both forms construct, through vision, a distanced, alienated relationship - a world at one remove - what Virilio calls “a certain teletopology” (7) which he notes is “marked by its remote beginnings in war” (6). Virilio describes this phenomena as contrasting with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s proposition “Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of my
sight, marked on the map of the ‘I can’”. Virilio notes “The bulk of what I see is, in fact and in principle, no longer within my reach. And even if it lies within reach of my sight, it is no longer necessarily inscribed on the map of the ‘I can’”. Virilio names this modern remote imaging “the logistics of perception”(7).

To continue with this military metaphor, I would like to equate the moment at which a photograph is taken to a moment of detonation, a detonation which Barthes recognises later in a detail on the surface of the photograph. This ‘explosive/exposive’ moment is particularly recognisable in flash photography accompanied, as it is, by a bright burst of light caused by a ‘charged’ release of energy from a ‘flashgun’; it is repeated in the TAT by a flare effect which lights up the miniature model ship and the beam of a spotlight which traces the path of the virtual torpedo; ultimately it is resolved in the moment at sea when the charged projectile meets its target thus causing an explosive detonation which is accompanied by a blaze of dazzling light. I am particularly interested in this moment as it seems to be the point at which photography meets performance; it is a time of cleaving when life binds to the image and, simultaneously, the image splits from life in the stasis which Berger finds so violent. In “A Small History of Photography” Walter Benjamin calls this moment - the “Here and Now” of photography - which Benjamin claims causes the viewer “to search such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with which reality has so to speak seared the subject”(243). In photography this ‘searing’ of the particular ‘here and now’ is often signalled by the shocking flash of an excess of brilliant light which marks the origin of photography’s claims for realism.
Theatre, Performance, Photography, and by extension the TAT, all have similar and competing relations with notions of ‘reality’. Theatre seems to exhibit, at best, a tenuous relationship with the concept of a real. Theatre, particularly Naturalist and Realist theatre, may attempt to construct, through scenography (and the work of people like Daguerre and Watts and Corry) the sense of a ‘real space’ in which the action of a play takes place. However, framed, as it is, by the architecture of the theatre itself, such a strategy will always end when the scenery meets the proscenium arch. The ‘frame’ which contains the play, like the frame of a photograph, indicates a border where one reality stops and another starts. Inside the stage space the reality of the play, in terms of theatrical setting, becomes the domain of painting and sculpture, carefully constructed sets and props which reference parts of a recognisable environment. In its overt reproductions of an exterior environment the theatre, in some senses, always remains a fictitious space. As Schieffelin has noted;

In Euro-American (basically Aristotelian) tradition this divide is [...] a metaphysical, even ontological, one between a world of spectators which is real and a world conjured up by performers which is not, or more precisely, which has another kind of reality: a virtual or imaginary one (200).

I would argue, that the “virtual or imaginary” realism of theatre is met in another, more cerebral encounter via its deployment of live human bodies performing human behaviours. Through its use of actors working as individual characters, theatre dramatises fundamental human fears and desires and these ‘plays’ are the source of its comedy and its tragedy. Realism in theatre comes from its representation of intersubjective behaviour and human psychology, much of which, though perhaps exaggerated by the demands of narrative fiction, is recognised and also ‘performed’ by its watching audience in the wider world.

The discussion that follows is not intended to reference The Real in the specific psychoanalytical Lacanian sense (ie the third order of subjectivity which lies beyond symbolisation) but to the many ‘reals’ constructed by discursive practices which offer representations of worlds/situations intended to represent and conform to a consensual notion of ‘reality’ and which, in so doing, make recourse to epistemic claims of truth. However arguments concerning forms of representational expression which make recourse to a realist aesthetic do impact upon The Real in the sense that they invoke the Imaginary and masquerade as expressions made ‘outside’ of the symbolic. See footnote 7.
Performance, as an extension of and reaction to theatre, provides a more definite relationship with an idea of reality in that it presents an ‘actuality’. Philip Monk writes “The early history of performance distinguished between theatre as representation and performance as the literalization of event - where the meaning was inscribed from outside through the material and context, in the real time and space of the artist’s actual body” (163). Chantal Pontbriand has also recognised this quality of “literalization” in performance; “performance unfolds in a real time and a real place without any imaginary or transcendental space-time a priori, performance actualizes time and place” (155). Pontbriand traces this “actualization” back to the influence of photography and cinema in modern culture. Quoting Benjamin she notes that performance, like a mechanically reproduced work of art, arises from “the desire of the contemporary masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly” (Illuminations 216/7) and she continues; “[mechanical] Reproduction techniques invest art with a proximity or immediacy, a presentness, and a materiality, previously unthinkable” (156). Thus, in an attempt to present reality, performance operates without the overt codes and signs of theatre (fixed character, costumes, scenery etc.) and “withdraws from representation into simple presentation [...] into simple actuality” (156). This means performance purports to be ‘signless’, or to work through what Pontbriand calls “the transparent sign” and, in so doing therefore, “performance introduces the function of the index” (157). Here, once more, we find a meeting between photography and performance in the shared “transparent sign”. The means by which performance “aims to show the real without mystification” (157) is more aligned with photography, and the products of lenses, than theatre and leads Pontbriand to conclude “A consequence of mechanical reproducibility is performance” (157).

In concert with Pontbriand’s observations on performance Barthes notes the ‘signless’ quality of the photograph; “A specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its referent (from what it represents) [...] it is not possible to perceive the photographic signifier [...] a photograph is always invisible” (5/6). In fact a photograph straddles two of the three orders of signs identified by semiology, according to C.S. Peirce (paraphrased by Lapsley & Westlake) it “is both icon, in that it is similar to its objects, and
index, in that it is an effect on photographic emulsion of light interacting with the object" (36). An icon functions, as its name suggests, through displaying a resemblance to the object it signifies, an index operates through a causal relationship, “by virtue of a character which it could not have if its object did not exist” (qtd Lapsley & Westlake 35). Both orders lessen the gap between the object and its sign, between signified and signifier, and their representations can therefore, to a lesser or greater degree, become synonymous with that object. This process is encouraged more significantly by the index than the icon however. The index, because of its causal dependence on the object, cannot have an origin independent of the object it signifies, and this contingency assures that, as the signifier is (was once) one with the object, it disappears. As the photograph seems to function without a code, mark or language, it appears to be the material object, as Barthes states “the photograph always carries its referent with itself” (5). This realisation provokes Sontag’s oft quoted assertion of the photograph as “a trace, something directly stencilled off the real, like a footprint or a death mask” (154). Through its causally dependent signifier the photograph bears no sign of the re-presentation of its object and as Westlake and Lapsley have noted the ‘reality effect’ is dependent partly on “effacing all signs of [...] production” (161) Therefore, because “a photograph is always invisible” it makes a particularly strong claim in terms of reality for the object it depicts. This claim is further strengthened by the automated nature of its production, to quote Andre Bazin from “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” in What is Cinema,

For the first time, between the originating object and its reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a nonliving agent. For the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man [...]. The objective nature of photography confers upon it a quality of credibility absent from other picture-making [...] we are forced to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced (13). Therefore, unlike a painted image for example, a mediatized image, such as a photograph, is never tainted with the suggestion of human intervention and thus subjective interpretation - you see what was there.
Photography and performance appear to abandon the third signifying order of the symbol, which is the domain of character-based literary theatre. The symbol “is arbitrarily linked to its objects by means of an association of ideas or habitual connection” (Lapsley & Westlake 36) prime examples of such codes being spoken and written languages. As this signifying system is abstract and based on societal conventions, the relationship between its signifier and signified is not conditioned by a dependent or resemblant union between sign and object; “Because it is not a case of a one-to-one correspondence, language does not therefore reflect reality” states Susan Hayward in her book *Key Concepts in Cinema Studies*. However we must be careful here not to dismiss language’s allegiance with reality, (or indeed to assume that, inversely that the other orders of signs can ‘reflect’ reality). As Hayward goes on to explain, “Rather, language becomes a signifying system that sets ‘reality’ before the ears. It constitutes, mediates reality…”(309). This notion that the concept of reality is constituted by language arises from the work of Lacan who famously declared “It is the world of words that creates the world of things” (*Écrits* 65) and thus deemed reality and ‘real’ objects, to be dependent upon language. Because all experience (expression and perception) is mediated by language, reality can never be pre-discursive. Adrian Heathfield has succinctly expressed this; “reality cannot possibly be perceived outside of, and is always already enmeshed within, the linguistic”. What is important in this context, however, is that photography and performance seem to make an appeal to a different real from that of symbolic language, an empirical, external, preexisting reality of the objects and beings around us ‘presented’ through the ‘transparent sign’ in indexical images and photographs of the camera.  

This is a more powerful ‘real’ because it seems to extend beyond the control and influence of the symbolic with its (somewhat hidden)

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6 Whereas by Lacan’s formulation the index is subordinate to the symbol - “It is the world of words that creates the world of things” (*Écrits* 65).
associations of arbitrary and culturally determined signification.\textsuperscript{7} This is why performance and photography, unlike theatre, only seem concerned with presentation (and its associated actuality) and not representation with its associations of arbitrary signification, subjectivity and ‘human’ language.

\textbf{The here and now}

The TAT, like a photograph, makes its appeal to a reality via a representation which operates through the visual sense, however it veers towards the iconic rather than the indexical sign in that its reproductions of this ‘external’ reality occur through painted and modelled ‘resemblances’ to sky, sea, ships etc. and are not of the dependent order of the photographic index. As these resemblances are worked by the human hand, approximations and interpretations are seen to occur and these elements constitute a form which drifts towards an overt ‘language’. However it is interesting to note the function of light within this context as it is the action of light on a painted scene which draws the representational form back to a more indexical type of reality. Light in the diorama allowed for an animation of the scene and this was the source of its successful illusion of reality. When Daguerre used specific lighting with his stage settings he was acknowledged to have transfigured ‘real’ scenes. The TAT also uses controlled lighting to give motion to its simulation and this motion gives the appearance of a life-like reality. Light is ubiquitous and all pervasive, it therefore carries with it a powerful realism. ‘Natural’ light would appear to be beyond manipulation and control and thus changes to this light must be of a ‘natural’ order which is not of human origin. Although an audience (or

\textsuperscript{7} The symbolic carries with it a sense of its arbitrary relation between signified and signifier in the form of the condition of lack. In a Lacanian/Freudian description of the formation of the ego the child’s entry into the Symbolic occurs with the acquisition of language and the acceptance of social laws and codes. This progression occurs at the expense of a ‘unity’ experienced in the earlier, prelinguistic Imaginary. Throughout our conscious existence in the Symbolic a sense of the lost unity of the Imaginary remains as something to be returned to and this sense is described as the condition of lack, just as we are born into language we are inevitably also born into lack. The gap between signified and signifier exemplified by the symbolic code of spoken and written language acts as a constant reminder of this lack, whereas with the iconic and indexical codes of images, particularly mediatized ones, the gap between signified and signer is lessened or effaced. In human subjectivity for this reason images can be more aligned with the unity of the Imaginary. This is where realism meets The Real as that which is beyond symbolisation although in the final analysis images cannot escape the trap of the symbolic conditioned as they are, along with all aspects of existence, by the linguistic.
the pilot) might be well aware of stage lighting as artificial, it cannot prevent a powerful association with reality occurring when presented with a scene animated and transformed by changes in light. Beyond the theatrical arts it is possible to identify the ‘reality effect’ which light brings as it works directly on the light sensitive material used in still and moving cameras to create its indexical images. In these representations light is the causal agent and it is through light that these images present a strong sense of reality. In this sense the photographic arts, as is suggested by the figure of Daguerre, can be seen as a development of earlier theatrical traditions concerned with the control and manipulation of light. Photography just achieved the logical extension of this project in that it perfected this control in an ability to trap and capture light.

There is another feature of the TAT however which manoeuvres it away from photographic realism and back toward theatre and performance and this occurs through its interest in the body. Even though the TAT emphasises the visual, the experience of training in it is not an exclusively visual encounter, indeed crucially it is the relationship between the body of the pilot and the visual depictions of an external reality which gives the TAT its particular effect. It is the bodily presence and actions of the pilot which manipulate these realistic images and in so doing create the simulators' overall reality effect, an effect which is a combination of a bodily reality with an imagistic one. The introduction of the body into the representational equation of the real, aligns the TAT with the modern day simulations of virtual reality (VR), and indeed, as an early example of a flight simulator the TAT is clearly a pioneer in this field. Within the technical limitations of the day (primarily in this instance theatrical) the TAT attempts to construct an analogue model of an external world which, when 'performed', responds much like that external reality. The report from the ‘Barracuda Pilot’, Dunstan Hadley, of “a very realistic illusion” testifies to its success. Therefore the TAT, as an early form of virtual reality, appears to be interested in recreating a reality in much the same way as performance is by appealing beyond the purely visual (like the dioramas) to a multisensory experience involving the body of the operator as well as his eyes. The position of the pilot who operates in the TAT has similarities with both the performer and spectator of a performance, because through the body the TAT tries to conjure up an
actuality that performance also aims to provide.

Performance, theatre, photography and virtual reality all create competing and contradictory versions of the temporal and spatial conceptions of a ‘here and now’ and it is via these different constructions that each of these forms maintain a relationship with notions of reality. For example, as previously quoted, Benjamin named the “here and now” of photography its “spark of contingency” and hence saw it as the origin the reality of a photograph. Performance is totally concerned with the ‘here and now’ of present time, as Pontbriand states “what is involved [in performance] is indeed an obvious presence, not a presence sought after or represented; this desire to discover, then, a here/now which has no other referent except itself”(157). Theatre is a live event and as such maintains the ‘now’ potency of present time, however, by making a physical and rhetorical separation between its ‘representational’ stage world and the ‘real’ space of the auditorium and its audience, theatre reconfigures the ‘here and now’ into an alternative sense of a ‘there and now’. Barthes talks about the represented present when he notes that “Every photograph is a certificate of presence” (87) but what is significant in this construction is the word “certificate” as this indicates the ‘here and now’ that really concerns photography is the ‘here and now’ of the past,— an ‘I was here’. Barthes again acknowledges this by naming the “noeme” as photography’s “essence”, its identifying principle, “the thing that has been there”(6). Virtual reality and its accompanying utopian rhetorics as identified by Robins seem at times to allude to the third tense of future time;

Mundane realities and experiences seem to pale in comparison to dreams of virtual life and cyberculture. Have faith in these technologies of the future, the techno-visionaries exhort us, embrace the emancipatory potential of the new technoculture. Invest your trust and optimism in this brave new vision. What we have in this idealisation of image technologies is the basis of a new utopianism (3). However, in (virtual) reality these simulations are constructed in the more negative space of a never ‘here and now’ - or as Robins points out the ‘nowhere’ of Thomas More’s original utopian vision.
The TAT exhibits a connection with each one of these ‘here and nows’ and in so doing manages to share elements of the realism provided by each of the forms. As has been demonstrated the TAT uses the signs of theatre’s ‘representational real’ (scenery, stage lighting, character acting in the role of ‘the pilot’) to present its ‘theatre of war’; however through the body of the pilot, who also is a pilot, it includes performance’s ‘bodily real’. Like a photograph the TAT is a displacement of a specific visual segment from an external reality, but unlike a photograph this displacement does not occur in time; therefore it is the contemporary TAT, an historic building, which is more akin to a photograph in that it references a reality which has passed. Virtual reality, like performance, is interested in the bodily real, but it places that real within a multisensory responsive array; the TAT executes a primitive version of this virtual reality by working the body in combination with a visual which is responsive to the actions of that body. Yet all these reals are superseded and placed into perspective by a socio-political one - the reality of the war. The event the TAT recreates, that of warfare, is contiguous with its simulation and gives a present urgency to its function as a training environment. The phenomena of the TAT is charged by the proximity of the war, and the time of the TAT is an explosive ‘here and now’ beyond that of performance, theatre, photography or VR. Its simulation of reality touches a real by the very immediacy of the war, which lies in attendance beyond its brick skin. After training in the simulator the pilot steps out to replay his actions in the real arena of life and death. Nevertheless this intensifying historical real is what, in the final analysis, also exposes the TAT as ultimately a simulation of reality just like all the other cultural forms. Like the fantasy of VR of which it is a precursor, the TAT omits a vital constituent of that reality which is pre-eminent in wartime - the reality of death. Virtual reality as a ‘nowhere’ space ultimately denies this encounter with death, but paradoxically it is through its proximity to the possibility of death that the TAT achieves its unique sense of realism. We define a form as realistic when it creates “the representation of reality which a particular society proposes and assumes as ‘Reality’” (Heath 20) yet one crucial element to the ‘reality’ of life is its accompanying inevitability of death. Upon considering the TAT in relation to its context - the Second World War - the absence of death in its simulation of reality is exposed and such reflection might provoke further questions about the presence of death in other, so called, realistic forms.
Margaret Iversen in “What is Photography” puts forward the thesis that Barthes’ hunt for a photograph of his dead mother in Camera Lucida is a commentary on Lacan’s 1964 seminar (published as Four Fundamental Concepts…) and asserts that; “its underlying theme is taken from Lacan’s account of the encounter with the Real which is ultimately an encounter with the persistently denied fact of one’s own mortality”(451). I would like to expand on this notion and suggest that all cultural (artistic) practices could be viewed in terms of the degrees by which they deny mortality, and thus, the ways in which they establish alternative, death-defying realities to efface this ultimate Real.

Death-defying simulation

The phenomenon of death is perhaps the single most powerful force in the constitution of western culture. In “Facing the Other: The Performance Encounter and Death” Heathfield quotes a number of studies, including Zygmunt Bauman’s Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies which “share the understanding of cultural production and its social organisation as originating in a defensive reaction to the threat of mortality”. Heathfield, working from Baudrillard, also proposes that in a sense “our society stages a failed collective repression of death which necessarily returns to haunt us in the symbolic sphere” hence Baudrillard’s assertion “we live in a culture of death”. How is this ‘haunting’ manifest within culture? Heathfield paraphrases Baudrillard from “Symbolic Exchange and Death”; “For Baudrillard, all forms of reproduction, whether intellectual, industrial or biological, arise from the attempt to ascribe absolute value to life in the face of its negation through death”. Heathfield goes on to make a connection between the notion of reproduction as an “exclusionary protection against the force of death” and Freud’s thinking on repetition detailed in “The ‘Uncanny’”; “He [Freud] saw repetition as the ego’s attempted protection against death and related this to the figure of the double, exemplified through the ‘immortal soul’”. Thus reproduction and repetition are tactics mobilised in order to achieve a form of continuation or transcendent immortality in the face of our inevitable annihilation through death. Robins, writing specifically about digital technologies, suggests that “Death defying simulation is linked to powerful fantasies of rational transcendence”(161)
and this is a project he identifies as operating within culture centuries prior to contemporary imaging technologies; “Images have always been linked with death” (160) he says. In the light of Heathfield I would extend this idea to include all forms of cultural repetition not just those of the image: just as the photograph visually ‘repeats’ a segment of a material reality, the theatre ‘repeats’ human environments and behaviour and the TAT ‘repeats’ a particular battle scenario. The repetition of elements from life that these forms execute, are also the basis of their claims to ‘realism’ in all its guises, and repetition and its attendant realism can now be seen as an aesthetic practice provoked by a fundamental desire to escape from death.  

Perhaps the photograph, of all cultural forms, can most clearly be construed as an escape from death. The photograph, as a visual repetition of the object/self, is an attempt to defy death by preserving the object/self in a cryonic photographic image. This repetition, once again, originates in a human necessity, in the words of the American poet Thomas Lynch, “we want and crave as humans some measure of immortality”. The immortality delivered by the photograph works through its frozen image, it succeeds because it removes its object from the mortalising effects of time, or what Jonathan Dollimore terms “the tyranny of time” (Lynch). Heathfield cites Bauman’s idea of “object-hood” as a form of “survival strategy” within culture which fixes “that which eludes […] into identifiable and knowable objects”. This objecthood means culture “embodies a certain substantiality which seems to escape life’s transience, and thus attains a kind of ‘extemporality’”.  

This extemporality is exactly the effect of photography which immortalises through its reproduction and repetition of life. Paradoxically, however, although reproduction and repetition are mobilised as escapes from death, they also deliver death; “repetition can summon death as an immanent power” states Heathfield. Heathfield continues “Although it is designed to shore up the psyche, the compulsion to repeat is based on a need for stability and stasis, a halting of temporality; it is a

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8 Repetition is also death-bound, in that as well as acting as an escape from death it also paradoxically functions as a desire for death. This idea forms the basis of my argument later in this section.

9 Heathfield takes this term from Bauman’s Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies p.31.
retrogressive movement which seeks an earlier condition without time and division and is thus, paradoxically, a movement towards death”. Repetition therefore is also death-bound. This observation in terms of photography has, as I have already outlined, been forcefully made by both Sontag and Barthes and relates directly to objecthood and its associated “extemporality”. Barthes titles photographers “agents of death” and on being photographed states, “I am neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is becoming an object: I then experience a micro-version of death (of parenthesis)”(14). Likewise Sontag observes;

All photographs are *memento mori*. To take a photograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability, mutability. Precisely by slicing out this moment and freezing it, all photographs testify to time’s relentless melt (15).

This extemporality is the origin of photography’s violence as identified by, amongst others, Berger and it is a moment which is sometimes signalled by a shocking flash of light which marks this moment of separation from time.

But what of the other cultural forms which concern us here? Barthes also makes a useful observation on the relationship of theatre to death which allows him to construct a connection between photography and theatre. He posits that photography relates to art not through painting, (which is a connection traced by most conventional histories of photography via the camera obscura) but through theatre whose masked and/or made up body of the actor denotes the performer as “simultaneously living and dead: [...] Photography is a kind of primitive theater, a kind of *Tableau Vivant*, a figuration of the motionless and made-up face beneath which we see the dead”(31/32). Barthes cites theatres’ origination in death rituals exemplified by the use of the mask or make up which allow its actors to stand in for the dead. Theatre, in its origins therefore, acts like photography, as through its masked performer it signals both life and death. In a sense both theatre and photography contain the paradox of repetition as representations of life delivered through a kind of death, thus not only could they be seen as both agents of death but also, more practically, as rehearsals for the moment of mortality.
I have not yet discussed performance in relation to repetition and death in many ways because it forms a somewhat different equation with these phenomena from photography and theatre. Previously I outlined a separation between performance and theatre in respect of the overt uses of codes of representation, and concurred with Pontbriand’s conclusion that performance, like photography, functions through the use of the transparent sign. Death in theatre is delivered by its overt signs of representation, principally that of the mask. Death in photography, which is without sign, is manifested instead by its extemporal stasis. Both deaths are delivered through repetition. Performance contains neither mask nor stasis, it attempts to penetrate to the Real by being real rather than repeating it, therefore through its staging of actuality it could be seen to elude death by avoiding repetition. However, as we have already demonstrated, culture in general is constructed as a defence against death’s alterity and therefore performance, as a cultural construct, cannot avoid death. Thus it is necessary to seek out the presence of death in performance. Performance cannot avoid repetition in as much as consciousness cannot; “no one is ever anything but the copy of a copy, real or mental” states Barthes (102).

Performance, (like photography), may attempt to do away with the signs of repetition, but these signs are merely secondary manifestations of a process which has already occurred with consciousness’ entry into the Symbolic via the acquisition of language. Therefore in order to ‘make sense’ or ‘be understood’ even as actuality or the pure present of the ‘here and now’, performance still has to operate through language, through signs, signs of actuality. As Derrida states in Writing and Difference “Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence, has always already begun to represent itself” (249). These signs of actuality are invisible because, like photography, they are signs which conform to a seen, felt, sensed, tangible reality, but even though they do not signal representation they cannot be beyond it. Therefore repetition in the sense of the representational may be invisible in performance but in order to have meaning and be constituted as such, performance must operate through signs and a sign, even an indexical sign, is a repetition.

Photography affects its repetition through extemporality by removing an
image from time, it then doubles this repetition by re-presenting this frozen past time in present time. As a live medium, performance occurs in present time and therefore remains, to some degree, in flux; it thus escapes the double repetition of time afforded by the static photograph. However some performance work can exhibit extemporal qualities and it does so via forms of repetition. Heathfield cites the work of companies such as Forced Entertainment and Goat Island as examples of “performance as repetition” in that their work presents “a re-staging of events which, for the acting subject, persistently evade explanation and conscious mastery”. (Interestingly these elements of the performances are often modelled on photographically derived sources such as cinema and television sequences). These companies then “present to us a body that is falling out of linear time. Physical action [...] is non-progressive”. The ex or atemporal body in these performances becomes like the photographic or (recorded) mediatized body. Yet a significant difference still exists between the performing body and the recorded body in its relation to time. The time of the recorded image is essentially one of recovery, recovery of a past moment/event into the present and this executes a form of resolution for the image. In non progressive time, which is signalled by the performing body, actions are repeated but these are not past actions and are only similar to the actions of the moments before. Performance, because it has not fixed the past like photography, is a form which can never deliver this resolution when past meets present. Therefore there can be no overall mastery or recovery of time in this type of repetition and for this reason time, in this form of cultural expression, can only be experienced as loss. Is this where the repetition of performance meets death through its staging of time as loss? “Temporal progress, which held death in a suspended future, is replaced by an experience of time constituted as loss” states Heathfield. Could it be that performance does not constitute quite such an impervious barrier against the notion of death as the other reality-substituting forms of culture we have examined? Through its experience of time as loss, performance presages death and figures death as the imperative. Even in the most death-defying

10 I made similar observations in relation to the freeze in the case study Constants II in chapter two.

11 Heathfield also comes to a similar conclusion though not through a comparison with the time of photography; “This body in extremis is locked in a non generative movement, never fully surpassing or recovering the absent originary event which it evidently repeats”.

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(ie most life-like) repetitions, death is paradoxically present, and if all culture is ultimately death-bound then each temporary escape also forms a rehearsal for it. This is what is uniquely acknowledged by performance; performance, unlike other forms of cultural repetition, stages the fallacy of immortality and the inevitability of death.

United in death

Death is also, by force of circumstances, acknowledged in the TAT. The TAT is both a denial of and a rehearsal for death. The skilful execution of the codes of theatre attempt an exact replication of a torpedo attack and through this realism, like the photograph, the TAT suggests the possibility of mastery, as if by endless repetition the pilot could ensure that he will successfully deliver death and evade his own. But unlike the photograph, the TAT separates from reality spatially rather than temporally - it is exspatial and therefore the real it mimics is not in the past. It is a ‘real time’ event like theatre and similarly establishes its coterminous reality through reproductive codes. Thus like theatre, the TAT provides a replication of an environment which differs from its original mould in that it is determined and controlled. Here, surrounded by the representations of that environment the pilot rehearses his actions while escaping from war’s attendant mortality. But this escape is only a temporary one. Through this repetition he delivers death by rehearsing the moment when the torpedo meets its target, but the proximity of the war beyond the architecture of the TAT should serve to remind the pilot that death, in this configuration, is not merely metaphorical. The body of the pilot unites the world of the simulation and the world of war, and the intense socio-political reality of the war shifts the codes of the TAT from theatre towards the immediate here and now of performance. Like performance, death is immanent within the TAT, death enters with the pilot’s performance. Despite the TAT’s fixed codes of representation any resolution within this secure environment can only be temporary, death will not be assuaged.

This discussion has dealt with issues pertinent to both performance and media but the bombing simulator brings the two dynamics into relief. The live body of the pilot is the performing body; the fixed image-based
representations of reality animated by light are recorded media; the TAT is a multi-media performance event. The complete scenario is intensified by the attendant reality of the war just, as the invisible signs utilised in media and performance charge their presentations of reality. However, via its combination of the body and the ‘recorded image’ the TAT manifests a paradoxical relationship with the notion of death. The TAT is constrained by its fixed representations which function to exclude death, but as a training device it is necessary for the TAT to facilitate some degree of play within its fixed representations, which must remain, in part, spontaneously responsive to the actions of the pilot. These actions are live and although perhaps repetitious are never fully resolved until the pilot or his target meets his/its disappearance in death (signalled by an obliterating flash of light). The TAT therefore, combines performance and its associated implications of death with fixed representational images which exclude death, and thus within the TAT death is both immanent and deferred. This is what the TAT demonstrates for the contemporary project of multi-media performance which similarly combines these two principal elements of performing body and fixed image. The deferral and immanence of death has been seen to be a constituent factor in all repetitious aspects of culture, but it is multi-media performance and its collision of both parts of this dialectic which exposes this as a dynamic of culture rather than other cultural practices which exclude or hide this paradox.

3.2 Simulator

In my response to the TAT and some of the issues it raises, I constructed an installation around a meeting of theatre (performance) and photography (mediatized image).\(^{12}\) The ideas for this work developed alongside my historical and technical research, and it is interesting to note how the work evolved in relation to my understanding of the original torpedo attack trainer. This installation was completed for an exhibition deadline, and in analysing this work it is also possible to see how concepts and ideas are resolved in

\(^{12}\) The structure of this chapter might suggest that the conclusions I express in the first section “Reality and Death”. had been realised prior to the making of my installation Simulator detailed in the case study section. However, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter this research is ongoing, I have continued to make observations and connections concerning this work and this is a process which extends into this writing. The chapter structure is intended to enable both me and the reader to make reflections upon the final installation in the light of the prior theoretical discourse.
relation to this imperative.

I was principally interested in the TAT as an architectural phenomenon and found it difficult to work beyond it. As the possibility of presenting a site-specific work was not a practical option I was obliged to consider ways to realise the piece whilst maintaining the impact of the physical reality of the building. Originally I intended to make a large time-based installation that reflected the actual scale of the bombing simulator. It would use a combination of still and moving images, a live presence - possibly a performer, an explosive moment to cause a white-out and a sense of past time in the form of a soundtrack made up of aural histories. I wanted to recreate the curved screen and project onto it in an enclosed space, in which a blinding flash would be triggered by audience members entering the room, causing an image of the same audience to be projected onto the screen. This basic idea continued to be modified; the cyclorama was replaced by four separate screens in cube arrangement, four CCTV cameras and a hidden vision-mixer operator. The screens would display black and white archival war footage and this would be interrupted by a flash of light triggered by the operator, in the aftermath of the flash these images would be replaced with frozen pictures of the audience which would gradually fade back into the war time footage. The flash which exposed the viewing audience to themselves was intended to insert a frozen image of that audience into the historical continuum as represented by the film, thereby collapsing the audience into an event and eliminating separation and distance on an imagistic level. This construction of implication through the image seemed simplistic, and so I considered replacing the archive footage with the actual training films that I erroneously thought had been used in the TAT. In this equation the audience would have been brought into a more immediate contact with an historical event by witnessing their own image inserted within the actual footage used in the trainer, rather than by the more general anonymous representations of ‘history’ as signalled by standard war time archival footage.

The project continued to develop throughout 1998. I recognised that the importance of the original structure as an architectural space had to be one of the key factors of interest in the piece, and revised my plans to include a
curved projection surface. The phenomenon of the space seemed so powerful that creating a work outside of the original seemed potentially pointless, yet the difficulties of gaining public access to the TAT were insurmountable. Nevertheless I wanted to create some indication of the shocking contrast between the anonymous barn-like exterior and the carefully crafted ruined interior. This contrast I thought would emphasise the space of the TAT as being of a separated representational order and therefore aligned with the project of realism and other representational forms of culture. I tried to imagine ways of transposing the building into other spaces by using 1:1 scale photographic projections; it is notable that the photographic medium provided the means by which to maintain a sense of integrity with the original, no doubt due to its invisible index and therefore the strong transfer it facilitates of original object through an image. I also intended to use location sound recordings for much the same reason as they would ‘transparently’ reproduce the sound of the original, and in combination with the photographic image provide a powerful sense of actuality. These recordings were to be intermingled with fragments of testimonies from people who worked at Crail during the war to maintain the effect of the historically real within the piece. Initially an audience would be presented with an exterior view of the trainer projected onto a curved screen and only when a flash went off would the image change to the interior, temporarily granting the audience access into the space. These interior images would be layered to include theatrical sea and sky effects, a ship silhouette, archival footage, as well as pictures of the audience. Therefore in this scenario access to the interior triggered by an explosive moment would be equivalent to access to the past.

The scale of the project posed a problem for its realisation. On the basis of my interest in the building I had been asked to contribute to a group show called ‘The Shed’. When confronted with the need to realise a piece of work with a limited production budget in a shared space I was obliged to modify my plans yet again. I was not able to enclose a part of the gallery to produce a separate dark space suitable for projection, yet still wished to make a distinction between the interior and exterior spaces of the TAT in, order to enforce a sense of schism between its representational space and the world beyond which it mimicked. However if the phenomenon of the building
was of prime importance, any reproduction of it would potentially render the power of the space impotent - what was needed was a simulacrum.

As part of a theatre production process a designer often builds a model of the set enclosed in a ‘model box’ which is constructed to represent the wider architectural environs of the theatre. These scale models, sometimes referred to as a dioramas, show the set in its extended context and are also used by directors with miniature models of characters to block stage action. The idea of a scale model of the space appealed on a number of levels; first it doubled the abstraction of space which occurred in the original TAT between the actual encounter at sea and its representation as a training scenario but, by extension, the model also emphasised a function of all cultural artifacts that operate through repetition. Photography, theatre, film, television, are all, to greater or lesser degree, abstractions from the world which, depending on their degree of realism, either hide or emphasise their forms as representations. Susan Stewart writes about the model; “as the word implies, it is an abstraction or image and not a presentation of any lived possibility”(133); by producing a model of the TAT I hoped to be able to implicate more general cultural forms within the work and also point to the exclusion of aspects of the lived body from the model world. It is this lived body in performance which maintains the experience of time as loss and paradoxically therefore represents the possibility of death, or as Stewart states, “In contrast to this model body, the body of lived experience is subject to change, transformation, and, most importantly, death”(133).

More practically, a device such as a model placed the trainer on a more manageable scale whilst maintaining an integrity with the original space, as well as providing a suggestion of the theatre which had already been demonstrated to be a determining factor within the construction of the bombing simulator. By Spring 1999 I had established the idea of producing an ‘identical’ working model of the TAT enclosed within a model box. The outside surfaces of the box would be covered with photographic images or projections of the present day exterior of the trainer, whilst inside the image of a model ship would travel around a miniature curved surface. An individual spectator would be obliged to open a curtain that covered the front of the model box, much like the curtain at the front of a stage, in order to see
the simulator inside. After looking in for a moment, the viewer would be blinded by a flash, which would cause the lights in the model to dim, and reveal on the small screen their own face staring back at them frozen in time in a picture of temporal death.

I finally came to construct Simulator in May and June 1999, by this time the idea had changed once again. The structural similarities between a model box and an old fashioned box camera occurred to me, both seemed to be devices constructed to contain ‘model worlds’. In addition, it is also necessary to peer inside both devices, partially inserting one’s head, to see an image. These similarities allowed me to place more emphasis on the connections that I felt existed between the bombing simulator, photography and model worlds. Therefore instead of referencing the exterior of the building with images on the sides of the model box, I decided to make the box resemble a large wooden camera positioned on a tripod with a black photographers cloth (like a stage curtain) covering the front. Inside the box was a simplified version of the TAT; I constructed the touroidol shape of the cyclorama by resin casting around a tyre inner tube; after this was finished it was painted with a sea horizon line like the original and fixed to a miniature planked floor with supporting struts. Through a gap in the miniature cyclorama, a viewer would then look directly across to a spot-lit silhouette projection of a warship shining down from a simple projector consisting of a zoom lens and low wattage light mounted on the lid of the box. Out of sight behind the cyclorama were hidden two speakers and a Metz photography flash gun. A soundscape had been constructed from long durational recordings made on location in the trainer, and this played on a long loop cycle, so that when a viewer inserted their head into the Simulator they were surrounded by sounds heard in the actual simulator. After a period of approximately six seconds the flash gun would go off triggered by a pressure pad located under a mat in front of the Simulator which a spectator was obliged to stand on. The flash gun was located directly behind the warship silhouette on the screen, and the flash was masked with the shape of a cross hair gun sight. When the flash went off, if the viewer was looking

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13 It is interesting to note in this context that recorded sound functions similarly to the recorded image in that its fixing onto a repetitious carrier base (in this instance a digital mini disc and CD) affords a sense of indexical actuality to the reproduced sound. The replay transfers qualities of the real space that the model Simulator tries to invoke.
directly at the boat, they would be temporarily blinded and this cross hair image would be left as a retinal after-image. On exiting the Simulator this impression might remain, temporarily overlaying their normal sight with a small floating cross-hair image.

Vid. 18: Simulator - 3 views

b This documentation exposes problems which occur when working with physiological elements of vision such as the use of retinal after-images or, in the case of The Turin Machine discussed in the next chapter, low light. Due to a limited shutter speed and lack of sensitivity to abrupt changes in light a documenting video camera is unable to record the moment of bright flash in any detail and therefore is unable to reproduce the effect of the cross hair retinal after-image.

The major change in this version of Simulator is in its use of a cross-hair to create a retinal after-image which replaces the idea of presenting a viewer with a frozen image of themselves. I discarded this mirroring idea after considering its technical and artistic implications; the electronics within the Simulator were already surprisingly complicated, since the flash had to be adapted to work from a mains power unit, the trigger and delay were temperamental and although I built miniature amplifiers to power the speakers, these never functioned without an interfering mains hum and had to be replaced with a standard amplifier. To project a picture of the viewer would have involved a camera, a video projector, an image grabber (either installed on a computer or within a vision mixer) and a dimmable lighting system all which would have had to work from the same and/or a related triggering system. Lack of time and resources made this idea difficult to realise, but ultimately I discarded it because I did not like the relationship it established between the trainer and the viewer; it seemed too simplistic. I was unsure if people would be able to make any productive connections between the projection of the boat followed by that of their own face, and the narcissism of the encounter seemed cyclical and enclosed, and only suggestive of the act of looking without any consequences which might
have suggested broader historical or cultural implications for the work.

After images

The cross-hair retinal after-image had the advantage of being technically simpler to realise in a short space of time but, more positively, it created a literally active relationship between viewer and object. Retinal after-images had been a phenomenon which I had been considering for sometime prior to my encounter with the trainer. They interested me as they seemed to represent another moment where performance meets photography as the body’s biological equivalent of a (temporarily) recorded image. The means by which an after-image is created also has similarities with processes of photography, and indeed all mediatized images, in that light is converted into a malleable representational image. In flash photography the process by which an image is burnt, (Benjamin uses the word “seared”), onto the photographic emulsion is made particularly noticeable by the excessive amount of light needed to produce that image. The flash emphasises a process which is normally discreet and hidden because it occurs through available light; the shock of the flash carries the potential to jolt our perception out of this norm and into a realisation of the mechanics of photography (and mediatized images in general). An after-image figures a ‘branding’ of the retina by light similar to that of photographic emulsion. The retina retains a stimulus from the light once it has ceased to have contact with the retina, and in an extreme case, like a flash of light, overloads the retina and causes temporary blinding. I would argue that there is a similarity between photography (mediatization) and the act of looking itself through shared responses to light, and I locate this similarity within the explosive moment of the TAT which, within the actuality of war, obliterates as it is seen. The spectator is physically implicated in the functioning of the Simulator and an equivalence is drawn between the pilot sighting his target

14 The phenomenon of retinal after-images form an important strand of Jonathan Crary’s argument in his book Techniques of the Observer as they indicate the increasing awareness of the physiological aspects of vision which developed during the nineteenth century.

15 Phelan makes a similar argument for after-images as an indication of the “optical unconscious”. This is an idea which will be developed in the following chapter.

16 A similar point was made in chapter two regarding the transformation of light into various electrical charges by the video process.
and the spectator’s act of looking. The flash provoked by this looking causes the obliteration of the image, suggesting the destruction of the object by the gaze. The protagonist in this obliteration, the gaze, is revealed as a cross-hair impression which remains after the explosion of light. The spectator, in the rupturing moment of the flash, becomes simultaneously the gunner-pilot-photographer and the target as their vision is annihilated by the blinding flash of light. This dualistic positioning remains for a short time outside of the model, as the spectator moves around the gallery bearing a cruciform impression on their retina which obscures their ‘normal’ vision.

Vid. 19. Simulator - Walk In

Fig. 4. Simulator cross-hair

Therefore, in an encounter with the Simulator installation a number of ideas are activated. Shock, originating in the experience of war (the Great War) has long been seen as a condition of modernity, as Susan Buck-Morss notes in “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered”; “Benjamin claimed this battlefield experience of shock ‘has become the norm’ in modern life”(388). In its miniature replay of this battle shock via the photographic flash(gun), Simulator attempts to attach itself to the reality of war and also to a reality of modernity. According to Buck-Morss, Benjamin, following Freud, also notes that “consciousness is a shield protecting the organism against stimuli - ‘excessive shock’ - from without, by preventing their retention, their impress as memory”(388). Simulator reproduces this ‘excessive shock’, but also signals the memory protection mechanisms of consciousness by affording only a temporary bodily record in the bright, but disappearing, after-image. By mimicking the mechanics of photographic image-making, the Simulator also alludes to modernity’s alternative forms of memory which are not originated in the body, but a function of external cultural practices, in particular those of mediatized

17 All quotations from Buck-Morss in this chapter are from “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics".
images; “What served in the place of the photograph; before camera’s invention? The expected answer is the engraving, the drawing, the painting. The more revealing answer might be: memory”(50) states Berger and he goes on to note that; “The camera relieves us of the burden of memory. It surveys us like God, and it surveys for us. Yet no other god has been so cynical, for the camera records in order to forget”(55). But the shock of the flash can also be equated with a moment of revelation, a ‘Road to Damascus’ type of vision wreathe[d] in light - which in turn ‘enlightens’. I wanted the unexpected flash of light occurring in close proximity to the spectator’s eyes to literally ‘illuminate’, to resituate shock back into photography and to provoke a moment of understanding as to the extemporal qualities of image making. In this sense the flash was to act like Berthold Brecht’s ‘Verfremdungseffekt’ or Viktor Scholovsky’s ‘Priem Ostranenniya’ - ‘the device of making strange’ sometimes defined as alienation and described by John Willet appropriately as a matter “of perception and understanding: or gaining new insights into the world around us by glimpsing it in a different and previously unfamiliar light”(220). In the case of the TAT it was the relationship of war, vision and mediatization that I wished to ‘bring to light’.  

I was aware, however, that this unexpected flash of light also perpetrated a form of violence upon the viewer which I felt drew a comparison between the viewer, the pilot and the photographer, the act described by Sontag as “sublimated murder”(14). In the TAT/Simulator configuration, by substituting the look of the photographer/pilot for the look of the spectator, 'looking' is made active rather than passive. This vitality of vision is short lived however, as the viewer is simultaneously blinded by the light, which echoes Virilio’s understanding of “[the] constant straining after ‘more light’” (which he sees as the sociopolitical project of increasing control over space) and which leads to “a sort of precocious disability, a blindness”(9). Virilio, quotes from J.P Vernant’s La Mort dans les yeux; “When you stare at the Gorgon, the

18 Interestingly Berger cites Brecht's theories as the means by which photography might be delivered into a more socially and politically responsible dimension: “If we want to put a photograph back into the context of experience, social experience, social memory, we have to respect the laws of memory. We have to situate the printed photograph so that it acquires something of the surprising conclusiveness of that which was and is. What Brecht wrote about acting [...] is applicable to such a practice” (61).
sparkle in her eye dispossesses you, makes you lose your on sight, condemns you to immobility”(41). In Virilio’s analysis the blinding effects of light, “which has no image and yet creates images”(9) is, by extension, the effect of all photography and mediatized images. Therefore between Sontag and Virilio we find the annihilation of the object of the photograph and its subject the viewer, which returns us to a moment of death, which both subject and object have strived to evacuate from the representational equation.

In the light of my analysis I am able, however, to identify a number of weaknesses within my installation. Although Simulator seems to satisfactorily inculcate elements of theatre and photographic practice into the formation of simulated model worlds it is, as a work, unable to progress beyond demonstrating these technical dependencies and therefore make active the consequences of certain forms of cultural expression. The difficulty originates in the pivotal moment of the flash which is intended to replicate the obliterating of subject and object founded in the viewing exchange. On a purely practical level, if the spectator’s attention was not centred directly on the spot-lit silhouette of the ship the cross-hair matte of the flash was undetectable, and all that was sensed was a bright flash which caused no after-image. In addition after the flash gun had fired, the image of the ship remained resolutely unchanged, not in fact ‘disappeared’ by the action of the flash nor ‘over written’ by a cross hair image. Therefore the ‘explosive/exposive’ moment affected no radical difference or change either in the object of vision, the ship, or the subject, the viewer. However, even if a spectator had looked directly at the flash at its moment of detonation and thereby received the retinal effect, I believe this in itself did not sufficiently progress the viewer into the wider repercussions of image-making that I had identified as resonant within the original torpedo attack trainer. In my exhibited installation I had replaced the earlier idea of a photographic image of the viewer with the flash-induced retinal after-image. This flash, along with a camera-like exterior construction, was intended to be sufficient to signal a comparison between looking, mediatization and acts of war. Unfortunately the pivotal moment of the flash was not, in itself, suggestive enough of the act of photography (mediatization) to continue a metonymical chain through to the original trainer and its attendant overtones
of death.

Whilst reviewing *Simulator* in preparation for this writing it has become apparent to me that the idea that I had discarded as a narcissistic simplification - the photographic mirror image of the viewer - was exactly the component the work required to trigger its broader considerations of imaging culture. The static portrait of the spectator would have provoked the radical change the work was preceded upon, particularly if combined with the retinal after-image and a moving ship silhouette which had disappeared after the flash, to be temporarily replaced by a frozen face. This static image would have introduced the extemporality of photography and provoked a moment of alienation (*Ostranenniya*) between the vital body of the viewer and his or her mortified representation. Therefore, such an image would have stated the ‘presence’ of photography as well as the contrasting ‘presence’ of performance and returned the act of looking to a more nuanced condition. The use of a static image of the viewer would have emphasised the trajectory present in the act of photography: that the act of looking causes the ‘death’ of the object and the continuation of the subject at the cost of a certain blindness and petrification. Perhaps it is contradictory to suggest that the image of a frozen face would have brought the living body back into the representational equation, but this stasis would certainly have acted as a microcosm of death just as the model *Simulator* was intended to do in relation to the original TAT.

The static photograph could have complicated the installation in a productive manner by reversing the role of the spectator within the viewing equation. Within such a configuration the subject, conventionally the viewer of the art object, becomes another object through the petrifying effect of the recorded image. The subject is transformed by the glare of the flash gun into the object and as object therefore becomes an ‘other’. By presenting a static image *Simulator* thus emphasises part of the ego forming process by presenting a viewer with an image that is simultaneously of the self but not the self (the frozeness enforcing an alienation from the body and emphasising this self as an object/image). Robins cites Philip Dubois’ idea of the figure of Narcissus as symbol of ‘our psychic investment’ in the
image. Narcissus, who fell in love with his own image represents a desire for unification with the image, a prelapsarian unity which is infantile in origin and ultimately leads to Narcissus' death by drowning. Narcissus meets death through his failure to recognise himself as different from his image. The failure to recognise the image as an image is precipitated through a narcissistic longing for fusion which is ultimately destructive and leads to the death of the self. Though presenting a spectator with an image of themselves, might have appeared at first to replicate a reductive narcissism in the installation *Simulator*, I would now speculate that this could have triggered a number of productive aftershocks from the work, possibly leading back to a consideration of the dynamic of death within contemporary visual culture.

The reflective image of the viewer experienced in the installation might also maintain a consideration of the duality of the self founded in the self sameness and self otherness paradox at the centre of identity, provoked, as it might be, by the similarity and difference between the live spectator and his or her frozen image. Here the subject transformed into object looks back at the subject in a blind stare, an endless reflective feedback suggesting the negotiation of these two positions operating at the heart of our sense of identity. In its revised state, the *Simulator* installation will stage the live body as concurrent with the body as image, and neither version of the self will be resolved or absorbed by the other. We are simultaneously subject and object, and it is this operation of identity that multi-media performance, and indeed any work preceded upon a coexistence of body with image, realises within a cultural sphere.

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19 This is not only Dubois' idea. Narcissus and the love of self-image that this myth symbolises is used by both Freud and Lacan in their descriptions of the formation of the ego. Lacan's description of the three orders of subjectivity begins with the Imaginary and the Mirror Phase which describes its development. The infant sees his image in a mirror and experiences jubilation at the image which offers an impression of completeness and unity - this is described as a narcissistic moment which informs the Imaginary. Dubois' "psychic investment" can also be termed the libidinal drives at work in human subjectivity which desire a return to this unified, pre-linguistic Imaginary state represented by images of the self.

20 This paradox of the divided self also originates in the Mirror Phase where the image of the infant is at once the same as but also different from the image (see previous Footnote).
Death and the other

One important aspect of this realisation lies in our encounter with ourselves as ‘other’ because it as other that we can grasp the reality of death. Robins cites Emmanuel Levinas in this context;

Levinas in fact traces a correlation between the human confrontation of death and confrontation with the Other. Death is unknowable, it is what marks ‘the limit of the subject’s virility’, it is where ‘the subject loses its very mastery as a subject’. [...] Death exists and exerts its force over our lives as an imperative, and it is through the Other that we experience that imperative force (25/6).

Thus transformed by the camera into objectness and other we can understand the morbidity of photographs - Sontag’s “memento mori”, and hence the potential power of this photographic object when placed within the intensive space of the Simulator. In a revised form, which included the viewer’s static image, subject and object would meet, face to face, in the blinding(binding revelation of an explosive/explosive moment. Robins continues Levinas’ observations on death; “it is this encounter - in which we are exposed to, and afflicted by, the vulnerability and mortality of the Other - that is the basis for our moral and ethical relations”(26). It is notable that it is exactly these moral and ethical dimensions that Sontag and Berger felt were evacuated from the photographic encounter. The ‘face to face’ confrontation with the other, as Robins acknowledges, raises “the fundamental question of how we experience and relate to the world”(26).

Beyond the Simulator

In the light of Robins’ “fundamental question”, what are the consequences for a type of cultural practice which stages a meeting between subject and object such as that figured by the combination of performance and the mediatized image? Is multi-media performance of any social or political import beyond being a specialised subsection within a sphere of performance/media culture? The TAT, as an historical object of war, provides the possibility of suggesting a broader territory for any work which takes it as its subject. Simulator, an installation that would ideally play
between the difference of the recorded and living body, illustrates the possibility that issues contained within these dynamics can also extend into other types of work undertaken within the field of multi-media performance.

Recent visual theory has traced a trajectory which links the scopic regimes of the film and media spheres with developments in military imaging technology, examples would be Virilio’s *Vision Machine*, Baudrillard’s *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*; Robins, in particular, bases part of his analysis of virtual reality in this comparative trajectory. He charts the technological phenomenon of virtual reality as an extension of the western rationalist/enlightenment project of absolute control over environments realised in the construction of micro worlds. These worlds are either approximations of a reality and/or idealised in some form to allow an exploration of the simulacrum without encountering any genuine threat, particularly the threat of pain or death. In this way Robins accuses technologically created ‘worlds’ of operating like a narcotic in order to ‘neutralise experience’. Model worlds are a distantiation from and distillation of the world which facilitate a limited form of experience and hence a total control of the substitute environment. Buck-Morss sees this limiting of experience accompanied by an illusion of total control as the project not just of virtual reality but of much modern visual culture, and she also accounts for this via the influence of rationalist and enlightenment philosophy figured in “the motif of autogenesis”(379).21 Buck-Morss continues “What seems to fascinate modern ‘man’ about this myth is the narcissistic illusion of total control. The fact that one can imagine something that is not, is extrapolated in the fantasy that one can (re)create the world according to plan”(380). Like Robins, Buck-Morss adopts the notion of a narcotic to metaphorise aspects of nineteenth and twentieth century visual culture. She states; “Beginning in the nineteenth century, a narcotic was made out of reality itself. The key word for this development is phantasmagoria. [...] It describes an appearance of reality that tricks the senses through technical manipulation”(394). In the nineteenth century these phantasmagoria are typified by Parisian shopping arcades and

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21 Buck-Morss provides footnote for her idea of “the motif of autogenesis” which in turn indicates a meaning for the word “autogenesis”. She writes “The birth of the Greek polis is attributed precisely to the wondrous idea that man can produce himself *ex nihilo*. The polis becomes the artifact of ‘man’ in which he can bring forth, as a material reality, his own higher essence”(379).
notably panoramas and dioramas “that engulfed the viewer in a simulated
total environment-in-miniature”(394). Although she does not specifically
reference virtual reality Buck-Morss goes on to note that these
phantasmagoria “are the precursors of today’s shopping malls, theme
parks, and video arcades”(394). All are examples of “techno-aesthetics”
employed to provide a fantasy of control while providing a buffer against the
shocks of modern day experience; “The goal is manipulation of the
synaesthetic system by control of environmental stimuli. It has the effect of
anaesthetizing the organism, not through numbing but through flooding the
senses”(394) and she concludes “Sensory addiction to a compensatory
reality becomes a means of social control”(395).

The TAT can be seen as an exemplar phantasmagoria, a micro world
based on “an appearance of reality that tricks the sense through technical
manipulation”, but as a war simulation the TAT also potentially exposes the
limits of its particular representation of reality by necessarily restricting its
operations to a limited field of experience i.e. one that excludes war’s
attendant reality - death. This is what makes the TAT a particularly fertile
subject for work which wishes to discuss the broader implications of Buck-
Morss’ ‘techno-aesthetics’. Robins, following Levinas, has already raised
the possibility of ethical and moral imperatives as deriving from an
encounter with death, and Buck-Morss now adds the implication of “social
control” in work which creates autogenetic micro worlds which logically
exclude or deny an encounter with death. Heathfield has also noted that
death-defying cultural formations are “founded on the maintenance of an
absolute and binary distinction between death and life” and quotes
Baudrillard “All the agencies of repression and control are installed in this
divided space”. Therefore these writers provide evidence that devices such
as the TAT precipitate social and political consequences which extend
beyond their immediate function as war simulating machines.

The bombing simulator demonstrates better than most this fantasy of
control present in much visual representation. The pilot exerts a control over
an apparition of an external reality which transcends his human and mortal
being and protects him from the experience of death. The TAT, like much
visual culture and particularly media culture, establishes its immortal world
by replicating, primarily through the visual sense, realistic images of the mortal world. Realism is a vital component to these micro worlds because in making recourse to realist aesthetics these representations claim to ‘reflect’ and ‘replicate’ an actual, a priori, exterior world - life as it is experienced and understood. Thus these representations assert an epistemic truth; via their ‘accurate replication of life’ these products wish to acquire a status that is equal to life. However this visually mastered reality leads Robins to observe that a consequence of this is that “Vision is becoming separated from experience”(11) - imaging technologies increasingly produce visions of the world which belie their difference and detachment from the world. Robins’ observation concurs with Virilio’s earlier refutation of Merleau-Ponty; “The bulk of what I see is, in fact and in principle, no longer within my reach”(7). It is the separation of vision from experience which is the precedent for much military imaging technology and in turn permits a form of alienation which allows for behaviours which had previously been unavailable either physically or morally. Robins provides the bleak example of the shooting down in 1988 of the Iranian Airbus flight 655 at the cost of 290 lives by the USS Vincennes, where the America war ship used a targeting system unable to distinguish between military and civilian aircraft. Interestingly these imaging technologies form a contrast to a belief articulated by Bergson in his work Matter and Memory; “distance represents, above all, the measure in which surrounding bodies are insured, in some way, against the immediate action of my body”(20/1). The intervening one hundred years since Bergson wrote his philosophy has seen the collapse of physical distance as a form of protection between peoples who are now brought into one another's immediate spheres of influence by the technology of 'Mechanical Reproduction' and its associated desire for proximity as originally identified by Benjamin. These technologies paradoxically create simultaneously both a proximity and a distance and alienation which make them particularly suitable for applications in the military domain, which is where, according to Virilio, they originate from; “The panoply of acts of war thus always tends to be organised at a distance […] the teletopological phenomenon remains heavily marked by its remote beginnings in war”(6). This has led Virilio to observe;

paradoxical logic emerges when the real-time image dominates the thing represented, real time subsequently
prevailing over real space, virtuality dominating actuality and turning the very concept of reality on its head. [...] a paradoxical presence, the long-distance telepresence of the object or being which provides their very existence, here and now (63). Time and particularly the speed of light wins out over space; “The time frequency of light has become a determining factor in the apperception of phenomena, leaving the spatial frequency of matter for dead”(71). In Virilio’s analysis therefore here and now (time and space) has become purely the preserve of light (time) transposed by the “paradoxical logic” of the teletopological domain.

This form of visual and spatial alienation extends beyond that of the operator of specific imaging technologies, and towards anybody who partakes of looking within the particular scopic regime enforced by ‘technoaeesthetics’. The pilot training in the TAT is able to sever any emphatic feelings he may have for his human targets through the alienation and distantiation afforded by his model environment. Likewise any spectator of media images of atrocities is able to bear such witness due to the protection and separation induced by the forms of their reproduction; “The feeling of being exempt from calamity stimulates interest in looking at painful pictures”(168) states Sontag. Robins terms this condition “the disidentification with actual existence”(16). It is precisely this disidentification which allows repetitious images to become the means of waging modern warfare as well as the images provided by ‘the media’ which can then transform the event of war into a morally and ethically vacuous spectacle.²²

Many of the writers quoted in the preceding pages express a dissatisfaction with this technoaeathetic condition on the grounds of its implications for social and political interactions. In particular it is certain types of experience which are left out of the technoaeathetic exchange. This can be seen in early forms of this encounter in media such as photography; “The powers of photography have in effect de-Platonized our understanding of reality, making it less and less plausible to reflect upon our experience according to the distinction between images and things, between copies and

²² Virilio quotes Admiral Gorchkov’s assertion “The winner of the next war will be the one who made the most of the electromagnetic spectrum”(71).
originals”(179) states Sontag, and Berger asks for a return of the photograph “back into the context of experience”(61). In terms of more recent developments in visual culture Robins states “What is at stake, then, is the question of experience: we are contemplating the denial and disavowal of experience in modern culture, and the implication of vision technologies in this attenuation of modern experience”(22). Robins then goes on to quote Thomas Ogden who talks of “substitute formations, which involve turning the condition of non-experience into the illusion of experiencing and knowing”(23). The TAT, virtual reality simulations, photography, indeed any form which is preceded on a realistic reproduction of the idea of ‘the world’, could be identified as one of these substitute formations which, via their ‘realism’, provide an illusion of experience. Both Robins and Buck-Morss agree that what is needed in order to alter this condition of visual culture in a productive way is a reconnection of experience and vision;

I believe that it is through what is denied or disavowed in the dominant, rationalistic culture that we can find the basis of real cultural experience. [...] This is what must be recognised [...] by whoever seeks to reaffirm the transitive dimension of visual culture and to reconnect image and experience (Robins 11).

The body can be seen as the locus of experience; “If we experience the world, it is because we are bodily present in it: experience is inherently embodied”(30) states Robins. It is this body which is evacuated from most techno-aesthetic exchange, as Robins notes, “The world of simulation is a world without bodies”(20) and “We have come to the point of inhumanising and dehumanising ourselves when we no longer recognise and acknowledge the significance of embodied involvement in the world” (29/30). Working from Benjamin, Buck-Morss calls for a return to the aesthetics of the body; “that is, to undo the alienation of the corporeal sensorium, to restore the instinctual power of the human bodily senses for the sake of humanity’s self-preservation, and to do this, not by avoiding the
new technologies, but by passing through them”(377). This is the project that I would like to propose is initiated by multi-media performance emphasising, as it does, the body in relation to the technologically mediatized visions of our world. Part of this work -performance - as an incarnation of the actual body in a specific time and space is exactly that which is disavowed in a culture which is dominated by technologically derived visual images, hence Phelan’s description of performance as “the runt of the litter”(149). But performance’s body can signal and thence reactivate exactly those qualities of experience excluded from mediatized technoaesthetics and it does so by “passing through” new technology in the interdisciplinary mix of multi-media performance. Buck-Morss notes that as part of its narcotic effect phantasmagoria tends to appeal to one sense, normally the visual, above all others; “It is significant for the anaesthetic effects of these experiences that the singling out of any one sense for intense stimulus has the effect of numbing the rest”(396). Although a multi-media performance might be visually complex it cannot be reduced to this single dynamic using as it does the spoken word, mediatized images, physical action, sound and combinations of these. Neither does it attempt to present a unity of these disparate influences unlike Wagner’s ‘Gesamtkunstwerk’ which is sometimes cited as the precursor of interdisciplinary performance work. Instead, by presenting the body in close proximity to its mediatized image, multi-media performance is able to stage the reconnection of vision and experience. The ‘here and now’ in this equation is of an earlier order, and dependent upon a coexistence of time and space which is different from Virilio’s teletopology based as it is on a reality defined only by the time of light and not physical matter or space.

Berger specifically writes of the need to provide the photographic image with a “context of experience”, “so that it maybe seen in terms which are

23 Buck-Morss notes that the original meaning of the word aesthetics refers to the body; The original field of aesthetics is not art but reality - corporeal, material nature. As Terry Eagleton writes: ‘Aesthetics is born as a discourse of the body”’ and only later “aesthetics underwent a reversal of meaning so that by Benjamin’s time it was applied first and foremost to art - to cultural forms rather than sensible experience, to the imaginary rather than the empirical, to the illusory rather than the real (378/9).

24 Buck-Morss quotes Adorno “Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, intimately related to the disenchantment of the world’ is an attempt to produce a totalizing metaphysics instrumentally by means of every technological means at its disposal”(397).
simultaneously personal, political, economic, dramatic, everyday and historic”(63). The mediatized images used in multi-media performance are seen within a context, albeit perhaps not so extensive as the one advocated by Berger but nevertheless a context which places images into an immediate relationship with both performing and watching bodies. Therefore the distance and separation traditionally invoked by the photograph, or more recently the micro worlds of virtual reality, is not easily sustained in these images as they become situated back into the domain of Merleau-Ponty’s “Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, marked on the map of the ‘I can’” (qtd in Virilio 7). With the reintroduction of the body and hence experience back into the scopic regime, multi-media performance is able to activate some of the social and political dynamics which are negated in other mediatized forms of alienated/alienating visual culture.

3.3 Summary

At the beginning of this chapter I proposed that the TAT functioned as a meeting between performance and the mediatized image, and as a war time training simulation acted to provoke a number of ideas and assumptions pertinent to the discourses and practices of these forms. I began by making comparisons between the TAT and the technologies operating in dioramas and theatre techniques which shared an interest in producing ‘realistic’ environments. These live spectacles were, to varying degrees, both immersive and responsive. I then followed a trajectory principally prescribed by Berger and Sontag which mapped out a degree of interconnectivity between the practices of war and recorded media, particularly photography and the effect on our experiences and conceptions of reality derived from these practices. I also noted Pontbriand’s observations on performance as a response to these mechanical imaging technologies. However performance, like the earlier forms of live spectacle cited, is able to maintain a degree of reponsivity within its (re)presentations. I noted that the forms of performance, photography, theatre and the TAT (as virtual reality) all seemed able to construct different temporal and spatial relations with the concept of a ‘here and now’, and in so doing create a variety of interconnecting and contrasting ‘reals’ including the dual realities
of the body and the representational image.

The TAT is less a cultural practice than a specific historical technological and aesthetic object and its 'real' existence as a war time device provokes a very immediate and tangible relationship with the notion of death. In turn this extends into a consideration of the configuration of death within the other representational practices utilised by the TAT. Heathfield’s analysis of death (working from Bauman) contrasts two trajectories operating through repetition within culture; one death defying, the other death bound. It was possible for me to trace these at work in photography, theatre and performance. Through a direct comparison of the treatments of time and space afforded by photography and performance, I was able to conclude (in accordance with Heathfield) that in contrast to recorded mediatized images performance effected no overall mastery or recovery of its subject and thus, rather than working through indexical realism to exclude death, it presaged death and alterity. The TAT as a ‘multi-media performance’ with its dual body and mediatized realities also staged the two contrasting approaches to death and alterity - the recorded mediatized which fixes, controls and attempts to master and the alterity of the body, unstable and fundamentally undetermined.

After constructing this analysis I was then able to look back at my installation work Simulator. Extending from my understanding of the performative at work within the TAT, I had hoped to construct a work which activated a similar dualistic approach to the conceptions of reality and death figured in the original device. Working around the idea of shock and flash photography, I wanted to evoke an instantaneously dichotomous moment which referenced the conditions and effects of both performance and photography by imprinting with light onto the living body. In this way (though flawed in its execution) the installation was intended to act as a critique of both mediatizing and war-making processes which have, as referenced in my earlier writing, proved to be synonymous. In response to my critical reflections I was able to revise my ideas for Simulator and envisage a variation which would realise the efficacy of the human body more profoundly within the installation. By emphasising the body of the viewer as both subject and object (through the use of a still photographic image) the
work is potentially able to expose what is in turn effected by and evacuated from mediatized forms of encounter.

Mediatized images (and their confederate military technologies) are described by Virilio, Buck-Morss and Robins as driven by a desire for mastery and control over environments resulting in the creation of alternative, reality-substituting/escaping, autogenetic model worlds, exemplified by dioramas and VR installations. Such representations and environments are preceded upon a degree of sensory deprivation and alienation and include the exclusion of the imperative - death. These constructs in turn remove moral and ethical considerations from their predominantly visual interactions, and via their ‘realistic reproductions’ claim an empirical and omnipotent ‘truth’ for what are partial and specific cultural ‘constructs’. These conditions and the ideologies which determine mediatizing technology and its images are what make it so suitable for applications within the military domain. Yet Simulator and other performance related work is able to offer a critique of the practices and rationale behind the ‘camera/gun’. The body placed in proximity to a mediatized image experiences and references the heterogeneous nature of sensory experience, and reminds us of the consequences of the impoverished form of encounter propounded by the lens. The performing body of the spectator/performer is able to reactivate a conception of the codependent conditions of time and space, in which time - real time/body time - is always inscribed as loss. In this scenario there can be no mastery or transcendent disembodied fantasies of control - and after all it is exactly these fantasies that provoke a denial of alterity and demand its obliteration though violence and death.
4.1 Vision and Touch

the repressed of today is the body, the sensory and motor body. In the era of the third industrial revolution, the revolution of information, nuclear energy, and the video, the repressed is the body. (Didier Anzieu).¹

At the end of the previous chapter I charted the consequences of so-called ‘realist’ forms as substitutive forms of experience. Following a number of theorists (principally, Robins and Buck-Morss) I explained how certain scopic regimes and mediatizing technologies worked to displace or evacuate certain experiential qualities from the viewing equation, principally via an exclusion of the human body from these forms of representation. I also posited ‘the body’, as exemplified by the spectating/performing bodies of multi-media performance, as an antidote to and critique of, these practices and their effects. The body was figured as the locus of heterogeneous experience and, in accordance with the above theorists, I identified a need for a reconnection of vision with experience via a new ‘aesthetics’ of the body.

Merleau-Ponty’s statement “everything I see is within my reach” (first cited in chapter two) establishes a concurrence between the two senses of touch and vision, and indeed in The Visible and the Invisible he suggests the two senses are transposable;

we must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out of the tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the touching, but also between the tangible and the visible [...]. Every vision

¹ From Anzieu’s A Skin for Thought: Interviews with Gilbert Tarrab. p. 64. quoted in Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies p. 27. All quotations from Grosz in this text are taken from Volatile Bodies.
takes place somewhere in the tactile space. There is a double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and the tangible in the visible (134).

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is important because, as Elizabeth Grosz explains in *Volatile Bodies*, he is one of a number of modern philosophers whose thinking goes some way to reformulating the position of ‘the body’ in western thought. Against this, Grosz charts a profound dualism operating at the heart of our ideas of the world and the human subject. This dualism is often described in terms of the Cartesian mind/body split but Grosz finds it operating in earlier Ancient Greek and Christian philosophy. What Grosz notes about this, (and the other oppositions founded in the mind/body binary) is that “Dichotomous thinking necessarily hierarchizes and ranks the two polarized terms so that one becomes the privileged term and the other its suppressed, subordinated, negative counterpart”(3). To this extent it is the mind which is framed as the superior term - the seat of learning, knowledge and reason and thus the body becomes at best a troublesome irrelevance;

Body is thus what is not mind [...]. It is what the mind must expel in order to retain its ‘integrity’. It is implicitly defined as unruly, disruptive, in need of direction and judgment, merely incidental to the defining characteristics of mind, reason or personal identity (3).

In traditional epistemological pursuits vision is associated with mind as the means by which to achieve understanding and knowledge. The close relationship of vision and knowledge is noted by both Grosz and Martin Jay. In a footnote Grosz comments;

> From the time of the Greeks, visual metaphors [...] have dominated conceptions of knowledge. Thought is regarded as

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2 It is important to stress that Grosz identifies that there is no such thing as *the* body “there is no body as such there are only bodies”(19).

3 Grosz provides a list of the associated mind/body oppositions, these are; “reason and passion, sense and sensibility, outside and inside, self and other, depth and surface, reality and appearance, mechanism and vitalism, transcendence and immanence, temporality and spatiality, psychology and physiology, form and matter, and so on”(3)

4 In the opening paragraph of *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought* Jay uses twenty one visual metaphors to demonstrate the domination of the visual sense in Western culture. p. 1.
speculative, imagistic: the visible coincides with the intelligible. Knowledge is ‘depicted’ as revelation, manifestation, or aletheia: [...]. These metaphors provide a series of usually unexamined presumptions governing the ways in which knowledge is construed; they are deeply implicated in the history of epistemology (220).

Thus vision becomes the sensory tool of the mind and reason and the means by which to understand and ‘master’ the surrounding world. In contrast to this, the sense most associated with the body is touch. Touch is the realm of feelings, emotions and the sensual and the body is interpreted as “a source of interference in, and danger to, the operations of reason” (Grosz 5). The body and its correlated touch are thus constructed in opposition to vision and mind as unable to provide an ‘objective’, scientific view (understanding) of the world. To this extent philosophy and associated knowledge seeking discourses have built a model of the dispassionate, detached inquirer observing the world around him in order to extract knowledge in what is ultimately a controlling endeavour.⁵ This is the model of vision Crary sees as exemplified by the camera obscura, and in such a conception for the purposes of understanding and knowledge, the mind has been separated from the body and vision as the servant of the mind has been similarly disembodied. In the light of Grosz’s analysis it is now possible to conceive of the rationale which limits the construction of ‘experience’ to the visual in many scopic regimes, and particularly those as manifested by modern mediatizing technologies.

Therefore we can now see that Merleau-Ponty’s conflation of touch and vision (mind/body) is indeed a radical departure, not only in terms of conventional inscriptions of the human senses as separate, but also in terms of a fundamental epistemic practises. In Merleau-Ponty’s description, vision is not a disembodied entity which allows a being to adopt an all-seeing detachment from the world, and thus knowledge to be gained untainted by the body; “Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, and thinks of the object-in-general, must return to the ‘there is’ which underlies it; to the site, the soil of the sensible and opened world such as

⁵ Phelan notes that this model is problematised by modern scientific understandings of vision stemming from quantum theory which determines the act of looking as influential over the phenomena observed.
its is in our life and for our body” (“Eye and Mind” 281). Vision, alongside touch and all the other human senses, places us not outside but inside phenomena, at the centre of the world; “Here, where the world is sensible; here, where I am” (Phenomenology xx). In such a conception it is impossible for vision to remain detached from the body and Grosz has noted that Merleau-Ponty’s association of vision and touch, in contrast to traditional configurations, works to implicate the body of the viewer in what is seen; “While it is clear that in the case of touch, the toucher is always touched, in traditional understandings of vision, the seer sees at a distance and is unimplicated in what is seen”(101). Key to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of vision and touch are his ideas on the “double sensation” or “reversibility”, and he extrapolates his observations from the realm of the tangible to the realm of the visible. In touch, he notes, it is impossible to touch without also being touched, hence the ‘reversibility’ of touch and thus, as Grosz acknowledges, “the subject is implicated in its objects and its objects are at least partially constitutive of the subject”(100/1). When a similar idea is applied to the more detached sensation of vision Merleau-Ponty concludes:

As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision (as is so well indicated by the double meaning of the word) be doubled with a complementary vision or with another vision: myself seen from without, such as another would see me, installed in the midst of the visible, [...] he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it (The Visible 134).

What is attractive about Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is that by comparing touch to vision he works to demonstrate the interdependence of subject and object. Whereas in previous ocularcentric philosophies the subject has remained separate and unaffected by the object of his vision (a detached position of mastery) vision is now figured as co-relational.

However, as Grosz goes on to recount, Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the interconnection between touch and vision is problematised by the feminist theorist Luce Irigaray. Irigaray proposes that the two senses are not equivalent in their reversibility and that in fact touch precedes and goes beyond vision; Grosz, quoting Irigaray, writes; “The tangible is the invisible, unseeable milieu of the visible, the source of visibility; it precedes the
distinction between active and passive and subject and object: ‘I see only through the touching of the light”(106). Phelan in her work Unmarked, makes a similar point about an invisible that determines the visible, but makes her argument not in terms of touch but via the after-image as an indication of the ‘optical unconscious’. An object which has disappeared from the field of vision leaves a trace as an after-image and therefore indicates

a realm in which what is not visibly available to the eye constitutes and defines what is - in the same way as the unconscious frames ongoing conscious events. Just as we understand that things in the past determine how we experience the present, so too can it be said that the visible is defined by the invisible (14).

The significance of this ‘invisible’ will be elaborated-on later in this chapter; in this introduction, however, I would like to consider the subject/object dissolution once more. Irigaray’s conception of the tangible which precedes vision problematises the idea of an easy reciprocity between subject and object in the visual field but it does not completely dismantle the notion of their inter-relational basis.

Alphonso Lingis has also written about the subject/object interface in terms of touch, and figures touch as the conduit of the object/other; “to recognise another [...] is to be touched by a body” (qtd in Robins 30). In being touched by another we experience a direct contact with a force, a being or phenomenon, that goes beyond ourselves and our control; “as embodied beings we come upon others in their difference, others who extend our awareness and experience, but others who also frustrate our expectations or put demands on us” (Robins 30). This contact with the other is an inevitability of human interaction and an indication of our interdependence and the source of our learning, development and change as individuals. In this sense the object/other comes to stand for the unknown and Robins suggests we should consider “touch in terms of the experiential and transformational possibilities in the unknown”(30). However a

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6 Phelan acknowledges that this is Walter Benjamin’s phrase, Unmarked p 14.

7 This experience is similar to the notion of death detailed in the previous chapter, death was also posited as ‘the Other’ - the ultimate alterity.
psychoanalytically informed interpretation of subject and object acknowledges that both terms are conditioned and mediated by language, and that is impossible to look directly at or view the object/other beyond or outside the screen of language. This screen determines the visible and invisible within culture and thus the transformative potential of the object/other is limited and determined by this screen, as Irigaray notes “If I cannot see the other in its alterity, and if the other cannot see me, my body no longer sees anything in the difference. I become blind” (qtd in Grosz 106). Yet it would seem to me that Irigaray’s construction of a touch which precedes vision implicates and draws attention to the function of the screen in intersubjective and other subject/object encounters to the extent that it indicates the presence of the unknown other beyond language.

**Tangible performance**

I would like to propose that multi-media performance acts as a direct intervention into the debates detailed above; by staging the live human body as concurrent with the mediatized image, multi-media performance implicates the mind/body dualism criticised by Grosz and Merleau-Ponty and its associated separations of touch and vision. The difference and similarities of these two senses is what is played out in the performance versus media exchange.

In *The Skin Ego* Didier Anzieu has noted “The skin can judge time (less well than the ear) and space (less well than the eye), but it alone combines the spatial and temporal dimensions”(14), this sharing of time and space has been demonstrated to be a defining feature of live performance (in contrast to Virilio’s ‘teletopology’ where the light and time of the mediatized image reigns supreme). A live performance event is a ‘peopled space’, it takes place between performers and audience in a shared time and space and as such replicates a form of ‘touching’ which is absent from the disembodied mediatized visual encounter. To this end Robins’ description; “In touch, we are immersed in the surrounding world. In touch, there is not the possibility to be alone or to be above it. We are all involved and implicated in the reciprocity of contact. And in this we cannot be the sole

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I would like to reference *Simulator* once more in this context and the ‘blinding’ moment of the flash.
initiators - we cannot escape from being touched by the other” (30) could well form the basis of a description for the performance encounter. This is the assumption I made at the close of chapter three and which I would now like to elaborate on specifically in relation to the notion of performance as a type of touch. This touch does not have to be literal, I would suggest that purely by staging and foregrounding the body in the way that performance does, touch is implicated into the parameters of sensational experience. Richard Sennett notes that there are “deepseated problems in Western civilization in imaging spaces for the human body which might make human bodies aware of one another” (21), possibly some performance bypasses this problem or indeed remedies it to some extent by placing an audience in direct and proximal alignment with performers’ bodies, thus ushering qualities of touch, including those of implication and the unknown cited earlier.

**Touch/touching**

To return briefly to the subject of the case study in chapter two which concerned the multi-media performance *Constants II*. Touch provides an axial moment within this multi-media performance and foregrounds a disparity between the image and the body.

Vid. 20. *Constants II* - Ghost Touch.

Media products operate by reducing the body to a visual image and simultaneously validate this image as an ‘equivalent’ which stands in for the body. Yet in multi-media/performance collaboration, types of sensory based interactions are enacted which cannot be reduced to a visual dimension by the watching cameras. The ‘Ghost Sequence’ illustrates this;
Sheila, deceived by the sight of Patricia’s image, attempts to touch her as she sits down on a chair, however, as this version of Patricia is only a recorded image Sheila’s hand passes straight through Patricia’s immaterial body. It is only when live, material Patricia approaches and sits, once more, in the chair that Sheila is able to make bodily contact with her. The television screen provides no discernible difference between live Patricia and recorded Patricia; both are represented by the same images of identical quality. Only through a sense of touch is it possible to distinguish one image as immaterial and the other as material. Because visual media is able to mimic elements of material bodies in present time and space, we are left with touch as the only means by which to determine finally a material embodied presence in the present. This sequence emphasises a lacuna between touch and vision and draws attention to components of sensual experience dispelled by visual images. Furthermore, due to the staging configuration of this performance (see Vid. 2.) no separation was made between the performance space and audience space, and at times the performers did literally touch the spectators as they moved around. However, this touch was not only a literal possibility throughout the duration of the show, but the shared space and time of the performance created a sense of proximity and inclusion for a viewer who could not remain distanced and detached from the events s/he was experiencing. This is evidenced in the testimony of one audience member, Guy Undrill, quoted earlier, “When Patricia says ‘we are the inconstant fragmentary things’, for once in the theatre, this ‘we’ feels genuinely inclusive” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye).

4.2 Looking Glass

The sense of touch in Constants II was used to mark a distinguishing moment between the live body and the mediatized and it also occurs elsewhere within my work. Looking Glass is an interactive installation which preceded the making of Constants II and was constructed in response to another earlier work The Turin Machine.9 I first became interested in the relationship between vision and touch while performing The Turin Machine; via the experience of performing in this installation I found that the quotation

9 The Turin Machine is the subject of a separate, more detailed case study later on in this chapter beginning on page 156.
in Barthes’ *Camera Lucida*; “the photographed body touches me with its own rays”(81) became particularly pertinent. *The Turin Machine* is a giant pinhole camera in which I use my live body as a performer to produce a photographic image. During this extended process (the performance lasts four hours) audience members are admitted into the camera one at a time to experience this moment of exposure in the form of a live image seen on a light sensitive screen. Within the giant camera and in the process of becoming a photographed body, light extends from my live body and physically imprints, or impinges itself, upon the cloth and also upon the viewer. To the extent that this reflected light constitutes an image of ‘me’ it seems to be a part of myself, albeit an immaterial one, that is reaching out and making contact with the viewer. Perhaps all human interactions and apprehensions could be figured in this way, as either a physical or metaphysical meeting or touch. One reason that this formula particularly appealed was because of the agency that this gave to the act of looking; without light, for example, there could be no looking and therefore if light behaved like a touch then the same could be said of looking. By equating looking with touching the passivity of the look is destabilised and looking is reconfigured as an active, constructing action.

*Looking Glass* was designed, however, to overcome a potential difficulty in *The Turin Machine*. If the mechanics of the pinhole camera installation are not wholly understood by the viewer a certain ambiguity can form around the viewing relations set up within the piece whereby, the presence of the live body is potentially effaced by its own image; people might imagine that what they see in the camera is solely a projected image without being aware that a live body, not some form of recorded playback, is the source of this image.10 I wished, therefore, to make a work where the fact of the live body would be inescapable in relation to its constitution as an image. Originally I wanted to stage this idea using a live camera relay to project my image as a performer entombed in a glass sarcophagus in a sort of electronic version of *The Turin Machine*. However this idea merely represented the body via an

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10 This misapprehension is occasionally reported by people who assist with the exhibition of the *The Turin Machine*. Prior to the performance I was aware that it was a possibility and published a programme distributed free at all exhibitions of the work which explains the operations of the camera (see Appendix 5.). I also have an assistant present at the entrance to the installation who offers visitors help and advice and answers whatever questions they might have.
image suffused with the qualities of the electronically mediatized. Due to this ‘video’ quality the origin of the image was redolent of recorded reproduction rather than an actual live bodily presence. Thus this suggestion of reproduction would, once more, allow the live body effectively to be replaced by its mediatized image. I then realised that by replacing my body, as the performer, with the body of the spectator the live coexistence of body and image would be undeniable. The spectator would become both the subject and the object of the work and undeniably embody this live presence. Describing Looking Glass as a multi-media performance is somewhat problematic as it is designed as a non-durational gallery installation without specific performer(s). It is possible, however, to identify a performing element in the work and a concern with the body and the picturing of the body. In the same way that Constants II, via its use of the live camera, collapses the distinctions between audience (as looker) and performer (as looked at), Looking Glass furthers this occlusion by reversing traditional distinctions and reconfiguring the audience as the performers of the piece. Thus viewing positions become transformed into performing positions.

Looking Glass was presented as a work in progress piece at Napier University’s Department of Photography, Film and Television in May 1998.

Vid. 21. Looking Glass - Documentation

The installation consists of an electronic ‘mirror’ that is activated by touch. This idea is facilitated by the use of two cameras, a video projector and an MX50 vision mixer; the video projector produces a white light which back-

\[11\] In the work in progress version of the work the actual stimulus which triggered the display of the ‘mirror’ image was not in fact the touch of the spectator’s hand. However, the prototype proved that the idea was technically possible and produced the desired images by approximate means.
projects onto the glass ‘mirror’ screen, one camera looks at the face of the spectator while the other looks at the spectator’s hand against the glass. The silhouette of the hand on the bright screen creates a dark matte shape which is used as a luma key signal for the vision mixer, the dark space in the video picture can then be replaced by an image of the viewer’s face provided by the second camera. This combined key signal is then projected onto the mirror. Ideally the work should be realised as a wall mounted sheet of glass, which glows steadily in a darkened gallery space. The technical apparatus of the installation should remain hidden. A hand placed, as invited, on the screen creates a space in the white light through which a spectator can see their own face. The image is only visible as long as the spectator maintains contact with the glass. It disappears as soon as the hand is removed. Thus the coexistence of body and image is confirmed in two ways; firstly by the congruent bodily presence of the spectator and secondly by an image of this body which is only revealed by the touch of that same body. Thus touch and vision are configurated as interlocking; we must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out of the tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the touching, but also between the tangible and the visible (Merleau-Ponty The Visible 134).

Despite the image of the body being mediatized and clearly of video origin (and therefore subject to the potential elisions and erosions performed by mediatization), the touch on the glass is able to confirm the material presence, or, as it were, the simultaneous embodied existence of a mediatized body.

The mirror image

Looking Glass, like any other mirror, could be seen as an ‘identity maker’ and the work is not merely concerned with displaying a meeting of the visual image and the corporeal body. Specifically the work concentrates around an image of the face and is therefore resonant of other traditions of identity-making namely portraiture. Silverman has remarked of Lacan’s description of the visual field “all visual transactions are inflected by
narcissism”(3) and indeed Phelan, following Lacan, concurs by stating “all looking is an attempt to find a mirror”(25). If all our acts of looking are, to some degree, determined by the desire to see ourselves this desire is most obviously gratified by our encounter with mirrors and indeed originates, according to Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis, in early identity-forming encounters. In his theory of the mirror phase, Lacan observed the superiority of a six to eight month-old infant’s visual perceptions in comparison with its lack of motor coordination and proposed that this superiority allowed the infant, when confronted by its mirror image to ‘misrecognise’ this reflected image as his ‘complete and unified self’ - this image produces the illusion of a narcissistic self-idealised unity which which is the foundation of the Imaginary. This theory leads Kaja Silverman to observe that Lacanian psychoanalysis emphasises the visual above all senses and “the ego as a product of specular relations”(14). Faces in particular are seen as the source of individual identity. Both mirrors and portraits present an image of the face, which according to Lacan, “assumes its value as a mirror of psychic expression” (qtd in Bonner 234/5), that is faces are able to ‘reveal’ or represent their subjects’ internal character or being. Susan Buck-Morss makes a similar observation and quotes Sir Charles Bell’s belief that “the countenance is the index of the mind”(386), she then elaborates on this idea and sees in the face a meeting between the internal psyche and the exterior world;

The expressive face is, indeed, a wonder of synthesis, as individual as a fingerprint, yet collectively legible by common sense. On it the three aspects of the synaesthetic system - physical sensation, motor reaction, and psychical meaning - converge in signs and gestures compromising a mimetic language (386).

Thus the face is the intensive site for both the perceptions and expressions of an individual’s subjectivity, it is the register of the self.

Much of my multi-media performance work is directly, though not necessarily consciously, formed around the psychic trope of the mirror phase in that it expands envisioning forms beyond the infant’s reflective mirror into the products of media imaging and out into the specularity of live performance itself. Recorded images, live camera relays, photographic
portraits of the viewer/performer and electronic mirrors all exhibit an interest in the translation of the body, often the face, into an ‘identifying’ image. When the body is intermingled with the technological apparatuses of visual representation, these performances are inevitably concerned with what constitutes a body, its identity and its sense of self; and the live, mediatized and recorded images do not merely illustrate psychoanalytic theory, rather they enact this theory upon the bodies of both performers and spectators.

The threshold

In The Threshold of the Visible World Silverman presents an interesting analysis of ideas concerning the formation of the ego in which she pays particular attention to the senses of vision and touch. She maintains that a concentration around the visual imago, as provisioned by Lacan, leads to a type of ‘incorporative’ identificatory practice which is deemed damaging to certain types of ‘others’ within society. In brief Silverman, working from Lacan, writes about the méconnaissance (misrecognition) that occurs when the infant first apprehends his image in the mirror, this image contains a fundamental paradox - being both the same as but also (as only an image) different from the infant. This paradox is the origin of the notion of the divided self, as in order to conceive of self the infant necessarily has to see himself as another. This otherness, however, is occluded by the jouissance (jubilation) engendered by the principle of the ‘self-same body’ which only sees the image in the mirror as the same as the self; as this image presents a ‘whole’ body it therefore establishes the sense of a ‘complete’ self. Within wider social interactions this self-same image works to limit and contain identificatory possibilities to socially idealised subjects because, beyond the mirror and extending into all acts of looking, the subject wishes to see only a reflection of its ideal ‘whole’ self in an attempt to maintain a (delusory) homogeneous unity for the ego. This type of identification is termed idiopathic by Max Scheler, as it performs an incorporative ‘engorging’ of ‘the other’ who becomes interiorised as the same as the self, and subsequently “repudiates what it cannot swallow - by refusing to live in and through alien corporealties” (Silverman 24). Silverman believes this description of incorporative ego formation “to be at the heart of normative adult subjectivity. Indeed, it provides the very basis for
the formation of a ‘coherent’ bodily ego”(23); however she goes on to conclude that “The aspiration to wholeness and unity not only has tragic personal consequences, but also calamitous social effects”(27). Identities deemed socially undesirable remain excluded from idealisation and continue to be the target for the displacement of what we do not wish to recognise in ourselves, idiopathic identification is a process which Silverman describes as motivated by “attempts to personally approximate the ideal [which] end in failure and leaves us in a relation of fatal aggressivity towards others”(4). Thus Silverman seems to be isolating this form of identificatory practice; our requisitioning of the socially prized partnered by a failure to identify with non-ideal others, as the origin of a type of social violence. Robins, amongst others, has made similar observations regarding our relationship to others as constructed by the devices of modern warfare and technological visual culture.

Silverman proposes an alternative to this ‘colonising’ account of the processes of the psyche, however. She describes another element in the formation of the ego which provides a positive identificatory model for our interactions with the other. She notes that Lacan’s emphasis on vision as the prime constituting force for the ego “has made it extremely difficult to theorise the role played there by bodily sensations”(14) and quotes Sigmund Freud from “The Ego and the Id”, “Freud maintains that the ego is ‘first and foremost, a bodily ego’; it is not merely a projection of a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface”(9). From this Silverman deduces that “our experience of ‘self’ is always circumscribed by and derived from the body”(9) and goes on to identify two other phenomena which she believes play an important part in the constitution of the ego. The first is that of the ‘sensational body’ which is outlined in James Strachey’s notes to “The Ego and the Id”, “the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body”(26). The second idea comes from the work of the French psychiatrist Henri Wallon whose work formed another basis for Lacan’s own analysis. Wallon differentiated between an exteroceptive experience of the body, ie one based on vision, and the proprioceptive, which Silverman, quoting Wallon,

12 Freud’s exact phrasing is; “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego: it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface”(26).
describes as signifying; something like ‘the apprehension on the part of the subject of his or her ownness’. [...] Proprioceptivity can best be understood as that egoic component to which concepts like ‘here’, ‘there’, and ‘my’ are keyed. It encompasses the muscular system ‘in its totality,’ including those muscles which effect the ‘shifting of the body and its members in space’. [...] It thus involves a nonvisual mapping of the body’s form (16).  

Both these theories - the sensational body and the proprioceptive - emphasise the importance of tactile sensations of the body, alongside the visual, in producing and maintaining the ego.  

The proprioceptive has consequences for the exteroceptive as it is via the proprioceptive that we are able to “perceive things as exterior [ie beyond our body] and, so, that the specular image might be said to be ‘outside’” (Silverman 16). It is through the combination of the exteroceptive and the proprioceptive that we are brought back to the paradox of the self seen in the mirror as simultaneously the same but other from the self. This dualism operating at the heart of the self works to problematise notions of a single unified ego and “confirms a heterogeneity of the corporeal ego [...] which is inextricably tied to the aspiration toward ‘wholeness’ and ‘unity’” (Silverman 20/21). As has been noted previously, the aspiration towards egoic unity is displayed in idiopathic incorporation rooted in exteroceptive vision; against this Silverman positions an alternative identificatory system that originates in the proprioceptive and is termed excorporative, creating a heteropathic ‘identity-at-a-distance’. The proprioceptive maintains that “The visual imago itself remains stubbornly exterior, like the original mirror reflection described by Wallon, at the expense of an imaginary bodily unity” (Silverman 23). In this equation the other remains an other and does not need to be violently repudiated/discarded because it no longer threatens the (myth) of the coherent ego. To this end Silverman notes in relation to alternative identificatory practices;

13 Elsewhere, in Charles W. Bonner’s chapter “The Status and Significance of the Body in Lacan’s Imaginary and Symbolic Orders” Wallon’s Proprioceptive is simply interpreted as “the proprio-interoceptive (i.e., felt) experience of the body” (236).

14 Didier Anzieu’s The Skin Ego similarly deals with this idea that the surface of the body, its skin, plays an integral role in the formation of a bodily ego and this work is also referenced by Silverman.
I am not arguing against idealization - without which human existence would be unendurable, and which is the precondition for every loving access to the other, whether identificatory or erotic - but against the smooth meshing of that psychic operation with culturally defined norms. [...] We need to learn how to idealize oppositionally and provisionally (37).

This detour into Silverman’s theories and the radical potential of the proprioceptive equates with the ideas on touch and the transformative benefits of the body cited earlier. At the centre of what Silverman proposes is a less ‘oppressive’ relationship with the other, facilitated by an introduction of an awareness of the body, and specifically its touch, into scopic/egoic arenas. Importantly Silverman goes on to note the importance of aesthetic texts in the delivery of this different way of being/seeing: “idealization is clearly an operation whose roots extend deep into the unconscious, it cannot be simply decreed through conscious edict. We consequently require textual assistance in carrying out the project I have just described” (37). Silverman, writing about the unconscious, makes her argument for the value of aesthetic texts as able to “intervene where we cannot” (4) and she notes the unconscious’ ability to “bring about a much more radical transmutation of values than can conscious revision”, the unconscious can reverse normative values and “render a culturally insignificant object libidinally resonant, or a culturally significant object worthless” (3/4). However this radical re-valuation remains locked within the unconscious and Silverman maintains that this re-valuation is potentially played out in a conscious ‘re-viewing’ via aesthetic texts. Certain texts, and especially visual ones “have the formal and libidinal properties of highly charge unconscious memories. They are consequently capable of moving immediately to a privileged site within the unconscious. At the same time, they are available to conscious scrutiny and interrogation” (4). Therefore

15 Silverman argues this negatively when she states;
I want to stress [...] that my intent in the last two sections [was] to dramatize what it means for a culture to valorize a particular bodily configuration at the level of the screen. This valorization precipitates a dangerous méconnaissance on the part of certain subjects, which prevents them from identifying outside extremely restrictive bodily limits. It encourages others to live the irreducibly disjunctive relation between the sensational ego and the specular imago in a pathological way, i.e., as personal insufficiency and failure. As a result, all kinds of potential transformative opportunities are lost (36/7).
Silverman privileges an aesthetic work “which resists our attempts to assimilate the ideal image. [...] and, thus, engages us in an active rather than a passive form of idealization”(2). Just as I have previously suggested that the multi-media performance *Constants II* could operate as a materialisation of theories concerning vision, touch and the body, I would now similarly like to propose that these debates, which have been expanded by Silverman, could also be applied to other multi-media performance works and in particular my installation piece *Looking Glass*.

Re-viewing

Lacan’s account prioritises the visual over the sensational and proprioceptive, but it is in these latter domains that the difference between the body and its image can be determined. As Silverman observes;

> along with muscular sensation, cutaneous sensation would seem to play a particularly privileged proprioceptive role, since together these two things are primarily responsible for the production of a nonvisual corporeal *Gestalt* (17).

It is this nonvisual gestalt, which Silverman calls “the sensational ego”, which along with the visual imago constructs a ‘corporeal ego’ around an awareness of the self-same/otherness paradox. It is this paradox which is recreated in multi-media performance, which through its staging of touch and its foregrounding of the body, emphasises the proprioceptive contribution to the ego as working in close proximity to the more commonly acknowledged self as constituted through the visual imago. The interactive installation *Looking Glass* also realises the importance of both visual and sensational perceptions as it refuses the production of an identity without both elements. As a mirror it confronts directly the idea that all looking is a search for the self; yet this identity cannot materialise without the look *and* touch of the spectator. This idea of the dual search is doubled in the installation because not only is a touch required to produce an image on the glass but this same image is only partially seen, revealed *through* the
The image on the glass therefore provokes a paradoxical relationship with its viewer; the image is live and functions as a mirror image and as such is misrecognised by the spectator as the same as his or her ‘self’. However, the hand on the glass acts to prevent narcissistic jouissance by reminding the spectator that whilst they see their face beneath their hand they do not touch this same face, the hand senses cool glass not warm flesh thus indicating, that without the reversible sensation of toucher/touched, the face on the glass is something other than the self, an image alienated from the body. In this way Looking Glass works to illustrate the paradox of the selfsame/otherness of portraits and mirror images by staging the different sensing elements involved in the formation of a subject’s ego, and thus it embodies and envisions the paradox that exists at the source of the subject’s sense of self. I would like to argue that Looking Glass constitutes an aesthetic work that explores Silverman’s prerogatives; “We need visual texts which activate in us the capacity to idealize bodies which diverge as widely as possible both from ourselves and from the cultural norm”(37). Although the face we see in Looking Glass is clearly our own, by rendering this image of the self as partial and fractured through the divisive ministrations of touch and vision, the work gives the lie to a sense of a coherent bodily ego. As has been suggested by Silverman, an abandonment of this ideal ushers in a new order of heteropathic identification and the possibility of prizing previously socially non-ideal

16 Although I have previously quoted Merleau-Ponty in relation to this moment I would now, perhaps paradoxically, like to invoke Irigaray’s comment once more; “I see only through the touching of the light”. Although the moments of touch and vision coexist within the piece, an image only appears because of a touch and in this way the work could be seen to realise Grosz/Irigaray’s configuration of an invisible tangible that precedes vision.
On reviewing this work in the light of Silverman, however, I perceive an additional nuance that would perhaps extend the efficacy of *Looking Glass* in line with Silverman’s project. Although the presence of what could be termed ‘the other of the self’ is confirmed by the proprioceptive touch upon the glass, the implications that this self-alienation may have for the images of ‘others’ may not be fully realised within this work. *Looking Glass* does not present a body or bodies which “diverge as widely as possible from [both] ourselves” because the installation as currently realised works only with the reflective mirror image of single specific viewer. Yet it would be possible for the installation to operate beyond this initial encounter and therefore draw parallels between the other of the self and images of other others. For example, after an initial interaction with the piece, the face pictured on the glass could gradually change to an image of one of the previous viewers, whose face had been recorded during an earlier encounter. The faces of ‘other’ viewers would then more problematically ‘mirror’ that of the present viewer and these others would be both detached from and also aligned with the other of the self. If these images could be selected at random to prevent a predictable ‘series’ this would confront the viewing self with another other and directly engage the viewer with the idea of an ‘identity-at-a-distance’. *Looking Glass* is still a work in progress piece and I intend to rework it with this addition, this will, I believe, produce an interaction with the piece which will continue beyond narcissistic gratification. The inclusion of the images of previous visitors/others will expand the scope and context of the work and introduce a more social dynamic to its interface. Such additions will emphasise and make overt some of the dynamics which underlie the work, such as those that are concerned with ‘difference’ and our relationships with others.

The icon

There is a final piece of work that I would like to discuss with regard to issues raised in my analysis of *Looking Glass*. *The Turin Machine* has been previously cited as the precursor of *Looking Glass*, and to some degree it acts as a distillation of a number of the concerns figured in the
meeting of performance with mediatized images. In my reviewing of *Looking Glass* I omitted to acknowledge another purpose of the touch of the hand on the glass which, once again, retrospectively aligns the work with Irigaray’s analysis. For example, Grosz, following Irigaray, proposes that “the tangible provides the preconditions and grounds of the visible. [...] the tangible is the unacknowledged base or foundation, the source of the visible”(105). In *Looking Glass* this idea is made literal as we do not see until the hand has contacted the glass - thus touch can be figured as a conduit for the visible - something that defines vision. As has been demonstrated by Robins, touch has been absented from most modern visual encounters, and yet, some critics deem these encounters with the visible to be in some senses dependent upon touch. There are indications of the interdependence of these two sensations in other earlier representational images and it is to images of this order that my piece *The Turin Machine* in part alludes.

Prior to the invention of techniques for mechanical reproduction, it is possible to identify another ‘autonomous imaging’ tradition and one particularly concerned with portraiture - the religious icon. The objectivity of these images derives from an ‘ultimate’ source of objectivity in the sense of an omnipotent deity. Many orthodox Christian icons are believed to have been painted through the action of divine intervention - God ‘working through’ the hand of the icon painter - or, alternatively, these images have no known human origins having been ‘found’ as already completed images in remote sites and brought back to become the objects of veneration for religious communities. What is interesting about the icon as an example of an autonomous image is that, unlike photography and other more

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17 This idea is also expressed by Phelan in these terms :“Visibility and invisibility are crucial bound; invisibility policies visibility and in this specific sense functions as the ascendant term in the binary”(26).

18 Andrii Borovets writes “He [the icon painter] did not think it proper even to sign his works because he ascribed his inspiration and creative achievement to grace imparted to him by God. This can explain the spreading of legends about ancient icon painters whom angels helped in their work” (“Icon Gallery”, Olteanu). Icons not made by human hand are titled ‘acheiropoïeta’ and those made by angels ‘aggeloktistos’. For example there is a Russian Icon titled *Redeemer Not Painted By Human Hand* painted (sic) by Simon Ushakov 1657 (Russian Icons Index, Mitrevski). An encaustic picture of the Virgin at Méga Spílio Monastery in Greece is an example of a ‘found’ image. The picture is said to have been found by the shepherdess Ephrosyne in AD 362 in a cave, and its discovery led to the building of the monastery on this site.
modern forms of mechanical reproduction, having excluded the human body from the image making process it then resituates this human dimension from the realm of physical production to physical reception. Many religious icons function through touch, they are intended, first and foremost, to be touched by orthodox believers.¹⁹ These icons, despite their name, are not primarily objects of visual veneration but transmit the ‘essence’ or ‘power’ of the individual they depict via a direct physical contact between image and spectator. Even in the case of icons which remain untouched, this connection is exhibited metaphorically as the icon acts as a channel between its original subject and the people who worship before them. The images are a charged surface which conduct ‘spiritual power’ from a holy body directly into the bodies of believers, and as commented by Michael Olteanu “every icon was endowed by believers with a supernatural power which had the mysterious and inexplicable ability to link the soul of a mortal with God”. In some senses this encounter bears more relation to a meeting between two live bodies than to a purely visual one, in that it conveys tangible elements of the physical presence of the person which sight alone could not communicate. *The Turin Machine* works this ‘primitive’ logic of the ‘presence’ of the person as ‘present’ in an image, as well as overtly referencing the traditions of icon painting and holy relics and the ‘proof’ of a body that these provide. Thus I am able to make a comparison between elements of multi-media performance and more exclusively visual forms such as icon paintings. Both cultural products hint at qualities of the body possessed by the subject and object (divine or human) which cannot be experienced solely in the visual domain, and are instead rooted in other sensational qualities of the body.

### 4.3 The Turin Machine

*The Turin Machine* is a performance/photography installation originally conceived in response to a radio news report which suggested that the Turin Shroud was a mediaeval fake that had been created in a pinhole

¹⁹ Judith Herrin makes an interesting observation in “Women and Icons in Early Christianity”, she reports “Reading the accounts of […] early pilgrims, there is an overwhelming impression of the importance attached to physical contact; Christians sought to touch to kiss and to embrace objects associated with their Founder’s earthly existence” (61). One could perhaps conjecture that the later practice of touching icon paintings extended from these earlier encounters.
camera using ‘mediaeval’ photographic techniques. The suggestion of this research was that a cadaver had been used to form the image of a body upon a cloth, or shroud. The cadaver had been hung outside a shuttered room in bright sunlight, a small ‘pinhole’ aperture had allowed light to enter the room to produce an image upon material coated in light sensitive chromium salts. After a day had passed the unexposed salts were washed off and the material was then scorched to fix the image of a body. In my conception of this work I replaced the dead cadaver with my own living body, used modern photographic materials and made the process of exposure available to public scrutiny, as well as the final photographic product. I was not interested in recreating the purported mediaeval processes, rather, I was concerned with mobilising a number of the relationships that the original research seemed to provoke. Namely: what is the relationship between a body and its image (specifically a mediatized image) and what does an image and/or a body ‘represent’ within wider social and cultural boundaries? To this end the means of both these phenomena - the body and its image - were reduced to a minimum; the imaging apparatus was a pinhole camera which functioned without even the intervention of a lens; the live ‘performing’ body was restricted to stillness as near as was physically possible. It would be hard to conceive of a more impoverished meeting of the live and the mediatized.

The work was first undertaken in prototype form as research at Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art before receiving funding from the Scottish and English Arts Councils and a commission from ‘Arnolfini Live’. Subsequently The Turin Machine has toured nationally and internationally and as such represents an ongoing piece of practical research. The pinhole camera is a purpose-built canvas enclosure which hangs within a large wooden frame (7m x 3m x 2.5m) and its structure is reminiscent of a circus or a seaside attraction. The installation consists of three chambers: a light room in which I stand during the performance; a dark room, separated from the

20 This news report was based on the research findings of two British researchers Lynn Picknett and Clive Prince. The details of their claims can be found in the book Turin Shroud; In Whose Image?

light room by a pinhole, which contains a photographic screen to catch the light reflected from my body and a third viewing room where visitors stand to look into the dark room. Spectators enter the viewing room, one at a time, where they lift up a shutter to look into the camera and witness the image during photographic exposure. Initially, on looking inside the camera nothing is visible, but as the spectator becomes accustomed to the darkness an image begins to appear. This 'biological fade up' reveals an image of my live body, inverted by the pinhole, hanging in a dark void. The body possesses a strange luminescence and exhibits ghostly qualities appearing to hover, as it does, on the edges of perception. Due to the lack of light the image is never fully visible and moves in and out of focus as the eyes try to fix it. The effect of the vision is strange and disorientating and creates a wide variety of responses from viewers. After an exposure time of approximately fours hours, the performance ends and the photographic screen is removed from the camera and developed to produce, in negative, a photographic portrait. These portraits are then exhibited within the gallery, or the performance space surrounding the camera, and thus a visitor to the installation is able to compare the living image seen inside the camera with its resolution as a fixed photographic record hung on the walls of the gallery. These two contrasting experiences are intended to provoke a consideration of the difference between the live and the recorded body. The work occurs over a number of days, each day resulting in the exposure of a picture or 'shroud'.

Fig. 5. The Turin Machine - Three views.

Much like the installation Simulator this work presents real documentational difficulties, working as it does at the very limits of vision. Due to the lack of light used in the work, the image seen in the camera can only be realised
by a photographic emulsion after a four hour exposure. I have answered a difficulty in the documentation of the performance by incorporating this record into the installation’s overall concept and exhibition - the ‘shrouds’ are effectively the only possible record of what occurs within the camera. However, any visitor to the camera will realise that this photographic image, fixed, negative and totally ‘visible’ bears little resemblance to the inverted, positive, ephemeral body seen inside the camera; it is this version of the body which cannot be translated into a document or any form of mediatized image. (Other electronic methods of image-capture, such as video, require the use of an image enhancer which artificially increases the light of the video image, thus rendering far more detail and definition to the picture of the body seen in the camera than is ‘reported’ by the naked eye). Two contrasting presentations of the body are made in *The Turin Machine*, in this way the installation expresses the restrictions and differences effected by the body and its various images. Thus this work questions the assumption of much mainstream technological visual practices which encourage an equivalence between the body and its mediatized image and thereby, more often than not, ensure an erasure of the body and the supremacy of the image.

**Looking towards other**

Like *Looking Glass*, *The Turin Machine* is concerned with the making of identity - the transference of body to image, however, unlike *Looking Glass*, touch is not an overt signifying force within this equation. *The Turin Machine* does not confront the viewer with an image of themselves as other (rendered so by touch) and in so doing it does not play directly with the self-same/other paradox of *Looking Glass*. *The Turin Machine* is not a mirror, instead it provides an antidote to the criticism of self reflexivity that I posited in my review of *Looking Glass*. In *The Turin Machine* the other is not constructed from an image of the self, it is distinguished as different as it takes the form of the socially/sexually marked ‘Other’ of the female as defined through her body. Touch in *The Turin Machine* is metaphorical, figured by the gradual appearance of an image from out of an invisible dark void, in this extreme instance light becomes ‘felt’, viscerally acting upon the eyes of individual spectators. ‘Looking towards other’ therefore becomes
the subject of the work as it presents a spectator with a ‘visual experience’, the first moments of which are confounded by a lack of vision and which are then resolved in an image of an other of no apparent normal order or conventional representational quality.\textsuperscript{22}

Previously I quoted Silverman’s insistence that “all visual transactions are inflected by narcissism”\textsuperscript{(3)}. Put simply, we look in order to see ourselves. But this looking is not a one way process and a confirmation of the self is received by the returning look of the other, summarised by Silverman when she writes “To ‘be’ is in effect to ‘be seen’”\textsuperscript{(133)}. This idea has resonances with Merleau-Ponty’s observations cited earlier, “he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it” (\textit{The Visible} 134); looking takes place in a social domain and inevitably also involves being looked at. Phelan, working from a Lacanian premise, and resonant of Silverman’s observations on the incorporative ego states;

Identity is perceptible only through a relation to an other - which is to say, it is a form of both resisting and claiming the other, declaring the boundary where the self diverges from and merges with the other. In that declaration of identity and identification, there is always loss, the loss of not-being the other and yet remaining dependent on that other for self-seeing, self-being (13).

Once again we see that an emphasis on the other, and our dependence on being seen by others, is fundamental to a sense of our own being and identity. However, the identity formed in the exchange between self and other is fraught with an insurmountable impasse because the self can never occupy the place of the other in this exchange, as Lacan writes, “I am unable to see myself from the place where the Other is looking at me” (qtd in Phelan 15). Like Silverman, Phelan sees the relationship between self and other as a potential source of aggressivity and violence;

This relationship between self and other is a marked one, which is to say it is unequal. […] the always already unequal encounter nonetheless summons the hope of reciprocity and equality; the failure of this hope then produces violence,

\textsuperscript{22} When I first undertook tests of this work, Sandy Tulloch, the photography technician at Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art, remarked that the image he saw in the camera possessed a quality unlike anything he had ever seen before.
Phelan’s solution to this also accords with Silverman and concerns a realisation of the structure of one’s own identity as paradoxical i.e. simultaneously self and other. Phelan elaborates on this notion of one’s internal other in the terms of the loss and lack of the unknown, and asserts “until one can accept one’s internal other as lost, invisible, an unmarked blank to oneself and within the world, the external other will always bear the marks and scars of the looker’s deadening gaze”(26); That is, without an acknowledgement of the otherness of the self the subject will continue to colonise and ‘incorporate’ others as selfsame. However, Phelan posits a realisation of this psychic operation in somewhat different terms, drawing upon theories of lack (figured in the Lacanian phrase ‘not-all’) and the invisible.

The invisible

Phelan, like Silverman, extends a Lacanian psycho/linguistic argument into theories of vision. Returning to the primal scene of psychoanalysis, she notes the ‘lack’ at the centre of being. In a search for the self and in order to cover up this fundamental lack, the subject uses vision and the other; “The process of self-identity is a leap into a narrative that employs seeing as a way of knowing”(5), and in an attempt to avoid this experience of loss Phelan suggests we are obliged to over-determine the external “visible configurations” of others to confirm a sense of ourselves as complete. (This is a process which could be seen as akin to Silverman’s incorporative ego which constrains the other in service of the self). Phelan then problematises the utilisation of vision to shore up the lack of self and notes “The physiological understanding of vision [...] is also a theory of loss and distortion”(14). Phelan cites the work of Jonathan Crary as dismantling an assurance between vision and knowledge by introducing the idea of vision as partial and dependent upon the physiology of the body, therefore, “Vision

23 Toril Moi provides this explanation on the idea of lack in *Sexual/Textual Politics:* The speaking subject that says ‘I am’ is in fact saying ‘I am he (she) who has lost something’ - and the loss suffered is the loss of the imaginary identity with the mother and the world. The sentence ‘I am’ could therefore best be translated as ‘I am that which I am not’ according to Lacan. [...] To speak as a subject is therefore the same as to represent the existence of repressed desire: the speaking subject is lack, and this is how Lacan can say that the subject is that which it is not (99/100).
cannot be a guarantee of knowing once one knows that vision is never complete”(14). Phelan uses Crary’s example of the after-image cited earlier to build a case for an indication of the dependence of vision on the invisible which, as a sign of the ‘not-all’ of vision, hints back to the not-all of the self. As all seeing, like all being, is infected with loss, vision and representation (like Silverman’s ego) are marshalled in a concerted effort to erase this presence of lack and do so by constructing “ever more elaborate promises to deliver a satisfying and substantial real”(15). Therefore “the external gaze is a compensatory way of returning a failed internal gaze”(15). It is this failure of the internal gaze which demands that we keep looking at others in order to see ourselves; incorporating a sentence from Lacan’s *Four Fundamental Concepts* Phelan expresses this as “Seeing secures only the fact that ‘you never look at me from the place I see you’ and the (failed) desire for a reciprocal gaze keeps the looker looking”(20/1).

Phelan’s argument, like Silverman, then develops a more social inflection as it opens out into an analysis of the Lacanian terms of ‘the gaze’ and ‘the screen’.

![Fig. 6. Simplified version of the ‘Lacanian’ field of vision](image)

Visual exchange occurs *between* a subject and an object and is operative through ‘the gaze’, the two interlocking triangles in Fig. 6. represent this constituting gaze, which could alternatively be thought of as light. However, it should be noted that the subject’s view of the object and vice versa is blocked by a third mediating quantity - the image/screen - described by

> “What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied and through which […] I am photo-graphed” (Lacan *Four Fundamental Concepts*... 106).
Phelan as “the laws of the Symbolic which define subject and object positions within language”(16). Therefore there are a number of notable elements to this description of the field of vision; both the subject and the object lie beyond the visible constituting light of the gaze and can only perceive a ‘version’ of one another via the image forming screen which functions both as a mirror to reflect the viewer and a screen to provide an image of the object. Working with the screen it is the gaze which creates an image which is ‘recognisable’ within a specific social/cultural sphere, figured by Silverman as “the ‘unapprehensible’ agency through which we are socially ratified or negated as spectacle”(133). Although this diagram appears to present a reciprocal exchange between subject and object, Lacan acknowledged that this is not in fact the case, as all looking occurs within a socially, culturally and politically determined field. This field functions at the level of the screen which mediates all visual exchange, through endless binary oppositions in which one quality is marked in order to obscure its opposite, the most obvious of these being that of sexual difference. In patriarchal culture difference is inscribed through the phallic signifier therefore the female becomes an unmarked lack; “There is no such thing as The woman since of her essence [...] she is not all” (Mitchell and Rose 144). This positioning of the female returns us to Phelan’s observations on the lack in being/seeing. Phelan suggests that, like the after-image which signals the invisible, the female can work as an indication of this not-all within a culture which normally works to suppress and cover up lack. Phelan now extends her metaphors of invisibility;

"Opening up the 'not all' of vision requires patience with blanks, with blindness, and with the non reproductive. To take the humility of blindness inscribed with the gaze seriously, one must accept the radical impotency of the gaze. This impotency underscores the broken and incomplete symmetry between the self and the image of the other (18)."

This is the crux of Phelan’s argument; the absence at the centre of the self is reproduced in our acts of looking and indicated within culture by the female and a recognition of a certain ‘partial sightedness’. Phelan claims that “if one could face these features of psychic life, a different order of sociality might be possible. [...] the not-all of visual representation creates in the looker a sense that there is something ‘beyond’ the picture (and the
signifying system itself) that is not shown"(25). The social order that Phelan alludes to bears a resemblance to Silverman’s vision and equally has consequences for our relationships with others. Phelan proposes “If one could confront the internal/external other as always already lost one would not have to rely so heavily on the image of the external other to produce what the looker lacks”(26).

**Phelan and *The Turin Machine***

I have referenced Phelan’s argument partly for the resonances that it has with Silverman's analysis and partly because I believe that it illuminates a number of my practical art works, in particular *The Turin Machine*. The diagram presented in Fig. 7. describes the viewing relations established in *The Turin Machine*:

![Diagram of viewing relations in *The Turin Machine*](image)

**Fig. 7. The Turin Machine/Lacanian field of vision**

Here the ‘object’ is myself as the performing body and the subject(s) is/are the individual viewers; the apex of both triangles mark the apertures, the pinhole and the shutter, from which the gaze (‘embodied light’) emanates. In the centre of this exchange stands a literal image/screen which interrupts

25 Much of my work implicates Phelan’s invisible in its scopic terrain, most obviously *Simulator* uses the aftereffect of the after-image and *DeliverUs* and *Constants II* both foreground pre-visible touch. *Simulator* in fact can be seen as a reworking of a number of structural elements involved in *The Turin Machine*; both installations create separated dark ‘camera’ spaces within a larger gallery set up, and both require individual viewers to involve themselves bodily within the work, either by stepping into the installation or just placing their head inside. Once inside, the vision of the spectator is ‘troubled’ by extremes of light, either darkness and a lack of light or an excessive flash, this disturbance of vision is intend to then provoke a re-evaluation of the object viewed and ultimately of the act of looking itself.

26 ‘Embodied light’ rephrases Lacan’s formulation “the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied” see footnote 24.
the light and allows an image to be formed, for without the photosensitive screen no-body would be discernible within the dark camera. The mediating screen allows an image of the object (which isn’t the object) to be apprehended by the subject and also functions as a mirror for myself (that isn’t myself) in the form of a photographic self portrait. However, in Phelan’s terms, this work also expresses the inequality of the visual encounter and implicates the notion of lack which she believes operates at the heart of vision and identity. On first entering the camera a viewer experiences a form of blindness as no image can be seen in the darkness, and the circumspection of vision continues throughout a spectator’s time in the camera as the image never becomes totally clear and lucid. ( Appropriately the image is at its brightest when a viewer looks ‘askance’ since this ‘skewed vision’ allows the black and white receptors positioned around the periphery of the retina to come into direct contact with what little light there is). In this way the body in The Turin Machine begins to invoke Phelan’s ‘not-all’ of vision and it furthers this association by doubling this not-all through its presentation of an inverted female figure. Because this lack is visited upon the viewer (in the form of the visceral action of light upon the eyes) and not just inscribed within the presentation of a female body, a viewer cannot remain aloof from the absence proposed in the work. Just as she or he is bodily enveloped by the Machine they also become psychically involved, and the lack of the female becomes the lack of the subject, “This incompleteness is fundamental to [...] psychic identity, and to the gaze itself. The psychic subject for Lacan, then, is the castrated subject - the subject Freud defined as female” (Phelan 18); it is as if ‘to look’ is almost to take the place of the female within culture.

If we return to Silverman’s ideas for a moment and replace the notion of lack with ‘other’ we can see that what The Turin Machine stages is a refusal of the incorporative identity of the self-same body. Waiting in the darkness the spectators’ initial desire to see, ie. to see themselves in the other (the self-same impulse) is confounded, and they are required to see again. And

27 The ‘reversibility’ of the positions of subject and object should also be noted within the installation - I am object but also subject whilst, were the light to be reversed, the subject spectator would also be my object.

28 Adrian Heathfield describes this sensation in The Turin Machine programme notes, “I must open my eyes to see what I cannot see” found in Appendix 5. p.280.
when an image finally appears it as the culturally marked Other of the female. Thus from both Phelan’s and Silverman’s perspective the work provides a space for a re-viewing of the other and the self in terms which differ from the norm. The undocumentable image inside the camera hints at the body beyond the screen; paradoxically, within its representational form as a live projection onto a screen, this body suggests that it is beyond representation, and therefore is constituted as ‘an other’ which can never been seen, nor therefore known, and thus assimilated. Ultimately I would argue that *The Turin Machine* presents a ‘psychic truth’ as it stages the unknown other or lack at the centre of being, which is enacted by both the subject and the object of the piece. In making this lack overt, *The Turin Machine* is able to provide a space for that alternative ‘order’ that both critics demand, a blank space which does not demand that it is filled by the other.  

**Camera/gaze**

In chapter two I quoted Lacan’s metaphor of the camera as the gaze;  

> What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied and through which [...] I am photo-graphed *(Four 106).*

Within the giant camera of *The Turin Machine* Lacan’s idea is made tangible. The screen inside *The Turin Machine* provides the axial point around which the installation pivots, and it creates an image allowing the work to have repercussions which extend beyond the specific products of visual culture and out into broader social/political life. Silverman has identified the screen as the...  

> cultural image repertoire [which] inhabits each of us, much as language does. What this means is that when we apprehend another person or an object, we necessarily do so via that large, diverse, but ultimately finite range of representational coordinates which determine what and how the members of

29 This paraphrases Phelan’s statement “By declaring our eyes blind and impotent we maybe able to resist the smooth reproduction of the self-same. We may begin to be able to inhabit the blank without forcing the other to fill it”(33).
our culture see - how they process visual detail, and what meaning they give it (221).

Silverman’s characterising of the screen as ‘a language’ collapses the activities of looking and representation, as Undrill writes “Vision partakes in the violence of representation” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne & Rye). To think about everything we see as a type of language, places vision firmly within the constraints of culture and subject to the laws and priorities of a given society, hence Merleau-Ponty’s assertion; “It is at the same time true that the world is what we see and that, nevertheless, we must learn to see it” (The Visible 4). Therefore prior to the mediatized representations of camera images, there exists a representational aspect to vision itself, this is what the screen in the Lacanian field of vision defines. The screen in The Turin Machine cannot be perceived (there is not enough light to illuminate it in the camera); it is an invisible signifier like those of all mediatized images and the opaque screen in Lacan’s description. Because the screen is invisible, the ‘representation’ of the visual is not seen, which is why we are able to determine the products of cameras and, similarly, our own eyes as ‘real’, ‘true’ and ‘objective’ whereas, in reality, they are subjective and limited by our own enculturated selves. The Turin Machine is a material realisation of the camera/gaze metaphor. In it, looking is made indivisible from a moment of representation, and this metaphor is further reinforced as the image seen on the screen is simultaneously creating a photographic representation. The work therefore emphasises the act of looking as ‘linguistic’, a representational process, and thus extends this implication into all looking, recalling Lacan’s formulation “it is the world of words that creates the world of things” (Écrits 65). This description of vision as governed by language can lead to a depressingly restricted notion of seeing, as Barthes notes “today, there is no language site outside bourgeois ideology: our language comes from it, returns to it, remains closed up in it.” (Sade 10). The screen as the “cultural image repertoire” reduces the agency of looking, as it suggests that this agency is locked into a specific culturally determined language, in the words of Phelan “learning

Silverman’s interpretation of the screen accords with Phelan’s definition previously cited on page 163 as, “the laws of the Symbolic which define subject and object positions within language”(16).

This statement has resonances with Auslander’s observation presented in the first chapter of this thesis that “I doubt very strongly that any cultural discourse can actually stand outside the ideologies of capital and reproduction”(40).
to see is training careful blindness. To apprehend and recognize the visible
is to eliminate as well as absorb visual data”(13). As has been previously
detailed, however, both Phelan and Silverman have proposed ways in
which sight can deviate from this hermetic model and produce
“circumstance[s] under which we nonetheless manage at times to see
productively or transformatively” (Silverman 3).

Three-dimensional photography

In her analysis Silverman provides a number of examples of ‘productive’
aesthetic texts, including the work of Cindy Sherman and her Untitled Film
Stills whom she writes about in relation to a theory of the pose. In reading
Silverman’s description I found startling similarities between her ideas and
The Turin Machine, but with one crucial exception. Silverman writes about
the congealing effect that the presence of a camera has upon the human
body and cites Barthes’ previously quoted description of being
photographed:

Now, once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything
changes: I constitute myself in the process of ‘posing,’ I
instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform
myself in advance into an image. [...] I feel that the Photograph
creates my body or mortifies it, [...] the Photograph is the
advent of myself as other (10-12).

To support this idea Silverman cites the work of Craig Owens’ as realising
this preparation of/for stillness as “essentially photographic [...] the fact that,
in addition to being imitative of a preexisting image or visual trope, it is
imitative of photography itself”(202). In freezing the body in preparation for
the photograph, the subject presents a kind of self-conscious doubling of
the self - they perform ‘self’ for the lens; “The representational force which
the pose exerts is so great that it radiates outward, and transforms the
space around the body and everything which comes into contact with it into
an imaginary photograph”(203).³² Given this previous description from
Silverman I find it remarkable that she does not then draw parallels with this
pre-photographic pose and the discipline of performance, particularly
because she also compares the pose to Roger Caillois’ description of

³² This ‘performance of self’ has lead Phelan to observe that “All portrait photography is
fundamentally performative”(35).
mimicry in the natural world as "a reproduction in three-dimensional space with solids and voids" (qtd in Silverman 201). This idea of the pose realises the degree to which unmediatized performance, though devoid of the machinery of representation is still concerned with exactly this. The self-conscious pose is the root of all performance which, just like Silverman’s pose, creates a “representational force” which “conjures into existence, first of all, that explicit or implicit frame which marks off all representation from the ‘real?'” (203). Therefore the pose is capable of summoning the screen and making overt its operation as a language. By assuming a pose a “subject does not wait passively and unconsciously for the gaze to ‘photograph’ him or her in the shape of a preexisting image. On the contrary, he or she may give him - or herself to be apprehended by the gaze in a certain way” (Silverman 201). This idea of the pose thus provides a certain agency for the subject/object of the gaze who attempts to exert some element of control over the image on the screen. Lacan proposed the possibility of this agency when he wrote;

The human subject […] is not, unlike the animal, entirely caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. How? In so far as he isolates the function of the screen and plays with it. Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is the gaze (Four 107).

Spectral bodies

In “Spectral Bodies: Performance, Photography and The Turin Machine”, I described the process of performing in the installation, “Within the camera, unsure of exactly when I’m watched, I perform my part and become a body, an object’”(2).34 My body congeals as I attempt a three dimensional photograph and thus, in the camera, I perform the representational effect of the camera/gaze which is inevitable in the specularity of everyday life.

33 In “Posing the Question: Wilde, Wit and the Ways of Man” Ed Cohen has written about the pose in similar terms; “Thus what posing foregrounds is the imbricated but usually concealed work of representation that (re)produces those mimetic effects which are habitually of as ‘the real’”(40)

34 This unpublished ‘artists’ paper was presented in various forms during 1998 to the Performance Theory Seminar, Lancaster University, Nottingham Trent University’s Open Lecture programme and Napier University’s Department of Photography, Film and Television Senior Seminar. A copy of the paper can be found in Appendix 3 (p. 266) and the quote is found on p. 267.
However, I am also very well aware of the limits of this performance; unable to spectate myself, I have little conception of what image people receive of me or even when they are watching, I am both protected by, but trapped in, the screen. Silverman is also aware of the limits of this ‘play’ with the screen; “the specularized subject has at best only the barest modicum of control over how he or she is apprehended by the camera/gaze” (204). Thus the pose represents only a very limited form of agency because the object has no control over how his or her image is ‘photographed’ or received by the watching subject. Nevertheless, Silverman distinguishes between the gaze which functions as the symbolic to constitute the field of vision and thus preexists the subject and remains unapprehensible, and the look which emanates from the subject inside the field and thus is “evidence of a desiring subjectivity” (175). Via this distinction Silverman maintains that a look, though aligned through the gaze, can operate in spite of the gaze and its screen and that there are times when it is possible to look ‘askance’ or re-view the screen; the eye is nevertheless capable of seeing productively - of occupying a viewing position other than that assigned in advance, and, so of apprehending its object under radically different terms. However, it is often only retroactively, through a Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, that it manages to assume this ‘deviant’ viewing position (222/3).

To this end Silverman proposes the work of Cindy Sherman as an example of an aesthetic text which mobiles such a ‘look’, “since these images are so hyperbolically ‘about’ the gaze as camera, their solicitation of us to look again, differently, can perhaps best be understood as an invitation to ‘rephotograph’ the women in them” (223). Because Sherman’s photographs are about photography itself Silverman maintains they “open up to us the possibility of looking again, from a new vantage point, and so of both subjecting the initial act of perception to critical scrutiny, and apprehending the object via different representational parameters” (223). These “different representational parameters” encourage an identification between subject and object/viewer and photograph through the principle of the ‘good enough’, it is because the women Sherman ‘becomes’ in her photograph’s

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35 My inability to look at myself accords with Lacan’s previously quoted assertion “I am unable to see myself from the place where the Other is looking at me” (qtd in Phelan 15)
“fall so far short of approximating their ideal imagos that we identify with them”(224). Thus these photographs produce “a new kind of pleasure. This pleasure follows from a more improvisatory relation to the ideal”(225). This can be seen to fulfil Silverman’s aim of establishing different non-ideal identificatory possibilities, thus these photographs become “an assertion of the look’s potentially transformative powers”(227).

4.4 The Body Beyond

Yet I perceive a problem in Silverman’s analysis which stems from the media from which she chooses to select her exemplary aesthetic texts. Despite an emphasis upon the sensational body, The Threshold of the Visible World only examines recorded mediatized practices for examples of the “productive look”. In this way I believe Silverman's account to be circumscribed by some of the representational logics and material practices she seeks to deconstruct. In her text Silverman writes about the way “the photograph severs a moment from the temporal continuum and ‘carries’ it away to another domain”(148). These static images are then subject to the processes of revision which she identifies as the origin of a productive look. Yet Silverman further notes, as I have also done in a previous chapter, that “This capture permits a piece of the real to escape the vicissitudes of time, but only at the cost of a kind of death”(149). As I have argued in chapter three, in this mediatized version of ‘death’ time is not experienced as loss and the body is protected by being excluded. In contrast to this I argued that performance, through its staging of the body in time and space, maintained a sense of time and the body as lost; an idea succinctly expressed by Herbert Blau - “it is the actors mortality which is the acted subject, for he is right there dying in front of your eyes [...]. That’s his body, doing time” (qtd in Mellencamp 143). Through this experience of loss, originating in the mortal body, both spectator and performer embody the concept of lack, hence a disquieting relationship with the Other is ushered in. In live performance individuals experience a direct contact, or a type of touch and through this touch, as Lingis and Silverman (amongst others) acknowledge, we are brought into an awareness of the other/Other (both within and without ourselves). This other is beyond sight and exceeds representation, it therefore occupies the realms of the ultimate alterity and
Silverman/Sherman’s photographs, as moments frozen in time, do afford a form of re-viewing but also present a fait accompli and thus a resolution and enclosing of their productive images, which is in danger of reestablishing some of the stabilities of the conventional camera/gaze. Because they are static and fully visible, these images represent a fully visible plenitude and therefore do not implicate that which lies outside the gaze, and cannot create a ‘tangible’ sense of the radical unknown of the other. Therefore static photographic images will always tend towards a self-same viewing relationship, as these ‘untouchables’ can never realise, to the same degree of alterity the unknown other, and cannot therefore problematise, to the same extent, the “involuntary acts of incorporation and repudiation” (Silverman 184). But what of non static photographic images such as film and video? Do these exhibit similar normative stabilities but disguise their ‘stasis’ through a ‘masquerade of vitality’ in the form of movement? The principle of their origin (captured light/reproductive time) remains the same as a photograph and these texts may, likewise, be resolved and neutralised, thus they could equally be forms which do not implicate the body and cannot therefore operate as a gateway to the other. Yet, in contrast to this formulation, Vivian Sobchack has constructed an argument that utilises phenomenological theory to determine the film experience as intimately bound up with the body and “embodied existence”. 36

Sobchack writes that, “More than any other medium of human communication, the moving picture makes itself sensuously and sensibly manifest as the expression of experience by experience”(37). This is a large claim to be sure, and immediately has resonances with my early writing on the necessity of reinscribing the body and hence experience back into modern technological mediatized discourses. Sobchack elaborates on her position by explaining that film uses the embodied language of existence eg. seeing, hearing, moving as the basis for its articulation;

the film experience is a system of communication based on bodily perception as a vehicle of conscious expression. It

36 Sobchack's account is found in the chapter “Phenomenology and the Film Experience” in ** Viewing Positions** ed. Linda Williams
entails the visible, audible, kinetic aspects of sensible experience to make sense visibly, audibly, and haptically (41). Because these articulatory means are shared by its viewer in a "shared space of being, of seeing, hearing, and bodily and reflective movement performed and experienced by both film and viewer"(41) Sobchack is then able to characterise the cinematic encounter as intersubjective;

Indeed, it is this mutual capacity for and possession of experience through common structures of embodied existence, through similar modes of being-in-the-world, that provide the intersubjective basis of objective cinematic communication (38).

To this extent Sobchack therefore constructs the film text as an other subject which shares the same embodied and enworlded characteristics as the viewers themselves, “direct experience and existential presence in the cinema belong to both the film and the viewer”(41). Sobchack elaborates on this intersubjectivity by noting that the film encounter is identical to our ‘life’ experiences as they are constituted through the address of “the expressed perception of an anonymous, yet present, ‘other’”(40). Reminiscent of Lacan’s figuration of the field of vision, Sobchack’s analysis constructs film as an ‘other’ that functions like all of life’s others, that is “the concretely embodied situation of the film’s vision also stands against the viewer. It is also perceived by the viewer as a ‘There, where I am not,’ as the space consciously and bodily inhabited and lived by an ‘other’”(41). Thus, in sympathy with Lacan’s observations (reiterated by Silverman and Phelan) on our dependency on the other for our sense of self, Sobchack goes on to describe the experience of watching a film in these terms; “Watching a film is both a direct and mediated experience of direct experience as mediation. We perceive a world both within the immediate experience of an ‘other’ and without it, as immediate experience mediated by an ‘other’”(42). Sobchack singles out film as a privileged form of communication within culture, due to its unique ability to make public “direct experience as mediation”, to make overt the linguistic basis of intersubjective experience. She writes:

A film presents and represents acts of seeing, hearing and moving as both the original structures of existential being and the mediating structure of language. [...] It presents and represents to us and for us and through us the very modes
and structures of being as language (42-44).

The interdependence of language and being has been demonstrated by a number of theorists cited within this document. Yet Sobchack, in continuing her phenomenologically inflected analysis, notes Merleau-Ponty’s separation of language into two layers;

Before the aspirations, differences, and systems of exchange articulated in and by what we call ‘natural language’ [...] we are always first immersed in the more primordial language of embodied existence. [...] long before we constrain ‘wild meaning’ in discrete symbolic systems, we are immersed in language as an existential system. In the very movement of existence, in the very activity of perception and its bodily expression, we inaugurate language and communication (43).

It is worth noting that Sobchack’s argument does not suggest that this “primordial” embodied language lies outside language per se, indeed previously she has clearly asserted, “signification and significance [are] as immanent, as given with existence”(39). Thus it is impossible to separate language and being in order to be outside language and this is why, as Merleau-Ponty states, “because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning, and we cannot do or say anything without its acquiring a name” (Phenomenology xix). However Sobchack, like many of the other writers quoted, suggests that this language of the body has a radical edge, and in her configuration this embodied language opens out the possibility of a split or gap between a fully constituted ‘natural language’ of the symbolic and “the radical origin of such a logic in lived-body experience”(39). Cinema and an examination of cinema is therefore important, as it allows an analysis of “the structures of communication as they radically emerge in the structures of being”(39), in the hope that this analysis “points to and describes that radical and existential ground for both a theory of sign production and a theory of meaning as they are always entailed in the lived-body experience”(50).

Ultimately Sobchack’s argument is concerned with the study of film itself, and calls for a theory of “semiotic phenomenology” which “attempts to describe, thematize, and interpret the structures of communication”(39) as
they emerge in “the expression of experience by experience” which is the film text. Such an approach, Sobchack believes, will allow film theory to transcend what she characterises as the ‘totalizing’ theories of poststructuralism,

What contemporary film theory stresses and decries in its variations on the metaphor of the mirror [ie poststructuralism] is the totalitarian transcendence of either psychic or ideological structures over the signifying freedom of individual viewers in their concrete, contingent, existential situation (47).

Thus Sobchack valorises the embodied experience of individual spectators as able to provide the possibility of variation and deviation from the operations, in Lacanian terms, of the screen and the gaze which determine “signification and significance [as] always predetermined by apparatus and ideology” (48). In so doing Sobchack posits, once more, the question of agency for the body and carries forward the same hope that is expressed, in different terms by Phelan and Silverman: that of the body as radical and transformative.

Intersubjectivity revisited

However, I believe that Sobchack’s examination of the film/spectator interface is problematised, in much the same way as Silverman’s account, by the very forms it attempts to deconstruct. Yet, precisely because of this (and informed by both Silverman and Phelan) her analysis enables me to construct a productive argument for my own mediatized performance work.

Sobchack’s is a theory of the living body grounded in a recorded mediatized text. On this basis I would like to contest the claim that, “More than any other medium of human communication, the moving picture makes itself sensuously and sensibly manifest as the expression of experience by experience” (37). I wish to demonstrate that performance, as a living mode of expression, and in particular multi-media performance, is able to fulfil the conditions that Sobchack has deemed to be the unique properties of the filmic experience. Furthermore, over and above film, multi-media performance is capable of realising “the expression of experience by experience” because its ‘text’ is the origin of experience itself - the living
There would seem to me to be a fundamental problem with identifying the cinematic exchange as intersubjective, because crucially film lacks a conscious body or “embodied existence”. Sobchack states “Cinema thus transposes [...] those modes of being alive and consciously embodied in the world that count for each of us as direct experience”(37). Two points are critical here; Sobchack’s use of the word “transpose” indicates the limit of the film experience. “Consciousness” according to Merleau-Ponty “is being towards the thing through the intermediary of the body” (Phenomenology 138/9). The signifiers of direct experience (seeing, hearing, moving) are only reproduced by a film and are not brought into the world on a moment to moment basis in the way that direct experience is constituted by the living body. Direct experience also consists of an awareness of being seen, being heard and being moved, or more importantly touched and these are sensations that the bodiless film object cannot embody. A film may mirror aspects of our everyday experience of existence which take place through the ‘expressed perceptions’ of others; it is also reasonable to characterise the film text as an other which “stands against the viewer”, nevertheless, an evaluation of the nature of the film text’s ‘otherness’ allows a differentiation to be constructed between it and the otherness of a living human subject. A film is not a living being and therefore, I would contend, it is unable to be constructed as a fully formed other or, equally, a ‘complete’ subject. In this scenario therefore the cinematic exchange cannot be described as intersubjective.

A film, as a subject, lacks embodied existence as constructed in exactly the terms of Sobchack’s own argument. Following Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack writes “In an unprecedented way, the cinema makes visible and audible the primordial origins of language in the reversibility of embodied and enworlded perception and expression”(37) and Sobchack maintains “that the act of viewing as the commutation of perception and expression is both an intrasubjective and intersubjective performance equally performable by filmmaker, film and spectator”(51). It is the simultaneous and reversible acts of expression and perception that create the ‘centred’ body of phenomenology - Sobchack quotes Merleau-Ponty, “Here, where the world
“Here, where the world is sensible; here, where I am” (37). But it is precisely the means of achieving this ‘centred’ body that the film cannot enact. Expression and perception are not reversible qualities of film, as Sobchack’s opening declaration testifies, a film can only express, it is not capable of perceiving. Merleau-Ponty writes “In order to perceive things, we need to live them. [...] I perceive with my body.” (Phenomenology 325/6). Film has no body, it can show perception taking place on its screen but the screen and the film itself cannot perceive the presence of its other - the audience and without this reversibility “those modes of being alive and consciously embodied in the world” it cannot be a subject but only represent a subject. A film does not posses full, centred being because it is not capable of experiencing experience because it cannot embody language; a film, like all mediatized experience, is an impoverished form of encounter, its language is fixed in time and travels only one way as an outwards expression. Therefore, although a film can draw attention to the language of embodied existence by displaying it upon a screen, it cannot embody this language itself. This embodiment would seem crucial to Sobchack’s intersubjective argument, as “direct experience and existential presence in the cinema belong to both the film and the viewer” (41), but how can a film possess “existential presence”? As I have stated on a number of occasions, a film as a recorded medium only exhibits a recovered relationship with present time, its present presence is always circumscribed by its re-presentation of time and space. This in turn determines the film’s lack of a body in Merleau-Ponty’s formulation; “Just as it is necessarily ‘here’, the body necessarily exists ‘now’; it can never become ‘past’” (Phenomenology 140). Likewise a film cannot be ‘existential’; it has no capacity for experience, as it does not posses this present temporally and spatial dependent body; “I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them. The scope of this inclusion is the measure of that of my existence” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 140). Susan Stewart also notes “the body of lived experience is subject to change, transformation, and, most importantly death” (133) and death could be construed as a defining characteristic of existence. Recorded media (film) cannot experience death being, as has been previously demonstrated, already dead; therefore it cannot be a “body of lived experience”. Thus in
terms of a “mutual capacity for and possession of experience through common structures of embodied existence, through similar modes of being-in-the-world” a film cannot “provide the intersubjective basis of objective cinematic communication”(38).

Subjects of vision

In considering performance to work as a type of touch, I wish to establish a dichotomy between Sobchack’s description of film as “embodied existence” and what I perceive to be live performances’ “capacity for and possession of experience”. Via Sobchack’s own arguments I can figure live performance, with its live performing bodies of performers and spectators, as an incontrovertibly intersubjective encounter. If we regard the performance encounter once more in terms of language we see that the objects (the performers) as live, human presences are inevitably embodied, and as such are capable of both expression and perception. There is an interchangeable symmetry, a crucial reversibility, as with touch, between these object/others and the spectators as watching-subjects; both can share an “existential presence” and both are capable of expression and perception. Therefore performance, not film, is a “shared space of being, of seeing, hearing, and bodily and reflective movement”(41). Rather, a film conforms more to Merleau-Ponty’s description of a ‘thing’; “the thing holds itself aloof from us and remains self-sufficient. [...] It is then hostile and alien, no longer an interlocutor, but a resolutely silent Other” (Phenomenology 322). A film, whilst it can be other, will always remain this silent object/other, and thus it cannot be framed as a subject like the other in the performance. Thus only a performance event occurs between subjects, a subject who, as described by Merleau-Ponty, “has his body not only as a system of present positions, but besides, and thereby, as an open system of an infinite number of equivalent positions directed to other ends” (Phenomenology 141). This indeterminate, “infinite number” of possibilities is what determines the intersubjective encounter, and importantly it marks this intersubjectivity as a volatile domain in which the object, as an other subject, cannot be fixed.

Therefore, unlike film as ‘the other’, and all recorded mediatized
expressions, the human interchange of performance presents subject/objects which can at any time potentially exceed their ‘texts’. This is what Sobchack suggests as a possibility of the lived body and the reason she calls for a semiotic phenomenological examination “to describe, thematize, and interpret the structures of communication as they radically emerge in the structures of being”(39). However, any study that wished to make an examination of the way that language emerges in being might be better served by analysing a cultural form which stages a truly intersubjective exchange. Although Sobchack would like to construct the film exchange as “not merely objects for vision, but also subjects of vision”(51) because a film, like photography, is locked in a recorded stasis and destined to fixed repetitions it cannot fully constitute a subject. Thus the previous description of the “subjects of vision” would be much better suited to performance where both parties in the communicative equation are in a fluid, changeable and interchangeable exchange. This is the condition of an embodied language which comes into being in subjects present in a specific time and space, and in response and relation to the similarly unstable present embodied languages of others.

I should like to make one further claim in respect specifically to multi-media performance. Sobchack states “Watching a film is both a direct and mediated experience of direct experience as mediation”(42), this ability to signal both “the original structures of existential being and the mediating structure of language”(42) therefore allows a film to be “a medium that articulates the unified, if ever changing, experience of existence, that expresses the original synonymy of existence and language, of perception and its expression”(44). For the reasons detailed above I would argue that film cannot articulate the experience of existence, it has no body and ‘the other’ it represents is not of the same order as those experienced through an encounter between living bodies. Film can represent an experience of existence but it can not be that experience. Sobchack requests a theory for language as it emerges in being, and multi-media performance proves to be an interesting intermediary in this respect. As a performance, it embodies in both performer and spectators “lived-body experience”, as defined by Sobchack as “the activity of embodied consciousness realizing itself in the world and with others as both visual and visible, as both sense-
making and sensible" (39). As media, multi-media performance stages the moment when the ‘wild meaning’ of these bodies meets the ‘natural language’ of “discreet symbolic systems”. As a form, multi-media performance, the camera/gaze metaphor made overt, is able to make apparent “direct experience as mediation” whilst maintaining the transcendent potential of the lived body. Therefore to repeat Sobchack’s words “It points to and describes that radical and existential ground for both theory of sign production and a theory of meaning as they are always entailed in the lived-body experience” (50). This I believe is what makes multi-media performance unique as a cultural form and the reason that I take issue with Sobchack’s analysis. It seems to me that multi-media performance "makes itself sensuously and sensibly manifest as the expression of experience by experience" (37). It is able to do this because it maintains the duality of being and language by performing language - by presenting re-presentational media and the body as indistinguishable - “the original synonymity of existence and language”. As a cultural form it does not diminish or collapse one part of this equation into the other and therefore, more that illustrating a theory of embodied language (as film does) it enacts the possibilities of embodied existence on its indistinguishable performers and spectators, “to change it [the world] into a spectacle, to make visible how the world touches us” (Merleau-Ponty “Cézanne’s Doubt” 19).

Making visible how the world touches

In spite of a valorising of the body and particularly the touch of the body, Silverman limits her analysis to specific mediatized texts. Because her mediatized texts alienate elements of time and/or space, the present/presence of the live body is therefore also necessarily evacuated, and without the body there can be no indication or manifestation of touch and its transformative potential. Finally, I would argue that it is via the live body that we can be brought into an appreciation of touch, either literally or metaphorically, and thus back to an awareness of the presence of ‘others’ as such. What the ‘touch’ of this body is able to communicate more effectively than mediatized images is the unknown - the (invisible) body beyond the body you can see. Work which maintains a sense of this body
therefore also maintains a sense of the fundamental difference of the other, and provides a refusal of the self-same image. This unknown also hints at the lack in vision, which echoes the lack at the centre of being which Phelan finds so powerful, and is the basis of her argument which champions the live body of performance.\textsuperscript{37}

Tangible visions

The 'living cameras' and live bodies of multi-media performance together create “three-dimensional photographs” - instantaneous subjects and objects - thus they maintain the efficacy of the camera/gaze metaphor to expose the operations of culture/language/representation within the field of vision without collapsing this process into a final 'photographic' product. \textit{The Turin Machine} is a living camera, and inside the installation all the instabilities of the living other are visited and its final photograph is realised as always different from, and never equal to, this body. Likewise other examples of my multi-media practice can be seen as 'living cameras', literally through the use of a live camera relay and/or by their insistence on staging moments of 'representation'. These moments are layered by distinctions drawn between the unmediatized, the live mediatized and the recorded; distinctions which can only be made by the ‘touch’ of the live body but all of which are mediated by a language of visual representation. I do not wish to posit the body as an antidote to the representational frame or to essentialise it as an unrealisable and unified Real behind the visible, but I do think that it can work within the economies of visual representation to hint at something beyond them and thus expose their limitations. Within visual representation, mediatized and mediated, the live body is the most productive indication of the Other, whilst alive it transgresses and transforms all the reductive stabilities of the image which Robins criticises. The vital flux of a living body prioritised by performance means it is a cultural form which can talk about embodied experience, pleasant and unpleasant, including: pain, the unavoidability of death, the brutality of time, the unknown, lack of control over others and the loss (lack) of the self. In active collaboration with the lens, this body is able to metaphorise our psychological functioning by exposing the representational aspects involved

\textsuperscript{37} This argument is the basis of Phelan's chapter “The Ontology of Performance:representation without reproduction” in \textit{Unmarked} pp. 146-166.
in all acts of looking. Thus multi-media performance can provoke a
consideration of the ways in which image ‘technologies’ are embedded in
our selves, as well as wider social formations, and how these work to either
control, suppress or ignore the productive and transformative aspects of
life’s others.

4.5 Summary

At the start of this chapter I briefly examined a number of theories that
impacted upon notions of vision and touch; particularly those of Merleau-
Ponty and Irigaray. Both theorists, as Grosz has made clear, (re)establish a
significance for the body in acts of looking and associated epistemic
practises, and introduce the notion of a correlation between subject and
object in sensational encounters. I characterised performance as a form of
‘touch’ and multi-media performance was figured as a meeting between
disembodied vision (via its mediatized elements) and embodied touch
realised by its performing/spectating bodies. These two contrasting
quantities worked to problematise conventional subject/object separations,
and usher in aspects of ‘the other’ and ‘the unknown’ into the
representational equation.

On examining my practice in these terms, I determined that touch was used
as a distinguishing moment in a number of my multi-media performances
as a means of activating a difference between the live body and its
mediatized image. As this work seemed, in part, to be constructed around
the subject/object dialectic, I began to expand on these notions in terms of
human subjectivity and particularly the role of images in ego forming
processes. In this respect I noted that much of my work was constructed
round the physic trope of the mirror phase, and that it was concerned with
the creation of an identifying image, often in a contrasting relation to the
body and sense of self. In the light of Silverman’s analysis, I suggested my
piece Looking Glass staged disembodied vision as concomitant with
embodied touch, and that, in Silverman’s terms, it formed a potential
‘productive’ aesthetic text which refused the idea of the self-same and
replaced it with an ‘identity-at-a-distance’, and thus a less oppressive
relationship between self and other.
Looking Glass also acted as an illustration of Irigaray’s notion of a tangible which precedes vision. I went on to look at other specific instances of a concomitance of vision in touch in other identity forming image practices, and in particular my performance/photography installation The Turin Machine. My analysis of The Turin Machine was informed by Silverman and Peggy Phelan. Following Lacan, Phelan identifies ‘lack’ or ‘not-all’ to be at the heart of human subjectivity and, like Silverman, cites vision as the means by which ‘the other’ and particularly the image of the other is used to shore up this absence. However, this activity is fraught with difficulty; the ‘looker’ (subject) and ‘looked at’ (object) are figured as interdependent within the social domain, but this interdependence does not necessarily signal an equal reciprocity of vision. Indeed Phelan and Silverman are able to demonstrate how all looking occurs within an unequal field, in which the screen as the mediating force of language makes visible only some elements of culture at the expense of the invisibility of others, and thus the ‘lack’ of the subject extends into all acts of looking. I described The Turin Machine in terms of these references, and was able to identify that it operated as a manifestation of the Lacanian metaphor of the camera/gaze to implicate the screen in all subject/object relationships. In The Turin Machine the act of looking is confounded, as the spectator initially encounters darkness and the lack of an image; after a period of time the image of the culturally determined Other (the female) appears but is never fully visible. The lack of the object/other is visited upon the subject in a corporeal experience of vision which is ‘not-all’, and therefore this notion of lack is implicated in both the subject and object. In Looking Glass proprioceptive touch was used as the means by which to indicate the otherness of the self. Although touch is not an overt signifying force within The Turin Machine, this idea is expanded into a social (subject/other) domain and the tangible is implicated along with the invisible as the unrepresentable quantities through which vision/being functions.

I then examined The Turin Machine in terms of the pose which Silverman, via Owens, posits as a pre-photographic (performative) moment, which like the invisible/tangible, summons the presence of the screen in the viewing equation. The pose raised questions of agency and in my own work I
described experiencing the limits of my control within *The Turin Machine* as I tried to create an image of myself. Although I knew my external visible image to be largely determined by the action of the screen and the gaze, I believe I am also able to destabilise these imperatives by working the identity-forming moment within a live scenario. In contrast to Silverman/Sherman's static photographic pose, I believe the live pose within the camera to be more effective, as it mobilises an experience of time and space as lost alongside an impoverished partial image which is never resolved or replete. These conditions of image-forming/viewing, I suggested, circumvented the self-same equation that all static, photographic images tend towards. In the live mediatized domain, a productive chain of resonances is provoked which, starting with an experience of loss, ushers in the other as unknown and hence activates the transformative potential of alterity alluded to at the start of the chapter.

Yet the limits of the photograph as a productive text were identified as a result of its stasis - its death - which evacuated the body from representation. Therefore a question remained concerning *moving* recorded mediatized images. Vivian Sobchack's account has privileged the relationship between film and the body, and she characterises the film encounter as an intersubjective exchange. Such a form, she maintains allows an examination of structures of communication as they emerge in structures of being. Like Phelan and Silverman, Sobchack posits the body as a radical/transformative entity, capable of problematising or transcending these structures of language epitomised by the metaphors of the screen and the gaze. However, I was able to use Sobchack's analysis to expose once more the limits of the recorded moving image. Language, as it emerges in being, occurs within the 'centred' body in present time and space; whilst a film is able to represent embodied language, it does not possess a body, and it is not able to activate the radical potential of an embodied language between its viewer and text. Thereby multi-media performance was championed in the terms of Sobchack's own argument as able to show the relationship between "direct experience as mediation" as synonymous with the radical living body. 'Living cameras' such as *The Turin Machine* make overt the operation of the screen/gaze by doubling the representation of the body via the camera lens. Thus this work is able to
demonstrate the mediation of all experience by language, but also, by staging the body under the lens as alive, evasive, incomplete, a living camera also maintains the efficacy of the radical body. This body cannot be separate from language and the screen, but it can allude to that which lies beyond representation. I understand that through my work it is possible to implicate the structures of language that operate in all levels of experience, and yet by continuing to work that body in a live present domain, I am able to maintain a sense of what lies beyond the linguistic. Therefore paradoxically I am able to work in the field of the visible to allude to the significance of the invisible, tangible other.
5.1 The Attributes of Multi-Media Performance

My first conclusion in drawing together this body of research originates in my reflexive practice; these individual art works do not deal with discrete issues, instead my multi-media performance and associated installation work revisit a number of preoccupations, and circle round issues without necessarily providing a sense of closure. In this way the work itself resembles the living body with which it is ultimately concerned.

In chapter one I posited a series of questions to be further expanded in the thesis, the primary one being - what interrogation, if any, can multi-media performance make of contemporary, media driven, society? This question was supplemented by the proposition that work which staged a meeting between the live body and mediatized images provides an insight into the languages and consequences of a mediatized culture. As a means of providing answers to these questions, I can now identify a number of attributes which are activated by aspects of my multi-media performance practice. First and foremost, this multi-media performance and installation work features the body at the centre of visual representations. This ‘re-embodied image’ provokes a number of consequences for ideas about the body and the representing image, which, in turn, implicate other conceptions concerning, the self, the ‘real’ and the o/Other, (all factors which participate in shaping human behaviour on a wider social/political level).

In much of my multi-media performance the activities of bodies are united with the production of images, whether this be in the domain of the literal production of images, for example, via a live camera, or in terms of reception where the spectator is implicated within the performance and thus made aware of the constitutive power of his or her looking. By placing the production of (mediatized) images in closer proximity to the bodies which produce them, and are subsequently constituted by them, this work figures...
an inter-relational dependency which is sometimes denied when these forms are presented as single, isolated disciplines. Not only is the body figured as reliant upon the production of an image for a sense of identity but, inversely, camera images are seen as dependent on the bodies which lurk behind and in front of their lenses. Whereas it is possible to conceive of the body (as an indication of the agent of the self) as subjective and partial, this is less common in terms of the camera and mediatized images; thus multi-media performance problematises the objective status of mediatized images by qualifying the notion of the ‘autonomous’ camera. Both image and body are rendered within the domain of the subjective, and thus the subject is implicated within the object and vice versa. Just as body and image are figured as interdependent this work logically prevents the reduction of this binary; the body and the image are staged as coexistent, neither one nor the other. Within the staging of this dialectic there are moments of similarity and moments of difference when the body is collapsed into its image and contrastingly extracted and separated. These processes oscillate within a performance or remain unresolved within an installation, so that it is possible to say that this work prevents the succession of the body by its image and the subsequent exclusion of the body from mediatized images. However, although multi-media performance reinstates the body within mediatized representations, it does not attempt to reverse the body/image hierarchy enforced by conventional media practices. Neither medium of expression takes precedence over the other and instead both are complicated by subtle division into a series of configurations of the body/image (the live body, the live mediatized body, the recorded body). This ‘performance’ does not claim the body as the origin of meaning and value, as some form of defensive stance in response to a perceived threat of encroachment by the mediatized image, rather, by establishing the body as significant within these images it reclaims a certain status and agency for the body. To the extent that this multi-media performance work is not a feature of mainstream culture it signals an alternative to conventional representational practices, and presents a different approach that foregrounds the body as a significant element within representation. In the form of ‘re-embodied images’, multi-media performance presents a reunification of vision with experience, and, in so doing, suggests qualities of experience encapsulated by the body which are vital to a construction of
the sense of self. In addition, it foregrounds an understanding of the relationship between the self and external other (including moral and ethical implications) which can be absent from other forms of mediatized visual representations.

Reclaiming the ‘real’

Work which encourages a distinction and yet maintains a contingency between the body and its camera-image evokes a philosophical dilemma in terms of a definition of the ‘real’. It is this dilemma that was played out in the formal experimentation of many performers and video artists during the nineteen sixties and seventies. Multi-media performance problematises the notion of the omnipotent camera and exposes the limitations of the lens. Likewise, this work also figures the body and the act of looking as a form of partial blindness. Therefore neither practice - the gaze of the camera nor the look of the eye - can be established as providing ‘complete vision’ and thus delivering a fully formed, independent and external ‘reality’. This failure of both camera and eye complicates the ‘real’ which is now qualified and made conditional. The consequence of this disruption of vision and knowledge does not remain within a purely philosophical domain, but impacts politically upon culture in terms of the construction and control of what is taken to be ‘real’. In chapter three I looked at the ways in which a variety of cultural practices construct and maintain a relationship with the ‘real’ and work to exclude the body and death from particular scopic regimes. These ideas, manifest in specific envisioning objects, could then be effective in political and social interactions, for example, in the execution of war. I posited that the live body posed a problem to these traditional scopic regimes and the means by which they maintain their ‘reality effect’. The body introduced death and loss back into a notion of what constitutes the ‘real’, and to the extent that these are excluded from most representational equations, the ‘real’ became a contested and shifting ground. Other critics have noted the effect of the performative upon the notion of the ‘real’. For example, Butler asserts that gender “is real only to the extent that it is performed” (qtd in Diamond 4). The body, in that it enacts a reality, therefore provides, once more, a threat to the notion of an external a priori ‘real’.
In pondering the power of the reality-effect of the lens in relation to the ‘real’ live body I established some grounds for a different and significant ‘real’ from that provided by ‘real’ mediatized texts. I did so by identifying elements of sensational experience normally excluded from purely visual representations - such as touch. These heterogeneous sensational encounters with a live present ‘other’ enabled a productive meeting which was denied and disguised by conventional mediatized practices. In an attempt to reclaim or reformulate the ‘real’, Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of ‘reality’ allows me to understand the difference between the bodily ‘real’ and the mediatized ‘real’, combined in multi-media performance. For Merleau-Ponty reality is a multisensory live encounter;

what I call experience of the thing or of reality - not merely of a reality-for-sight or for-touch, but of an absolute reality - is my full co-existence with the phenomenon, at the moment when it is in every way at its maximum articulation, and the ‘data of the different senses’ are directed towards this one pole (Phenomenology 318).

This “absolute reality” is also determined by an inseparable interlocking of significance and existence which then allows Merleau-Ponty to construct a difference between a picture (mediatized representation) and reality per se;

Like the thing, the picture has to be seen and not defined, nevertheless, though it is a small world which reveals itself within the larger one, it cannot lay claim to the same substantiality. We feel that it is put together by design, that in it significance precedes existence and clothes itself in only the minimum of matter necessary for communication. The miracle of the real world, on the other hand, is that in it significance and existence are one, and that we see the latter lodge itself in no uncertain fashion in the former.” (Phenomenology 323)

Multi-media performance stages both these ‘reals’ as concurrent - the mediatized ‘real’ and body ‘real’ - but because it does so within a live domain between the bodies of performers and an audience, it also prioritises the “coexistent” and “maximum articulatory” aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘real’. Thus it emphasises and empowers the body as the site in which significance and existence coexist, and in so doing some of the
epistemic power normally reserved for the mediatized ‘real’ can be reclaimed and transferred back to the living body.

Specularity and subjectivity

As I have noted in chapter four, multi-media performance materialises the metaphor of the camera/gaze and places this idea under scrutiny through an interaction between performers/spectators and mediatizing technologies. In so doing multi-media performance draws attention to the logistics of looking within mediatized culture and particularly the notion of representation within this equation. Silverman notes “There can never have been a moment when specularity was not at least in part constitutive of human subjectivity. [...] ever since the inception of cave drawing, it has been via images that we see and are seen”(195). Subjectivity has specular foundations and hence is bound up with representation. Work which foregrounds looking and the different mechanisms of representation stages the concomitant elements of being and seeing, and via its exploration of the constitutive forms of human subjectivity is inevitably involved in a broader field of social and political issues. There are various ‘bodies’ within multi-media performance both mediated and mediatized; at times during this work similarities are constructed between the mediatizing gaze of the camera and the mediating look of a spectator, in the selecting and discarding of objects of vision, for example. In this way the camera provides a parallel with the processes of physiologically and psychologically determined vision, and all ‘seeing’ is rendered as subject to forms of mediation (in the sense of Raymond William’s “intervening or intermediate agency”). Understanding the part that representation plays in ‘seeing’ reflects back on Derrida’s assertion as quoted in my opening chapter, “the theater of cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which life is unrepresentable” (Writing 234). This “unrepresentable” cultural practice, even within the environs of unmediatized performance is now seen as an impossibility, a fact paradoxically clarified by Derrida when he writes “Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence, has always already begun to represent itself” (Writing 249). Representation in this formation equals language and language provides meaning to the extent that existence cannot take place outside language. This reshapes Derrida’s
earlier quote, which like Phelan’s invisible, hints at qualities which exceed representation and because of this can never be represented. Once all seeing (perception) is performed through a representational screen it also becomes more or less culturally determined, and, once again, this problematises the notion of a neutral, pre-given reality and the power of the lens or eye to deliver this external ‘real’. The ‘real’ becomes a negotiated terrain acted upon by numerous social, political and cultural factions and claimed by a number of competing representational frameworks.

If one accepts that representation occurs at all levels of expression and perception, not just in specific aesthetic, cultural objects and texts (Phelan calls these "representations of representations"), what then becomes necessary is an exploration of how different representational structures function - what these structures actually ‘represent’, and the different ‘reals’ that they construct. Such an exploration allows Phelan to create her distinction of performance as “representation without reproduction”. For example how do cameras and recording technology alter our conception of time and space? Rather than a passive submission to the operations of the gaze and the screen, and the ideology embedded within linguistic systems, multi-media performance attempts a deconstruction and separation of different modes of representation. Auslander’s assertion; “I doubt very strongly that any cultural discourse can actually stand outside the ideologies of capital and reproduction” maybe theoretically correct, but as a statement it discourages any attempt to discover the degree to which particular discourses simply reproduce or critically problematise this ideology. Multi-media performance, as well as collapsing the gaze of the camera and the look of the spectator, also provides moments when these are not aligned and differ radically from one another. In so doing it is a cultural practice which is able to make distinctions within different types of representation, and thus open out a space to discuss the constitutive factors of human subjectivity. Importantly, this space demonstrates the possibility of separation between an individual’s mediated look and a camera’s mediatizing gaze, by presenting moments at which a schism occurs between the two. Subjectivity in this instance is figured as a combination of specular conditions, some of which are confirmed by the lens and others which are often divergent. The position and desires of the
individual spectator may not be maintained by the camera and indeed could well contradict this gaze. In this way multi-media performance exposes a separation between media discourses (the mediatized image) and ‘mediated looking’ - both are subject to controls, but the latter functions through the more unstable conscious/unconscious subjective body and thus presents moments at which this subjectivity can differ from dominant hegemonic (mediatized) discourses. Therefore in the background to this work is a belief in the radical body and its non-conforming look. It is this body which multi-media performance alludes to and activates.

Self and other

In terms of the attributes of multi-media performance, much emphasis has been placed on the notions of the self and the other constructed by this work. In multi-media performance the encounter between the subject/object, self/other does not take place within static and fixed positions but in a fluid and mobile domain. In this cultural formation the object returns the gaze thus rendering all subjects objects and vice versa. Specifically I have made a case for how this work can illustrate various aspects of the formation and maintenance of the ego and functions to expose the self/other paradox by stressing the necessity of both visual and tactile sensations in the constitution of an identity. This theory, as realised and enacted in multi-media performance, replays the coexistence of the body and its mediatized image and disallows the supremacy of one sensational realm (the visual) above the other (the tactile); in so doing, therefore, it contradicts the conventions of technologically mediatized representations which are, unsurprisingly, also the identificatory practices of ‘normal’ adult subjectivity. Instead the cultural event of the multi-media performance proposes an irreconcilable fluctuation between the visual and the tactile, and stages a form of ‘bodily contact’ which ensures a powerful sense of the other. This materialisation of the other as Other is also figured in terms of irreducible alterity, the unknown or lack, and is posited as a constituent element of the self. Therefore such multi-media performance works to figure the gap or void at the centre of subjectivity, the acknowledgement of which provokes profound consequences for our conception of ourselves, and which, in turn, reflect upon our conceptions of others. Indeed both Phelan and Silverman
have written about the importance of maintaining both a sense of the other which is inextricably linked to an acknowledgment of the other within the self in order to sustain less oppressive and violent identificatory practices.

5.2 Reproduction V Mediatization

In my opening chapter I introduce the debate concerning multi-media performance’s social and political potential. These debates arose partly from my review of the theories of Philip Auslander and Peggy Phelan. I will close my analysis with a brief resume of this major debate which influences the field of performance practice.

Auslander objects to Phelan’s identification of live performance “as a social and politically oppositional discourse [based on] ontological differences between live and mediatized representations”(159). Yet I would argue that this quote reveals the extent to which Auslander misunderstands Phelan’s central thesis. Phelan makes her argument for performance specifically through an analysis of ‘reproduction’. To the extent that she invokes the mediatized she does so only in terms of the recording, (reproductive) dimensions of media. Auslander’s use of the term ‘mediatized’ indicates only “that a particular cultural object is a product of the mass media or of media technology”(5); hence, for example, he is able to mistakenly characterise the microphone as “the apparatus of reproduction” (“Liveness” 199). Thus Auslander fails to make a distinction between mediatized elements which occur live and therefore are concurrent with present time and space, and those which originate from a recording carrier base and thus reproduce a past time and space. There would seem to be a crucial difference between these two versions of the mediatized as was explored in detail by the performance and chapter two case study Constants II. A live camera image remains, to a certain degree, in a similar domain to that of the living body; it is time and space specific and though reduced and

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1 Auslander makes this observation in “Liveness: Performance and the Anxiety of Simulation” in Diamond’s Performance and Cultural Politics. However, a microphone does not reproduce, it picks up sound and converts it into an electrical signal. The apparatus of reproduction in this equation would be what ever recording device was attached to the microphone to record these signals. The same differentiation can be made for a camera - a camera alone does not reproduce - it mediates, represents or collects images, and allows an image to be reproduced only once this has been stored on tape, film or digital disk.
fragmented by a lens this action (as is demonstrated by the camera/gaze metaphor) is not a reproduction but merely repeats a mediation of the body that occurs within sight itself. Moreover this live mediatization can at times be subject to scrutiny and understood within a context of process, where the camera can be seen to be fallible and subject to human operations, even when the object beneath the lens evades complete capture. As long as the image remains within this live domain it can be imbued with connotations of subjectivity and otherness that ultimately place it within a more fluid, unstable, productive cultural reservoir that, like the living body, invokes the possibilities of difference, flux and change. In contrast to this, however, the recorded image, exemplified by the recorded body, severed from its specific time and space, remains limited and destined to reproduce on each occasion the identical and the same.

Auslander argues for a dissolution of differences between the live and mediatized, but even though there may be examples of live and mediatized forms which mingle or mimic one another, this does not mean that there are absolutely no differences between them. Indeed it might explain a difficulty in identifying differences between the live and the mediatized, but a merging of forms does not in itself constitute a reason to cease “to make ontological distinctions”. Somewhat paradoxically, Auslander himself seems to acknowledge this when he calls for a discourse to examine the live and the mediatized.

Because live performance is the category of cultural production most directly affected by the dominance of media it is particularly urgent to address the situation of live performance in our mediatized culture (2).

Another flaw in Auslander’s argument comes from his complaint, “I doubt very strongly that any cultural discourse can actually stand outside the ideologies of capital and reproduction that define mediated culture or should be expected to do so”. Yet nowhere in her work Unmarked does Phelan suggest that this is the position which performance occupies. Indeed in her careful working of Lacanian theory, Phelan maintains an awareness of all pervasive language, its alliance with dominant social and political frameworks of power and the way it structures the subject. Phelan’s argument is more subtle that Auslander’s totalizing vision and invokes a
poststructuralist position which sees the subject as both constituted and constituting, where the field of language is made more plastic by the introduction of aspects which expose the logics of the speaking subject and introduce alternative and less culturally validated forms of identification and articulation. Thus Phelan never proposes the possibility of linguistic expression outside dominant ideologies, rather she explores the values implicit in their production as a way of establishing a complex agency for the subject which can, in turn, act in contradiction to some of these logics.²

5.3 The Productive Body

Phelan’s attempt to construct performance as a politically radical form (refuted by Auslander) is a project aspired to by other theorists and is attributed to other cultural forms. Between them Silverman, Berger, Sontag, Robins, Buck-Morss and Heathfield, amongst others, all propose ‘aesthetic’ strategies to engender what are variously termed ‘productive’, ‘resistant’ and ‘transformative’ texts. To this extent Phelan’s writing can be seen within the context of a wider progressive agenda, which identifies certain pervasive and oppressive qualities within culture and seeks to find ways to undermine or expose these. Elin Diamond makes a similar claim in her introduction to Performance and Cultural Politics and singles out performance as especially productive in this endeavour; “Performance [...] is precisely the site in which concealed or dissimulated conventions might be investigated”(5). Diamond makes her argument in response to Butler’s observations on the performativity of everyday life described as “a reiteration of a norm or set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition”(12). Diamond notes that because performance foregrounds the body, its inevitable performativity provides a platform to examine what is normally hidden in the performative; “that risky and dangerous negotiation between a doing (a reiteration of norms) and a thing done (discursive conventions that frame our interpretations)”(5). Therefore, as a cultural practice, performance is able to highlight the moments when social

² In both Phelan and Silverman’s accounts, the unconscious is seen as a vital constituent in bypassing and reworking culturally-inscribed positions, and both theorists also provide descriptions of the various means by which ‘aesthetic texts’ can work to implicate the domain of the unconscious which as prelinguistic is also, to a certain extent beyond ideological infection.
conventions/language become embodied - announced, enacted, made real. (This was the project put forward by Sobchack as the basis for an examination of film discourses and which I criticised on the grounds of the recorded text’s inability to be *spontaneously* performative). Because the implications of performativity reach far beyond the practice of performance and out into the practices of everyday life, observations made within the cultural sphere may well be transposed into broader social and political fields.

Throughout this text the body has variously been posited as ‘radical’, ‘productive’ and ‘transformative’. These figurations are supported in the theories of, amongst others, writers such as Grosz and Theodor Adorno. In the introduction to *Bodies That Matter* Grosz writes;

> Bodies are not inert; they function interactively and productively. They act and react. They generate what is new, surprising, unpredictable. [...] bodies [...] always extend the frameworks which attempt to contain them, to seep beyond their domains of control (xi).

This is where the radical body meets the performative as a reiteration of norms and why the fundamentally unstable and indeterminate body can at times diverge from and elude these conventions. It is via the body and its imperfect repetition of these norms that we encounter Adorno’s “negative dialectic” - the idea that “no pattern or concept is ever ‘totally congruent and isomorphic with the experience it purports to denote’” (qtd in Carlson).

Importantly Adorno juxtaposes the idea of human activity with that of reproduction;

> human behaviour [...] is characterized above all by the fact that the qualitatively new appears in it [...] it is a movement which does not run its course in pure identity, the pure reproduction of such as already was there, but in which something new emerges (qtd in Buck-Morss “Origin” 54).

Therefore the performative body foregrounded in performance can show moments of performative repetition where the body provides the possibility of agency and innovation, and slips away from or disrupts the social and cultural conventions inscribed in the linguistic. Within this configuration we can now identity Auslander’s failure to differentiate between repetition
(which includes live mediatization) and reproduction as a fatal error. Without an understanding of the difference between these two activities a separation between the body and its recorded mediatized image cannot be distinguished, and, furthermore, the origin of the radical, productive body - its imperfect repetition - cannot be appreciated.

5.4 Living Cameras

Thus far I have invoked arguments for the efficacy of performance, but what of multi-media performance and my belief that it might provide some form of interrogation for contemporary society? Previously I questioned whether my multi-media performances’ use of mediatizing (reproductive) technologies might operate to exclude the progressive power of performance’s (the body’s) “representation without reproduction”. However, upon review I find that my work intensifies Phelan’s project rather than dissipating or negating it, because it is able to figure the very ubiquity of representation. No critic has as yet specifically addressed the form of multi-media performance in terms of its combination of the productive body with its mediatized image.

As an extension of the cultural practice of performance, multi-media performance continues to foreground the performative body, but it also juxtaposes this body with its reproductive image. The similarities and differences between these versions of the body are complicated by being shown as both mediatized live and mediatized recorded, thus not only is the body foregrounded but so too is the image and the act of viewing the body. The lens doubles the mediating look of the spectator and thus the specular, representational aspects of all looking/all being are emphasised. This image at times conforms to and at times diverges from the body it ‘represents’. By staging the body as both divergent and convergent with its images, multi-media performance figures both sides of the performative equation; that is, the body’s imperfect repetition (as always potentially different) and the reproductive discourse of social/cultural conventions and norms (as always the same). Because multi-media performance presents both the live body and the reproduced body through this contrasting juxtaposition, it is able to show moments when the live body diverges from its reproductive presence and thus highlight the body’s vital difference.
Multi-media performance, because it maintains the body in tandem with the mediatized image constantly makes overt these moments of slippage and therefore is able to demonstrate and activate, more productively than purely mediatized texts or performance per se, some sense of the non-conforming resistant body which reaches beyond representation.

Grosz has written of “the body as the threshold or borderline concept that hovers perilously and unpredictably at the pivotal point”(23). I find this to be an apt description not just of my performance/photography installation The Turin Machine (where the body image acts as a pivot and literally does hover at the edges of perception), but much of my multi-media performance and installation work. This work maintains the body as coexistent and unreconcilable with its image. The electronic freeze in Constants II, the pose in The Turin Machine and the (future) frozen face in Simulator illustrate moments when the repetitive live body is qualitatively different from the reproduced image body. Touch in Looking Glass and in the ghost sequence in Constants II, perform a similar rupture where the image cannot be conflated with the body, being or the self. In creating these moments of difference between the live body and imaged body, I allude to invisible qualities which go beyond the representationally (conventionally) visible, the performative qualities of a living body. Many of these moments are staged within living cameras: the pinhole Turin Machine and box camera Simulator, or amongst live relay cameras: Looking Glass and Constants II. Thus the consequences of this ‘invisible’ are both enacted upon, and are in turn enacted by, the bodies of the audience. These living cameras clearly have significance for bodies which exist in a predominantly recorded mediatized culture and offer the possibility of another way of seeing and another way of being.
APPENDIX 1

CHRONOLOGY OF PRACTICAL WORKS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

1997

May
Appointed postgraduate assistant at Department of Photography, Film and Television, Napier University.

June
Assistant directed Ruby 16mm Short Film (First Reel scheme)

July
The Turin Machine performance/photography installation performed at the South Bank, London.

October
Drafted research proposal including provisional scheme of practical projects.

November
The Turin Machine performance/photography installation performed at Now ‘97, Nottingham.

Attended Slipstream Conference, Photo ‘97, York

Submitted research proposal

December

1998

Jan
Draft practical project proposals

February
Made research visit to MITES (Moving Image and Touring Exhibition Service) for technical advice on practical projects.

Gave paper “Spectral Bodies” at Performance Theory Conference, Lancaster University.

Guest lecture at Nottingham Trent University on The Turin Machine.

March
Gave paper “Spectral Bodies” at research seminar, Department of Photography, Film and Television, Napier University.

Guest artist lecture at Edinburgh Art College.

April
Practical research towards Sarcophagus/Looking Glass live video mirror.
May
Presentation of Looking Glass live video mirror as work in progress project, Department of Photography, Film and Television, Napier University.
Attend research conference Napier University Bodies in Flight initial meeting concerning Constants, multi-media performance project.

June
Initial documentation of Looking Glass
Writing up Looking Glass
Site visit to Crail to document the Torpedo Attack Trainer.
Exhibition of The Turin Machine shroud/photographs at the Mortuary Chapel in Arbroath organised by the Hospitalfield Arts Trust.

July
Devising and rehearsals of Constants, multi-media performance/installation in collaboration with Bodies in Flight.
Work in progress multi-media performance/installation Constants shown at Bonington Gallery, Nottingham.

August
Edit of Looking Glass video documentation
Documentation of Constants work in progress version.
Write up of projects and finalise documentation.

September
Research exhibition, KJP Gallery, Department of Photography, Film and Television, Napier University.
Conclude project writing and documentation.
Devising and rehearsals for Constants: A Future Perfect multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight (2nd phase rehearsals).

October
Devising and rehearsals for Constants: A Future Perfect multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight.
Attend Root '98, Hull.

November
Constants: A Future Perfect performed at Arnolfini, Bristol.
Constants: A Future Perfect video documentation.
Writing up Constants:A Future Perfect documentation.

December
Edit of Constants: A Future Perfect documentation.
January
Guest artist lecture Edinburgh Art College

February
Initial meeting with Awarehaus Theatre re Stoker - multi-media theatre piece.
Attend Performance Theory Conference, Warwick University.

March
Begin work in collaboration with Awarehaus Theatre on multi-media theatre piece Stoker.
Attended ‘Breakers’ new technology course at MITES, Liverpool.

April
Attended Performance Studies International (PSi5) conference at Aberystwyth University, Wales.
Stoker multi-media theatre piece premiered at the Lemontree, Aberdeen

May
Stoker multi-media theatre piece run at the Lemontree, Aberdeen.
Video documentation of Stoker
Began work on Simulator installation.
Writing up Stoker

June
Working on Simulator installation.
Exhibition of Simulator installation in ‘The Shed’ group show, Collins Gallery, Glasgow.
Video documentation of Simulator

July
Continuation of Simulator installation exhibition in ‘The Shed’, Collins Gallery, Glasgow
Initial meeting Scottish National Portrait Gallery regarding The Turin Machine performance/photography exhibition.

August
Edit of Stoker video documentation
Edit of Simulator video documentation

September
Start devising rehearsals for DeliverUs, multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight.

October
DeliverUs multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight devising and post-production work.
DeliverUs multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight
premiered Arnolfini, Bristol
Video documentation of DeliverUs

**November**
DeliverUs multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight presented at Bonington Gallery, Nottingham.
Writing up DeliverUs documentation.
Write up practical projects into case study notes

**December**
Write up practical projects into case study notes

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**2000**

**January**
Wrote article multi-media work in DeliverUs for documentational insert for Live Art Magazine.

**February**

**March**
Attended performance art symposium at Talbot Rice Gallery.

**April**
DeliverUs rework with Bodies in Flight.

**June**
DeliverUs multi-media performance on tour to; Green Room, Manchester, Roadmender, Northampton and The Wickham Theatre, Bristol.

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September 2000.
PRACTICAL PROJECTS: CASE STUDIES

1. The Turin Machine 204.
2. Pieces of the True Cloth 206.
3. Looking Glass 208.
5. Stoker 238.
7. DeliverUs 261.
CASE STUDY 1. THE TURIN MACHINE

Project Description

The Turin Machine is a Performance/Photography installation which uses a giant pinhole camera to create life-size photographic portraits of the artist. The camera consists of a canvas structure supported by an external wooden frame, inside are two chambers and a wooden viewing booth is attached to the end wall which looks into the second chamber. In the first chamber stands the artist, brightly lit, facing a wall which contains a small aperture. Through this aperture the light enters the second dark chamber and collects upon a large photosensitive screen consisting of polyester coated with a photographic emulsion. The light which falls onto the screen forms an inverted positive image of the artist. This process can be watched by an audience from the adjacent viewing room which contains two viewing windows one high, the other low, to accommodate for the different viewing heights of children, people in wheelchairs and standing adults. After a period of time the screen has been exposed to enough light to allow a photograph to be created.

During the exhibition the audience enters, one at a time, into the camera to view the process of exposure and in doing so witnesses the act of “taking a photograph”. Initially on entering the camera nothing is visible but as the spectator becomes accustomed to the darkness an image slowly fades up. This spectral picture hangs inverted within the void of the camera and is possessed with a luminescence which exhibits ghostly, magical qualities. The effect of the vision is strange and disorientating appearing to hover, as it does, on the edges of perception; it is unlike any other visual image and unique to a pinhole camera. After a performance time of approximately four hours, the screen is removed and the image developed revealing, in negative, a picture of the artist. These portraits are then exhibited within the gallery or performance space to complete the performance/installation process. The work occurs over a number of days, each day resulting in the exposure of a picture or ‘Shroud’.

The research and development of the “The Turin Machine” was begun at Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art in Dundee where it was first presented as part of the staff research show ‘Media Circus’ in March 1996. Based on this initial work the project then received public funding and was staged at the Arnolfini in December 1996. At exhibitions the work has been very enthusiastically received with many people commenting on the extraordinary quality of the image and the intimate viewing circumstances which throw into collision notions of performance and exhibition. The installation presents the viewer with an immersive environment creating a visceral and emotional experience which is simultaneously underpinned with layers of conceptual logic. Because of the nature of the piece the work is simultaneously a performance and a photograph and as such explores fundamental concerns that lie within the act of image making. Indeed the relationship between the live and the recorded is pivotal to the meaning of
the work and uses mediaeval technology to confront us with the very contemporary issue of what constitutes and distinguishes between the real and the representationally or 'virtually' real.

As a cross art form piece “The Turin Machine” can quite appropriately be presented within a performance space, gallery or some such similar area which affords a degree of control over lighting. Access to nearby darkroom facilities is preferable but it is possible to work in other spaces which have running water available. Accessibility has also been considered and the work has been designed to be viewable by people of all ages including those in wheelchairs. As the installation can only be viewed by one person at a time our experience at the Arnolfini and elsewhere shows that a contemplative, unmarshalled space which allows an audience to come and go freely is beneficial, preferably within the context of a larger exhibition or festival. Ideally the work should be open to the public over a number of days, three being the minimum, and has a duration of between four to six hours a day depending on the viewing requirements of the organisers. The performance occurs in two hour blocks with a one hour break in between so a typical daily timetable would be 12-2pm, 3-5pm, 205.

EXHIBITION RECORD

Premiered Arnolfini, Bristol, December 1996
The South Bank, London, July 1997
Now '97, Nottingham, October 1997
Root '98, Kingston upon Hull, October 1998
Cambridge Darkroom Gallery, Cambridge November 1998
Museum of Modern Art, Stockholm, November 1998
Scottish National Portrait Gallery, September 1999

May 2000.
CASE STUDY 2. PIECES OF THE TRUE CLOTH

Artist’s contribution to the performance publication *Shattered Anatomies*

*Shattered Anatomies* is a box which contains a collection of critical essays and documenting artifacts by a wide range of performance practitioners and academics. My own contribution to the box was constructed around creating a document for *The Turin Machine*. This had to be an object that had a resonance with the original work as well as being a record of the event. The document was made as a work in its own right and created with an understanding of the implications of recording for the original performance moment. Each performance of *The Turin Machine* produces a record of the event in the form of a negative life size photograph, therefore the production of a record was already integral to the work and tangibly linked through time and light to the performance. In this instance the record is a consequence of the performance and as a negative is as unique as the moments (four hours) of its creation, there is therefore an element of critique around the notion of the record integral to the work. The problem then became one of meaningfully reproducing this event and the understanding of record-making which was integral to it across a large number of editions. Each performance produced only one shroud and I had been asked to provide 600 documents I wanted to find away to multiply this effect whilst retaining an integrity between the documenting artifact and the performance event. Photography, in contrast to performance, is a medium of mass reproduction, as the ‘shrouds’ were negative the obvious way to increase their number was to photograph them but I wanted to maintain a critique of the photographic process which problematised the idea that a photograph = the original object. Therefore I documented three finished shrouds, a triptych to maintain a resonance with religious artifacts and because the performances normally occur over three days. These were photographed on medium format transparency film because a reversal film maintains a contingency with the object which it depicts via the fact that it has been in direct contact with the light reflected by that object. This is exactly the same relationship that my body has with the shroud photograph in the original Turin Machine camera. The transparent triptych was then bound in the ‘skin’ of one of the three shrouds used in the documenting photograph. In this way literally layers of documentation were created. The completed documenting artifact was presented in a plastic snap seal ‘evidence’ bag thereby providing a broader cultural reference which indicated that ‘evidence’ was what was being contemplated. Between the clear plastic bag and the bound photograph was text on transparent acetate, text which provided the ‘authority’ written information. The text gave the title of the piece and explained that this was documentation from/of *The Turin Machine*, below this were three lines of text describing the basic process of the performance;
A giant pinhole camera
A four hour performance/exposure
A photograph/shroud

From this text it should have been possible to establish how the images in the transparency had been created and therefore understand something of the dynamic at play within the original work. It was also necessary to view the transparency 1. through the text and 2. through a piece of an original performance shroud. In this way as a spectator you came into contact with images of the body which had been created by similar means but had very different relations to that original body. The transparency framed on film exhibited the completeness of a document but this was visually interrupted by being viewed through a fragment of the original performance moment embodied on and by the cloth shroud. The three photographed shrouds had been divided into 600 in order to be distributed between the boxes this fragmentation of the original reflected the incompleteness of a document which attempts to capture the totality of a performance, an incompleteness which is denied by normal documenting procedures which wish to maintain a transparent integrity with their original object outside of the unique moment of time and space so essential to performance.

April 1998
CASE STUDY 3. LOOKING GLASS

Work in progress presented at Napier University Department Photography, Film and Television May 1998.

The origins of this work lie in ideas that I had for a much larger piece which was formulated in response to *The Turin Machine*. Like *The Turin Machine* the work was intended to pivot around constructions of identity and in particular to articulate the irreconcilable schism between notions of self with images of the self. I felt that *The Turin Machine* was potentially flawed as it all too easily replaced the live body with an apparently mediated one and in this way made the originary presence of the live body uncertain. (This relates back to other work *Constant II* and *DeliverUs* where the image, to some extent, effortlessly negates the body). Some visitors to the Machine apparently remained unaware that the object which produced the image was alive, I therefore wished to make a piece in which the fact of the live body would be inescapable. I was also interested in equating the look with a touch in order to emphasise the action of light as visceral and our looking as active, from this position looking becomes something which constructs an image and spectatoring is removed from the realm of the passive and neutral. This argument about spectatorship also relates back to notions of the self as the image is no longer god-given but is the product of interpretation, an action which is fundamentally controlled by the self and simultaneously defines the self.

*Looking Glass* is a scaled down version of a piece of work provisionally titled *Sarcophagus*. *Sarcophagus* worked through the dynamics of *The Turin Machine* in a slightly altered form; in this instance the image forming medium was light in combination with electronic video. A body would lie ‘entombed’ in close proximity to an audience and could be seen through a glass screen which was activated by touch. This hypothetical configuration did not however resolve the live dilemma. The body was reproduced to the audiences via an electronic camera and video projection it would therefore look in conventional imaging terms ‘reproduced’ and seem even further removed from the body as real and present than the spectral presence in *The Turin Machine*. There were also other problems with this idea concerning the technical practicalities of the piece which demanded contradictory optical positions as the body, the camera and the projection all interrupted one another. I decided to scale down the idea and more significantly to replace the image of the live performer with the live image of a spectator. The liveness of such an image would be undeniable as the spectator themselves would embody this fact.

Thus the presentation of the body is reconfigured as the presentation of the face (the head). The face, as the primordial signifier of identity, is the obvious element of the body to use in a work which discusses identity. The face is the principle site of communication and expression of being, it is also the place where our reception of others is concentrated. Because of my work on the Turin Shroud I had been doing some reading around relics and
religious icons and I was interested in the way that these representations performed a different function in comparison to conventional everyday representations. These reproductions maintained an efficacy with the body by re-presenting the original in contrast to the way that ordinary representations seemed to be orientated around absence, replacing the original with a likeness which recalls through similarity. By its very nature a representation replaces the absent original (is this where the negating power of the image extends from?) whereas a relic presents part of the original and therefore is constructed through presence. Icons tended more toward the operations of conventional likenesses particularly to a non orthodox viewer however it is important to remember that icons are not primarily visual mediums. Although an icon is an image not the part of the original object (eg. hair, bone etc.) the power of the picture is communicated first and foremost by touch not by what it represents. Icons are intended to be touched and it is through this touch that the holy spirit of the figure depicted maybe felt by the worshipper. Therefore the icons are imbued with the spirit of the person depicted (like a fetish) and this is communicated to the spectator through touch, icons, unlike ordinary portraits, are not constructed around absence but around a sense of the spirit in the present. Relics present a material phenomenon of the body in the present, icons translate the spiritual phenomenon of that body as still active and powerful into the present. Ordinary pictures invoke a sense of presence merely through a visual similarity to the original but cannot pretend to extend any element of the effective power of the original body constructed as they are around its absence. For this reason I would conclude that relics and icons are more akin to performance as an artistic form that to the fine arts of painting and sculpture.

Looking Glass is an electronic mirror which is activated by touch (actually in the prototype version I made this was not strictly true due to certain technical limitations however the principle was proved possible). On entering a darkened gallery space a viewer is confronted by a small sheet of glass mounted on a wall like a mirror or picture. The glass is blank and glows steadily, lit from behind by light from a projector. The floor immediately in front of the glass is lit by a small spotlight and an instruction beneath the glass reads “Please Touch”. As a spectator approaches the screen nothing is visible but if, as invited, they place their hand upon the screen an image appears. The hand on the screen creates a space in the white light through which a spectator is shown their own reflection. The image is produced by a live camera which points at the spectator, it is only visible as long as the spectator maintains contact with the glass and it disappears as soon as the hand is removed. This physical connection with the screen is vital in order to maintain the sense of the presence of the image in the present, this is important because the screen image looks mediated and therefore carries suggestions of past construction and manipulation - touch establishes the image as live and direct and by this immediate association with time therefore a ‘true’ representation of the moment. Part of the interest of the work exists in its narcissism, the confirmation of existence this brings and the spectator’s interest in studying themselves.
The image which is given back to a spectator is not exactly a mirror image being actually the production of a lens and projector therefore the image on the screen is more like the resemblances provided by photographs. Therefore a spectator’s relationship with the *Looking Glass* image is similar to that confusion experienced when confronted with a photography of oneself, each image has to be negotiated in terms of the twin ideas that ‘this is me’ and ‘this is what I look like’ and ultimately incompatibility of these two statements. Perhaps it is possible to argue that the photograph, located as it is in the past, can be more easily collapsed into the notion of the self. Perhaps photographs can come to represent the past self because a past self is a lot less complicated a construction than the present self? Particularly because we are used to photographs performing this identifying function in terms of official documents and records of who we were (such documents can, by their very nature only be related to the past self). We also use images of ourselves taken in the past to constructed an imaginary image of what we look like - it is only when we are confronted with a live image of what we look like that the image/self image dilemma is provoked.

Our image as a metonym for ourselves is increasingly proliferated by modern visually orientated technical culture, our image is increasingly reproduced outwith the original being and any problematic which may arise from this practise is forgotten for the sake of convenience. *Looking Glass* arises from an anxiety around the relationship of the idea of the self to the image of the self and does not see these two selves as synonymous. I believe the problematic is illustrated in two ways, one of which is similar to the prioritising of mediated experience above immediate experience and the other of which concerns control. To reduce an experience or a person to a single sensory encounter (in this instances visual) necessarily removes a degree of complication from the phenomena of self as being or being as other. Work, such as multimedia performance, attempts to resituate this one dimensional visuality into the multi sensory complex that is performance - a medium more perhaps akin to our direct experiences of life. The other problematic concerns the production and control of images, many of which are created without our knowledge and distributed beyond our immediate spheres of influence (I am thinking particularly of surveillance but this would also be true of the internet, institutional and government identification etc.) The profligacy of the identifying image is a relatively new phenomena and increases with exponential speed each year, *Looking Glass* is an attempt to restore the creation and distribution of images back to the original subject, the spectator makes a living portrait or a performance portrait which only has existence in the single time and space of the here and now. The question is does this type of image therefore accord with our notions of ourselves or do we now required to be pictured by others, covertly or overtly, in order to construct a sense of ourselves?

September 1998.
This project has been undertaken in two stages, the first, a research and development period was presented at the Bonington Gallery in Nottingham in July as the show ‘Constants’. The show used two performers, choreography, text, live and prerecorded video projection and a sound track to explore the aging process and created a looping installation which was open to the public. My particular area of responsibility was the way that media was to be used in the show; that is what the content of such work would be and the way that this would be integrated into the performance as a whole. The working methods were collaborative which means that decisions and discussions range beyond specific individuals areas of responsibility and the final show can be shaped by the whole working group.

The earliest discussions about this work took place between myself and Simon Jones the writer and director of ‘Bodies in Flight’. It was initially proposed that the research work period should concentrate on the sound and video elements however this idea was wholly unsuitable for my needs as I was primarily interested in integrating the video with the performance so any separation of ‘technology’ and ‘performers’ in the working process would have been unproductive. Early on there was the sense that the work should surround a space possibly with performers working around an audience who would be seated in isolated blocks thus transformed from witnesses to participants. Likewise it was felt that the video imagery would have to fill this space providing several points of focus rather than the single one associated with proscenium arch staging, cinematic forms etc. The piece was focussed around memory and an old woman at the end of her life and with this as an impetus I proposed picture images which followed the performers or were carried around by the performers as external visualisations of memory. Using the performer’s bodies and clothes as screens would be one way of ensuring a greater coverage of the space and splitting the audiences focus. I was keen to use micro projections or small screens or monitors to avoid the domineering effect of large video projection and to place the media at a human scale. I also wanted to provide the performers with small cameras which could be carried about in the space and used to generate live images to be mixed with pre-recorded ones. There was also originally a notion about time as compressed by age and memory which it was felt could be illustrated well by video. Electronic images could exist in a multi layered form indicating a compression of time and by concentrating on the textures of the immediate present ie a performers skin express the profound depth of bodily experience and our experience of time.

Before any practical work began a whole group meeting was convened (including Sara Giddens, choreographer and Darren Bourne, composer) at
this meeting it was decided that ‘memory’ was a problematic central concern leading possibly to a banal illustrative dynamic for the work. Instead a shift of emphasis was decided on in which age and the experience of aging became the motivating principle for the work. This it was felt was a more productive subject for creative invention and one that worked constructively against the predominately ‘youthful’ orientation of most performance work. Also at this meeting the relationship between lived experience and mediated experience was discussed again, the possibility of using a combination of live and prerecorded video sources was elaborated on, along with the opportunities this provided to introduce a variety of time scales and points of view into a performance space.

Before we began a two week ‘work in progress’ production period I was required to write a paragraph for a funding application on the role of the media within the work which outlined my intentions prior to the rehearsal period:

The imaging technology used in this show will be integrated with the live performance on an unprecedented scale. The emphasis will be on fragments and detail; a number of glass screens will be placed amongst the audience denying the possibility of a single totalizing image. The images on these screens will be mediated both by the performers themselves and an operator who will sit amongst the audience, share the performing space and become another dynamic within the live action. The performers will use live DVC cameras to visually interrogate and illustrate one another, staging images as directed and requested. The pictures produced from this interaction will be projected in real time to the scattered glass screens providing the audience with surface visual detail not directly available to them from the performance space. At times these performed camera images will be mixed live with pre-recorded video, the recorded images will match the live feeds but depict action that is not directly occurring in the space thereby creating an uncanny moment by provoking temporal and spatial confusion. As well as illustrating detail the small video screens will frame whole bodies and body parts to populate the space, playing with scale and perspective which alternatively contrasts and mirrors that of the live performance. The performance space will become an arena in which the various mediating forms, image, music, text conspire to stage the dichotomy of old and young. Each form, though spatially unified, separating out to tell its own story in its relationship to this dynamic of beginnings and ends.

STAGE ONE REHEARSALS WEEK 1.

The first rehearsal period took place over two weeks (6-18th July) at the Bonington Gallery in Nottingham. I had equipped myself with 3 DVC cameras, 3 projectors and an MX50 vision mixer. Early on it became apparent that the configuration of the space played a vital role in how the media could be used and therefore what form it could take. I ran initial workshops to explore real time keys (an idea that had emerged out of a
previous research project ‘Looking Glass’) and tested out a glass screen. The gallery in Nottingham is large and has white walls which meant I could also use these as projection surfaces and bright luma key background for large full body key effect. An afternoon was spent looking at the various effects which could be created by using one performers body as a Matte key shape for the other performer and how the addition of various mixer effects changed the perception of the action as performed and simultaneously projected. We were working with Sheila Gilbert an actress in her seventies and Patricia Breatnach a recent graduate from Nottingham Trent University.

I had envisaged a space scattered with glass screens but it became apparent that this was not a practical option as each screen required a separate projector and we only had three projectors at our disposal. As the space was so large even with three projectors it was difficult to break away from concentrating attention around the projected images. I tried a variety of spatial arrangements, grouping the chairs in a clump and placing small glass screens within this or exploding the space by scattering chairs placed in twos around it and projection through these onto the walls. Ultimately a combination of elements was decided upon; four pairs of chairs were placed around the space allowing room for performers and audience to move behind them and a place for any action which was to be performed sitting down, a large projection filled the far end wall of the gallery, opposite the entrance and a smaller glass screen was hung a few meters in front of this providing a concentrated, smaller version of the projection upon the wall. In this way the images demanded a frontal focus but as much of the action occurred throughout the space and often juxtaposed in relation to the positioning of the images a split of audience focus was achieved. The performance was also promenade so it was possible for people to move about the space to adjust their viewing position.

Once I had established that it was possible to create key images successfully over a large scale this became the possible basis for the live video material within the show there was also however a matter of pre-recorded material. Some of this was generated in text and choreography work done early on in the rehearsals. I recorded Sheila’s hands and feet performing repeated habitual gestures which took the form of a miniature dance, I also shot Patricia’s limbs interrupting a blank white frame as it were as glimpses of her dance. There were also head moves and turns which corresponded with various text sentiments. As well as this I wished to look at the compression of time as demonstrated by a static face shot for an hour then digitally fast forward revealing ticks and anomalies a perfect metaphor for the compression of time. During all this filming I occasionally caused the focus to drift and worked with dynamic flashes of light to briefly illuminate a subject. I was also fortunate in that all shooting took place within the gallery itself so if necessary I could maintain a spatial continuity between live and pre-recorded material. Much of this material was concentrated around the face and head as the focus of identity and the most obvious site of aging; head and body parts were fragmented and disappearing as had been debated during previous pre-production
POST PRODUCTION

At this stage (four days into the rehearsal process) a final content and structure for the show had not been determined so the editing process became one of deciding what material worked most successfully imaginistically and it terms of the mood and effects we had previously discussed. The final edit master could not conform to some preordained plan but had to maintain a flexibility in order to be able to fit in with changes and decisions created by the devising process that was continuing in my absence. A review of the rushes quickly established what material was usable in these terms. The fast forwarded faces and the detailed hand gestures had the most potential dramatically and maintained an openness in terms of meaning which at this stage was beneficial but they also seemed to represent two opposing strands of video material; one manic, the other slow and serene, constantly disappearing into a black background void. It was felt that these two opposing time frames were very appropriate for the show in that they represented the two different experiences of time as demonstrated in old age - the external slow and apparently calm time combined with the internal where time is rapidly compressing in on itself making a separation between past and present impossible. After experimenting with a number of types of fast and slow motion as created by the DV cameras in playback I dubbed a combination of these effects onto Beta. I also used some head movement shots from Sheila and some extemporised material I had got by letting the camera run on but I could see no place for other material I had taken of Patricia. I then constructed 3 short video sequences based on the hand ‘dances’. The logic behind the construction of these choreographed gestures was that sequence would move from fragments and parts of gestures to more a focussed routine until the full movement sequence was shown completely. One sequence in particular used a gesture which had been fractured into pieces by being speeded up and was then slowed down back down using Avid to maintain this fractured look and give an ‘out of time’ feeling. All this material was worked very impressionistically partly driven by previous group discussions but partly by my own visual sense and therefore to some extent the material was a limited and determined by the shooting methods and techniques I had employed.

The faces of Sheila and Patricia which had been shot to match in scale and eye line provided the potential for superimposition therefore making a metaphoric relationship between the two performers concrete by visually collapsing young into old. I could also superimpose a number of layers of the same face on top of one another to give the idea of multiple coexisting timeframes. I cut two speeded up sequences approximately 10 minutes. in length one of CU’s of Sheila and the other of Patricia and I also made up two more complex sequences; a manic fast cut sequence made up of ECU’s and flashes of Sheila’s face and another sequence which superimposed this over the CU version. Digital editing makes working
these sort of combinations quick and easy but effects like long superimpositions are better suited to analogue suites were a fine degree of control can be exercised as the signals are mixed in real time. Therefore at the end of the post-production stage I had a number of short sequences and A and B roll tapes of faces which I planned to combine together in an analogue SVHS suite. I had potentially conceived of the large wall projection containing a combination of superimposed faces which became more manic before moving into a concluding sequence made up of Sheila’s static face illuminated by a passing light which slowed down until it reached an end point. The smaller central glass screen would contain more oblique descriptions of a women through the hand dances interspersed with moments of layered manic faces. Though because I had not cut definite Master Edits I was able to have the luxury of returning for a day into an analogue suite when I had a more precise idea of the contribution needed from the media for the final show.

REHEARSALS WEEK 2

Once I returned to Nottingham I spent a day with the video material before I was able to resolve the exact nature of the media and its combination with the other performance elements. An overall structure was absent and as often happens with group devised work no one individual felt able to determine the shape of the show in its entirety. For my own sake I produced an inventory of the potential media available for use. As well as the rough cut sequences there were the live media experiments such as the large scale key and smaller hand keys (from ‘Looking Glass’ installation), close up details provided by performers manipulating cameras, freezes, strobes and the possibility of performers matching pre-recorded video action particularly with the faces material. I realised that it was possible to create a performance which had a media dynamic that moved from live to pre-recorded over twenty minutes and that at times there should be a confusion as to whether one was watching live work or recorded. The show could begin with Patricia dancing behind the glass projection screen while her dancing figure was re laid via a DVC camera to the mixer to make a key shape which was filled by CU pictures created by Sheila who was pointing and moving a camera around her face and body. This key was simultaneously framed in small scale by the projection onto the glass screen placed between the audience and Patricia whilst Sheila was sited behind the audience on the end wall thus creating a split focus which used the whole performance space. The other key effect used featured just Sheila’s hand upon the glass screen which made a key shape to reveal an image of her face projected on the same screen. When a strobe effect was added to the fill image, ie Sheila’s face looking at herself through her hand, the suggestion of pre-recording or a trapping of the image in someway could hint at a possible pre-recorded element which was not yet present in the early stages of the show. Then the performers could align themselves in opposite corners of the space and by being monitored by cameras create two live images of faces which gradually disappear into the pre-recorded face sequences which they matched. The show could end with the recorded
faces which fade slowly to black. Although this structure was conceptually neat the hand sequences remained underused so it was suggested that these interrupted the four main movements like ‘knee plays’ in Noh theatre and accompanied similar stage action thus usefully providing time to reconfigure equipment for the next major sequence. A two minute segment at the beginning of each loop also allowed time for all the equipment to be reset for the start of the cycle. It was also decided that the two screens should share identical video images but by bringing up lights on the back wall the large projection could be more or less obscured by being washed out.

Once this structure was agreed upon it was necessary to spend a day in an online cutting a show tape that would run in the correct order to the correct timings for each section. It was also in the online that the final mixing of the superimposed faces occurred to make it easy for the performers to match with their stage action. Final placements for equipment, tripods, projectors and screens were fixed and technical run throughs proved that the sequence was workable.

PERFORMANCE

It had been decided prior to rehearsals that technical operators would work within the performance space as it was felt this was suitable to the work in progress nature of the show and the degree to which the technical elements played a major part in contributing to the overall effect of the work. The twenty two minute show cycle was repeated over a period of four hours with a half hour break. During this time I was responsible for cueing and operating the media. (To establish an idea of the shows contents please view the accompanying video documentation and refer to cue sheets and photographs).

POST PERFORMANCE

As I was involved in ‘performing’ the show it is difficult to make an objective analysis of its effects and the audiences behaviour. Most people seemed very engaged with the work choosing to stay for at least one cycle of 22 mins. and more normally two. This I think indicates that the work occupied an interesting space in terms of theatrical and spectatorial conventions, clearly more than an installation the work accumulated meaning over a period of time which meant that it was necessary to watch for longer than one might normally when watching an installation type gallery piece. However neither was it a piece of work that required devoted attention for over an hour such as a straight forward performance piece, rather it was an intermediary form. I expected people to move more in the space but perhaps because the performers used much of the room the audience tended to find a position usually around the periphery and maybe only move once or twice to shift their point of view. The audience were also invited to sit in one of the pairs of chairs of which there were four. This meant that the space next to them could be used at times by a performer who would sit next to them and
merely by proximity an audience member would become enveloped and implicated into the work. The blurring between audience and performer was emphasised by the promenade nature of the performance, on entering the gallery it must have been initially difficult to distinguish between the performers and spectators this gave the performance a pleasant sense of inclusion as there was no demarcated performance space. If I were to speculate on the success of this initial work in progress I would imagine that its apparent popularity was due to a combination of poetic text, sensual imagery and its unusual treatment of an unusual subject. The subject of old age is certainly a universal though little discussed and perhaps the performance combined text, imagery and space in away which emphasised this universal dynamic. Specifically within my experience people react well to video used within performance, it can provide a visual variety and poeticism and remove an audience from the kind of insistent pressure of attention that a live performance demands by creating a reflective, mediated and therefore more assured space.

I was most interested in the ‘live’ media particularly the first key and the superimposed live faces which then blended with pre-recorded material. I particularly enjoyed the complexity of the large key which created a number of different viewing positions, and used the live cameras to create an image in which the elderly performer space was contained within the younger performers body. This allowed a number of strands of expression to co-exist within the performance where the stage action synthesised by the media combined to create an additional stage image and layer of meaning. Likewise the performers positioned themselves in opposing corners of the space as part of continuous stage action but once in position fixed cameras reproduced their faces as a projected image and allowed a live mix to be performed which extended into a matching pre-recorded sequence. The moment of transition between the live and recorded faces was difficult to identify covered as it was by long dissolves so the notion that the present had become the past only emerged once the sequence had become visually complex and the performers had moved away. The sections which used the ‘knee plays’ to accompany stage action seemed to me to be a simple juxtaposition between the action played out live on stage whilst at the same time being shown in a projection which meant the media could never work beyond the illustrative, reinforcing the live action but never contributing an additional meaning. Conversely the second smaller key which used just a hand to produce a face was a productive use of media. The notion of revealing the face through the hand worked well as a metaphor for the writing of identity or the creation of self but once the face had become established as visible perhaps other stage action should have supplemented the sequence in order to develop this. However a key is not an effect that is used very often in a live context (I have never seen it used before) and is productive both because it is unusual whilst managing to integrate stage action with camera mediated projection therefore moving the images beyond a purely illustrative relationship with the performance. Personally these are the moments I find most successful when it was impossible to determine a separation between a live performance and its
mediated visual effect because it places an audience into a new space in terms of the definition and experience of ‘the live’.

QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In terms of my research it is this cross over area between the live and the recorded that I am most interested in as these liminal moments seem to provoke questions about the experience and interpretation of the live and the recorded by placing them in close proximity. For the second phase of the work I would like to use more live camera’s combined with material which has been pre-recorded in such away as to make that transitional moment difficult to identify. This means possibly working with a number of live camera sources (up to six?) on set pieces which can then lead in or out of matching recorded material or using all six cameras as potential key sources. One idea could be to have fixed cameras stationed about the space to coincide with moments in the performance, these ‘televisual’ images are relayed to nearby screens like a continuous commentary but always providing the potential that what is on screen is not also occurring live within the space but is a pre-recorded tape. Thus two time frames are always potentially present within the performance the pats and the present equivalent in some ways to the way that time is experience at the end of a life. If, within this context, we then also use sequences which retain a clear recorded/live division, such as the ‘knee plays’, this might undermine the simple illustrative nature common to much multi-media performance where the theatrical is accompanied by the cinematic as two separate strands of expression.

I would also like to discard the large scale projection and the glass screen although I realise a lot of the success of the media’s effect is due to its spectacular nature. I would rather work with a number of small CCTV monitors which would allow me a good coverage of the space but keep a spectators focus fix over a variety of discreet areas rather than one large ‘cinematic’ space. I also think the black and white monitors might also contribute to the notion that everything that is being watched is occurring in real time as they give the sense of surveillance equipment rather than entertainment technology. I will continue to work with the MX50 as it gives a flexibility of image choice and manipulation within the performance space I will perhaps work with a switcher that allows me to feed either camera images direct to the monitors or to intercept this feed and manipulate it via the MX50 before showing on TV screens. We will also continue to work with the operators in the space, there should be little sense of seamless magical technology as this again means the media seems less ‘live’ and ideally the sound score will be worked more intrinsically with the images ie if text is spoken it is seen as spoken.

September 1998

CONSTANTS - A Future Perfect
This work developed from an earlier work-in-progress piece *Constants I* that was produced at the Bonington Gallery, Nottingham in July 1998. *Constants I* was presented to the public as a durational performance installation and from it I was able develop a number of ideas and conclusions (see Appendix 7 MPhil). My initial responses to the work in progress naturally concerned the relationship between the mediated and live elements of the show. In *Constants I* I had used live cameras for the first time and the images that these cameras produced (projected onto one large and one small screen) seemed to occupy an interesting halfway point between the live and recorded in the show. I decided that I would like to use more live cameras and combine the images these produced with prerecorded ones in such a way that it would be difficult to distinguish a difference between the two, or, at the very least, that the transition from the live to the recorded would be unseen.

The images produced by a camera can be relaid live, but equally they can be recorded and played back and from the resulting image it can be virtually impossible to identify the originating source. If the carrier base of the recorded image is of sufficient quality to mimic the pictures produced by a live camera, and these same images match at the point of reception, the difference in time between the production of these images is difficult to distinguish. Television works with this collapsed difference the whole time (cf Williams do more work about this instant time of TV see Warwick notes). If I was to produce images whereby the live mediated and the recorded were indistinguishable this also presented me with another possible dynamic for the *Constants II* production; that of highly treated and very obviously recorded material transposed into the performance environment. Instead of restricting the media contribution to recorded material the use of live relay in a performance space potential allows the media to transpose elements of the live into the media work and sets up an internal dynamic binary within the multimedia itself.

In *Constants II* I wanted to work with a number of small monitors distributed through the space rather than the one or two media focal points created by the large and small scale projections. This dispersal of screens through the space was intrinsic to the idea of an undirected, or rather fragmented, point of view for the audience throughout the piece. Initially I imagined that these monitors would be black and white which, along with live cameras, I thought would reference CCTV and therefore create the effect of realtime surveillance. However I finally worked with black and white live cameras which created the same effect but also left me the option of using colour in the piece. In *Constants I* technical operators had worked in the performance space and it was decide to continue with this configuration to contribute to a sense of moment by moment spontaneity rather than images, sound and light magically appearing from an unknown undefined elsewhere.
Following on from the CCTV idea I investigated the possibility of CCTV cameras and found that the best option was to buy black and white PCB cameras and adapt them for use by the performers. These cameras were small enough to be carried around and could be mounted virtually anywhere and produced surprisingly good 480 line resolution pictures. The signals from these cameras reached my central control desk via 30 meters of cable. The cameras had a wide angle of view and good focal range and worked down to a 1 lux light level, in addition two, of the four cameras I made, had simple condenser microphones attached which allowed the cameras to double occasionally as microphones for the performers.

The final show contained four levels of media intervention:

1. Live camera relay.
2. Show recordings (made during the time of the performance).
3. Recent recordings (made in the performance space prior to an audience arrival).
4. Prerecorded material.

Therefore it could be said that the show used four different orders of media image moving from a unity with the live performance through ever widening degrees of separation between the time of the image production and its reproduction in the performance space: minutes, hours, days, weeks or even months.

ACT 1

TIME AND THE ELECTRONIC PANOPTICON

“But …this constant instant…stupifies her and wipes out now”

There are small black and white cameras in all four corners of the performance space and via these cameras we watch Sheila’s progression around the perimeter walls. Sheila moves from long shot into close up as she approaches each corner, as each camera is reached the image cuts to the next camera. This has the effect of rendering the figure constantly visible, at the point where Sheila might pass beyond one camera’s point of view the image is modified by a switch to the next camera in the circuit and she must begin her journey again. As the performance space is a uniform colour and has roughly two matching long walls and two shorter end walls it is difficult to locate Sheila’s exact position within the space and, because of this similarity of context, it is also hard to determine Sheila’s precise position in time; she appears to be stuck in a repetitive loop. The pictures are oppressive and trap the figure in an endlessly visible circle - a panopticon. Sheila is contained by the walls but also by the screens as her image is constantly made visible to the audience by the cameras.

This action, which begins the show, occurs around the edges of the performance space which has been divided into three areas: the four walls and empty perimeter ‘track’ enclosing a circular ring of audience, monitors
and operators in the mid part of the space, which is in turn clustered round an empty circular central hub. Therefore when Sheila begins to walk around the walls, first clockwise then anti clockwise, the audience is required to twist and turn in their seats if they wish to keep Sheila in view at all times. The audiences view is further complicated as Patricia stands and begins to progresses across the space to an opposing external wall. In this configuration it is not possible to watch Sheila and Patricia simultaneously. Almost immediately the audience are then presented with a third focus for their attention as Sheila’s mediated image appears on the televisions screen.

Eight television monitors are interspersed around the seating so that it is possible for each member of the audience to see at least two and up to four monitor screens. All eight screens show identical images. The audience is therefore deliberately presented with a space in which the objects of their attention, televisions and performers, have been dispersed and thus attention diffused. Because each television has been positioned to face a small section of the audience these screens therefore provide a convenient and comfortable view. This view is also the most ‘consistent’ because, unlike the performers, the televisions do not move around in and out of eye lines. Therefore is quite natural for a large part of the audiences attention to concentrate around the images on the screens. This exchange of focus from the live to the mediated is eased by the understanding that the images on the screens are concurrent with the action, they are live images and present the same space, time and action, they are in simple terms the same. This transferal is also encouraged by the positioning of the cameras which allows a view of Sheila’s face as opposed to the profile seen from the audiences direct point of view as well as the positioning of the screens which provide images front on for audience consumption. Irrespective of the fact that the cameras provide an angle of vision which in no way replicates their own the audience is prepared to substitute their direct but often incomplete view of the action for the mediated version. This transferal is made because the screens appear to present more information in a more comfortable form.

However, almost as soon as the televisions become a consistent focal point the information provided by the screens becomes problematised. From the first moment that live images have been visible on the screens these images have also been sent simultaneously to a digital video recording deck. It is then possible to substitute the live images for this digital video information which has been recorded only seconds previously. Because the space and image quality is identical and the action repetitive it is difficult for an audience to deduce the split that has now been made between the live action and the screen image. The difference is made more obvious when Sheila pauses to deliver some text at which point her screen self continues to promenade. However it is necessary for an individual to alternate his or her point of view from screen to ‘stage’ in order to ascertain this difference. Therefore early on in the piece a warning occurs which hints at the problems of conflating mediated screen images with unmediated
direct experience of the performers. In this instance the mediated has an
unstable relationship with time and can almost invisibly slip from the live
present into the recorded past. Although the media ‘parcels’ and thus in
some ways makes the performance more easily accessible the
performance seen on the screens may not be the same as the one
occurring in the live space. This particular staging strategy emphasises the
live as more frustrating in terms of its more partial focus but it also presents
a space where it is always and only possible to discern the present.

“You were in some groove and you got stuck”

NO REPETITION ONLY ADDITION IN THE LIVE

It could be thought that the ever presentness of performance, though the
source of its effect, is also in some way oppressive - the “constant instant”
that traps and stupefies. Although Sheila’s live actions are repetitive they
always progress through time as we watch them. It is only by adding into
this live moment the replay of time afforded by recording technology that we
can genuinely create the sense of repetition, that sense of a needle stuck in
a groove. The media allows us to work with two co-existing time frames and
represent an experience of time that we can never normally have in live
performance.

(In addition it is exactly this coexistence which it is impossible to recreate in
documentation as one of the two essential dynamics - the live - is absent
therefore work which operates by exploring two or more time frames is even
more compromised when reproduced as documentation than other live
performance work)

ACT 2

“To not be. To be no more. To be never again. A simple and entire not be.”

As Sheila delivers these lines she stops and for the first time addresses the
camera thus creating on the screens a conventional front on talking head
shot. This signals the move from Act 1 into Act 2 and marks a significant
shift in the performer/technology relationship in the piece. The address to, or
rather through, the camera indicates an understanding of the operations of
technology within the space and therefore an acceptance or willingness to
interact with these. In the corner of the room Sheila offers herself in a
fragmented, disembodied form to the audience. At this point the screen
image takes precedence over the live figure in the corner and the TV
becomes a substitute or alternative performer. Then, following the rules of
classic continuity editing we cut to the next character, Patricia, in a matching
shot and a fractured dialogue begins. The image stays with Patricia who
remains in the corner of the room while Sheila begins to walk amongst the
audience, we therefore hear Sheila’s dialogue off camera and see Patricia’s
reaction shots in another classic screen convention.
“She’s so full of it she can hardly move”

However, rather like the moments of replay in the first act, as we begin to be lulled by the screen we are reminded of the difference between the mediated and the unmediated as Patricia’s face is frozen on the words “She’s so full of it she can hardly move”. Unlike the repetition of time afforded by tape in the first Act this is a momentary pause, a hiatus, a glitch where time gets stuck and doesn’t run on. This type of interruption could be created by a freeze in action by a performer but, I would argue, is never convincing; however proficient the freeze a body seethes with life and the audience understand this idea on a visceral level because they share in this experience of a body. A performers freeze can reference a <<PAUSE>> but it can never actually be one. Electronics, like photography, can create pauses which are altogether more convincing because the stilling of time is their raison d’etre. When a freeze frame is activated on an vision mixer it holds 1/25th of a seconds worth of time and repeatedly sends this same configuration of frequency out through its circuitry. True this image is ‘created’ every 25 times a second but it contains no signs of life such as movement or change, no change occurs in the resulting picture until the mixer is given an alternative command.

The live mediated image is restored with Patricia’s next line as she picks up the camera and begins to move into the audience arena. However the image retains elements of its electronic interruption in the form of a slight strobe. Technically this means that instead of seeing a new frame every 1/25th of a second a few frames of picture information are repeated and then update to the next available frame which is repeated and so on. This gives the image a strobed, slightly jerky effect as the eye does not quite receive enough new and different information to allow the persistence of vision to create the illusion of real time movement. This effect creates a slight separation between Patricia’s actual movement and the version of this movement we see on the screen. As Patricia walks she talks and we see her framed face, the performer is absorbed into the camera and onto the screen which again stands in for the performer and the strobe makes the figure appear to glide in a slightly unearthly manner. Though the movement is occurring live and we may wish to see the screen view as the version the mediated nature of our vision is emphasised by the addition of the strobe and the strange quality it brings to the image. The effect that the strobe creates and the way that the performers choose to use the cameras to address one another in the space hints at another dynamic for the media within the show, that of the medium, a concept that is more fully developed later on in the piece.

At the end of the dialogue Patricia has moved to sit facing a television in an empty chair at the edge of the hub, the camera is placed in front of her on top of the television. This arrangement of camera and screen is an interesting one. Up until this point the camera has acted as a conduit for an image which is reconstituted on the screen, although Patricia has
addressed her words to the camera our reception of her words has occurred around the screen. Therefore the performer seems to have addressed us solely via the screen. The camera’s role in this delivery is as a medium in the true sense of the word (cf Williams for keyword definition) and has remained virtually invisible. Only when the screen’s point of view is shared by the camera does Patricia direct her address to the television. The strobe and freeze effects emphasise the electronic, mediated nature of the image but only when the camera and the screen are placed in close proximity do we understand that the space of the screen and the space of the lens, though physical different, are the same. This metaphysical spatial unity, like the co-existing layers of time presented in multimedia performance, is not be found in the logics of the pure live here space remains separated and differentiated and time is always only present and linear.

“I feel you. In me now. More than I see you, hear, touch you. In my bones”

The collapsing of space and the layering of time afforded by media apparatus also allows a simple simile to be illustrated between the old woman and the young woman in the piece. The piece involves no other performers and its central axis stages the young and old in relation to one another, as well as suggesting a mother/daughter relationship there is also the implication that the performers represent the same person at different points within a lifespan. This idea can be realised visually by freezing Patricia’s seated figure and then allowing Sheila to assume the same position. The images of the two women can be intermingled using a partial dissolve on a vision mixer and their bodies can momentarily inhabit the same space at apparently the same time. This unification of young and old occurs an number of times through out the piece. It is seen at the end of the camera dance sequence when both performers mirror one another’s actions by throwing back their heads, on the screens this action is seen simultaneously by the layering of two camera images. Also, towards the end of the work in a period which leads into the final recorded image sequence, Sheila and Patricia both frame their faces with a matching eyeline allowing me to manipulate the dissolve function to create a third, ever changing, amalgamated face which ebbs and flows between Sheila and Patricia - a Shericia or Patila. However it is at such moments that the precise visibility of such an idea often appears to render the media’s contribution to a work redundant as if it is almost too illustrative and crowds out that reflective, creative aspect of spectating that an audience of live performance can engage in.

CAMERA DANCE - OR THE CAMERA AS BUTCHER

Compliment not replicate

Patricia passes Sheila a cigarette and then leaves the audience ring and walks back into the corner. The camera, united in its point of view with a television, shows Sheila watching Patricia until she reaches the corner when the image cuts abruptly to a close up on Patricia from the corner
camera reminiscent of the frame for the earlier dialogue sequence. The camera-screen conflation is ruptured and screen space and the originating picture space of the lens are separated within the performing space once more. However the choreographed sequence that follows develops and emphasises the difference between all these three spaces; the screen; the lens; the stage. Until now in the performance the cameras have either been strategically positioned to show observational type long shots or have framed the face in hand held close ups. Both these views have purported to show the audience a totality of information, the lens has not been obscured nor the frame interrupted. Patricia now holds the camera at arms length and begins to dance with it, the images produced move with her gestures, momentary pauses hold and frame parts of the body before moving on. The dance is choreographed for the camera and the images created are completely different from those we experience when directly watching the same live action. The screens become dynamic, the images alternate between rhythmic abstraction and moving cameos of different body parts. The view the camera gives us is the view from Patricia’s right hand, as it were from inside the dance, and this view is partial, fragmented and fleeting. In this way the liveness of the mediated image is not problematised by the addition of an electronic effect but instead the physical restrictions imposed by the optics of a lens are emphasised. When we watch Patricia dance we see a whole body, the camera only shows us parts, the two views in close proximity can compliment but cannot replicate one another. It is difficult to ascertain if one view has ascendancy over the other. I suspect that because the dance was choreographed primarily to create interesting televisual pictures that this was the method that the audience used to watch the majority of it but no doubt, due to the dynamism of a physical, moving body in close proximity, the live version will also have been watched with particular reference to the media.

The fallibility of the media image is further emphasised by the concluding gesture of the dance which has Patricia frame her hand before drawing it back and bringing it down on top of the lens causing the image to black out. This is an interruption to our view caused neither by electronic effect or a restricted field of vision. The performer causes the screen to go blank and in doing so a clear power relationship is established which is very different to the omnipotent all seeing ‘eye’ of the camera in the first Act. And just as at the start of the second act the direct address to the camera acknowledges ‘the lens as mediator’ within the space the gesture of obliterating is really the logical conclusion to this realisation and it is a powerful act within this live/ mediated constellation.

Sheila watches the dance on the television in front of her. The sight, which occurred on a number of occasions throughout the piece, of an old woman watching the telly caused a number of the audience to remark on another dynamic within the work; that of the outside world mediated to the elderly via the television set. Because I tend to use a television monitor as a tool of visual expression I sometimes forget to see it as a cultural object however I had deliberately gone for a low-tech look by sourcing small colour portable
television. I had therefore unintentionally created this rather bleak reference of an old woman separated from the world and watching it on her television.

**OBJECTIFY YOUR LOVE**

“Here I am. The object. Opened out. Just for you. Use me up”

The scene which follows the dance cuts away from Patricia’s black out to Sheila sitting staring at the television. Once again television and camera point of view are united. Sheila’s image is joined by Patricia in a partial dissolve while they perform a united head gesture before being resolved to Sheila for the beginning of her dialogue. Patricia stares intently at the television in front of her while on the opposite side of the hub Sheila speaks into her camera/television. This staging gives the clearest indication yet of the ‘camera as intermediator’ between the performers as well as mediators for the audience. It is the first time that they have both sat and focused on the televisual images mirroring the audiences attention to the screens.

The objectifying power of the lens is well documented and in this section Sheila clearly acknowledges this when she says “Here I am. The object.” On an one level Sheila equals the television, through her mediated image she has become the television set as an object as well the object of the camera. It is the ability of the lens to segment, parcel, and reproduce that give it its objectifying abilities and it is these that Sheila acknowledges and encourages, using her image to present or ‘make a present’ of herself - “this gift for you”. Her acceptance of this object-like quality conferred by the mediated image leads us into the next sequence which uses, for the first time in the show, a piece of distinctly recorded televisual material.

**PRERECORDED HANDS - FORENSIC LENS**

"Where does time go. It vanishes and stretches. In my bones."

The sequence that now plays across the screen is made up of a variety of hand movements which blur in and out of focus. Sheila performs these moves in her lap concurrently with the images but it is clear from the difference in image quality and camera angle that the hands on the screen are not the hands in performance - although they are both Sheila’s hands. The hands and the face are the most visible and therefore ‘representative’ part of a person. The emphasis on hands, in sympathy with the earlier emphasis on the face, identify Sheila the performer. The hands also signal both the giving and taking of a gift, indeed Sheila has concluded her previous speech by bring her hands into the camera frame in a gesture of supplication. However the recorded hands allow us to concentrate on a new element within the performance by dwelling on the texture of Sheila’s elderly flesh. Although Sheila moves in close proximity to the audience the forensic nature of the camera allows us to study the surface of the recorded performer in a detailed way that is not available to us in the live moment. The hands are isolated against a black background and disembodied by the tight framing of the shot. The flesh is marked with age and any extended
reflection upon this surface inevitably lead to thoughts of mortality, particularly because Sheila has just reminded us, "Where does time go. It vanishes and stretches. In my bones. And very soon that's all there'll be left of me. Which will be not me". Because this is a prerecorded sequence I have been afforded the luxury of a degree of image manipulation which is not available with live mediated images and just as the text suggests thoughts of mortality the images play a similar role. The pictures breakup and swim in and out of focus retreating into the dark only to reappear once more. Within the picture surface parts move before others and only unite momentarily to form a complete hand before disintegrating again. The two aesthetics of disintegration and disappearance in this context reference death. In this way the recorded past, when replayed in the live present is able to reference the near future when the body of Sheila, as the older performer, will be absent.

THE GHOST IN THE MACHINE - Multimedia as a haunted space.

“As a dream comes through the crowd and announces “Here I am”. That different an order of being. Your being here. That different a logic”.

As the prerecorded hands sequence ends Patricia picks up a camera and carries it across the hub to Sheila’s television. Because the camera is pointing at the television this causes the image to feedback providing a conveniently indistinguishable point at which to substitute live images for recorded ones. The image on the screen continues to accord with Patricia’s camera moves as she lifts the camera above Sheila’s head, but from this moment on we know that we are now seeing images that cannot possibly be live. The picture continues to move over Sheila’s head and then cranes rapidly up to give a bird’s eye view of the space complete with performers and furniture but no audience. The high angle camera hovers tracking Sheila and Patricia’s progress round the chairs. The position of the performers in the recording matches their live positions on the stage, and as they walk round the camera swoops and dives down hunting through the empty chairs and pausing in front of each television in brief interrogation. The camera moves somewhat erratically in ways that would be impossible for a body and the resulting images are intended to suggest a third invisible presence, a spirit which haunts the performance. This televisual spectre is the subject of the ensuing dialogue, and marks another shift in the way that media is used in the performance.

In some senses this ‘ghost’ is just a simple visual trick which references typical horror film type imagery with its use of eccentric camera moves at unnatural speed to create the illusion of a third presence in the space. But the audiences experience of these images, in combination with the live action and dialogue of the performers is somewhat more complex. Significantly the camera now presents a novel point of view. Previously the camera image has been inhabited and/or controlled by a performer, it has been embodied, but this new point of view comes from an impossible space far beyond the body. Hovering meters above the ground the camera is now separated from the body, disembodied and without a body it can only
be a spirit.

As an audience we know that the ‘ghost’ is a camera trick but because the images it produces show us a space which is identical to the one we inhabit it is easy to imagine that this camera presence, because it shares the same space, also shares the same time - it is present in the present (there has been an attempt in the screen image to disguise the transition from the present to the record). However the pictures on the televisions are potentially rendered ‘unbelievable’ by the absence of an audience, the space consists mainly of empty chairs, clearly a recording has taken place prior to the entrance of the audience. However I think that this contradiction between the picture space and the live space is overcome by constructing a variety of logics; the invocation and manifestation of a spirit indicated by the text and media images suggests that we are in a magic space, one that is supra-natural. If individual members of the audience do not see themselves as present in that particular version of reality, that is the reality of a spirit world, then it is quite plausible for their presence not to be represented and equally, because this world shares the same space as their existence in the live stage space, that it is possible for these two worlds to coexist. Similarly we understand that cameras can produce pictures that see beyond and differently from the human eye (the forensic lens), therefore the ‘ghost/camera’ only sees what he is programmed to see (from the text the presence is a male one), what interests him. Perhaps, more literally, this selective vision is also understood to be a common convention of the supernatural. One other element contributes to these logics. On a more psychological level as individual spectators we tended not to be perceive our own selves watching therefore ‘we’ are absent from our own perceptions of the space.

Using one, or all of these schemes, it is therefore perfectly acceptable that the audience is not present in the televisual representation of the space whilst a tangible realisation of the coexistence of spirit and material world can be maintained. Perhaps this is the multimedia equivalent of the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ used in the literary arts. The representation of the third or the Other that media affords works in contrast to it’s more invisible, omnipotent operations either as an observational device such as the CCTV style monitoring of the first Act or as a conduit that delivers Sheila and/or Patricia to the television screen. Therefore, as well as this ability to channel information and direct attention, media has the potential to invoke and make tangible that which is physically absent from the performing space. Media can act as the ultimate medium summoning the immaterial into the material and the past into the present. “That different an order of being. Your being here. That different a logic”.

THE HAPTIC AS PERFORMATIVE OR DOUBTING THOMAS

The ‘ghost’ comes to rest on top of a television set looking back over an empty chair. As Sheila walks towards this same chair a matching view from a live camera is partially dissolved with the recorded so we then see Sheila standing over the empty chair. Patricia continues to journey around the
audience appearing in the television picture to come toward the empty chair and sit in it. But this version of Patricia is a recording and as she sits her live figure comes into view and sits on top of her recorded self. Sheila has placed her hand on Patricia’s shoulder but at first it passes through the insubstantial recorded version. The idea of the ghost, which was represented through a point of view, has now been transferred and inhabits the figure of Patricia, who in her recorded version, now embodies it’s insubstantial qualities. It is only when live Patricia occupies the seat that Sheila can reassure herself of her presence by touching a solid body. As if acknowledging the insecurity of this ghostly time space Patricia answers Sheila’s touch by reaching up and laying her hand on top of Sheila’s. It seems that due to the past deceptions of the visual sense this physical contact is the only way the performers can establish their real time coexistence in the same physical environment. The touch acts not only as a reassurance of the presence of another but also serves to establish the presence of the self in the space. It is ultimately a performative gesture which enacts a reality.

VIDEO REWIND- THE PRESENT CANNOT SUSTAIN

The first moment of physical contact between the performers is surprisingly moving but as Patricia’s hand reaches Sheila’s in this gesture of confirmation the mediated image begins to rapidly rewind showing all the recent screen history of the performance, live and recorded, in discrete blocks of digital breakup. This sequence is motivated by the understanding that the power of the performative gesture - a touch - cannot be realised on the screen (a metaphysical space of tricks and deceptions) it can only be effective (as true and real) in the live moment. The sudden separation between stage space and screen space is particularly potent in relation to the earlier understanding encouraged by the ghost sequence of the two spaces as contiguous. This rupture causes the media element to, as it were, unravel. In a sense this is a malicious act which attempts to assert the superiority of the record onto the live. What the playback shows is the fragility of this live moment by replaying to an audience images and actions that were, moments previously, live but, by the relentless progression of time, have now been rendered past. It demonstrates that the present cannot sustain.

ACT 3

“The light is cruel. Not as life is cruel. That harbours malice. Whereas the light is without heart. Even a negative one. Cos light is constant.”

During the rewind transition from Act 2 to Act 3 Patricia has placed a chair in the centre of the empty hub and Sheila now sits in it. She holds a camera close to her face and begins to speak. The televisions show pictures from Sheila’s live camera but the movements are not as controlled and the face not so well framed as it has been previously. There is a strange lag to the highlighted areas of the image and parts of Sheila are momentarily left behind in a superficial disintegration reminiscent of the earlier recorded
hands sequence. When Patricia begins to speak we cut to her live camera which tightly frames her mouth however within the darker areas of this picture the images from Sheila's camera continue to show. This is a live key effect and allows parts of Sheila’s image to emerge from the image of Patricia. It is different in its effect from the earlier unities created by partial dissolves here Sheila is not layered with Patricia but incorporated into her, a separation between the two is harder to distinguish and shifts with every variation in the light. Patricia’s final speech concerns the nature of light and identifies it as the ‘constant’ in contrast to the human “But us. We are the inconstant, fragmentary things. We bleed. We spin and burn. And give everything to light, unstinting. Its lustre. Its hues. Its dusks and its dawns. Its loveliness to behold.” This speech forms an unorthodox liturgy concerning the universal properties of light and set lights ‘persistence’ in contrast to our own temporal human frailty. Any visual media is dependent on light to reproduce its subject, human or otherwise. What multimedia performance can do is stage an equation between light, perception and existence by picturing this action electronically at one remove. Therefore what remains of a person once they have gone from the world except photographs, films, video recordings? These are not the person they are all just versions of trapped light hence “The light is cruel” but in the absence of a body the record proves an existence. A luma key, like most camera images can only function with light, it determines the difference between light and dark, if there is no light there will be no image and the performer will be invisible, no longer present and consigned to the darkness.

At the end of Patricia’s speech she draws the camera away to frame her face and Sheila does likewise to create a picture of the amalgamated face referred to earlier in this document. This image of a unified Sheila and Patricia allows a seamless bridge into identical prerecorded video material. The face moves back and forth between Patricia and Sheila until Patricia disappears from the mix and we are left with just changing images of Sheila which begin to layer and mix with others. There is a sense of dissolution and disappearance as the images swim in and out of blackness. As if she can guess what these pictures hint at Sheila holds up her hand to me, the video tape operator and with this gesture pauses the show in order to deliver her penultimate speech.

“....So maybe me like so. Me gets so small it cannot be seen, cannot be felt in the room. And keeps turning in on its own deep space, keeping me me, as this flesh fails, must surely fail, and you pronounce me dead and cry for me‥‥‥”

However, during the pause the persistent light, like insistent time, continues unrelenting and while Sheila delivers her speech the paused black and white image of her face gradually acquires colour across all the television sets. After the monochrome of all the previous images the colour has the effect of heightening the visual rhetoric of the piece and signals a climatic moment. This idealised in colour ‘lifelike’ picture is ultimately appropriate for the moment at which the image is about to supersede it’s object. Sheila,
always one to acknowledge the inevitable, starts the flow of images again, the live camera is now redundant in her lap and she retreats into a repeated spoken mantra while her image and recorded voice take over. The recorded is here again able to do something fluid with the dynamics of time that live performance alone would be unable to manage. Although Sheila is still present in the space the ‘dynamism’ or ‘drama’ of that arena now lies clearly within the domain of the recorded. This then looks forward to a future moment in time beyond Sheila’s death where she will no longer be present, her presence will only be indicated by her re-presence in records. This use of media is the inverse of the earlier ghost sequence; the record, so often associated with the past, is now used to invoke a future state where we are all preserved in the perfected form of our recorded image - a future perfect.

CR November 1998

SUMMARY

Live cameras -
Liminal mode between Record and Live - the mediated
Difficulty in distinguishing between Live camera and recorded camera as source of image. Allows an internal dynamic within the mediated material between live and recorded which reflects wider stage dynamic.

The Electronic Panopticon -
CCTV aesthetic = Live?
Live TV as Live performance; functions in identical time and space
The All seeing camera eye totality of vision as opposed to partial audience vision
The lens as objective and objectifying how is this different from the eye? The panopticon interrupted -The camera view as partial, fragmenting not totalizing camera dance

3 orders of cameras
Objective, subjective (as inhabited by a subject), The Other (spirit). The camera acts as omnipotent, bodied and disembodied is able to represent an immaterial presence. Up until the ghost sequence the mediation has been ‘invisible’ the ghost makes the invisible visible draws attention to the continues presence of the invisible in the space. In this way recalls the past as tangible which is what all recorded images do in performance reinvokes the past.

Records as Future
Often thought that records recall the past into the present and only performance is concerned or can reference the future as constantly moving into the future.
However the hands and end recorded sequence work in contradiction to the usual equation as they manage to reference future ie absence of Sheila.
Present as past
Video rewind sequence emphasises fragility of present not moving into future but always being past.

Reduced to light
Media reduces the human body to light.

The Haptic as performative and beyond media to establish present presence. This gesture is delivered via a screen and in order to understand it we have to occupy two opposing viewing strategies simultaneously 1. the image is the action therefore mediation as invisible 2. The gesture presented as different from the mediated. The Haptic might be close to providing a definition for the live - how does the touch of the photograph (Barthes see Drever on sound) compare to the touch of the live - can any reproduced record be Haptic cf Looking Glass (mirror image).

Time
Media and time in unstable relationship or Fluid
Surface anomalies introduction of the electronic displacement of time in a strobe effect able to discern the mediated from the live as not equivalent.
The live cannot repeat only the record repeats THE LOOP is a function of the record can only be created in a live space through the rerecord.
Likewise can only PAUSE in mediated or recorded (live can reference pause like it can reference loop but it cannot be these things in time) causes a dualistic experience of time
Sense of time as conditional on space consistency in space causes confusion of perception of time.
Live space as only additional (not repetitive) because of this it is the only space in which the PRESENT can be clearly discerned/identified therefore the relationship between live and the recorded become a bit like that between waking and dreaming or the conscious and unconscious.

Collapsing Space
Camera lens as surrogate performer (disembodied Bodies) collapses spaces of stage/camera/screen to deliver parts of the performer to the screen.
Collapsing space or layering via partial dissolves afford the collapse of bodies into each other
In the live space remains separate and discernible undissolvable

Life as mediated
Sheila sits and watches TV references a reality beyond that of the performance our experience of the present.
Media affords the multiplication of time and space frames within the present of live performance in a way that is impossible for the live. This multiplicity of frames is our experience of the present outside of performance however in the performance the creation and difference between these frames are sometimes emphasised or dramatised in contrast to the way they seem hidden in everyday life. Is the exposure of the effect of media on our
perception of time and space the efficacy of multimedia performance?

November 1999.
CASE STUDY 5. STOKER

in collaboration with Awarehaus Theatre, Aberdeen premiered The
Lemontree Aberdeen April 1999.

Stoker was a produced by the Aberdeen based theatre company Awarehaus
and was designed as a piece of multimedia theatre. The project was funded
by a grant from the combined arts fund of the Scottish Arts Council and I was
asked to join the collaborative team as the media artist. Despite the
experimental potential indicated by its funding and proposed ‘collaborative’
working structures the project originated from a theatre model and for this
reason much of its processes retained elements of ‘traditional’ theatre
practice. The piece was text based, the work originated from a script written
by the playwright John Harvey. Although the script was written in consultation
with the director Tina West and myself it was not constructed along with
rehearsals as a devised text might be nor was it substantially revised once
rehearsals began. It was a requirement of the production process that the
final text had, more or less, to be in place by the start of rehearsals. One
reason for the preeminence of the text was due to the use of ‘actors’ rather
than ‘performers’ in the realisation of the piece. Actors come from a
particular training and background in theatre which demands that the text be
a fixed certainty from which they can extract a ‘psychology’ to form the basis
of their ‘character’s’ performance.

Technical roles were broken down into the conventionally distinct areas of a
composer, a designer, a costume designer, a writer, a director and in
addition to this the less usual media artist. The production progressed
through a series of production meetings which occurred prior to and
alongside rehearsals again the usual working model of traditional theatre.
Because the practices of theatre tend to originate from the demands of the
script and working roles are separated into different skill bases this can
lead to a degree of inflexibility in working methods and this in turn has
consequences for what can be realised on the stage. This is particularly
pertinent for a discipline such as multimedia for which very little precedent
exists in terms of working practices in theatre. Integrating media into a text
based theatre production can often be a process of compromise and
negotiation because only a limited understanding and experience of
multimedia exists within a production team. For these reasons the majority
of my media contribution to Stoker is in the form of illustration, that is to say
there is very little interrogation of the workings of the media itself within the
piece.

The action of the play occurs in the same place, Cruden Bay, over three
different time periods, the 1890s, 1950s and the present day. The cast
played a variety of characters from these different time periods and the
media performed a useful role by distinguishing between the three different
moments through the use of three different filmic textures. All present day
images were originated on DVC Pro, whereas all past events where shot on
Three overarching strategies were developed for the integration of media into the play and all three used various Victorian imaging phenomena as their starting point. A large cyclorama hung at the back of the stage and onto this white backcloth various scenes were front projected from a bright LCD video projector. These images dominated the stage creating flat ‘environments’ in which action took place. I called these projections Dioramas after the nineteenth century invention which originated in the practise of scenic stage painting. A diorama presented a panoramic life-like painted landscape or interior and then staged the ‘drama’ of the depicted space by manipulating the light behind the scene cloth in such a way that the picture appeared animated. Therefore my projections, like the conventional painted backdrop of theatre, created a context for the action and used light, like a diorama, to move and change these ‘landscapes’ to suit the shifting contexts of the play.

Downstage from the cyclorama, in front of a scaffold gantry, hung two smaller projection frames covered with sharks tooth gauze which, depending on the direction of the light, allowed action to be viewed through them or images to be projected onto them. The projections for these screens originated from four synced carousel slide projectors (two for the stage left screen and two stage right) a stage left back projecting LCD and a stage right front projecting LCD. All these projectors were more or less hidden from view by masking or props. I called these two screens Daguerreotypes. The screens were intended to reference early photography and were used to present artificially aged portraits of the cast as well as archival photographs reproduced on slides. The screens hung in portrait format but did not conform to the conventional 35mm ratio instead I used an idiosyncratic ratio which was slightly over square a size determined by the set and ideally reminiscent of the early days of nonstandardised photographic formats. Finally the arrangement of the screens, one centre stage left the other centre stage right was an attempt to suggest the glasses-like stereoscopic viewers popular in the Victorian age used to create a three dimensional photographic effect. The original idea for these screens was that, through the use mirrors it would be possible to present live actors framed in the screens and that it would be difficult to distinguish between this live action and similar recorded images projected onto the same screens.

One further strategy involved an onstage projector. This projector was originally intended to be peripatetic and free to move around the stage projecting onto various screens and surfaces. This idea originated from the notion of the magic lantern, a glass slide projecting device used in music hall and domestic parlours to present an evenings entertainment. Concurrent with the invention of the magic lantern occurred the invention of another Victorian reproductive device - the phonograph - an object actually used by Bram Stoker to write his books. An old phonograph was included in the play and it was this equipment which hid the onstage projector thus...
conflating the idea of recorded image and recorded voice. We wished to establish a relationship between the idea of the ‘undead’ vampires in Bram Stoker’s Dracula and the ability of recording devices to represent that which is now absent and ultimately to recall the dead. Mechanical recording was a new phenomena to the Victorians and these photo and phonographic representations “drawn by natures own hand”, must indeed have made their subjects appear as ‘undead’ witness for example the nineteenth century practice of mortuary portraits. However the onstage projector proved to be less flexible than originally conceived so a fourth LCD projector was installed under the front row of the seating in order to project on screens set directly centre stage.

The play began with a prologue but as soon as the main action began a small television placed high up stage right on the scaffold gantry began to play Murnau’s classic 1920s masterpiece Nosferatu. The film had been slowed down to match the duration of the play and it ran throughout the action rather like a channel icon in the top left hand side of a cable broadcast. The idea of this continuous image was to signal the power of the Dracula myth which ran through the piece (the lead character is obsessed by the book) but also to indicate a broader awareness of culture as a process; Dracula is already the subject of innumerable stories, films, pictures etc. and via the film we were able to indicate a sense of the play’s contribution to this cultural weave. The pervasiveness of the Dracula myth is due in large part to Bram Stoker’s book and in keeping with this cultural self consciousness we wished to acknowledge Stoker as a writer as well as theatre as a site where writing is staged. Therefore, with the use of rope and tape, the white cyclorama and floor were made to look like a ruled blank page. At the beginning of the show, across the back ‘page’ of the cyclorama, words began to appear, typed from a typewriter, writing up a passage from the book. At the same time on stage the character Stoker begins to type so the projected images seem to be a direct result of this activity. Whilst Stoker types three women who form the Chorus read. The stage was covered in text, saturated by it and peopled with the act of reading and writing, thereby the stage is acknowledge as a place of storytelling. As we inhabit a (western) culture we are also infused by it, our responses and interpretations are determined by it and any experience of the play Stoker would be affected by this prior knowledge. By drawing attention to the act of storytelling, showing a text developing word by word, we emphasise how myths and stories circulate and the stage becomes a site which presents the operations of culture itself.

The typewritten words begin to dissolve into a wide shot of present day Slains Castle as the modern day Renfield character begins to speak. The ruined castle gradually dissolves into a shot of the beach at Cruden Bay, illustrating the subject of the onstage dialogue. These giant panoramas at first appear to be static, like a painted backdrop, but in reality they are actually projections shot and then replayed in real time; trees move, birds fly, rains falls. These images, originated on digital video rather than film, create a separation between the spaces of fiction in the play and that of fact, as
well as indicating contemporary rather than past contexts. These are images of real places shown in real time - Cruden Bay is a place north of Aberdeen where Bram Stoker wrote Dracula. Due to the particularly charged relationship that products of the lens have with realism these projections, like the later use of archival images, add a ‘documentary’ potency into the overall fiction. The present day is styled as factual and therefore ‘real’ in contrast to the potentially fictional and constructed world of film.

The play is punctuated by readings from Stoker’s Dracula - the live action equivalent of the constant presence of Murnau’s Nosferatu. a reminder of this story which permeates our world and those created on stage. The act of reading is as important as that of writing in the formation of culture and it is one that is repeated regularly by the actors. Each passage from the book is accompanied by a short S.8mm film depicting a boy sat on a beach reading which is projected onto the stage left Daguerreotype. The film is intended to reference 1950s and 60s home movies and represents Renfield the child absorbed by Dracula whilst on holiday at Cruden Bay (this reading is an activity which has already been described at the beginning of the first scene). The film illustrates this fiction with all the appearance of a real 1950s home movie and allows a comparison to be made between the present day Renfield and his childhood self ultimately providing a psychological explanation based in past childhood experience for his contemporary behaviour.

Scene 2 begins with another large scale projection which shows a turbulent sea breaking at the base of cliffs. Renfield is recounting how Stoker would walk the cliffs at Cruden Bay in search of inspiration. The projected image creates a context for Renfield’s speech both by illustrating a past context for the Victorian Stoker as well as Renfield’s present location on the same cliff top. (Renfield is trying to write a biography of Stoker and he is walking along the same cliffs in search of inspiration.) However, as well as representing an external scene, they also serve to illustrate an internal, mental one. The restless and chaotic waves represent a state of mind, suggesting that Renfield is a troubled man. On closer inspection it is possible to note that the video picture does not progress in realtime but is a loop made of the same wave breaking repeatedly. If we were to read this projection on a metaphorical level the reoccurring wave might indicate that Renfield is a character that has somehow become stuck, fixated with a particular moment in time.

Scenes 3 and 4 used no media and depicted Stoker’s death and then Lucy’s death taken from the novel Dracula. Scene 5 reconfigured the diorama idea on a smaller scale. The scene was set at the reception area of the Kilmarnock Arms Hotel, the hotel which Bram Stoker stayed in whilst writing Dracula in Cruden Bay and now the site of a meeting between Renfield and a young girl called Lucy. The actual reception area of the present day Kilmarnock Arms was projected onto a large sheet hung, centre stage, directly behind the actors. Again the realism of the image cut through the dramatic fiction placing it into a recognisable external reality. However,
like the cliff top scene, time as represented in the projection did not progress but looped the same minute throughout the duration of the scene. Unlike the waves though this loop was harder to detect as the reception area consisted of a static ‘cabin’ and chairs, only a small clock hanging above the cabin indicated this loop as its hands did not move beyond the same minute. With recorded images the progression of time can only be indicated by movement within the picture, if there is no movement events appear trapped indicating a different more ‘unnatural’ order.

Scene 5 also took place in the Kilmarnock Arms Hotel but is set in Stoker’s room in 1896. Bram Stoker was the theatrical manager for Sir Henry Irving’s company based at the Lyceum Theatre in London. Fact and fiction collide as Stoker recounts his first meeting with Irving. Stoker’s description of this encounter is illustrated with a number of archival slide images of Irving in various costumes striking poses ending with a photograph of his portrayal of Mephistopheles. Stoker had hoped that Irving would play Dracula on the stage and thereby ensure Stoker’s reputation as a writer of fiction. As Stoker’s monologue invokes images of Irving we see him realised as a real historic figure in one of the daguerreotype screens. A maid then enters to confess to breaking one of the wax cylinders that Stoker has been using to dictate his book Dracula and Stoker demonstrates the phonograph to the maid. As he plays back passages he has spoken which now form parts of the book an image apparently plays out of the phonograph horn and onto the stage right daguerreotype. These images accompany the words and are taken from the film Nosferatu. Although this is technically an anachronism (the film having been made in the 1920s not 1896 the year that Stoker wrote his book) the black and white film provides a visual equivalent to the crackly voice which emanates from the phonograph and are the closest that it is possible to get to a moving image of ‘Victorian’ filmic quality. This device uses the same film which plays at on a television on the side of the stage and projects it directly within the stage action thereby momentarily suturing the film into the body of the play. The phonograph sequence also illustrates of the concept of the ‘undead’ - Bridget “But, who? Who is.. who was...” Stoker “Who was? Indeed. Who was? For when they who speak are dust their voices will live on - undead.” In this context it is possible to make the connection between Stoker’s undead and the resurrectional qualities of the new recording technologies available at the end of the nineteenth century.

The scene ends with the reading of an unusually sensuous passage from the book. In this instance the reading is not accompanied by the S.8mm boy but uses an extract from Murnaus’s film in a continuation of the images used during the phonograph sequence. Taken out of context the film sequence appears to present a woman in the throes of sexual ecstasy (although interestingly the image is actually depicts a moment of near death when Dracula clutches at Mina’s heart). This sequence establishes a mood for the following scene which recounts an early sexual encounter between the young Renfield and Margaret, a maid from the Kilmarnock Arms Hotel which marks a moment of trauma for the boy. Margaret has been swimming naked and is chanced upon by Renfield whereupon she asks him for a kiss.
This action is recreated by a projection of Margaret emerging from the sea projected onto the figure of Lucy, the young woman whom Renfield has already encountered in the hotel reception area. This projection stands in for Renfield’s literal projection onto the figure of Lucy his preoccupations concerning Stoker and events surrounding his first reading of the book Dracula. The appearance of Lucy at Cruden Bay begins to trigger memories which finally culminate in Renfield’s breakdown at the end of the play and this particular encounter with Margaret is the start of a chain of events which eventually leads to the maids suicide as witnessed by Renfield. The projected image of Margaret onto Lucy therefore mimics the confusion which develops in Renfield’s mind between present day Lucy and 1950s Margaret.

The play develops through a series of encounters between Renfield and his therapist, Stoker and various Cruden Bay luminaries, and is interspersed with readings from Dracula. Renfield carries with him a series of note books and in one he has written an account of Margaret's death by drowning which he reads to his therapist. The passage has a poetic, impressionistic quality and is accompanied by a short video sequence projected onto the stage left daguerreotype. The pictures are a series of abstract underwater stills which dissolve into each other, the light of this projected sequence is interrupted by Lucy who stands behind the screen causing her body to be silhouetted within the scene. The media adds a distanced, dream-like quality to the account of a trauma remembered and, like the prose attempts, to recreate Margaret’s last images at the moment of death. The silhouette within the projection also substitutes Lucy as the body of the absent Margaret.

The different time periods which until now have remained separate and discrete scenes now begin to merge as an evening of Victorian charades is played out while simultaneously Renfield recalls a reoccurring dream. Projected across the cyclorama at the back of the stage a drowning sequence, shot from a subjective point of view is played, centre stage Stoker mimes a scene from his book to a small audience and downstage, in the foreground Renfield sits recounting his dream. This confusion of stage spaces marks Renfield’s increasing confusion and inability to separate dream from reality as well as fact from fiction. The projection begins as a direct illustration of the images in his dream but as his account becomes symbolically peopled the images no longer illustrate his words and present a frenzied sequence of underwater movements accompanied by furious air bubbles until the image slowly comes to rest framing a gently swaying piece of seaweed. The images are reminiscent of the earlier drowning sequence and indicate that Renfield’s dream is an unconscious product of his obsession with Margaret’s suicide. By placing these dominant images behind the fantastical charade scene the media illustrates layers of Renfield's consciousness dominated by this moment of death which is confused with the morbidity of the fiction Dracula and by extension Stoker and Cruden Bay.

Coincidentally modern day Lucy is in Cruden Bay to attend a funeral.
Renfield has started to stalk her and the funeral we see is Renfield's version made up of a conflation of the present day, Margaret's funeral in the 1950s and that of the character Lucy from the book *Dracula*. The stage is dominated by a realtime diorama projection of the kirkyard at Cruden Bay whilst the cast process across the gantry dressed in Victorian mourning. Renfield has a fantastical conversation with Lucy which concludes as Lucy merges into his memories of Margaret and turns towards him with Margaret's face projected over her mourning veil. The projection of one character onto another is the same device as was used in the earlier scene between Renfield and Lucy and it is this earlier encounter on the beach which Renfield again recalls during the funeral. However on this occasion the projection of Margaret shows just her dead face, pale and bloated from drowning. This moment of horror triggers the plays denouement when the three separate worlds (the 1890s, 1950s and present day) finally collapse into an inseparable confusion which is combined with passages of the book in a staging which replicates Renfield's manic state.

The final scenes take place in Slains Castle by night, the model for Dracula's castle in Bram Stoker's book and the place where Margaret drowned herself. Renfield is enticed to up the castle by 'voices'. A large diorama plays but unlike the fixed opening view of the castle the image now moves, swinging from side to side, mimicking Renfield's point of view as he approaches the castle. The dialogue is made up of fractured broken sequences from different characters and different times. Into this mix another smaller daguerreotype projection is added which plays beneath the diorama showing first a seascape beneath the castle then a boy reading. This projection remains more objective describing with images that have reoccurred throughout the play first a realistic context (the churning sea beneath the castle) then a past moment in Renfield's childhood. These images end as the camera approaches the entrance to the castle and the diorama image freezes at the point of entry. Here for the first time Stoker directly addresses Renfield, crossing from one time into another as Renfield leaps from the gantry to the stage. This leaps signals Renfield's final descent into madness. The large projection follows his jump down and drops into the castle and begins to hunt around its ruined interior, the space is confusing and the camera moves are frantic and desperate. On the stage left daguerreotype screen a slide sequence of Victorian pornography begins to be projected while a short scene in a gentlemen's club is played by the actors on the gantry above. The diorama projection freezes and the video image shows empty window recesses in the walls of the castle looking out to sea. These window recesses create temporary frames for a short speech by Stoker to Renfield and is a device which is repeated through out the remainder of the scene. The manic hunt round the castle continues and a slide dissolve sequence begins on the stage right daguerreotype, this shows individual portraits of the cast which slowly age and merge into Victorian daguerreotype images. A picture of Stoker's wife Florrie appears in on the opposite screen whilst an actress sings a sentimental song. The scene continues in a series of short dialogues and freezes and the picture of Florrie is replaced by a moving image sequence. This sequence is made
up of fast cuts between material that illustrates the imagistic preoccupations in the show; typing hands, graveyards, crashing waves, dead Margaret’s face. Finally the diorama projection reaches the centre of the castle and the camera looks up to the sky and begins to turn. Renfield is left sat on the gantry gibbering whilst the sky whirls round him in a perpetual endless loop, the cast retreats, and the other projections fade.

The media in scenes 13 and 14 serve to represent Renfield's psychological state but they also directly illustrate subjects referred to on stage; Renfield is drawn towards the castle just as the camera is; the chorus describes the waves beneath the castle - “Breathing, yes. In and out like the waves far below” “And falling into the darkness of the sea” and in the small daguerreotype screen we see the waves; Renfield reads a passage from Dracula and we see the young Renfield reading the same book as a boy on the beach. However once the diorama moves into the castle the other images on the daguerreotype screens attempt to work on a more allegorical level. The ‘naughty slide’ sequence followed by the portrait of Florrie attempts to illustrate visually an idea which is only hinted at in the text of the play - that of the contradiction between two Victorian ideals of womanhood. This is a contradiction which persists into the present day and is exemplified by the female characters in Stoker’s Dracula who are either desiring vamps or loyal angelic wives. This contradiction was discussed early on in the writing process as a possible source for Renfield’s breakdown however I think that its inclusion so late on and within the already confused context of the final scene means that it is questionable whether the images alone are able to convey this idea of underlying social hypocrisy. On the other daguerreotype screen another allegory is played out as the actors are dissolved and transformed into aged Victorian daguerreotypes. This slide sequence attempts to represent the idea of the undead by rendering each ‘live’ actor into an uncanny deathly ancient portrait.

Scene 15 establishes Stoker back at his writing desk this time accompanied by a large static diorama of the final page of Dracula in a staging reminiscent of the opening sequence. Thus the end of the drama is synchronous with the end of the book and we are reassured that “Hard work it maybe but the admirable thing about fiction is its triviality. A good yarn. What more can I create and what more can a reader demand”. And all that has past on the stage is safely confined to the realm of fiction.

Technical Note:

The moving images for Stoker were editing and projected from the digital editing system Avid. In the past I have completed my post production for multimedia performance projects on Avid and then transferred the material to tape for playback. However having the use of a nonlinear editing system in the theatre during the production week of the show gave me an unprecedented degree of flexibility in the production of visual media. Normally, at some point in the post production process, a decision has to
be made concerning the material which is to be used in the final performance. With Avid I could keep these options open and rearrange sequences, recut, add in new material or remove extraneous parts even change material between performances. Had the production been of a different, more experimental order it would even have been possible to improvise to a degree within the performance.

Previously, because of the need to output to tape, it has been necessary to work with approximate timings for media sequences. These timings are usually gathered in rehearsals and are often partly determined by guesswork. With Avid the sequences could be cut to more accurate timings which were determined by runs in the theatre space. The duration of sequences could even be altered between performances if timings changed from night to night. Not only did I have an increased flexibility in timings but also in the positioning of images within the stage space. Normally if one wants an image to hit a certain place on stage this becomes an almost impossible process of calculating original camera angles, frame position, projector position, projection ratios etc. With Avid it is possible to adjust a frame ratio and/or the overall position and scale of a picture so that it can coincide exactly with the actor, set etc. This allowed me to align the landscape horizons exactly with the gantry platform and position projected figures directly onto actors.

Because the final sequences all ran from external hard drives not tape this meant that accessing different material could happen almost instantaneously which made cueing sequences in rehearsals and performance infinitely easier. Technical rehearsals were also much quicker as I could move around material without waiting for tape to wind on. It also meant that cueing during the show became easier because of the visual representation of material in a timeline. A timeline represents a particular section of material as a graphic symbol and a blue cursor line runs along this as the material in the time that it takes to play out. Therefore the position of a particular sequence is visible in relation to the overall material and the playback progress through it in time is marked by the blue cursor. This makes different sections obvious and moving between them merely a question of clicking a mouse. This ease of movement also meant I could delay or speed up sequences to fit with the speed at which the actors performed on stage. By using a mixer to fade to black I could then jump quickly and seamlessly to the next sequence and therefore I was able to work to the actors rather than, as has happened in the past the actors having to work to the timings of a prerecorded media sequence. Operating from Avid gave me a degree of spontaneity which is already present in live performance but which is difficult to transfer to any media process because of its prerecorded nature. A non linear disk based system allows the media in a multimedia performance to come closer to the spontaneity of a live event.

September 1999
HIERARCHY OF FORMS -in the beginning was the word. 
*Stoker* essential text based theatre, Structure determined by a classical narrative flow based in individual psychological. Dominance of text requires all other staging elements to be subservient therefore media primarily illustrates in order to deliver the text. Meaning does not originate in the use of media neither does the media contribute to overall meaning outside of the domain of the text ie. does not interrogate or contradict itself or the text.

FILMSTAGE not multimedia performance
Due to illustrative role media primarily 1. creates ‘objective’ 2D contexts (the scene), 2. creates ‘subjective’ 2D contexts (states of mind). These are the conventional modes by which the moving visual image (media) operates to present a narrative, tell stories etc. exemplified by classical Hollywood films. The stage action, setting etc. are determined by the text and the media images work in the same mode in this context as they would in a film. QED Filmstage.

REACTIONARY REALISM
As we are in film mode realism is potent in this mix. Realism is what images can bring to the ‘melodrama’ of the stage. This is exactly the charge that existed at the birth of film (as an extension of photography) and is the same charge that early multimedia theatre practitioners (Meyerhold, Piscator) wished to transfer into the theatre. Stoker rehearses this same equation except that now film/tv is the dominant storytelling medium we expect stories to be told via a lens. This is how fiction is delivered. Therefore does the use of media in theatre make the process of theatrical story telling more akin to an audiences expectations of how a story/fiction should be told?

Different filmic textures to identify different time periods/fictional spaces.

Victorian devices: explosion of imaging devices at end of nineteenth century coincides with the writing of Bram Stoker’s novel *Dracula*. Loose historical equation between forms and fiction.

Dioramas: the Victorian VR equivalent of the reproduction of a life-like environment. Panoramas create objective and subjective 2D contexts for action of life-like characters/real life actors. Is Realism a move towards the live?

Daguerreotypes: Frames for temporary living portraits and archival material. Stereoscope reference an attempt to summon the 2D into the 3D stage. cf. Crary/Silverman.

Phonograph: on an ontological level recorded image and sound as the same phenomena. Realism of these re-presentations suggests the
immortality of records - equivalent to Stoker’s horror of the immortality of the undead?

Media as sign of ‘external’ culture represents other forms/other stories into the hermetic world established on stage. ie: use of Nosferatu on TV. Can be the world in relation to this world of the stage. Does the inclusion of media allow the stage to become a site which exposes the operations of culture cf. Brecht.

Making writing real or bearing the device. By making writing visible as an activity the visual image can expose the written word as the device behind this apparent spontaneous stage action emphasises fiction as a construct.

Media as FACT. Theatre as FICTION. Factual dioramas - realtime contemporary spaces. Factual S.8mm - looks historically real as holiday film in real place. Factual slides - archive photographs of real historical people. Filmstage as charged by the real.

The Loop (Waves, Kilmarnock Arms) in this context references internal mental state in relation to time rather than a broader experience of time ie that which is proposed in Constants II.

Progression of time in recorded images only indicated by movement. In the live the progression of time is felt by internal movement. Therefore when movement stop in recorded images this stops the real and puts these images into an order we do not recognised and therefore perceive as different/unnatural/uncanny/strange.

The record as resurrectional (relates back to the immortality of the undead) when a tape sound or image is played the presence is summoned into the present.

Physic projections literal projections. Using the body as a screen. Using the body as a screen for another person signals confusion of identities. The projection fantasies/idealisms cf.Lacan. In Stoker confusion only occurs on level if the individual protagonist does not extend into space sanitised contained by emphasis on individual

Media as the dream, illustrator of the e unconscious and by extension trauma. Need to research more the relationship between moving images and dreams why/do they occupy similar spaces?

Media as allegorical? Victorian porn/Stoker’s wife or perhaps more successfully the casts descent into daguerreotypes these dissolves like time lapse stage the drama of passing time concentrate time.

Flexibility of disk based nonlinear playback systems equates to the live or provides an increased degree of spontaneity which suits the working
processes of the live and could suit the content of a performance (improvisation) if required ie the way a DJ might drop samples into a mix?

November 1999.
CASE STUDY 6. SIMULATOR

'The Shed Show' Collins Gallery June/July 1999

I first came across a Bombing Simulator or Torpedo Attack Trainer (TAT) on a visit to a second world war airfield in Crail, Fife in 1997. The abandoned building enclosed a vast 340’ curved concrete cyclorama and its interior space was as impressive as its exterior was nondescript. Further research into the history of the building revealed a number of preoccupations which made the structure an interesting starting point for a possible piece of work.

Initially it was difficult to discover much about the function of the Trainer, who had built it and exactly how it had worked, therefore some of my early ideas were based on conjecture and assumptions which in time proved to be incorrect. It is interesting to note how this work has evolved in relation to my understanding of the original and with specific reference to the Simulator piece exhibited in 1999. In retrospect I am still researching the device and the installation shown in The Shed show marks a particular stage in this progress and is not a final and definitive response to the building. Indeed analysing this work in relation to my earlier ideas it is possible to see how concepts and ideas are refined by the necessity of producing an end product for an exhibition deadline.

The Torpedo Attack Trainer was developed during the second world war to train Naval Airmen in the bombing of shipping traffic. Designed by theatre specialists Percy (Peter) Corry and Humphrey Watts, the Simulator used an epidiascope to project the model of a war boat which moved across a curved cyclorama. The scene was made more realistic by a painted seascape and a variety of lighting effects which mimicked different weather conditions and times of day. The pilot, seated in an aeroplane cockpit, followed the moving target and rehearsed the actions of tracking, diving and bombing a ship. The position and perspective of the ship altered in relation to the trainee pilot’s movements but once he had fired the imaginary torpedo the Simulator froze and lit up allowing instructors to calculate the trajectory of the bomb in relation to its target. Once this had been determined the Simulator then played on to show whether the pilot had made a successful hit or not.

One of the interesting features of the TAT is its relationship to theatre. The Trainer created its ‘theatre of war’ with an emphasis the visual domain using technology more usually employed in the theatre of the day. The curved cyclorama ensured that the pilot’s entire field of vision was enclosed by the simulated image. The image of a ship at sea was seen, as it were, from the cockpit of an aeroplane, the perspective and position of this projection altered in relation to the trainee pilot’s manipulation of his controls. Great attention was paid to the realistic depiction of every aspect of the scene; the sea was animated by a cunning combination of stage paint and moving lights; the effect of different types of weather on ambient light conditions was also simulated with a vast array of different lighting filters. Daylight and nighttime attacks were also imitated including the reproduction
of a flare effect used to light up a target at night. To my knowledge the cockpit in which the pilot sat remained motionless and no acoustic element was used to recreate the attack experience. Therefore it is possible to say that the TAT relied totally on the visual sense to recreate, to the best of its ability, the actual experience of torpedoeing a ship. However the relationship between theatre and the TAT extends beyond that which is demonstrated in the skills of scenic painting and variable lighting used to recreate an environment it is also present in a wider cultural sense. The Trainer, like the theatre, recreated a ‘life-like’ arena in which specific sociopolitical preoccupations are revisited and interrogated.

Nowadays we would see the realistic recreation of events in time and space to be the project of Virtual Reality (VR). We would expect the efficacy of this ‘reality’ to be delivered technologically through an appeal to a combination of senses; imagistic realism, acoustic equivalences and approximations of touch. In relation to this synthesis the TAT’s simulation appears crude and unsophisticated but the Trainer has a different and altogether more immediate relationship with the real which comes not from its structure or how it functions but its existence within a particular historic moment. After a brief training in the TAT a pilot would repeat the actions he had rehearsed in the all too real arena of war with its attendant possibility of death. And it is this possibility of death that allows a separation to be determined between the virtual and the real; even if all sensory experiences could be recreated, death (as the end of sense) would remain the one encounter that it would only be possible to experienced in real life. If the TAT is a prototype VR machine the ‘virtual reality’ of the device should be seen in terms of this contingency that it has with death, a contingency which operates in time, the shared time of war, and not the ‘virtual reality’ of a graphically accurate recreation of a space.

When standing inside the redundant space of the TAT we see a space devoted to spectacle and this emphasis on the visual triggers other responses. The giant curved cyclorama takes the shape of an enormous inverted eyeball, its blank walls a retinal screen ready to receive projected light. I realised that this projection would have to move to present an effective target and early on I thought that aerial surveillance films had been used in the Trainer. This caused me to consider film and ultimately photography in relation to the bombing simulator and in particular the explosive moment of flash photography which seemed to equate with the moment when a torpedo reached its target ship. The shared taxonomies of war-making and photography have been well rehearsed; a ‘target’ that is ‘sighted’ by ‘aiming’ ‘cross hairs’ and ‘shot’ by a ‘trigger’ and then this moment of capture being signalled by an explosive/exposing ‘flash’ of light. The spectre of death also haunts this linguistic relationship, death is the probable result of the trigger’s release as it is metaphorically with the camera’s shutter. A photograph deprives it’s subject of life by removing it from the continuum of time and rendering it a motionless image. (cf Sontag.) Historical buildings, such as the bombing simulator also perform a similar function to photographs, both extend from the past into the present
and provide an access back into history. Therefore I not only saw the TAT as an extension of the project of theatre I also saw it as a space where the language and metaphors of recorded image making, could be activated.

Originally I intend to make a large time based installation that reflected the actual scale of the bombing simulator. It would use a combination of still and moving images, a live presence possibly a performer, some sense of an explosive moment to cause a white out and memories in the form of a soundtrack made up of aural histories. I wanted to recreate the curved screen and project onto it in an enclosed space, a blinding flash would be triggered by audience members entering the room causing an image of the same audience to be projected onto the screen. This basic idea continued to be modified; the cyclorama was replaced by four separate screens, four CCTV cameras and a hidden vision mixer operator. The screens would display black and white archive war footage and this would be interrupted by a flash of light triggered by the operator, in the aftermath of the flash these images would be replaced with frozen pictures of the audience which would gradually fade back into the war time footage. The flash which exposed the viewing audience to themselves was intended to insert a frozen image of the audience into the historical continuum as represented by the film and thereby incorporate the audience into an event that they could no longer regard as separate and historically distinct. This construction of implication through the image seemed simplistic and inelegant so I considered replacing the archive footage with the actual training films that I thought had been used in the TAT. In this equation, if indeed it was possible to trace the films, the image of the audience would have been brought into contact with history by witnessing their own image inserted within the visual operations of the Trainer rather than the crass representations of ‘history’ as signalled by archival footage.

The project continued to develop throughout 1998. I recognised that the importance of the original structure as an architectural space had to be one of the key factors of interest in the piece and revised my plans back to involve a curved projection surface. The phenomena of the space seemed so powerful that creating a work outside of the original seemed potentially pointless, yet the difficulties of gaining public access to the TAT were insurmountable. However I wanted to create some indication of the shocking contrast between the anonymous barn-like exterior and the carefully crafted ruined interior. I tried to imagine ways of transposing the building into another space by using 1:1 scale projections and location sound recordings intermingled with fragments of testimonies from people who worked at Crail during the war. Initially an audience would be presented with an exterior view of the Trainer and only when the flash went off would the image change to the interior temporarily granting the audience access into the space. These interior images would be layered to include theatrical sea and sky effects, a ship silhouette, archival footage, as well as pictures of the audience. Therefore in this scenario access to the interior triggered by an explosive moment would be equivalent to access to the past.
The scale of the project still posed a problem for its realisation. On the basis of my interest in the building I had been asked to contribute to a group show called *The Shed*. When confronted with the need to realise a piece of work with a limited production budget in a shared space I was obliged to modify my plans yet again. I was not able to enclose a part of the gallery yet in order to make a separation between interior and exterior I wanted to present the space of the bombing simulator as enclosed and separate. Indeed the phenomena of the building seemed of prime importance to the work but it was not practical to use the actual space and any reproduction of it would potentially render the power of the space impotent - what was needed was a simulacrum.

As part of a theatre production process a designer often builds a model of the set enclosed in a model box, a miniature version of the theatre space, which shows the set in its wider context. I decided to adopt much the same strategy. Such a device would place the Trainer on a manageable scale whilst maintaining an integrity with the original space as well as providing a suggestion of the theatre which had already been demonstrated to be a determining factor within the construction of the bombing simulator. By Spring 1999 I had established the idea of producing an 'identical' working model of the TAT enclosed within a model box. The outside surfaces of the box would be covered with photographic images or projections of the present day exterior of the Trainer, inside the image of a model ship would travel around a miniature curved surface. The individual spectator would be obliged to part a curtain which covered the front of the model box to see the model simulator inside. After looking in for a moment they would be blinded by a flash which would cause the lights in the model to dim and reveal on the small screen their own face staring back at them frozen in time.

I finally came to construct *Simulator* in May and June of this year, by this time the idea had slightly changed again. The structural similarity between a model box and an old fashioned box camera occurred to me and it is necessary to peer inside both devices, partially inserting one's head, to see an image. These similarities allowed me to make pertinent the connection that I felt existed between the bombing simulator and photography. Therefore instead of referencing the exterior of the building with images on the sides of the model box I decided instead to make the box resemble a large wooden camera positioned on a tripod with a black photographers cloth covering the front. Inside the box was a simplified version of the TAT; I constructed the tauroidol shape of the cyclorama by resin casting around a lawn mower inner tube after this was finished it was painted with a sea horizon line like the original and fixed to a miniature planked floor with supporting struts. Through a gap in the miniature cyclorama a viewer would look directly across to a spot lit silhouette projection of a warship shining down from a simple projector consisting of a zoom lens and low wattage light mounted on the lid of the box. Out of sight behind the cyclorama were hidden two speakers and a Metz photography flash gun. A soundscape had been constructed from long durational recordings made on location in the Trainer and this played on a long loop cycle so that when a viewer inserted
their head into the Simulator they were surrounded by sounds heard in the actual simulator. After a period of approximately six seconds the flash gun would go off triggered by a pressure pad located under a mat in front of the Simulator which a spectator was obliged to stand on. The flash gun was located directly behind the warship silhouette on the screen and the flash was masked with the shape of a cross hair gun sight. When the flash went off, if the viewer was looking directly at the boat, they would be temporarily blinded and this cross hair image would be left as a retinal afterimage. On exiting the Simulator this impression might remain temporarily overlaying their normal sight with a small floating cross hair image.

The major change in this version of Simulator is in this use of a cross hair to create a retinal afterimage which replaces the idea of presenting a viewer with a frozen image of themselves. I discarded this mirroring idea after considering its technical and artistic implications; the electronics within the Simulator were already surprisingly complicated, the flash had to be adapted to work from a mains power unit, the trigger and delay were temperamental and although I built miniature amplifiers to power the speakers these never functioned without an interfering mains hum and had to be replaced with a standard amplifier. To project a picture of the viewer would have involved a camera, a projector, an image grabber (either installed on a computer or within a vision mixer) and a dimmable lighting system all which would have had to work from the same or a related triggering system. Lack of time and resources made this idea difficult to realise but ultimately I discarded it because I did not like the relationship it established between the Trainer and the viewer, it seemed too simplistic. I was unsure if people would be able to make any productive connections between the projection of the boat followed by that of their own face, the narcissism of the encounter seemed too cyclical and enclosed and only suggestive of the act of looking without any consequence which might suggest a broader historical or cultural context for the work.

The cross hair retinal afterimage had the advantage of being technically simpler to realise in a short space of time but more positively it created a literally active relationship between viewer and object. Retinal afterimages had been an idea which had occurred when I first encountered the Trainer and they interest me as the bodies biological equivalent of the recorded image. The spectator is physically implicated in the functioning of the Simulator and an equivalence is drawn between the pilot sighting his target and the spectator’s act of looking. The flash provoked by this looking causes the obliteration of the image suggesting the destruction of the object by the gaze. The protagonist in this obliteration, the gaze is revealed as a cross hair impression which remains after the explosion of light, the spectator in the rupturing moment of the flash becomes the gunner-pilot and this identification remains for a short time outside of the model.

In this Simulator looking is imbued with dangerous properties. When a viewer lifts the black cloth to look inside at the model they might imagine that their looking is a neutral, innocent act but the flash explosion does a sort of
violence to both object and subject and forces an alternative order of vision. This could suggest a number of wider concerns and responses. The Simulator might stage the Lacanian idea that articulation obscures and destroys its object (is this figured by the gaze which in its comprehension places the image/object into language?). Or it might suggest the historical connections between vision and the execution of war following on from Virilio’s analysis of the technical operations of battle which have developed through evolving visual technologies. The flash of the photographic flash gun may provoke reflection on the operations of the media in relation to war particularly the way that war, in the later part of the twentieth century, has been reported and thereby politically controlled by predominantly visual media ultimately leading to a fundamental change in the nature of what we understand war to be (Baudrillard The Gulf War). Or the violence of the flash could suggest the violence of photography itself which removes its subject from time and distances a viewer from the time and space of the actual event (Sontag). This separation and distance whilst allowing us access into history also removes us from an actual engagement with the subjects and images depicted. The separation caused by vision and the mediated image allows us to perform actions which otherwise might present themselves as too real and complex. When the world is reduced to a series of images and simulacrum we can exert a degree of control over it and behave accordingly; drop bombs, land planes, perform surgery, torpedo ships....

However although I believe this version of Simulator is an improvement on earlier ideas it is not without its problems. If the spectator did not look directly at projected ship it was impossible for the flash to create an afterimage on their retinal. Ideally the ship should have moved across the screen introducing a dynamism suggestive of life and ensuring that the spectator would have followed the image. This image should also have disappeared from the screen at the moment of flash in order to reinforce the idea of obliteration and the projection should have then recovered ready for the next viewer. Unless people realised that the installation represented a real construction it is possible that it could have appeared as a slightly trivial shock effect with little purpose or broader rationale. The wider implications suggested by the work relied on a knowledge of the existing structure, its function and purpose as only then would an equation be drawn between the installation and the concerns that I saw as active within it namely war, vision, images and death. I did provide a panel of explanatory text which described the TAT and some thoughts on image making however this was placed on a wall a small distance away from the installation and it is possible that it was not read.

It was difficult to judge reactions to the piece or make any objective statement as to its effect. I suspect that it was, in some respects, an unfriendly piece of work. The installation had a certain daunting appearance - a large box on a giant tripod with an electrical mains adaptor placed underneath, the inside was hidden and required the cloth to be lifted and head placed inside. The sound inside was strange and distorted, the image dim and almost immediately the viewer was shocked with a bright flash of light. However acknowledging this potential difficulty for a viewer the
installation was also executed with a sense of craft to indicate deliberate care particularly in the construction of the model. However overall the meaning of the work, like its subject, is potentially quite sombre and therefore appropriately does not function by appealing to a sense of aesthetic pleasure or familiarity from its audience. Therefore there is a degree of difficulty in its reception which was at odds with some of the other works in the gallery.

The Simulator that I finally exhibited in The Shed show had, in effect, replaced the portrait of the viewer with the retinal afterimage effect and in doing so emphasised the dynamics of viewing (image taking) over those of image making. As a consequence the work had a potentially ambiguous relationship with the practices of photography and theatre making (although of course the viewing process is as important as the making process in these two fields.) However I had intended to emphasis the space of the simulator and the event of the photograph both as activities which rehearsed for a moment of absence and death. The TAT does this by maintaining the appearance of the world but simplifying elements of its space, the photograph by showing us in the world but also free from it - separated from time. Both are approximations, devoid of complexity and available for manipulation and control. However it is conceivable that the final installation was still too orientated around the gaze and that this distracted an audience from focussing on the purpose of the bombing simulator and the camera. In the moment of the flash explosion the audience is unwittingly identified as the pilot which precipitates a collapse between looking (image taking) and trigger pulling (image making). This in turn obscures a cause and effect relationship and no distinction is made between the two activities. This collapse appears to be done to the audience rather than provoked by them and therefore they might be resistant to constructing any trajectory between image making and taking. Therefore the work was premised on an audience performing what might be considered an over ambiguous mental leap in order to appreciate what I had considered to be the works axial encounter namely vision as the negotiator between the object - its image - its absence and death. Perhaps Simulator failed to stimulate ending it’s encounter with a blinding negating flash of light which neither illuminated or provoked reflection. In retrospect some form of photographic image produced by this explosion might have encouraged connections to be made between the bombing simulator as an object and the recorded image, theatre and the rituals of death.

CR September 1999

SUMMARY

Connection between TAT and Theatre:
1. technical execution illustrates a uniformity with 2. Cultural function - as an arena for playing ‘life scenario’s’.

Connection between TAT and Photography (recorded image making)
1. Taxonomies uniformity of language underlies uniformity of purpose 2. to negate death 3. to deliver death?
DEATH
Theatre > Simulator < Photography
Equation activates Barthes comments in Camera Lucida relationship of photography to theatre and theatre to death rituals. Simulator/Photography reduce world to its images introduce possibility of control (Virilio) and thereby negation of death.

The presence of death is the ultimate distinguishing force between the virtual (simulations/images) and the real (as the experience of death is beyond the senses).

Death as a definitive moment - the making of images/ reproductions of the real to escape this inevitability.

Simulator/Theatre/Photography all forms of death ritual. All forms of fragmenting and replaying external reality (life) but when realised they all prepare us for our absence, they deliver a moment of death.

LANGUAGE FLASH

Exposing/exploding - moment of revelation/articulation (what, if any, is the difference?) which reveals/destroys it subject. How does this build into my death trajectory. The flash signals a simulated moment of death which is not death (the actual object not achieved) Simulator/Theatre/Photography all illustrate operations of living in or entry into language. Lacan?

BITS AND BOBS

Virilio - control of life through vision: images and simulations.
Baudrillard - War as (vision) media event.
Retinal afterimages - body records

December 1999.
CASE STUDY 7. DELIVERUS


DeliverUs was a multimedia performance event which I produced in collaboration with Bodies in Flight (see Constants I and II). The text for the piece was written by Simon Jones, it was choreographed by Sara Giddens and devised by the whole company, I was responsible for developing and delivering the media component of the work. The performance was presented in-the-round with two tiers of seating arranged round a ground level performance ‘pit’ of 2 x 2.5 metres. One television was located on each of the four sides of the pit, positioned underneath the seating blocks, facing into the space. Apart from a short prerecorded sequence which was projected onto the floor all the media images for the performance were shown via these televisions and were produced by two live colour cameras which two performers controlled within the space.

The performance was intended to illustrate a particular relationship that ‘being’ has to ‘language’ and it choose to use the state of ‘being in love’ as the dynamic ground for its observations. The piece figured love as a state that is both resistant to the world but also inevitably an expression of it. The work mapped through a trajectory which began with the lovers as an undifferentiated singular entity cossetted in their own private world (the pre linguistic) and gradually opened up through the operations of language (verbal and visual) into the separated self and other functioning within the wider world. Language is the way in which we can be in the world and the body is the site of its articulation where our relationship with the world is made manifest through behaviour (speech and action). The body is also the site of reception where the world is received and connected and then re-articulated. Live performance as a discursive arena provides a site of intensity, like love, where perceptions and expressions are heighten, they are both spaces which concentrate an experience of the world and provide alternative scenarios and possibilities for the self. To a lesser extent the visual media plays a similar intensifying role within this equation: the cameras fragment and isolate body parts, expressions, movements and broadcast them to the television screens available for extra scrutiny. As well as staging the communion between the lovers the work, as a performance, figured the performers as messengers, conduits who communed with the wider audience. The audience were asked to sit on opposite sides of the stage from one another, splitting couples, friends and families and this division by the space of the stage emphasised the performances liminal, intermediary function.

The show was constructed in three parts and the first part was intended to be representative of an inchoate state. The two performers lay together, folded round one another inseparable and apparently oblivious to the external world. The two cameras were hidden between their bodies and therefore produced darkness making the television screens appear blank, the hidden cameras and the blank screens meant that there was no
evidence of any media contribution to this spectacle. This invisible blankness is equivalent to a non existence; there is no articulation and therefore the lovers are not present in the world. Only when Mark stands up do the audience see the cameras and as the cameras are seen they also begin to see illustrating this childish equation of vision with presence (fort da). Mark runs on the spot and he is apparently oblivious to the camera which is hung over his shoulder which relays abrupt and jerky pictures of the ground. When Mark returns to Polly their bodies meet and the camera image once more goes blank. The rest of this opening sequence consists of a live image from Polly’s camera, the camera is moved and blanked by the performers bodies, held in Polly’s hand and manoeuvred about as part of a caress. Despite being held in the hand the camera appears to be totally undirected, absorbed into the bodily actions of the performer who is unaware of it as a separate object. Therefore the resulting images are rather inconsequential, blurred, dark, out of focus, extreme close ups of skin and fabric - as it were images of the body from the body, made irrespective of, or oblivious to, the normal demands of meaning and structure provided by a lens and a screen. As an audience we look to the television screens to provide us with information but all this camera shows is fleeting visions of a bodies surface undifferentiated and ill defined. The lens is not yet fragmenting and defining the space but is one with the body, disappearing into darkness and only occasionally alluding to the possibility of articulation. This is an attempt to create for the camera an equivalence to the inchoate prelinguistic attitude that the performers embody, the two bodies are inseparable and the images cannot establish their difference.

However at the moment an image becomes visible on the screen, however obscure, a separation has been made in space between the performers bodies and the image of the performers bodies. The camera becomes another way of articulating, attaining the body, another medium in the delivery of a message. The camera is absorbed as best it can be into the architecture of the body; Mark flinches as Polly places her cold camera/hand on his warm flesh, as an audience we can empathetically feel the touch by seeing and hearing the action but there is no imagistic equivalent for this touch, the literal touch of the camera to the body merely provides another view of flesh retreating from the lens and this alone elicits no empathetic reaction. It maybe stating the obvious to say that there cannot be an image that is a touch but the consequences of this tautology are that you cannot have an image that is a body as this would require some form of transubstantiation (which is why Turin Shroud is interesting as it attempts to perform this body/image transmutation).

The attitude of the performers to their camera’s takes a profound shift as a bridging device between the first and second parts of DeliverUs. Polly declares “Let love deliver us to the world” and as Mark replies “Deliver us....from....” Polly lifts her camera to frame them both, they smile and look up into the camera at which point the image on the screens freeze in a cheesy ‘lovers snapshot’ pose. Polly’s deliberate gesture is the first time
that the presence of the cameras has been acknowledged and not only are the performers now aware of the cameras as separate objects but they are also aware of their effect and purpose. The image is carefully framed to present a composition of ‘the couple’, the picture is recognisable not just within the context of the performance but outside of this as a typical product of ‘photography’. The meaning of the image is communicated both by the close proximity of the two smiling faces of the lovers but also by the similarity of this configuration to other photographic depictions of lovers. This is the first time that the cameras have shown us the face and it is also the moment where the media image shifts into defined articulation - language - through its appeal to a broader cultural language of the recorded image.

Mark then begins to use his camera to picture Polly. To begin with Polly playfully resists this image taking in a game of hide and seek; Mark scans the camera along the length of Polly’s body but each time it reaches her face she turns away in a refusal to be captured. However despite her resistance these moments of refusal are caught and held on the screens as a series of blurred freezes. These freezes are actually created by the video operator hidden from view, however they do not allude to this third external agent. This is because the performers now work the cameras with a compositional confidence that implies a strong intent, the audience is focussed into the space and the performers appear to control this space, therefore as they determine the images we now see on the screens with a self confident awareness, we assume that they must control all aspects of the mediation of the image including its stasis. Mark’s tracking and momentary entrapments of Polly provide a sense of taming, or familiarisation with the effect of the lens upon the body. This short sequence is resolved as Polly turns to meet Mark’s gaze which is also that of the camera’s to create a similar ‘lovers clinch’ snapshot. Polly then begins to allow Mark to film her face and now the camera lingers on her visage, fetishising the face as the identifying icon of the lover, the site of intense identification. Used in this way the camera begins to represent differentiated bodies allowing Mark to create and regard Polly as an ‘other’ and separate from him. It is the performance equivalent of Lacan’s mirror phase and a replay of the infant’s primal encounter with the world as separate and different from the self.

The screen images create a confusion of looks within the space. Mark addresses Polly but cannot look at her face because he sits behind her in an embrace, however via the camera the four screens manifest Polly’s face to the audience. Mark looks out to the screens around the perimeter of the pit, Polly looks up at the camera, Polly’s televisual image looks out at the audience, the audience look between the performers, the screens, and the audience; there is not one central focal point in the space. However during these moments an imaginary focal point is created which figures the dialogue as an exchange of looks between the lovers. This is possible because both the words and the images in the space are directed toward Polly as the sole the object of Mark’s attention in contradiction to the multiple
viewpoints existent in the space. Therefore a strange synthesis occurs and we imagine that the dialogue somehow takes place between the lovers - face to face.

Just as the camera has introduced this idea of differentiation between the lovers Mark retreats, through the text, back to the earlier undifferentiated phase of part one as he describes the unity of lovemaking. Mid point through this speech he forgets to direct the gaze of the camera and the screen image drifts off into nondescript darkness which also reminiscent of the first phase. The visual structuring and articulation of the world effected by the camera would be in contradiction to the totality and uniformity which Mark now recalls. Appropriately enough Mark also closes his eyes while he delivers this speech thereby paralleling the blindness of the camera and reinstating the blank of the opening sequence as the image and effect of the originary moment.

Polly extracts herself from Mark’s lapsed embrace and moves across the space while he remains lost in his reverie. The screens remain a blank. After a moments pause Mark returns to the present and establishes a new position for himself beneath a camera which he attaches to a light. Once he is in position the blank screens cut from black to an image of Mark’s face smiling up at the camera while he smokes a cigarette. Polly lies on her stomach with her back to Mark facing one of the four television screens which bear his image. This is the first time that the screens have been acknowledged as part of the viewing equation and Polly addresses her following speeches to the mediated image rather than immediate Mark. Therefore both as looked at and looker Polly has so far been established as passive in relation to Mark’s active constructions first of Polly’s face and then his own. As Polly eulogises about her lover’s face she touches the television screen in a partial caress indicating a collapse of screen into object. In this configuration touch of the image is seen as equivalent to touch of the body but the body has been contracted to the face and the power of the face as a signifier is proved by the maintenance of its effect through it’s mediation. The face is the site of expression, articulation, it is also the site of difference between the one and the other, looked at and to this extent always perceived as an image and something separate from the self. As an image the mediated portrait, particularly one made in real time, is able to maintain its status as a powerful signifier because it is akin to our unmediated perceptions and interpretations of the other as orientated round the facial image and in this scenario the media does not act as a form of reduction upon the object of its gaze.

Having responded to Mark’s image constructions Polly now begins to control the screen space herself. She scans the camera over Mark using the resulting images to illustrate her text in a series of freezes - “Tom’s toes, or Dick’s cock or Harry’s heart”. But the camera is doing more than illustrating her words it is also enacting the sentiment of the speech in which Polly compares her attempts to define her love as equivalent to the violence of the pathologist’s knife which defines through separation. This
notion is extended by the action of the lens upon the body and demonstrated visually on the screens where each body part is briefly emphasised by a freeze. Polly’s textural and visual advances into the separation of self and other are then temporarily halted when she joins Mark in an embrace producing another ‘snapshot’ image of togetherness that temporarily reinstates the lovers as a single united entity set against this separation. These punctuating snapshots are revisited through this section as a form of reassurance against the growing realisation of the difference between the two, the image is like the body of the mother who is returned to in between acts of ever more distant exploration. (fort da).

Throughout Polly’s speeches Mark has remained locked in the gaze of the camera, his compulsion now becomes narcissistic as he turns his head to regard his own image in profile on the screen beside him. This introduces another dynamic into the discourse on love, which is the love of the self. Concurrently in the text Polly admits to a degree of self consciousness during lovemaking which looks for the signs and expressions of love which reinforce the self as loved by the other. This attention toward language and articulation reinforces the self as separate in contradiction to the romantic idea of the inchoate unit remembered by lovemaking where the self is abandoned, collapses into, and becomes undistinguishable from the other. (Narcissism a function of being in language loneliness of separation?). Polly attempts to break Mark’s fixation with his own image by removing the camera from the light and dragging it along the ground. Mark, desperate to maintain his relationship with the lens twists and crawls along the floor to keep within the camera’s view. Polly inverts the camera and Mark’s image appears upside down, Mark corrects this image by inverting himself playing to the camera. Polly slowly raises the camera from the floor to high above her head and the image retreats from Mark as he remains benignly prostrate beneath the lens. Polly’s actions emphasise the narcissism of the closed circuit loop of self-love and can be seen as a jokey attempt to interrupt this self regard and draw Mark’s attention from the camera back to herself.

Part two ends as Polly draws the camera back down to Mark’s body and he covers the lens making the screens go blank once more. In the intervening darkness another change occurs in the media space, the screen is split in two by the unseen video operator. Until this point the screens have only ever carried a single image although there have always been two possible camera images. Now, when the performers uncover the lenses, half of both camera images are shown on two halves of the screen. The separation of the lovers is now made tangible upon the screens, and although the lovers on stage are, once more, enfolded in an embrace each performer occupies their own distinct screen space.

Polly’s next speech is delivered as a series of asides alternating between the two cameras which are held by the performers at arms length extending out of the embrace. This time, although the look is directed once more to the lens, we do not feel that this gaze is directed towards the lover but outwards
towards us, the audience and beyond this to the world. This effect is created by the text in relation to this new bipartite screen image;

“all proper to this love
where you have no place
because you are the third
outside the one and its other
you the other other”

The lovers are physically contained by the two frames of the screen but the text refers to a third and Polly stares into the lens and out of the televisions as an address to the audience. Until now the other has been constructed as the figure of the other lover but the logical consequence of this trajectory, which moves from the unified self/other through to the differentiated self and other, at some point inevitable admits the external world into the internal world of the lovers. In this sense the media now represents this worldly presence in its construction of a third point of view which no longer reflects back in a closed circuit of love but broadcasts beyond the two. At the end of Polly’s speech the lovers construct a third conglomerate face by uniting the two halves of their face. This ‘funny face’ is a visual joke but the humour also belies an irony beneath the construct as the single, ‘unified’ lover is now seen as absurd, a position which the differentiated lovers cannot return to it, the face is an example of dramatic irony because the gesture indicates a knowing awareness of the separated self and as such represents the loss of primal innocence. As the camera is acknowledged as an interloper so automatically is the audience and this performance which until now has been an intensely private spectacle is suddenly aware of itself as watched by something outside of itself.

As part three admits the presence of the outside world with this comes a refinement in the presentation of expression. The face is no longer interrogated as the site of meaning instead the operations of language - visual and textual are staged. Polly sits in a corner and begins to write and she shows the results of her pen’s effort in close up screen left, screen right Mark creates an extreme close up of his mouth miming speech - while Polly writes Mark speaks - but he soon tires of this and becomes distracted once more by his own image taking the camera closer to his face and into his mouth in an attempt to picture the roots of his vocal expression. Like their screen images the performers are positioned in opposite corners of the space, however Mark extends his foot and reaches into Polly’s frame, attempting to disrupt her writing with his toes in a childish play of attention seeking to call her away from her worldly expressions and back to him. She responds by grabbing Mark’s intrusive foot and writing on it and then proceeds to write on different parts of his body demonstrating that his body, his existence as lover, can only be articulated through the language of the external world. These two differentiated spaces and visualisations of the action introduce a sense of time to fracture this hermetic world which was, until part three, “this my only here-and-now love”. Mark examines his new written labels (all of which express hopes and claims of ownership) by
orientating different parts of his body towards the lens of the screen left camera while Polly explicates her actions through the text, framing her speaking mouth screen right:

“and all the time everything I name is not my own.
This isn’t the first time that this flesh has been written on.
I brand you with other peoples labels.
I distinguish your parts with others’ sense of discretion.
and I claim you as my own with their name for love”

The introduction of the past as the defining force within the present inevitably brings with it the possibilities of the future. This leads into a series of hypothetical supposes constructed around future scenarios of loss, the complete separation of the self from the other. Screen right shows Polly’s speaking mouth and screen left Mark’s face, eyes closed. The supposes are located in the future and as part of the evocation of this non present time. Polly closes her eyes and imagines the absence of Mark delivered through the loss of her sight of him, a construction reminiscent of the earlier fort da game (Mark’s presence in the space is already questionable as, with his eyes closed, he appears to be asleep). To invoke her vision she lowers the camera and obscures the lens to produce a blank. Mark, eyes closed, is still pictured on the right of the screen but next to him is an empty blank, he, like Polly sees nothing, he is pictured without her and she is absent from him; “suppose, when I can’t see you anymore, that is, when you’re no longer here....suppose”. Mark opens his eyes as Polly restores a picture to her camera, he turns his head to face her presenting on the screen his ear in close up juxtaposed with Polly’s mouth. Now the annunciation and reception of messages is figured on the screens, however as well as this the dynamic of time has been layered into the images by the addition of a subtle strobe on Polly’s half of the screen. The action of Polly’s mouth no longer matches perfectly with the live version, the live relay images are also no longer in the “only here and only now” the camera as a manifestation of language introduces the possibility of minute delay, a slippage between present and past. Mark sits up and in doing so reveals in his camera Polly in a long shot, from this position we also see the television behind Polly now pictured on the screen and spiralling off into an endless deferred feedback, the cameras show two different versions of the same moment, constantly manifolding and expanding outwards from a single unified point of origin. Mark sits back and on one screen his head obscures half the image, he is literally on the screen regarding the screen image of his now distant love rendered in long shot. With his head over the left hand side of the screen he then turns the camera to provide a view of himself watching himself, the screen and camera’s point of view are shared, while his real head watches his image head watching. At the end of her speech Polly pulls the camera back to frame, like Mark, her whole face. The image of their two faces side by side marks some sort of resolution. Each individually is given there own separate space within the screen and this space, through the icon of the face is clearly identified, defined as distinct from one another. Mark then ventures some of his own supposes and his speech is accompanied by a
confusion of looks between the two performers as the live space is contradicted by the screen and a look away becomes a look toward and vice versa.

On the conclusion of Mark’s speech Polly stands up and leaves the camera frame and this momentarily empty space is frozen by the vision mixer and from then on screen left presents no new information but this empty space. There is now a radical rupture between the screen and the stage. Apart from the occasional freeze and moments of black out the camera has always presented live images which were concurrent with the action on stage. Now we see Polly dance in the performance pit but the camera does not show us this instead we see an empty space, the stage and the screen worlds, following the shows determining trajectory, are separated. Mark has turned his back on the stage and lies with his face underneath the seating unit, the camera pointed towards him. A strobe effect is now added to his screen right image as he begins to speak further fragmenting the stage and screen worlds. At the end of his speech he sits up to face into the pit thus clearing the cameras frame and now this empty screen right image also freezes. In retrospect much of the action of the bodies on stage in the third section as been devoted to creating ever more elaborate images for the camera appropriately enough as it is this is the section which is most concerned with the articulation of the self through language, however the lovers are now left facing one another surrounded by neutral empty images.

The penultimate speech is delivered by Polly and is an exultation of “the lovely inbetween” which reinstates the value and pleasure of the present over the disappeared past and the hypothetical future. The dull screens repel attention and send it back into the here and now of the performance space a space which is now unencumbered by the efforts of the cameras to interpret and express. The speech is an acknowledgement of the self as constituted as present in the world through language and furthermore is an acceptance of this equation which means that the world (others) will always exceed the control of the self a concept that is figured by the abandoned screens - “they cannot make that other world in their own impossible image”. This sentiment makes the mediated image redundant within the conventions of this particular staging so an alternative is sought of an utterly different order as an expression of the final denouement.

From a projector hung in the lighting rig an image is projected onto the white floor of the performance pit. The sequence shows the lovers in a choreographed series of couplings and embraces, which gradually layer and multiply. The sequence has been shot from above and exactly matches the proportions of the space and the scale of the performers. The video begins by projecting it’s matching recorded figures onto the bodies of the live performers who lie apart from one another in the space. The live bodies shift and turn on the floor as if asleep creating spaces and patterns with the projected images. The sequence is intended to invoke all the lovemaking that has occurred between the lovers - it is a recapitulation and celebration of the “lovely inbetween”. The projection on to the bodies on the floor gives
the image a three dimensional quality and perhaps because the live bodies lie inert and prone the animated projected versions seemed to be more live and present than the alive and living versions. As a recording the sequence emphasises it moments as past but as a projection onto and amongst the live ‘sleeping’ bodies of the present it is also an evocation of the future, an idealisation or a dream. If one stages the act of sleeping in a live space and simultaneously show some visual images an equation is made between these pictures and the unconscious subject, they are seen as illustrative of the unconscious state. In this sense the multimedia performance space can be defined as a dream space. Both spaces cause a confusion of past and future by using past recordings, memories to construct imaginings and future scenarios in the present.

With this projected sequence a fundamental shift has occurred in the status of the media within the piece. The image is sourced as a recording and the action shown on the stage is of a past event, it has been treated and manipulated by a post production process which has allowed the time of the past event to be layered and concentrated, the picture is diffused into the space as projected light onto a single large screen located on the floor. All these factors make this media of a totally different order from that of the live camera relay broadcast to four identical screens. The live cameras in the show are intended to be seen as instruments of expression, the visual equivalent of text and the spoken word they are part of a language which articulates being. Outside of this live realm the recorded images of cameras can become symbolic meaningful by what they present and devoid of any signification as a linguistic construct. In the live scenario we are constantly shown the efforts of construction by the performers, in the recorded domain the construction is rendered invisible.

The projected sequence ends with a bright flash of light which bleaches out the picture like the introduction of reality into the symbolic. The lovers are left with the everyday, the space is not longer a site of intensification instead the dissipation of normality must be demonstrated. The televisions are all blank except one that Mark plays Nintendo on while Polly sits and brushes her hair, both actions are intended to epitomise mundanity. There is of course a difficulty in establishing an ending to the everyday as by its nature it is continuous so Mark’s last word can only emphasis this lack of finality .....“and?”

Note:

Watching the performance and in rehearsals I found myself often returning to and prioritising the televisual image over the live body (similar phenomena in Constants II). Therefore I could conclude that the information of the body becomes subordinate to that of the camera, the image exceeds the physical presence. I imaging that this is because 1. we expect
unproblematic information to be delivered via the media as this is our usual encounter with it (film/television) and 2. because the media image simplifies by fragmenting and allows for scrutiny by freezing. In contrast the body to some extent resists the gaze or complicates it by always being complex and in flux so that the gaze slips off it or round it. Multimedia performance can illustrate this difference in the visual encounter with the body and its image but it is necessary for the two to simultaneously coexist in order to construct this comparison (see Turin Machine)

December 1999

DELIVERUS SUMMARY

Media as an operation of language situated, like all expression as an interpreter/negotiator between the self and the world.

Multimedia Performance as a site where the consequences of the self as articulated through languages can be staged and particularly manifolds and complicates this definition of language to include the visual.

The camera/screen concentrates visual attention

SIGNIFYING NOTHING
Blank screen/eyes closed = invisible = no articulation = no presence in the world = illustrates the originary moment = absence.
The fort da equation of visibility with existence dramatised by the e camera.

UNDIFFERENTIATING THE DIFFERENTIATED or vice versa
Images from the body eg. the hand’s pov as inconsequential because they are not determined by sight and not structured by the logics of visual communication. The language of the body as different from the language of the lens.

DOUBTING THOMAS or the impossibility of Transubstantiation
The first image separates the body from its image and therefore this image begins to become or suggest articulation and reference language.
This image is not the body - this is emphasised in the performance through a moment of touch which is visually untranslatable (cf Turin Shroud as attempt to collapse body into image)

SNAPSHOT or the lovers clinch
First the media image separates then it begin to articulate. The snapshot references certain convention within the specific and external visual language of media communications.
Performers originate these articulations demonstrate an understanding of composition, grammar of the lens, determine pictures.
However as soon as phenomena come into language they become complicated layered with the direct articulations of the body, vocal
expression of the body, visual images of the body.

FACE 2 FACE
Text works to reconfigure screen and stage space. Text addressed to Polly not delivered to her face but the encounter is pictured in the imagination as occurring face to face due to the shared object of the direction and focus camera and text though this is neither shown on stage or screen.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION ACHIEVED or The Face Persists.
Polly’s caress of the screen collapse of screen and object in contradiction to assumption that the body cannot be the image. How does this occur? Is it because the face is always already an image/object the site of articulations of difference between self and other therefore the media image does not reduce but succeeds in genuine reproduction because the mediated form is the form by which we experience the face as objectified by our own unmediated gaze.

Media in this show does not illustrate a context for stage action (see Stoker) it is the action, it does what is being described in the text it stages itself as a linguistic form it is like the theory within the e the text, the theory is within the image it visual embodies the concept(s).

CLOSED CIRCUIT LOVE Narcissism
How does narcissism fit into the defining trajectory? Is the fixation with the self as love object a function of the separation from the Mother an attempt to establish another familiar other?
The lens becomes an umbilical chord once the effect of language is realise/achieved it cannot be given up - the fear of not being articulated would lead to oblivion means the self would be confined to blind oblivion non existance.

SPLIT SCREEN - Screen space is psychic space in part three.

THE OTHER OTHER
Media as the world/audience another example of how the media works with the text to deliver the concept in its reference to the third and its gaze deflected to the audience.
Camera is exposed as interloper watcher interlocutor going beyond the other and breaking the enclosed circuit..

SIGN OF THE TIMES
Space defined admits time why should time enter when space become differentiated?
Signs of time in strobe and freeze. This camera language is recordable and admits possibility of slippage between past and present. Present has to be translated, mediated before it can be stored (almost not in The Turin Machine)

Part three media calls attention to different methods of language via c/u’s of
writing, reading, speaking, hearing.

Camera can picture distance which cannot be created in stage space where bodies are always in close proximity but the distorting lens renders a figure into a distant long shot.

EMPTY SPACE
impossibility of achieving, possessing, controlling images of the other leads to the abandonment of this type of live visual articulation of the present.

UNCANNY, Multimedia Performance as a DREAMING
A crossover of the recorded into the live (like ghost in Constants II) matching images record and live but because record is more animated seems more present and live weird probably also because of Dreamtime effect which makes images extension and visualisations of the unconscious. Multimedia Performance and dreams use past to construct futures in present.

The record multiples time and space by layering in post production and then layers this into the present of the performance.

The record can be symbolic unlike the live mediated image which will always reference itself as a construct and therefore never fully be able to be purely symbolic.

The body as resistant to the gaze unlike the mediated which is presented for the gaze, the information of the body becomes subordinate to that of the image.

September 1999.
SPECTRAL BODIES: PERFORMANCE, PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE TURIN MACHINE.

The Turin Machine could be described as a performance/photography installation, that is to say it is a work which combines elements of both performance and photography to create something which is neither one form or the other but somewhere in between. (Slide 1) The Turin Machine is a large tent-like structure, 7m long by 3m wide and 2.5m high made of canvas and wood. The tent creates a self contained light tight space within the environs of the larger gallery or performance area.(OHP 1) The Machine itself contains 3 distinct sections. The first being a light chamber in which the subject of the performance/photograph stands brightly lit. The second is a dark chamber - the actual camera itself- in which the light from the subject is caught on a screen and forms an image. The third chamber is a wooden viewing booth attached to the end of the tent in which the spectator stands to look at the captured image. Each chamber is joined by a small hole which allows the performance/photograph, in the form of light, to progress from one room to the next. In the light chamber light is reflected off the body and through a tiny pinhole into the dark chamber where it travels through the darkness until it hits an opaque screen which collects the light causing it to form an image. A spectator in the viewing booth, on the other side of the screen, then lifts a small shutter to look into the dark chamber at the image which is back projected onto the screen.

What I have described then is a giant pinhole camera in which the normal external ‘daylight’ scene of photography is absorbed into the architecture of the camera and is replaced by the artificially lit body of a performer. This new scene is watched, as it were, through a viewfinder by an audience. This is the performance. However The Turin Machine does not just mimic the optics of the camera (or the eye for that matter) to make a stage for performance it also mimics the mechanics of the camera to produce a photographic record. This is possible because the screen within the camera is coated with a light sensitive photographic emulsion. The six hour duration of the performance/photograph is determined by chemical time - that is the time it takes to have exposed an image onto the cloth screen.

However, just like a piece of film, the screen whilst it stays in the camera remains blank, the light that has been caught and concentrated has not been revealed or fixed. It is only later when the screen is removed to a photographic darkroom and coated with developer that an image is revealed.(Slide 2) However via this process of transformation the image has been changed from an inverted positive, as seen in the camera, to the reversed negative. This is the photograph. These life-size negatives hang in the performance or gallery space immediately surrounding the camera, more
records of a process than photographic portraits, they people the space and
provoke a realisation of the difference between the interior and exterior
image. (slide 3)

During the performance/photograph the audience is asked to enter the
camera one at a time. Initially on entering the viewing booth and lifting up the
shutter nothing is visible, but as the spectator becomes accustomed to the
darkness an image slowly fades up. This image is always present in the
camera but it is only when the eyes have reached the physical limits of their
vision does it become visible. What appears is a body, a spectral presence
which hangs inverted within a void possessed with a luminescence that
exhibits ghostly, magical qualities. All sense of proportion and distance
between the viewer and image is lost as this figure “swims” in the darkness.
The image is indistinct and black and white, an image produced by a lack of
light and its qualities are unique to a pinhole camera. Interestingly the more
directly you look at this apparition the less you can see, but by averting your
eyes and looking askance is it possible to hold the momentary image which,
having appeared, constantly hovers on the edge of disappearing again.

Within the camera, unsure of exactly when I’m watched, I perform my part and
become a body, an object. My role requires very little effort except that of
standing still and reflecting light off my skin to make an image. This stillness
makes me doubt the veracity of my performing - can there be “theatre” in so
little articulation - so much just being? And while I doubt this I also know that
as soon as my image becomes spectated that it can only be a type of theatre
that is being watched. The presence projected onto the screen is not that of
the prerecorded reproductive order of film, photography or video but a
presence which is in the process of becoming a record.

Because of this presence which is shared by spectator and performer in the
present this is performance and only when I emerge from the darkroom with
my negative does this work become photography.

I think it might be useful at this stage to explain the origins of The Turin
Machine. By naming the work The Turin Machine I am clearly making
reference to the holy relic - the Shroud of Turin. It has been suggested that
the Turin Shroud is not in fact the burial cloth of Jesus Christ but is actually a
Mediaeval forgery. Research in both South Africa and in this country has
indicated that the shroud was produced in a pinhole camera using light
sensitive salts to fix an image. The idea is that a statue or cadaver was
placed outside a darkroom in bright daylight and its image was formed on a
linen cloth inside the room by the light passing through a small opening in a
window shutter. This image was then caught and fixed using Chromium
salts. Irrespective of the accuracy of this research the idea invokes a number
of reflections as to the mechanics and motives of image making or
representation in our culture.

The relic, like the photograph provides proof of the existence of a person or
object and it does this by exhibiting a connection with the subject pictured. In most relics this connection is a material one in that they present a part of the now vanished subject usually in the form of a fragment from the body - bone, skin or hair. The Turin Shroud provides this connection via an image supposedly scorched onto cloth by the divine body in the heat of resurrection. Unlike the fragments of conventional relics this image provides a whole body but it can only do this through a material connection which is now in the past.

This image stands in for the absent body. The image on the Turin Shroud is the body and the force of the presence of that body is transferred through this index. This indexical relationship is exactly the relationship that photography has with its absent objects, it is what Barthes refers to as photography’s ‘Noeme’ or Sontag’s description of a photograph as a footprint or death mask. These ideas suggest that photographs bear the imprint of the object they represent in a way that means the representation of the object, the sign, effortlessly replaces the object itself. For this reason alone it is quite plausible to call the Turin Shroud a photograph.

The consequences of the indexical nature of photography have been well rehearsed particularly in terms of the visual rhetorics of empirical truth. And photography still has a status with the real that despite recent technological advances remains relatively unchallenged. Although I am aware of the debates surrounding hypereality and the technologies of digital imaging it is not really these philosophies that I am interested in but rather the relationship that photography has with performance in its re-presentations of presence.

Proof, be it via relics or photographs, works by reinvoking the presence of the now absent body. Roland Barthes’ work *Camera Lucida* functions partly as an extended obituary for his mother in which the family album is ransacked until an image is discovered which causes him to declare “there she is”. Similarly through the image on the shroud of Christ in death believers can be assured of his continuing existence. These stories of redemption are no accident they accord with our most primitive needs as some would figure them. It is only via a sacrificial death and the rigor mortis of records that we can acquire everlasting life and by revisiting these photographic relics as viewers we can be momentarily released from the cold grip of mortality. By imagining (and imaging) a world without end we also wish for everlasting life, a world of always us - a continuous present of constant being.

The way presence is invoked in photographs is quite different from the presence of performance and the key to this difference is the relationship each medium has with time. Whereas a photograph acquires its presence from representing a past moment the presence of performance comes from the passing moments of present time. Photography can only give us a body as reproduced image, if we want to experience the body as a corporeal, material entity then it is to the present time of performance that we must look. Often in performance it is the body which is the primary site of signification for
the work and because it is a body and not the pre-authored text of theatre it inevitably means that the language of this body is and can never be fixed in relation to time. Because of this transience, which is the transience of life itself, it could be said that, on one level, the body in performance will always reference this - that is, what it is to be a living body, to be alive, to be. This is nicely summed up by Herbert Blau’s classic quote “it is the actors mortality which is the acted subject - that’s his body doing time”

There seems to me therefore to be a hierarchy of presence within artistic expression which concerns all material objects but is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the relationship that photography and performance have to the body. In performance the total corporeal living body is materially present, in a photography the presence of the body originates in a past moment, it is re-present, and has a material relationship that has been alienated from the original body. Relics live somewhere in between this trajectory of the material real and the alienated real in that they extend a fragment of the corporeal body into the present. This hierarchy of expression becomes a hierarchy of experience and has consequences for ways in which we can sense the body. It is as if some Faustian pact has been agreed. We can only experience the material living body in the present any other invocation demands either a fragmentation and/or a fixing of the body thereby depriving the body of the thing we sought the most - its life - its material presence. This is the sacrifice, we can fix images of the body in order to possess, control and recall the body to give it everlasting life but this fixed image is not the body we want - the body of constant being.

The Turin Machine is an attempt to act within this impasse. By working within these layers of presence and re-presence I’m trying to make a photograph which lives, to fix myself in life. The actual body in the camera is hidden from view it cannot be beheld, it is not possessed. As the light moves away from the body it begins, inevitably, to be changed, because it is literally distanced from the corporeal. It is inverted through a pinhole and as it travels through space becomes refracted, dimmed and disappears so by the time the body forms an image on the screen it is vastly impoverished, without colour and barely visible. Although I am doing my best to fix my body by remaining motionless I can but continually fail. The image of the living body seen in the camera bears only traces of life in its spectral qualities, its opacity and luminescence, but it lacks definition and precise detail. It is an image which is neither exactly living or dead.

Because of its ghostly presence as an image the body constantly eludes complete possession by the eye. If I, like the spectator, want to stabilise this sign in order to possess it clearly I can only do this outside the realms of the camera.

I have to remove myself and the screen from the camera thereby breaking the material relationship with the image and my body. The recorded image which first appears in the photographic darkroom is different from the one
experienced in the camera. (Slide 4) Most notably it has become negative and although the edges of the picture remain blurred and unfocused a female body is easily discerned. The surface of the screen, which remained unseen in the camera now takes on a life of its own and reveals a whole set of different material realities irrespective of the body which it represents. (slide 5) These are concerned with the chemical necessities of photography, brush strokes from the application of emulsion, (slide 6) spots and blemishes from variations in concentration, these marks of process have replaced marks of presence. At the beginning of each new day the previous day's attempt is hung in the gallery above or around the machine These negative spectres haunt the work which becomes increasingly populated with my failed attempts to fix myself in life. These images are the only records of the body within the camera, a body which has been irrevocably transformed by the process of recording. The only word for these images are shrouds, a cloth which binds the body, which is all that can remain of my now absent presence.

It might be possible to relate these ideas of a sensing hierarchy of presence to psychoanalytical ideas about the orders of language. The shroud that binds is the bound sign which gains its articulation at the expense of alienation from the object it can only represent. The essential difference of the performing arts from other types of artistic expression is in this domain of the unbound, fluid sign of the live body which, because it is continually present, cannot be fixed. As Derrida declared in *Writing and Difference* “whatever can be said of the body can be said of Theatre”. Realising this difference, it has been the preoccupation of some theatre and performance practitioners to develop a performance language which accesses the potential of this unbound sign. A theatre of pure presence which works through a non-representational language. I’m thinking particularly of projects such as Artaud’s ‘Cruel Theatre’ of which Derrida said “it is life itself in the extent to which life is unrepresentable”. But I think there is a problem with this idea and for the same reason that I am unable to fix myself within my camera this idea of a non-representational language of pure presence is an impossibility.

What I have discovered in my camera is that I can say nothing of or with the body but that I can only say things about the body in its relations, via light and a screen. Strangely this is something that Derrida also realised when he wrote “Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence has always already begun to represent itself”. That is presence in order to announce itself has to be articulated and in doing so is already in language and is automatically representation.

This is classic Lacanian stuff, it is the Real-impossible perpetually held at arms length by our existence within the symbolic order, fixed and forever yearning to be otherwise. Lacan’s theories also have inevitable consequences for ideas of the subject who therefore cannot be defined through the real but only by the relational signifiers of language. The Turin
Machine acknowledges the futility of language to capture the real and in doing so stages the consequences of this failure for the definition of the subject.

Within the western world, and elsewhere I imagine, women already know in a corporeal sense the difficulty of seeing the body as a signifier of Being or self identity. In a patriarchal culture where difference is already inscribed through the male the presentation of the female is always problematic. Perhaps this is why I stand in my camera trying to fix an image of myself, for myself. An identity which can exist outside of this culture. Another element in the process of cultural visibility is the way that the body is not only inscribed into language but read within language as well. And again I think women as the 'looked at' within culture may have a different awareness of the importance of this act. Perhaps this accounts for my feelings as I stand, object like, in the camera that this female body is not my own and because of this, even as I make my body visible, I comfort myself with the thought that it cannot tell you everything about me.

It is in order to highlight the act of reading that the viewing conditions within The Turin Machine are quite extreme, and in order to draw comparisons and equivalences between reading and writing certain physical relationships between the looker and the maker are recreated.(OHP 2) Both activities of image making and image watching are mediated by holes, a pinhole or a shutter, a framework if you like without which there would be no image.

Likewise both activities are interrupted by a screen which while providing an image prevents the subject from seeing the object directly and visa versa. This framework and screen are the operations of language and while they can reduce my being to my body they also protect my sense of self.

In collapsing these two activities I'm suggesting that there is a correspondence between the act of making and the act of looking and that the gaze of the spectator mirrors my “gaze” as creator and that these processes can be plotted at either end of the same spectrum. In much the same way that presence and represence fluctuate along the same continuum in performance. What is unusual about The Turin Machine in terms of performance however is that within the camera chamber it is this oscillation that is given expression, this is the subject, the body of the machine, and by constructing such physically literal viewing relations I’m asking both myself and my audience to embody this idea. Because who while standing in the camera can say where the live presence ends and the representing image begins? Or to put it another way in my camera Being is located somewhere in between the meeting of the material body with its constructed image.

In The Turin Machine this concept is realised as a physical exertion upon the body of the viewer most obviously in the being/not- being of the spectral image. Because of this it is possible that the work provokes an analysis of
the motives which lie behind the processes of looking and making. Not least because, unlike the irrepressible visibility of everyday life by entering the dark viewing booth you have declared a commitment to see which in the first moments of darkness are confounded. Therefore when you are finally rewarded with a vision its as if you are possibly seeing things for the first time, looking with new eyes. As you waited in the darkness you travelled to a new place, where, for a moment, you are allowed to glimpse a different order where Being is not a fixed identity but something which is constantly shifting.

I might be in danger of overstating the transformative powers of my machine but not being able to be a witness to myself I can only be encouraged by the reactions of others which seem to be strongly felt. People describe a disorienting, signless void which contains an image of unearthly qualities the nature of which they have never seen before.

It is a space which is very different from the space outside the camera which the place of fixed language here the spectre can only exist in the negative blur of a so called portrait. This is the only life the body can have outside of the camera.

In The Turin Machine I produce an identity by placing a screen between myself and the viewer, without the screen the viewer would stare into a black hole and I would have no photograph. The screen allows me to represent/identify myself but because this visibility occurs not solely within the reproductive logics of the representational field but also within the unified field of performance - oscillating between presence and represence - the identity made can only be an insubstantial one. By making an image which is not all there I am suggesting that real being, like Lacan’s Real-impossible, can never be realised, made wholly visible and that in this absence what must be understood as Being is located within this fundamentally unstable half life of the spectre.

Because this identity is so fleeting, so unlike the brash fixed images of true representation, what is absent can only be guessed at, speculated... This accounts for the hallucinogenic experiences of some of the visitors to the camera who describe curious visions of multi-limb hydra, spinning figures and fractured body parts. Of course these visions immediately become fictitious outside the camera when the viewer is confronted with the photographs of a corpse-like figure made by stillness over time. However this demonstrates that in the absence of the customary visual exchange the spectator fills in the picture, driven by the desire to see and to be seen, to ultimately reassure themselves of their role as a viewer, another being. This reassurance of being is the motivation behind making and looking.

If one for the reasons we make and look is to reassure ourselves of our own being The Turin Machine provides a space where the consequences of the interrelationship between being and language can be made manifest. It is the similarity of these processes of making and looking which are made literal in
the machine provoking the conclusion that whatever is true of the body made in the camera might also be said of the body who does the making. Both are partial and illusory.

The ghost in the machine I believe makes effective the problem of representing the female. It is only by making a space that attempts to be separate from the representational economies of the symbolic order do we draw attention do its rules of fixed, visibility which are the rules of patriarchal culture which exclude the Female and make her invisible. In The Turin Machine these rules of fixed proof are shown to be a fallacy as the body as Being which can be proved through the fixed negative bears no relation to the Being as body experienced in the camera. The camera has been described as womb-like and maybe it is a Female space where neither the viewer nor the witnessed can fix themselves and therefore as we cannot fix ourselves we cannot begin to fix and control, the external visible configurations of others.

This is a strength that the Female has in culture, to turn disadvantage to advantage because who wants to fix, possess or own, the terms of that type of visibility are too dear and importantly they are not the terms that I understand from my experience of being. And it is not because I am excluded and can't play within these economies that I don't, I will not disappear or become invisible. The Turin Machine is a real machine which is exhibited in real places and people come to stand and watch in it. If the audience were unmoved by the spectacle they experience in the camera I would doubt what Phelan calls “the radical contingency of the physic and the material real”. But I believe people are moved, they are surprised, perplexed, soothed, afraid - a whole range of human emotions are released by a simple optical trick. And one of the reasons they are moved I think is that they are seeing something which they recognise to be true in themselves. The ghost-woman hints at another way of seeing/being which has to be suppressed in order to see and be seen. Its a type of knowledge that can only be embodied and it is something that I also realise as I pose in the camera. I stand bleached by the light and you stand invisible in the dark and we both know that what we can see is not all there is.

March 1998
STILL IMAGE ENLARGEMENTS

Fig. 1. Torpedo Attack Trainer, Crail: Exterior and Interior 275.
Fig. 2. Torpedo Attack Trainer, Crail: Effects diagram 276.
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APPENDIX 5.

The Turin Machine Programme

The Turin Machine is a performance/installation which uses a giant pinhole camera to create life-size photographic portraits of the artist. During the exhibition the audience enters the camera to view the process of exposures and thus witnesses the act of 'taking a photograph'. The work occurs over a number of days, each day resulting in the exposure of a picture or 'shred'. These shreds are then developed and exhibited as evidence of a reality.

The origins of this work lie in recent theoretical research into the possible techniques involved in the production of the Turin Shroud. It has been suggested that the Shroud is a medieval forgery made by using early optical and alchemical technology; namely a pinhole camera and a cloth coated with light-sensitive chemicals. If this is the case then the Shroud is in fact the first photograph.

I have taken this notion and stretched it to reflect some of my own concerns. The Turin Machine is a basic camera: a box with a hole in it. Light from an illuminated exterior scene passes through the aperture into the darkened interior to form an inverted image upon an opposing screen. Thus the camera mimics the eye. On entering the camera the image is initially obscure and only appears gradually as the eye becomes acclimatized to the dark. Even then, due to the lack of light, the picture is rendered in simple shades of black and white.

In The Turin Machine I hope to confound the boundaries between the live body and the recorded (photograph). When you look into the camera the image you see is not a recorded one, rather it is a live presence in the process of becoming a record. This is possible because the conventional exposure time of a photograph – a fraction of a second – is now extended to many hours, allowing enough light to pass through the pinhole and create an image. The shudder remains open magnifying our experience of time and revealing a space to contemplate the act of looking/image making.

After a number of hours sufficient light has passed onto the screen and it is removed ready for development. Until this moment no mark has been made upon the material, in effect the image that has been seen in the camera is merely my projection, the screen has remained blank. However the cloth contains a hidden picture, one that has been made by light concentrated through the passing of time. With the application of developer it is this image that is now revealed, in negative, a witness to this process.

For me, as a piece of photography, 'the shred' is the first and the ultimate photograph. As such it is a mass of contradictions. Unique and yet potentially a multitude of multiples. Evidence of a lie in death. An identity which tells us nothing. A tabula rasa changing with the speculations of history. A relic for a faithless faith.


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